THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF ENERGY GENERATION AND SUPPLY: The Case Study of Georgia by OWEI, TIMINYO
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 
 
 
 
 
THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF ENERGY GENERATION 
AND SUPPLY 
The Case Study of Georgia 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 
 
By 
 
TIMINYO OWEI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisors: Dr Aidan While, Dr Stephen Connelly and Dr Tim Vorley 
Department of Urban Studies & Planning 
University of Sheffield 
August 25, 2017 
 
Page 2 of 311 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
“But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I will come forth as gold ~ Job 23:10 
I would like to thank all who lifted my up, cheered me on and pushed me through. I truly had 
the “dream team”.  
Thank you to my Supervisors, Dr. Aidan While and Dr. Stephen Connelly. 
To Aidan, thanks for offering me the chance to study this topic. I am grateful for your consistent 
support, guidance and advice, throughout the PhD. This research has broadened my 
understanding of the world and for that I am thankful. 
Thanks Dr Steve, for always leaving your door open. I am grateful that you had the time to talk 
with me, despite your busy schedule. I am grateful for your unique ability, to use engineering 
terms to explain social science issues. Thanks for telling me that I had the “dream team”. 
Thanks to my mother, who supported me through this PhD process. Thanks for all your love, 
prayers, lessons and advice, even when I didn’t think I needed them. My respect for you grows 
every single day and after going through this process, I respect all you have achieved. Thank 
you for maintaining this magnificent balance between professor and mother. I hope that I have 
made you proud. 
Thanks to my father who sponsored, encouraged, pushed and empathised with me. I am 
grateful for your sound advice and stories. I am constantly surprised by your ability to read a 
situation, so accurately and that you are always ready to jump on a 6-hour flight, just to make 
sure I am okay.    
Thanks to my sister, this journey was as much yours as it was mine. I am grateful for the phone 
calls, which have become an essential part of my day. I am grateful for our adventures, road 
trips, conferences, TV marathons. Together we laughed, cried and were terrified throughout 
this journey. Thank you for driving me to interviews. I hope our adventures continue. 
Thanks to my brother, who supported me by providing much needed entertainment value. I 
appreciated the chats about football, movies and games. 
Thanks to the USP staff, Keely and Co., who provided consistent support throughout the PhD. 
Thanks to Aisha, Uyi, Emma, Cissy, Aunty Lara and Rob who became my family in Sheffield. I 
will never forget the conversations, food, laughter and support. I am also grateful to friends 
and family, who despite being far away, always managed to check-in with me. Thanks to Lata, 
Dumbi, Amaka, Eloke, Ugonna, Douye and Isaac.  
Thanks to those in Georgia who provided data for my research and broadened my knowledge 
of energy in the United States. 
Page 3 of 311 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is now extensive academic and policy literature on pressures to rethink prevailing logics 
of energy governance in response to a range of, challenges and opportunities from factors 
including, carbon reduction, concerns about the security of imported oil and gas, the 
exploitation of new fuel reserves, continued opposition to nuclear energy and new agendas of 
decentralised energy generation.  
 
Decarbonisation is a key element of those debates about a new energy governance reflecting 
the influence of carbon policy in the present and the future. The new energy governance is 
affecting many countries. This thesis focuses on the changing context for energy governance, 
and especially electricity generation and supply in the USA. Electricity generation is selected as 
the primary focus in order to explore factors such as new models of decentralised energy 
generation. 
 
The thesis presents an in-depth case study of the state of Georgia, and especially the changing 
strategies for the state energy provider, Georgia Power in response to changing economic and 
environmental imperatives in electricity generation and supply and lobbying from a range of 
key stakeholders. The case study is based on 25 interviews with key stakeholders, including 
Georgia Power officials, state energy regulators (public service commissioners), federal, 
regional and state agency representatives, industrial associations, clean energy businesses, 
environmental and consumer advocates and political organisations. The case study focuses on 
a range of key issues that mark tensions in the transition from the prevailing mode of energy 
governance, notably developing federal regulations, pressure for decentralisation and new 
nuclear development. 
The thesis makes a number of key contributions to literature and debate on energy 
governance. By providing in-depth investigation of a context for energy transition/new energy 
governance that has not previously been researched, revealing new bottom up coalitions for 
decentralised supply and the importance of electricity pricing in influencing policy decisions.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Across the world, energy systems are being rethought and reimagined in response to a range 
of challenges and opportunities. There is growing literature on energy transitions in response 
to present and future climate policy, concerns about the security of imported oil and gas, the 
exploitation of new fuel reserves, continued opposition to nuclear energy and new agendas of 
decentralised energy generation (Hodson & Marvin, 2009; Morris & Pehnt, 2012; Verbong & 
Geels, 2007; While, 2008, 2011, 2014). Literature has focused on experience around the world, 
with significant research in countries like the USA.   
However, there is a need for further in-depth research on the response of key actors and 
interests to the changing context for energy generation and supply in different national and 
sub-national contexts. Indeed, although there has been significant research on changes in 
energy governance in the USA there have been relatively few detailed analyses of decision-
making.  The aim of this thesis is to take forward conceptual and empirical understanding of 
the changing context for energy governance focusing on the USA and particularly the state of 
Georgia.  The introduction that follows provides a brief background to the context for the study 
and its intended focus. 
1.1 THE NEW ENERGY GOVERNANCE: UNDERSTANDING ENERGY TRANSITIONS  
The new energy governance examined in this PhD reflects the coming together of a range of 
pressures, challenges and opportunities for existing modes of energy generation which are 
present and future climate policy, concerns about the security of imported oil and gas, the 
exploitation of new fuel reserves, continued opposition to nuclear energy and new agendas of 
decentralised energy generation (Hodson & Marvin, 2009; Morris & Pehnt, 2012; Verbong & 
Geels, 2007; While, 2008, 2011, 2014). It is a contingent matter whether these pressures and 
opportunities are present in all places and their implications for decision making. That will 
depend on the existing approach to energy generation and supply, the extent to which key 
actors are able to respond, different political, economic conditions (Hodson & Marvin, 2013; 
Unruh, 2000; While, 2011, 2014). 
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1.2 THE NEW ENERGY GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Arrangements for the generation and distribution of electricity vary across the USA, but in 
general by the early 2000s, the prevailing method was a highly-centralised model, dominated 
by monopoly provider with variation in markets (fully restructured, partially-restructured and 
traditional regulated markets), type of utilities, regulation, lock-in configurations of electricity 
networks and political and economic conditions. States are differentially impacted by the new 
energy governance because high electricity prices, outages/blackouts and new agendas of 
decentralisation, are also impacting electricity generation and supply, whereby states across 
the West, Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions are adopting low carbon energy policies, like 
renewable energy portfolios, energy efficiency standards and introducing alternative energy 
providers to state electricity generation and supply (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
2014; Rabe, 2006a).  
The PhD focuses on the State of Georgia.  The reasons for this are, having relied on coal for a 
large proportion of its electricity generation (Southern States Energy Board, 2012), since the 
early 2000s the state energy company has started having interesting discussions and debates 
about low-carbon energy restructuring. Georgia was selected because it has been under-
researched but also because it is a context where electricity prices are low and low-carbon 
would not be expected to be a significant driver of change to the dominance of coal-fired power 
stations. 
However initial research revealed evidence of pressures on the state electricity provider to 
reduce its dependence on fossil fuel and also pressures to open up the energy system to 
decentralised energy supply. The research provided an opportunity to explore what low carbon 
energy restructuring might mean in a context where political support for low carbon was 
traditionally weak and there is not an immediate crisis in the security of supply of relatively 
cheap electricity (compared with studies of areas that are typically seen at the forefront of low 
carbon energy policy such as California or Austin TX). 
The PhD presents research based primarily on 25 interviews with key stakeholders which 
include, Georgia Power officials, state energy regulators (public service commissioners), 
federal, regional and state agency representatives, industrial associations, clean energy 
businesses, environmental and consumer advocates and political organisations.  
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The research focuses particularly on lobbying for supportive energy decentralisation, 
investment in solar generation and environmental regulations debates and discussions.  
Interviews were used to explore how energy decisions are made, the context in which they are 
made and the factors driving or shaping those decisions. A key element of the research was to 
explore perceptions of the changing context for decision making, including some of the 
faultiness and tensions in organisational and activists’ positions. 
1.3 AIM, OBJECTIVES AND KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of the research is to examine the changing context for decisions about electricity 
generation and supply in the state of Georgia, USA.   
The objectives of the research are as follows: 
• To examine the impact of low carbon priorities on electricity generation and supply in 
the United States focusing on a case study of Georgia 
• To investigate the relationship between low carbon priorities and other factors that 
might influence investment in electricity generation and supply 
• To develop empirical and conceptual understanding of the restructuring of energy 
generation and supply systems in the current phase of low carbon restructuring.   
The key research questions are:  
1. What are the governance and management structures for electricity generation and 
supply in Georgia? How and why are they changing? 
2. Who are the key actors and interests in energy restructuring and what is their impact? 
3. What does the Georgia case study contribute to understanding of low carbon energy 
restructuring and the changing institutional context for energy generation and supply 
in the USA and internationally? 
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Following this introduction, chapter 2 describes how the context for making investments in 
electricity generation and supply in western countries with established infrastructure has 
changed since the 1990s. The chapter explains how important issues such as current and future 
climate policy, concerns about the security of imported oil and gas, the exploitation of new 
fuel reserves, continued opposition to nuclear energy and new agendas of decentralised 
energy generation, come together contingently, creating pressure on nations, cities and 
regions to restructure their energy systems.  
Chapter 3, describes the changing context of the United States electricity generation and 
supply system. It reviews the history of development of energy system across the country and 
the events which impacted change on the system, from the origins to the current low carbon 
era. The chapter, also presents the current era of low carbon and fracking, explores the 
ongoing factors putting pressure on the system across the country.  It argues that, the current 
energy governing system comprising of the electric utility business model and regulatory 
framework across the U.S. having remained largely unchanged for nearly 100 years is currently 
facing pressures and demands which are influencing the decisions about electricity generation 
and supply. 
Chapter 4, presents the research design and methods used to carry out the research. It explains 
the choice of case study and the methods used for collecting data which include, semi-
structured and observations. The chapter also explains the method of analysis and ethical 
framework. 
Chapter 5, introduces the case study. It discusses energy context of the case study. It describes 
the prevailing method of energy generation and supply, the key actors involved in energy 
decision making. The chapter also explores, the conversations taking place amongst citizens 
around energy generation and supply. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8, provide an analysis of the case study undertaken. Chapter 6, discusses the 
drivers for low carbon in Georgia and explores the debate and decisions about low carbon 
investment shaped by different interests in Georgia. 
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Chapter 7, examines the resistance to energy restructuring in the state of Georgia. It explores 
a range of powerful technological, organizational, industrial, societal, institutional barriers to 
renewable energy investment which raise questions about ideas of energy infrastructure lock-
in. 
Chapter 8, describes the story of Georgia’s solar growth and discusses the reasons and causes 
of conflicts between pro-and anti-solar groups and the outcomes of the solar debate. 
Chapter 9, presents the conclusion to the research. It summarises the events which take place, 
after the conclusion of the fieldwork. It discusses the findings of the research and provides 
suggestions for future research. 
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2 THE CHANGING CONTEXT FOR DECISIONS ABOUT INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
AND SUPPLY SINCE THE 1990S 
Since the late 1990s the growing importance of concerns with climate change and the rising 
costs of imported energy have led to a new set of challenges and opportunities in energy 
governance at the national and sub-national scale in many countries around the world (Hodson 
& Marvin, 2009, 2010a; Lovell, Bulkeley, & Owens, 2009; While, 2014). The aim of the following 
chapter is to develop a conceptual framework for researching, understanding and explaining 
the changing context for investment and management of electricity generation and supply. 
The argument of the chapter is presented in two sections. Section 2.1 explores the key factors 
which are leading to changes in the structure and management of electricity generation and 
supply. Section 2.2. explores how these key factors are impacting the subnational level. It 
considers the impact of climate change and energy insecurity on subnational approaches to 
energy. An important argument in this section is that prevailing modes and models of electricity 
generation are being challenged but there is uncertainty about the longer-term impact and 
importance of key elements driving change and different options for restructuring and 
reorienting energy systems.  
Whilst many of the pressures may seem to be occurring across all nations with an established 
energy infrastructure, the context for energy restructuring differs from country to country, and 
in many cases between cities and regions within nation states, depending on factors such as 
the reliance on imported fuels, the costs of alternatives and political decisions about energy 
governance and climate policy, the strategies of private companies and varying lock-in 
configurations (Hodson & Marvin, 2013; Unruh, 2000; While, 2011, 2014) of existing electricity 
networks. Key actors are making decisions on the basis of current changes but also potential 
future shifts in policy and markets. Throughout the chapter attention will analyse general 
changes in context whilst being sensitive to the ways in which contexts and circumstances differ 
across national and regional modes of energy governance and regulation and how they put 
pressure on energy generation and supply systems. 
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2.1 THE CHANGING CONTEXT FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY IN THE GLOBAL NORTH 
In most countries, frameworks for electricity generation and supply have been periodically 
restructured in the twentieth century reflecting changing priorities for government regulation, 
technological change, changing business priorities and uncertainty/changing consumer 
preferences (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Joskow, 1998; Verbong & Geels, 2007). Since the late 
1990s new pressures have emerged for existing systems of electricity generation and supply in 
terms of linked issues around climate change, concerns over energy security (and arguments 
over Peak Oil scenarios), the geopolitics of oil and shale gas, new technological innovations and 
the growing importance of cities in attempts to reduce greenhouse gases. This section will 
examine these pressures in detail.  
2.1.1 Climate change and its impact on energy generation and supply models 
The prevailing issue of climate change has, over the last two decades risen up international, 
national, regional and local agendas in the U.S. and elsewhere (Lovell et al., 2009; While, 2008). 
Concerns about climate change and its economic and social costs have ensured that: 
“the goal of radically reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and particularly carbon 
dioxide, is rising up the political agenda” (While, 2008, p.1). 
Additionally, varying carbon commitments to reduce greenhouse gas at multiple levels of 
government and in multiple sectors of the economy, especially electricity generation and 
supply, means that climate change and energy policy have increasingly converged so that 
energy policy is increasingly shaped by low carbon goals (Lovell et al., 2009). The problem of 
climate change, as described by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
“Refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that 
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods” (UNFCC, 1992, p. 7). 
Human activities including electricity production, transportation, industry, some agriculture, 
land use and forestry (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013c), have resulted in an 
accumulation of greenhouse gases over time and have continued to increase, changing the 
composition of the global atmosphere  (Watson, Albritton, Barker, et al., 2001). Greenhouse 
gases include carbon dioxide (CO
2
), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and the fluorinated 
gases (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013a).  
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Several forecasted changes due to climate change include: ‘higher maximum temperatures’, 
‘intensified droughts and floods in many regions’, ‘more intense precipitation events’ (IPCC, 
2001 p. 15) and the likely impacts of these will be increased risks to human health, life, 
infrastructure, and food (Stern, 2006; Watson, Albritton, Barker, et al., 2001). 
The International Energy Agency (2013) argues that concentrations of CO2 emissions continue 
to grow: 
“Global greenhouse-gas emissions continue to increase at a rapid pace. The 450 ppm 
threshold is drawing ever closer. Carbon-dioxide (CO2) levels in the atmosphere reached 400 
ppm in May 2013, having jumped by 2.7 ppm in 2012 - the second-highest rise since record 
keeping began” (IEA, 2013, p. 14 - 15). 
Since CO2 emissions will predominantly originate from fossil fuel combustion during the 21st 
century (Watson, Albritton, Allen, et al., 2001) attention has turned towards attempts to 
decarbonise electricity generation and supply. Concerns about real or perceived effects of 
climate change have prompted some countries to act on low carbon regulation, with laws 
proceeding internationally, regionally and locally. Since  1997, 192 countries have ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, committing states to reduce their greenhouse emissions (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997c).  
However, some developing nations including China and India were made exempt from the 
treaty. The initial plan involved an initial 5% reduction target of emissions below 1990 levels. In 
December of 2012, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was amended in Doha, Qatar, with a need for even 
more stringent emissions targets and extended to 2020 with the intention of reducing 
emissions by at least 18% below 1990 levels (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2012). International agreements such as Kyoto offer flexibility on greenhouse gas 
emissions and policies to meet targets could vary between countries: 
“The logic of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is that countries will achieve their emissions reduction 
through a framework of nationally distinctive carbon regulation via regulatory controls, 
green taxes, subsidies and grant support or the allocation of reduction targets to particular 
sectors or territories. Carbon regulation includes trading schemes where emissions 
allowance permits are distributed and exchanged so as to encourage investment in low-
carbon alternatives” (While, 2014, p. 43). 
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Additionally, beginning in 2009, the European Union (EU) created a climate and energy 
framework for 2020 (further developed in 2014 to include 2030), setting out legally binding 
targets to collectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions initially by 20% of pre-1990 levels by 
2020 and later by 40% by 2030 (European Commission, 2009a, 2016). Targets also include the 
development of renewable energy to comprise 20%  of electricity generation in 2020 and 27% 
in 2030 and to improve energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 and 27% by 2030 (European 
Commission, 2009a, 2016). The member states of the EU have some flexibility in how to meet 
their greenhouse gas emissions reduction and renewable energy binding EU targets by creating 
national renewable energy action plans which can be tailored to each members’ energy context 
(European Commission, 2009b).  
Part of this package of legal binding agreements within the European Union, has been the 
creation of the Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) to aid participating countries in meeting their 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets. The EU ETS is a cap and trade system for electric 
power stations, industrial plants and inter-EU flights (European Commission, 2013). The ETS 
saw the addition of  penalties for non-compliance with greenhouse gas emission targets, for 
example from 2005 to 2007, the penalty for not complying with rules was €40 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide and from 2008 to 2012, the penalty for non-compliance increased to €100 per 
tonne of carbon dioxide (European Commission, 2013). Since 2012, there have been more 
international negotiations towards even stricter climate change greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions commitments from the 19th, 20th, and 21st Conference of Parties in Warsaw, Lima 
and Paris respectively (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015b; United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015).  
Nevertheless, aside from international agreements there has been an ‘acceleration’ of carbon 
regulation throughout the world at national and subnational levels (While, 2014), with 
increasingly ambitious targets set requiring the restructuring of electricity generation and 
supply systems accordingly. While (2014) argues that this has led to: 
“Nation-states and sub-national governments taking the lead in setting ambitious carbon 
reduction targets, and introducing low-carbon regulations, taxes and carbon pricing 
mechanisms. Investment in low-carbon infrastructure and energy efficiency has increased 
significantly around the world” (While, 2014, p. 44). 
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The impacts of these carbon regulations in electricity generation and supply will vary across 
countries based on each country’s political and economic conditions but also the context-
specific forms of particular energy market and infrastructure configurations. For example, the 
EU-ETS, the EU 2020 and 2030 frameworks places European utilities in a different and perhaps 
stricter context, compared to U.S. utilities or those within other western nations, which may 
not have such a system in place. For European electric utilities: 
“In response to the energy and climate directives, the European power utilities ventured 
into renewable energy projects all over Europe. This triggered a wave of international 
investments by power utilities. Most often it has been domestic firms that have dominated 
the (large-scale) subsidised investment projects throughout the EU” (CIEP, 2013, p. 16). 
And also: 
“In the deployment of RES capacity in the EU, we can observe some geographic trends. Large 
scale instalments of wind power generation capacity predominantly have taken place in the 
UK, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Denmark, while solar power generation capacity 
instalments have been highly concentrated in Spain, Italy and Germany. These investments 
were mainly driven by national policy, but also by the direct and indirect subsidies provided 
through different National Renewable Energy Action Plans. Although some of the major 
power utilities had specific strategies to develop renewable champions, without the 
subsidies many of these investments would not have been viable” (CIEP, 2013, p. 16). 
The impacts of carbon regulation on electricity systems will also depend on what paths of 
decarbonisation are chosen at the national level and the extent to which they reflect other 
priorities across countries. For some western countries, it is possible other priorities for carbon 
regulation will include energy security (Lovell et al., 2009; While, 2011, 2014). While (2014) 
argues: 
“The economic imperative for national carbon regulation and decarbonisation is reinforced 
by the changing geopolitics of energy, notably the rising economic and political costs of 
imported energy and oil and predictions of declining global oil reserves. Issues of ‘energy 
security’ and climate policy are overlapping and converging in carbon regulation” (While, 
2014, p. 45). 
This will influence the investment decisions made in electricity generation and supply. For 
example, Germany has national targets of greenhouse gas reduction of 40% by 2020 and a 
reduction of 80 – 95% by 2050 (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2015). The 
country’s low carbon electricity plan primarily involves rapid renewable energy deployment 
and increased energy efficiency (Morris & Pehnt, 2012), however, a core part of differentiation 
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is the decision to phase out nuclear energy by 2022 (Morris & Pehnt, 2012). A crucial decision 
based on significant public perception of nuclear power: 
“The German public sees a significant difference between nuclear and renewables, 
however… the Energiewende movement started in the 1970s as a popular protest against 
nuclear power” (Energiewende, 2012, p. 7). 
But also:  
“If we can gradually shift to a renewable energy supply, then it seems irresponsible to have 
nuclear plants today – and unethical to continue passing on these risks to future 
generations” (Energiewende, 2012, p. 7). 
The UK in comparison considers a more diverse mix of options such as new nuclear plants, 
retrofitting fossil fuels plants with carbon capture and storage and continued growth in 
renewable energy as part of its energy transition: 
“The Government is happy for fossil fuels with CCS, nuclear or renewables to make up as 
much as possible of the 40–70 GW we think we may need. The Government would like to 
see the three low carbon technologies competing on cost in the 2020s to win their share of 
the market” (HM Government, 2011, p. 73) 
These examples highlight various approaches to low carbon development across countries. One 
reason for these differences in approach to low carbon regulation are the different energy 
governing structures that exist. For example, in many western nations the electricity regime 
has gradually changed, most responsibilities have shifted to independent regulators and 
government influence has reduced or declined in energy generation and supply (Monstadt, 
2007). For unbundled, liberalised and privatised integrated energy markets, there may exist 
tensions between market and government low carbon policy influencing the outcome of 
carbon regulation. 
Nevertheless, there are some important ongoing uncertainties about future regulations or 
events which influence low carbon restructuring in electricity generation and supply. For 
example, many European renewable energy development projects have relied on national 
government support i.e. subsidies (Groot, 2013), some of which have been reduced or 
removed, such as a cut to including Spain’s feed-in tariff in 2013 due to growing debt (Morales, 
2013), which may have added to renewable energy investor uncertainty about the country 
meeting its EU binding targets.  
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Another example is in the United Kingdom, where in 2015 the government cancelled the £1 
billion carbon capture and storage program after four years of ongoing planning and few 
projects (Carrington, 2015), leading to many investors/companies to stop projects (Energy and 
Climate Change Committee, 2016). In addition, in 2015 the UK government reduced subsidies 
in its solar Feed-In Tariff and Renewable Obligation programs (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2015), adding to the possibility of missing the EU binding targets. Ultimately, 
according to While (2014): 
“The uncertain direction of future regulation and energy prices also make it difficult for 
political leaders to create longer-term investment vehicles around low-carbon pathways” 
(While, 2014, p. 53). 
In summary, whilst climate change and subsequent international binding commitments to 
carbon regulation are putting pressure on some electricity generation and supply systems to 
restructure, there are other competing ‘self-interest’ or ‘self-preservation’ concerns (While, 
2014), which will be reflected in the decisions taken to restructure electricity generation and 
supply. These other national political and economic incentives or priorities include energy 
security, future costs of fossil fuel (While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2010) and potential gains from a low 
carbon economy. However, despite these broader concerns, decisions are being taken 
constantly due to current shifts in policy or markets as was the case in the European examples 
provided above but also potential future shifts in policy and markets. 
2.1.2 A new era of energy (in)security and concerns over Peak Oil  
There are arguments that since the early 2000s there has been a renewed concern with energy 
security in Western countries, brought about by concerns over the changing geopolitics of 
energy, uncertainty over global oil reserves (Peak Oil) and the high costs of imported fuels, all 
of which have economic and political impacts (While, 2014). Defined by the International 
Energy Agency as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” 
(International Energy Agency, 2014a), issues of energy security have varied over time. In 
response to the 1973 oil crisis, many countries initiated actions to reduce dependence on 
imported oil. In the USA for example, proposals by President Richard Nixon were geared 
towards energy independence such as an increasing drilling on federal lands, expediting 
permits and plants for nuclear and the encouragement of coal and renewable development 
(Grossman, 2013).  
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Another example is Denmark, which set a long term target to be independent of coal, oil and 
gas by the year 2050 whilst retaining economic competitiveness (The Danish Government, 
2011). However, the immediate target was to reduce the dependence on imported energy. 
According to Sovacool (2013): 
“After the international oil crisis of 1973, it took Denmark only five years to switch from 
being 95% dependent on oil for electricity generation to 5 percent” (Sovacool 2013: p. 9). 
The approach to gaining a high degree of energy independence was based on investing in fossil 
fuel resources but also extensive low carbon restructuring of electricity generation and supply 
(International Renewable Energy Agency, 2013; Sovacool, 2013) and imposing a series of high 
taxes on oil and petroleum products including diesel and petrol, natural gas, coal, carbon 
dioxide and sulphur (Sovacool, 2013), using the revenue to fund renewable energy and energy 
efficiency programs with wind energy as the preferred choice. 
However, in most countries the experiments of the early 1970s were abandoned following the 
end of the oil crisis. The current era combines concerns about security of oil supply due to 
political instability in many oil producing countries and longer-term concerns about Peak Oil. 
Energy security concerns tend to vary across countries and are not solely concentrated on fossil 
fuels. In some countries energy security can relate to an energy supply gap that could occur 
with the phasing out of carbon-intensive energy resources and simultaneously investing in low 
carbon energy supplies. Additionally, there may also be a subnational dimension to energy 
security. In some cities, towns and regions, energy security may relate to the reorganising of 
energy infrastructure and resources in order to secure city reproduction (Hodson & Marvin, 
2009) due to concerns about resource constraints and climate change. However, energy 
security and climate change are potentially competing agendas in some countries: 
“But for industrial societies with a high dependence on fossil fuels, climate change and the 
security of energy supplies present rather different sorts of challenges” (Bridge, 2010, p. 
523). 
Therefore, whilst energy security and climate change may overlap in carbon regulation (While, 
2014), the added energy security concerns across countries may result in different 
restructuring pathways reflecting different priorities. As energy security and the theory of peak 
oil are related subjects, these issues will be examined together.  
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a. Energy security and Peak Oil concerns  
The uncertainty about fossil fuel resources in part centres on peak oil theory. In summary, the 
peak oil theory originated from M. King Hubbert, who in 1956 predicted that the production 
of oil in the U.S. would peak in 1970 or 1971 (Hubbert, 1971). The theory has been expanded 
to include global oil production in subsequent years to be defined as: 
“When all the cheapest oil has been extracted and costs rise, with serious ramifications for 
our oil-dependent industrialised societies built upon low energy costs” (Chapman, 2013, p. 
1) 
Or 
“Peak oil refers to an impending, permanent decline in the production of so-called 
‘conventional’ oil as geophysical limits on its availability begin to bite” (Bridge, 2010, p.1). 
The theory is built on the assumption that the permanent declining production of conventional 
oil would not be fixed by new technological solutions related to oil discovery and extraction. 
Nevertheless, peak oil remains contentious (Bridge, 2010; Chapman, 2014; Fanchi & Fanchi, 
2010; Helm, 2011; Maughan, 2015) due to differing opinions on when the peak will be reached 
in terms of time (Chapman, 2014) and the impact (or lack of) of technological shifts (Bridge, 
2010; Helm, 2011; Maughan, 2015). This is summarised by Bridge (2010): 
“Although there is agreement that conventional oil production will peak at some point in 
the future, there are substantial differences of opinion over (a) the timing of the peak; (b) 
the significance of a peak in conventional oil for the availability of liquid fuels; and (c) the 
role of supply-side restrictions in driving peak production, given the possibilities for demand 
destruction via technological shifts (e.g. electric vehicles) and/or political action around 
climate change” (Bridge, 2010, p. 525). 
Chapman (2013) categorises predictions about peak oil debates as early peak advocates and 
late peak advocates. Early peak advocates are mainly proponents of peak oil and have 
predicted peak production dates ranging from 2005 to 2017. Conversely, late peak advocates 
are mainly sceptics and opponents of the theory, who have predicted dates ranging from 2017 
to no visible peak. Due to considerable variation in the models of geologists, industry experts, 
etc. the theory of peak oil has not been given closure and has led to considerable uncertainty 
about energy security.  
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Critics of peak oil often suggest that technological solutions/shifts have the ability to change 
issues of extraction, reserves and eventually price. For example, in completely dismissing the 
concept of peak oil, Maugeri (2012) adds that whilst some oil locations such as the North Sea 
are facing irreversible decline, others are growing and technology will allow for more growth: 
“In the aggregate, conventional oil production is also growing throughout the world, 
although some areas (the North Sea, face an apparently irreversible decline of the 
production capacity. In most traditional producing countries, old oilfields go through a 
production revival thanks to better techniques and knowledge, or advanced exploration and 
production technologies, so far used only in the U.S. and in the North Sea. Huge parts of the 
world are still relatively unexplored for conventional oil (for example, the Arctic Sea or most 
of sub-Saharan Africa)” (Maugeri, 2012, p. 66) 
Additionally, he adds: 
“Oil is not in short supply. From a purely physical point of view, there are huge volumes of 
conventional and unconventional oils still to be developed, with no “peak-oil” in sight. The 
full deployment of the world’s oil potential depends only on price, technology, and political 
factors” (Maugeri, 2012, p. 65) 
And finally: 
“In other words, we are living in a transformational age where energy efficiency legislation, 
climate change policies, technological advance, and the dissemination of energy 
alternatives will reduce the impact of oil in global economies” (Maugeri, 2012, p. 35). 
Helm (2011) highlights the uncertainty in making predictions about the future of oil resource: 
“There are, indeed, very good reasons for doubting the claims of the peak-oilers. The 
reserves may be much greater than currently assumed (especially in the Arctic), technology 
is likely to enhance both recovery rates and reduce the costs of currently marginal supplies, 
transport is increasingly likely to be electrified, and with the coming of unconventional gas, 
gas supplies look like joining coal in their abundance. The danger is now that we have far 
too much oil, gas, and coal, not too little, for the climate to tolerate. Any energy or climate 
change policy that rests on a bet on the future price of oil is inherently risky. Rather than 
assuming that the future and its technologies are known, policy should start from the 
assumption of uncertainty, and look for robust corrections of market failures (and to limit 
government failures)” (p. 89). 
In contrast, the International Energy Agency’s, World Energy Outlook (2013) argues for caution 
when predicting that the discovery of new unconventional oil and gas resources strengthen 
the arguments against peak oil:  
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“It has become fashionable to state that the shale gas and LTO revolutions in the United 
States have made the peak oil theory obsolete. Our point of view is that the basic arguments 
have not changed significantly (IEA, 2013, p. 422) 
Overall, the significant variation in dates, prices, supply or demand, etc. reveals, how uncertain 
energy futures can be. Despite these developments and uncertainties, Bridge (2010) explains 
that for countries with a high dependency on fossil fuels, the threat of oil resource depletion 
may result in pressure for low carbon restructuring or conversely, expand fossil fuel 
development: 
“Discourses of imminence and dependency associated with peak oil can, when conjoined, 
produce a compelling imperative for action. As part of a more general argument about 
increasing energy insecurity, for example, peak oil and the prospect of depletion can 
legitimate a wide range of projects, from heavy investment in fuel efficiency and renewables 
to opening up new areas for fossil fuel development” (p. 527) 
The path of restructuring chosen may vary across countries and will depend on the economic 
and political contexts across countries.  
b. Energy security and geopolitics of supply 
There are arguments that since the industrial revolution Twentieth Century capitalist 
economies have been based on the supply of relatively cheap fossil fuels, especially oil and 
petroleum for North America and Europe in the twentieth century (While, 2014; Yergin, 2006). 
The energy crisis of the 1970s called into question the security of oil and petroleum from the 
Middle East, a recurring issue due to wars, conflicts and the exercise of power by oil producers. 
The 1990 Persian Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War and the 2005 Russia-Ukraine natural gas dispute 
(Yergin, 2006) have revived concerns about oil and gas dependence and the security of the 
supply from areas with continuing and growing tensions in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region in both economic and political terms (Mitchell, Beck, & Grubb, 1996). For oil, 
the increased overreliance on a small number of oil producers in continuously unstable zones 
combined with the projected growth in energy demand have prompted concerns over energy 
security (International Energy Agency, 2014b). 
It might be the case that new fossil fuel reservoirs are found but despite the knowledge of 
existing and potential reservoirs of fossil fuels, exploration conditions are difficult, especially in  
deep water and artic sites (Fanchi & Fanchi, 2010).  
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It might also be that fossil fuel reserves are found but are in tense or inhospitable regions such 
as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. For electricity generation and supply, the 
concentration of natural gas reserves are concentrated amongst few producers since the early 
2000s, has revived security of supply concerns in countries with high import dependency and 
given the economic and political impacts due to natural gas becoming the dominant fuel in 
many countries across Europe.  
There remains pressure to ensure security of supply: 
“To some, this concentration of fixed oil (and gas) supplies in a few hands, faced with rising 
demand, spells disaster. Oil dependency on Middle East (and in Europe, gas dependency on 
Russia) is equated with threats to national security. Some advocate that this dependency 
should drive energy policy towards greater energy self-efficiency, diversifying sources of 
supply and reducing dependency on fossil fuels” (Helm, 2005, p.5). 
Also: 
“While peak oil advocates have concentrated on conventional oil, there has in the 
background been a quiet but profound revolution going on in gas. The importance of gas 
has grown slowly. Up to 1990 it was regarded as a premium fuel, to be conserved for use 
primarily in the industrial sector, notably in petrochemicals. In Europe, it had been 
effectively illegal to burn gas in power stations. But with the coming of North Sea gas and 
the development of Russian natural gas supplies, gas stepped up to become the fuel of 
choice for new power stations.” (Helm, 2011, p. 76). 
More so, given the importance of natural gas in electricity generation and supply, Helm (2005), 
highlights that energy security policies across Europe and in the UK has been focused on 
natural gas: 
“All of these highlighted concerns about import dependency and tacking climate change, 
with the key difference being the US focus on oil and the EU/UK focus on gas” (p. 6). 
These energy security concerns associated with dependence on imported natural gas and 
other political concerns have created pressures and demands for a restructuring of the 
electricity generation and supply system in countries such as Poland (Dittrick, 2011). In some 
cases, there may be pressure to develop a country’s own fossil fuel resources in response or 
to diversify the resources or both. Outcomes will depend on the context of the country. For 
example, in the 2014 to 2015 period, Poland generated between 84% and 85% of its electricity 
from coal (Kureth, 2015). Additionally, the country has come to rely on Russia for nearly 60% 
of its natural gas and close to 90% for oil.  
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Combined with the European Union’s 2020 targets to reduce its carbon emissions (European 
Commission, 2009a), and increasingly expensive coal  (Kureth, 2015), this leaves Poland highly 
dependent on imported energy resources and exposed to the economic and/or political costs 
associated with supply contracts with Russia. An issue which the country sees as problematic 
for its energy security, putting Poland under pressure to diversify its electricity generation and 
supply. In a context of climate change targets, Poland has identified the development of 
unconventional gas, specifically shale gas, as a way to solve this problem (Natural Gas Europe, 
2010). In the period of 2010 and 2011, the U.S. energy information administration estimated 
that Poland had up to 5.3 trillion cubic metres (Dittrick, 2011). 
Another aspect of energy security is that energy insecurity is also about price as much as 
availability. There are some countries experiencing rising electric utility bills, which could 
reflect economic costs of imported energy: 
“There has been increased recognition of fossil-fuel import dependency among developed 
countries (and, indeed, some developing ones, too, such as India and China). For the USA, 
dependency on Saudi Oil will increase, and it has sought alternative supplies from Russia, 
Libya, and the opening up of its own Arctic reserves. Europe has similar oil dependency 
worries, and now over gas, too. In all of these areas, where politics had been on the 
backburner for the surplus years, it has now returned to centre stage” (Helm, 2005, p. 2). 
For example, Lovell, Bulkeley & Owens (2009), describe that between 2003 and 2004, the UK 
has had concerns surrounding the security of natural gas supplies, especially when fossil fuel 
prices rose in 2004: 
“Despite the new position of climate change as a central issue on the energy agenda, the 
debate about the nature of the UK’s energy policy remained wide open. In particular, 
concerns about energy security and the resulting impact on fuel prices continued to be 
voiced. Fossil fuel prices rose sharply in 2004 and the reliability of gas exports from Russia 
to Europe came under scrutiny. The Ukrainian gas pipeline conflict early in 2006 
represented a policy ‘focusing event’, strengthening concerns about the UK’s security of 
supply. Further, the UK’s North Sea oil and gas reserves appeared to have peaked: the UK 
was a net importer of gas for the first time in 2004” (Lovell et al, 2009, p. 96) 
The specific breakdown of utility costs is often complicated, but the literature suggests that a 
key factor to explain rising prices for energy is the unpredictable global energy market. A 
reason for this is, since 2004, the UK became a net importer natural gas, with gas occupying 
between 35-50% of the electricity mix in 2011 (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2011).  
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By 2014, natural gas provided 30% of UK electricity (Électricité de France, 2016). EDF and 
National Grid also project that by 2020 the UK could be importing up to 66% of its natural gas 
(Électricité de France, 2016), further subjecting prices to global markets and or political 
uncertainty. In the UK, new nuclear energy development has emerged as a means of addressing 
both energy security issues and climate change (Lovell et al., 2009) but in 2013, the UK 
Government also stated its intention of fracking for shale (Cameron, 2013). 
The context for energy security has been altered in some contexts by the opportunity for 
fracking for shale gas. Some countries may be under pressure to frack in an effort to ease energy 
costs. Others, which are net importers of energy, may be under pressure to frack to increase 
their own supplies of natural gas. For example, in 2013, the UK government stated its 
motivation with regards to the development of shale gas in the UK, believing fracking and shale 
gas to have the potential to reduce energy bills, create jobs, and boost local economies 
(Cameron, 2013). In 2016, the government released an official guide on fracking stating: 
“The government believes that shale gas has the potential to provide the UK with greater 
energy security, growth and jobs. We are encouraging safe and environmentally sound 
exploration to determine this potential.” (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy, 2016) 
This response highlights how technological developments in unconventional resources have 
influenced the investment choices being made about low carbon restructuring. Especially in 
the case of fracking and shale gas but also in carbon capture and storage. It shows that energy 
contexts are also shaped by technology which is in part driven by energy security concerns e.g. 
increased research, investment, and changing economics. 
2.1.3 The uncertain landscape of technological futures 
The previous section introduced the issue of unconventional fuels (specifically shale gas) and 
suggested how it might be influencing investment choices. However, there are many 
uncertainties in relation to the future of technologies such as future policies, binding targets, 
environmental constraints, replication, public and political support, etc. all of which affect the 
uptake of technology. What is certain, however, is the ability for technology development to 
influence or reframe issues of energy security, depletion, prices and climate change very 
quickly, with outcomes varying between countries.  
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The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook (2012) shows an increasing demand 
for natural gas to 2035 – it is the only fossil fuel, which has this prediction. Natural gas demand 
is predicted to grow at an estimated rate of 1.6% per year until 2035, with some variation 
between OECD and non-OECD countries (International Energy Agency, 2012).  
The increased demand in natural gas is particularly significant in the power sector with a 
projection for a rise in global electricity demand might mean growth in the consumption of 
unconventional fuels such as tight gas, coalbed methane, shale gas and tight oil. Shale gas has 
shown to be the most popular, even with questions being raised about the environmental 
impacts of hydraulic fracturing (risk of earthquakes and water contamination). The availability 
of cheap and seemingly abundant gas supplies introduces a new challenge for decision makers, 
raising concerns over the role natural gas plays in the new fuel mix, including the potential for 
natural gas to be a bridge fuel (Helm, 2012) to a low carbon economy given its advantages over 
coal. Figure 2.1 shows the estimated unconventional gas resources across several countries. 
 
Figure 2-1: Estimates of shale gas and oil across developed and emerging economies 
Source: Accenture 2015 International Development of Unconventional Resources: If, where and how fast? 
 
In recent years, the United States has seen remarkable growth in shale gas, recently making it 
the world's largest producer of oil and gas (Dudley, 2015; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2016c).  
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In terms of electricity the emergence of shale gas especially in the United States is seen in the 
changing the dynamics of energy provision in terms of supply (Haddadian & Shahidehpour, 
2015; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012a), by making gas-fired electricity 
generation significantly cheaper to run than coal-fired plants in many states, allowing for the 
closure or retrofitting of coal-fired plants in others (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2012a, 2014b) and to an extent reducing carbon emissions (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2016a). Nevertheless, there remains uncertainty over whether shale gas 
development can be replicated in other parts of the world (Bassi et al., 2013; Helm, 2011; 
Natural Gas Europe, 2010; Stevens, 2010).  
There also remains uncertainty over the technological breakthroughs involved in shale gas, 
addresses, the security of supply in countries outside the United States. For example, in Poland, 
Helm (2011) writes about the role technological breakthroughs (hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling) have played and could still play in developing unconventional fossil fuels 
thereby delaying peak oil. Helm, describes Poland as one of the European countries that has 
shown significant potential for shale gas, predicting: 
“Poland’s current electricity industry is over 95% dependent on coal, and it is very exposed 
to climate change policy measures. The obvious strategy would be to switch to natural gas, 
but that requires reliance on Russia in a context within which the Nord Stream pipeline has 
been deliberately built outside its borders, between Russia and Germany. Given Poland’s 
terrible historical experiences with its neighbours, energy independence has a much greater 
resonance than for most other EU members. Its potentially very large shale gas deposits 
therefore represent an alternative, which has attracted international oil and gas companies, 
and which is likely to be developed over the coming decade. Other European countries are 
likely to follow at a somewhat slower pace” (Helm, 2011, p.77). 
This shale gas development was certainly probable, because in the period of 2010 and 2011, 
the U.S. energy information administration estimated that Poland had up to 5.3 trillion cubic 
metres of shale gas (Dittrick, 2011). This has been followed by a rush of licenses to drill 
exploratory shale gas wells in Poland. Five oil and gas companies (ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, 
ENI, Total) as well as ConocoPhillips and Marathon Oil, were licensed to drill exploratory shale 
gas wells in Poland. However, in 2012, the Polish government’s downgraded estimates of its 
shale reserves to a range of billions of cubic meters (Kahn & Onoszko, 2012). 
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In 2012, ExxonMobil was the first to leave its shale gas projects, followed by Marathon Oil 
(2013), Eni (2014), Chevron (2015) and on the 5th of June, 2015, ConocoPhillips was the last 
international exploration and production company to cease shale gas exploration in Poland 
(Barteczko, 2015). Citing a combination of difficult geology, the necessity of regulatory 
reforms, local resistance and the downgrade of shale gas estimates, the global oil firms have 
abandoned the projects (Koper, 2015) and the status of shale gas in Poland is uncertain. In a 
similar vein, the UK government’s choice to pursue shale gas, has been met with mixed 
responses. Whilst, there is agreement about the role of natural gas in a diversified energy mix, 
there is uncertainty whether fracking will reduce energy prices or significantly reduce energy 
imports in the long term (Bassi et al., 2013; Stevens, 2013): 
“As long as the UK remains a substantial net importer of gas, it is reasonable to assume that 
its wholesale gas prices will largely depend on prices charged by foreign suppliers. Although 
domestic shale gas production could benefit the economy by generating jobs and tax 
revenues while displacing imports, it is unlikely that gas consumers would see much, if any, 
benefit in terms of reduced gas and electricity bills. Of course, if proven reserves turn out 
to be significantly larger than current official estimates, or if UK shale gas production was 
part of a major increase in unconventional gas production around the world, there could be 
a significant effect, at least in moderating the increase in wholesale gas prices that would 
otherwise have taken place” (Grantham Research Institute, 2013, p. 18 -19). 
 
2.2 THE SUB-NATIONAL DIMENSION 
So far, much of the discussion in the chapter has focused on issues requiring responses at the 
national scale. This section considers the impact of climate change and energy insecurity on 
sub-national approaches to energy. Some authors have argued that this is a new era of urban 
ecological securitisation in which the safeguarding of resource flows at the national level has 
been rescaled to the urban level (Hodson & Marvin, 2009, 2010a). Urban ecological security in 
an era of climate change and resource constraints describes the recognition that urban 
economic and social sustainability is linked to ensuring the supply of natural resources, low-
carbon energy and climate proofing. It has resulted in cities starting to pursue or promote self-
reliant strategies which would protect, continue or enhance their resources and economic 
growth (Hodson & Marvin, 2009, 2010a). Other authors have made a similar point with respect 
to energy and economic competitiveness, for example Troy (2012).  
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Hodson and Marvin explore how world cities such as San Francisco, London and New York are 
seeking to (re)gain control over energy infrastructure to ensure security of supply and prepare 
for future carbon legislation (Hodson & Marvin, 2010b): 
“The combination of reusing energy, energy efficiencies, behavioural change and new 
sources of energy production are being bundled together in relation to World cities under 
the auspices of building energy independence and security. This is being done as a 
preparatory response to resource availability and price volatility, to the challenges of the 
peaking of oil and fossil fuels and also to the vulnerabilities of energy systems to 
weaknesses” (Hodson and Marvin, 2010, p. 98). 
The urban implications of low carbon restructuring have been explored in a range of literature 
(Hodson & Marvin, 2010a; Jonas, Gibbs, & While, 2011; While, 2008, 2011, 2014; While et al., 
2010). The premise is that regulation will increase for cities that lag behind in low-carbon 
energy infrastructure (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015b; United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). The pressure potentially comes from a new 
regulatory era of carbon control (While, 2008), where international and national climate 
change agreements are passed down to governments, communities and organisations at the 
subnational level: 
“Once the global emissions reduction requirement is agreed, it is then translated into a 
series of territorially based targets organised at the scale of the nation-state” (While 2008, 
p. ix).  
This includes, financial penalties for failing to meet the quotas or the existence of fiscal gains 
by meeting carbon quotas (Jonas et al., 2011; While et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, there are complications when attempting urban low carbon restructuring such 
as making decisions about the appropriate investments, inherited infrastructure lock-in (While, 
2011, 2014), differing governing capacities involving legal authority, funds/resources, 
governing powers (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006), the specific economic, political contexts and other 
urban development priorities: 
“Cities will face differential challenges and opportunities in restructuring for a low carbon 
future, reflecting factors such as their position within inherited infrastructure networks, 
economic and political circumstances and the degree of political support for changes that 
might have a relatively long-term payback” (While, 2011, p. 96). 
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Given, these complications, low carbon restructuring will vary across cities as they respond to 
pressures of carbon control: 
“The mix of policy responses will vary between cities, but the processes and outcomes of 
low carbon restructuring will ultimately be determined by political choices about different 
pathways taken within the context of wider international and national carbon control 
regimes, and forged through compromise and negotiation between different interests at 
the urban scale” (While, 2010, p. 96). 
As this quote suggests, a key issue will be the relationship between cities and ‘extra-local’ 
energy infrastructures in relation to the price of energy in the present and the future. Some 
cities will need to take control of energy infrastructure if the prevailing energy generation and 
supply network is not felt to deliver effectively for the city.  However, often the urban approach 
is about selective energy restructuring (energy efficiency, decentralised energy generation or 
district heating networks) whilst retaining the benefits of prevailing energy generation and 
supply networks. At any spatial scale, a radical transformation of the prevailing energy 
generation and supply network will be costly in the short to medium term even if there are 
longer term cost savings and benefits for economic competitiveness.  Cities will be sensitive to 
the price of energy for economic and social reasons. 
This chapter has set out some of the drivers for change, however the response to these 
changes will not be easy and will have complications, not only due to the costs associated with 
energy restructuring and lock-ins from existing investments but also due to the fact that the 
effects of some of the changes are often uncertain, for example, with low-carbon there is 
considerable uncertainty about future legislation. The costs in undertaking low carbon energy 
restructuring may involve the capital costs of new generation capacity, retrofitting 
infrastructure, transmission and distribution upgrades, potential tax and regulation costs 
(While et al., 2010), stranded costs of existing capacity (Hawkey, Webb, & Winskel, 2013) and 
contracts, permits (M. A. Brown & Sovacool, 2011). 
Additionally, electricity generation and supply infrastructure have long life spans, which after 
initial investment, may lock-in energy systems for a length of time and reduce the ability for 
networks to adapt to a changing environment (Unruh, 2000). Therefore, technological lock-in 
refers to a particular technology or product that is dominant, not because it is inherently 
superior because of its performance and cost, but that its continued use is supported by 
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powerful economic, cultural and political factors, which reinforce each other to make the 
system more complex while restricting alternative technologies (Arthur, 1989; Foxon, 2013; 
Unruh, 2000). Throughout the twentieth century, energy providers, predominantly large 
companies, have invested in centralised power generation systems (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000) and over time built increasingly large energy systems. In the U.S. for 
example, utilities invested significantly in nuclear in the 1970s and coal in the 1980s (Joskow, 
2001b; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000), while the UK investment in the 1990s, 
focused on combined cycle gas turbines (Simmonds, 2002).  
Therefore, low carbon restructuring may encounter various forms of lock-in, reinforcing these 
existing investments including technological, organizational, industrial, societal, institutional 
and cultural lock-ins (Unruh, 2000, 2002). Finally, decisions about undertaking electricity 
generation and supply restructuring, are shaped by privatisation and liberalisation in some 
countries, which might ease low carbon restructuring, nevertheless, decisions about 
restructuring will usually reflect multiple decisions being taken by different interests at a range 
of spatial scales. In that context, the scene is set for a new energy politics to unfold. This thesis 
is interested in the United States and therefore, Chapter 3, will examine what the new energy 
politics might mean in the U.S. context. 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: FACTORS INFLUENCING LOW CARBON INVESTMENT DECISIONS  
This chapter has set out potential challenges to prevailing modes of energy generation and 
supply. The rest of the chapter focuses on the factors which shape those decisions and 
highlights how these complicated explanatory factors may play out in different contexts. For 
example, decisions made by national government may be at odds with municipal authorities’ 
due to the local economy; places with low fossil fuel dependence, for example, may perceive 
the national government as not being aggressive enough on shifts towards low carbon 
restructuring, while others with economies based on fossil fuels might consider the effects of 
carbon taxes to be unfavourable for their local businesses. Others, may perceive opportunities 
from low carbon restructuring for growth (Jonas et al., 2011; While, 2011). All of which are 
likely to shape the direction and decisions on low carbon restructuring.  
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The factors that might shape low carbon decision-making, and will be explored in this section, 
include: 
• Ownership and control of existing infrastructure 
• Vested interests 
• Lock-ins (Technological, Organizational, Industrial, Societal, Institutional, Cultural) 
• Politics and Ideology 
• Capacity to act (Financial, Political support, Knowledge & Governing authority) 
 
a. Ownership and control of existing infrastructure 
In some countries decisions about how to proceed on energy investments are shaped by 
privatisation and liberalisation. During the twentieth century electricity generation and supply 
in many western nations tended to be through public control and integrated generation and 
supply at the regional scale. However, in most western nations, the electricity regime has 
gradually changed (Monstadt, 2007). In the 1980s to 90s the model was challenged by 
privatisation and liberalisation, which involved the sale of assets to private entrants and 
reforming the national governing structure to create competition in retail and wholesale 
markets (Pollitt, 2012), the creation of independent regulatory bodies and regulated access to 
monopoly networks i.e. transmission and distribution (Pollitt, 2012). For unbundled, liberalised 
and privatised integrated energy market, there may exist tensions between market and 
government on low carbon policy. Additionally, this shift in the electricity regime might present 
challenges in low carbon restructuring in some contexts that may complicate energy 
governance in cities and regions. As While (2014) argues:  
“The privatisation and unbundling of utility infrastructure has complicated investment 
decisions, and made it more difficult for cities to co-ordinate and cross-subsidise across 
different aspects of public policy” (While, 2014, p. 53). 
Monstadt’s (2007) study on urban governance and the transition of energy systems in Berlin, 
Germany, showed that the privatisation of national energy infrastructure has affected regional 
energy and climate policies. This resulted in the following number of issues; 
• The management and decision makers for the utilities were located outside the area of 
operation, meaning that corporate decision making was separated from local 
regulatory processes. Furthermore, local and regional control over infrastructure or 
investments reduced, leaving energy provision to the private sector. 
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• Environmental political initiatives were not always successful because they didn’t align 
with commercial interests of the utilities. This meant that to an extent, these policies 
were dependent on concessions from the utilities. 
• The nature of supra-regional utilities meant that national and European decision 
makers overrode the influence of the Berlin senate on energy regulation. 
In other national or urban contexts, liberalised energy markets might open up opportunities 
for low carbon restructuring by allowing new entrants into the electricity generation and 
supply markets. For example, in Germany: 
“While competition has been slow to evolve, it has been increasing over the past few years. 
In 2012, more than 20% of all end-user customers had a contract with a competitive retail 
supplier. Moreover, as more renewables have come on the system, the ownership profile 
of generation has been shifting. While the big four power companies own most 
conventional generation (hard coal, lignite, nuclear, and natural gas), they own only about 
5% of renewable resources. Private citizens, including farmers own 46% of renewable 
generation in Germany, followed by project developers, industry, and banks” (Regulatory 
Assistance Project, 2015, p. 5). 
Therefore, ownership of energy infrastructure is a crucial factor influencing investment 
decisions. It will vary across and within countries, as a barrier, opportunity or complication for 
low carbon restructuring. As the examples above showed, ownership of energy infrastructure 
may determine which groups will have the opportunities for investment in low carbon. 
b. Vested Interests 
The academic literature argues that any decisions made around energy restructuring are likely 
to involve struggles among different interests, because the choices made will impact 
individuals, businesses and Industries (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; While et al., 2010). The interests 
between national authorities and city authorities in energy restructuring may differ 
substantially. For example, stricter carbon regulation will affect carbon intensive industries 
while any carbon taxes or prices that come as part of that legislation might disproportionately 
affect small or medium sized businesses. These means of low carbon energy intervention may 
put some local authorities at odds with national climate change targets. The explanation being 
that low carbon transitions require upfront investments which put small and medium at a 
disadvantage economically in comparison with large factories i.e. distributional politics of 
consequences and benefits (Meadowcroft, 2011; While et al., 2010). 
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Additionally, negotiating issues between all the necessary stakeholders is political by nature.  
There will be a variation in the power of actors in terms of resources and influence involved in 
the decision-making process. Actors involved range from large corporations in the financial and 
energy sectors, small and medium enterprises, non-profit organisations, municipal authorities, 
politicians, etc. (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013) who may all have different motivations, depending 
on if they potentially gain or lose from low carbon restructuring (Lockwood, 2015; Newell, 
2015). 
In electricity generation and supply (currently comprising of energy providers, energy users 
and energy policy makers) investment decisions made in energy provision are generally a result 
of what energy policy makers set as incentives, regulations and the risks of the investment 
itself. The risks of the investment can be eased or heightened depending on the regulation or 
incentive given (Lockwood, 2015). These investment decisions then create vested interests 
that form or influence the actions of incumbents (mostly large energy companies) in the 
market. In order to influence policy, these incumbents may lobby governing officials or issue 
electricity reliability threats (Lockwood, 2015).  
Additionally, energy intensive users (e.g. manufacturing) may seek assurances on low cost 
energy supplies, households may be concerned about electricity bills and energy decision 
makers will also need to maintain a relationship between all consumers i.e. residents, 
businesses, etc. Therefore, there are multiple stakes in energy restructuring and low carbon 
decisions will be shaped by all these interests. 
c. Lock-in (Technological, Organizational, Industrial, Societal, Institutional, Cultural) 
Unruh (2000) describes lock-in through the concept of a Techno-Institutional Complex. Unruh 
(2000) explains that large-scale technological systems made up of interconnected physical, 
social and informational components in a network or infrastructure are established “through 
a co-evolutionary process among technological infrastructures, organizations, society and 
governing institutions, forming a “Techno-Institutional Complex” (Unruh, 2002, p. 317). In this 
research, the large-scale technological system is the electricity generation and distribution 
network.  
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Unruh (2000), explains, that in the early stages of development and commercialisation, 
technologies may show increasing returns to scale, which help them expand rapidly, in 
comparison with competitors. Increasing returns to scale mechanisms include:  
• Economies of scale: cost reductions per unit, as production is increased. 
• Adaptive expectations: increased use of technology results in increased confidence 
from users and producers. 
• Learning economies: cost reductions as knowledge and skills are improved. 
• Network externalities: the value of the technology system increases as the network of 
interdependent industries and users grows. 
These different increasing returns create technological lock-in. In addition, firm-level 
technological lock-in may be created, where incumbent producers of the technology, through 
repeated investments in infrastructure, reinforce the lock-in condition since the infrastructure 
is large, durable and cannot not be traded (Unruh, 2000). In addition, firm-level technological 
lock-in may be created as producers develop core competencies which initially allow the 
technological system to undergo rapid expansion and gain a competitive advantage over 
competitors, which may later become rigidities (Unruh, 2000). Essentially, core rigidities 
happen when, having established the technological system, firms become too dependent on 
their existing advantages and resistant to change. Both these firm-level technological lock-ins 
reinforce the technological lock-in, because when challenged by new market entrants 
introducing an alternative or superior technology, incumbents are unable to adapt and instead 
put more effort into making improvements in the current technology.  
Institutions, both public and private, may reinforce the lock-in occurring in already existing 
systems. Private institutions (formal and informal) such as industry associations, unions and 
other professional organisations, develop as the technological system grows and may form an 
influential and invaluable lobby for the specific technological system (Unruh, 2000). Finally, 
public institutions can intervene in a way that favours the incumbent technological system, for 
example government policies, regulations which favour a dominant mode of electricity 
production, may also reinforce the lock-in. The Techno-Institutional Complex develops through 
“a path-dependent, co-evolutionary process involving positive feedbacks (from increasing 
returns) among technological infrastructures and the organizations and institutions that create, 
diffuse and employ them” (Unruh, 2000, p. 818).  
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Once established, the Techno-Institutional Complex creates continuous stability and reliability 
in the technological system, but this also means that the complex develops a resistance to 
change in the long run, locking-out alternative technological systems (Unruh, 2000). Therefore, 
carbon lock-in may be thought of as a fossil fuel based Techno-Institutional Complex. Unruh 
(2000) defines carbon lock-in as: 
“A condition that arises through a combination of systematic forces that perpetuate fossil 
fuel-based infrastructures in spite of their known environmental externalities and the 
apparent existence of cost-neutral, or even cost-elective, remedies” (Unruh, 2000, p. 817). 
Since, the electricity generation and distribution network, composed of incumbent fossil fuel 
technologies and large centralised networks, exhibits increasing returns to adoption, through 
learning effects and efficiencies in the production and consumption of fossil fuels, it creates 
continuous, reliability, stability and predictability, despite the known environmental 
consequences. In other words, fossil fuel systems (technology and infrastructure) have 
undergone sustained periods of process innovation as opposed to product innovation, due to 
specialized knowledge and skills (Foxon, 2013) which complement infrastructure, consumer 
demands and expectations.  
There are also institutional support systems i.e. government policy, legal and economic 
frameworks that stabilises electric power systems, not specifically fossil fuels, but this can have 
a long-term impact on the ability of alternative low carbon technologies to gain market share. 
Finally, the individual or existing societal perceptions about what the system should deliver are 
likely to become embedded in broader values in a way that hinders low carbon alternatives. 
For some organisations/individuals, this might be reliability of electricity, where people 
perceive renewable energy technologies as not being reliable in comparison with fossil fuels 
or nuclear energy, and therefore decisions favour those other systems (Foxon, 2013). To give 
clarity on the complex nature of carbon lock-in, Unruh (2002) attempts to summarize the 
different sources of lock-in (table 2.2) 
 
Lock-in Source Examples 
Technological Dominant design, standard technological architectures and components, 
compatibility 
Organizational Routines, training, departmentalization, customer-supplier relations 
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Industrial Industry standards, technological inter-relatedness, co-specialized assets 
Societal System socialization, adaptation of preferences and expectations 
Institutional Government policy intervention, legal frameworks, departments/ministries 
Table 2-1: Summarizing sources of Lock-in 
Source: Unruh (2002) Escaping carbon lock-in 
 
Table 2-1, provides a means to analyse a large scale and complex system, without ever losing 
sight of the broader picture. Carbon lock-in is likely to exhibit all of the categories but some 
might be more important than others in different contexts i.e. some forces can be specific or 
broad and some are easier than others to influence or remove (M. A. Brown, Chandler, Lapsa, 
& Sovacool, 2008). As table 2-1 shows, lock-in can occur at multiple scales. At an organisational 
level, firms/companies will have specific methods of operation. They may sort tasks per 
function, process or even products which lends to operational routines or decisions, hindering 
alternatives. 
Industrial lock-in occurs over time, where members and firms of an industry, develop or 
improve practices or criteria for products and operation which often guarantee their continued 
use. This is often done because there is a degree of dependence between firms and members 
in the industry. An example could point to the relationship between turbine manufacturers 
and utilities, where increased improvement in the efficiency of turbines (GE Power & Water, 
2014) leads to an increased use of gas in electricity production. Often, when there is an option 
for change, incumbent parties will generally seek to introduce the solution with the smallest 
impact in order to maintain the existing system.  
This makes lock-in difficult to overcome but nevertheless, it can be challenged and broken. In 
the reduction of CO2 emissions from power plants there are opportunities to allow alternative 
low carbon technologies or specifically renewables to gain market share, especially if 
constantly treating emissions and modifying specific components to make the system cleaner 
are no longer feasible (Unruh, 2002). Decision makers might conclude that the continued 
attempts at extending the life of the plants beyond the original design by retrofitting them with 
expensive upgrades are no longer worthwhile and it may be better to opt out of using specific 
fuels.  
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Examples include the increased use of wet electrostatic precipitators, wet and dry flue gas 
desulfurizers for SOx, selective catalytic reduction systems (SCR) for NOx and powdered 
activated carbon (PAC) Injection for Mercury (Environmental Protection Agency, 2014a). Some 
authors argue that extraordinary events must occur for the lock-in to be broken, which go 
beyond the alternatives being superior technologies. They argue that lock-ins can be 
challenged in different ways through processes such as consumer-led challenge, due to 
changes in taste, which shift the demand from the dominant technology, regulatory 
challenges, and technological cost breakthrough i.e. changing economics often realised after 
early adopters have achieved economies of scale (Cowan & Hultén, 1996; Unruh, 2002). The 
breaking or challenging of lock-in will be contingent on the nature of the lock-in, however there 
will always be vested interests interested in maintaining the status-quo who will resist change 
and the greater the system disruption, the increase in lock-in resistance. It is important to 
understand how in specific cases (i.e. a city or state in the USA) lock-in is reinforced by certain 
factors over time and given the pressure for low carbon energy development, what happens 
when those factors underpinning lock-in are being challenged. 
d. Politics and Ideology 
The political orientation of decision makers could be a factor in shaping low carbon energy 
intervention (Dunlap & Allen, 1976; Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001). In 
the U.S., Dunlap et al., (2001) found a correlation between a party’s ideology and an 
individual’s voting record on environmental issues. By looking at the legislator’s personal and 
constituency characteristics (plus other variables) the study found out that there were 
significant partisan and ideological differences in concern for environmental quality, with 
Republicans and Conservatives consistently expressing less environmental concern than their 
counterparts. Similar studies in 1974 and 1976 conducted at the city and state level in the U.S. 
also noted similar conclusions. The reasons for this difference were that Republican Party 
decision makers were shaped by conservative ideology favouring business enterprise, limited 
government or limited intervention in a free market and a hesitancy towards changing 
incumbent institutions as a means of solving societal problems (Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Dunlap 
et al., 2001). 
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This may be significant because low carbon restructuring through carbon taxes or stricter 
emission controls may not align with the commercial interests of businesses (Monstadt, 2007) 
like electric utilities. Conversely, the Democratic Party was more favourable towards 
intervention measures, extending government activities, and pursuing an experimental 
approach to solving societal issues, which becomes evident in their support for environmental 
issues (Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Dunlap et al., 2001). The largest gap in ideology between the two 
focuses on the need for government intervention and its scope (Dunlap & Gale, 1974). 
Therefore, whilst, most U.S. decision makers would argue that environmental quality or 
protection was a non-partisan issue, their voting patterns would suggest significant variation 
in the outcome of environmental legislation (Dunlap & Allen, 1976; Dunlap & Gale, 1974; 
Dunlap et al., 2001). It should be noted that the extent by which the U.S. situation is 
representative of most political contexts is uncertain. 
There will be variation across countries and within countries, for example between city and 
national authorities in some places. This is to be expected as, Meadowcroft (2011) explains, 
actors will naturally have and support competing viewpoints made up of alternative ideas 
about the intertwined roles of society, technology and the environment. This ends up 
producing conflicting and even contradictory, policy positions on each side within or between 
policies in various sectors. Nevertheless, it is possible to see how political identities and 
economic principles could shape decisions in low carbon intervention.  
e. Capacity to act 
Capacity to act refers to the capability to undertake urban low carbon energy restructuring. It 
is the combination of having the resources which allow for low carbon restructuring, such as 
financial means, regulatory authority, knowledge, organization and political support or 
persuasion (Bulkeley, 2010; Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; While, 2011). Given that the energy 
regulatory framework, financial resources and political support for low carbon energy 
restructuring varies according to context, so will the capacity to act.   
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Financial resources are important as they go some way to explaining the capacity of some cities 
and regions to undertake certain low carbon restructuring measures: 
"Although not as critical in life and death terms, similar findings concerning the lack of 
resources to implement measures that could address climate change have also been found 
in developed countries, where the ability to access external sources of funding has been a 
key factor in determining which municipalities have put some policies and measures into 
place" (Bulkeley, 2010, p. 243). 
Depending on the relative wealth of the city or region, governing authorities may need access 
to financial support from external sources like private firms, non-profit company through joint 
ventures, government grants, public-private partnerships and co-operations (Hawkey et al., 
2013). The involvement of private firms to assist with financing introduces issues around rate 
of return on investments and the management of risks on investment and contracts. The issue 
of acquiring adequate financial resources and subsequent low carbon restructuring is not 
always straightforward. There are examples of cities having the financial resources for 
investments but being unable to conduct low carbon restructuring, partly due to political 
support and persuasion. Political support for low carbon restructuring could be enabled or 
constrained by an electorate.  
Decisions made on low carbon restructuring paths to an extent depend on the support of or 
persuading local businesses, residents, etc. (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006): 
“Moreover, where the capacity to intervene exists, there is a lack of willingness to act locally 
in the face of political, business or public opposition” (Bulkeley, 2006, p. 2248). 
An issue in political support is the availability or lack of leadership to lead on low carbon energy 
restructuring intervention, with the influence to push forward options for low carbon 
development (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006): 
“The greater the support that exists for climate protection among a city’s political 
leadership, the more rapidly it becomes established as a key objective in all of the 
administration’s activities” (Bulkeley, 2006, p. 2253). 
Another component of the capacity to act on urban low carbon restructuring could be the 
extent to which local authorities or stakeholders have the required knowledge of the nature of 
the problem and their awareness of the tools that may be available, such as through district 
heating schemes or community renewable energy projects.  
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One example is the case of a district heating scheme in the town of Woking in Surrey, UK, where 
the initial skepticism of district heating by local authorities and residents was overcome through 
the formation of  a joint venture with a Danish commercial energy service company which could 
draw on technical expertise to establish legitimacy for the new project (Hawkey et al., 2013).  
While (2011) introduces additional criteria, not previously considered, which may be significant 
in the capacity of cities in undertaking low carbon energy restructuring including, the economy, 
costs of low carbon restructuring and the competing costs of climate change: 
“The era of carbon control raises similar questions about the capacity of cities to make low 
carbon transitions, albeit on the basis of a slightly different set of criteria, including levels of 
carbon dependence (in the economy, infrastructure, land-use patterns, etc.), the costs of 
low carbon retrofitting and restructuring, the degree of political and public support for low 
carbon measures, and not least, the competing costs of climate change adaptation” (While, 
2011, p. 121). 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the issues that place pressure on western countries, cities and 
regions to restructure their energy systems. The conceptual framework provides the tools 
which will be used to analyse the factors influencing investment decisions in the electricity 
generation and supply systems. The concepts introduced in the framework will be used to 
analyse the research findings in empirical chapters 6, 7 and 8. The next chapter describes the 
changing context of the United States electricity generation and supply system. 
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3 THE CHANGING CONTEXT FOR STATE-LEVEL ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY IN THE 
USA 
The previous chapter was concerned with the changing context for decisions about electricity 
generation and supply, and especially the extent to which carbon reduction is influencing those 
decisions. The argument of this chapter is that the current energy governing system comprising 
of the electric utility business model and regulatory framework across the U.S. has remained 
largely unchanged for nearly 100 years and is currently facing pressures and demands which 
are influencing the decisions about electricity generation and supply, with particular attention 
paid to issues of carbon regulation. In this chapter, the changing context for management in 
electricity generation and supply industry in the USA is explored. This chapter is split into three 
sections. 
The first section presents a history of the U.S. electricity generation and supply over the last 
century. It reviews the major eras in electricity development, the pressures and demands that 
have led to major changes, the significance and impact of these changes and the resulting 
current structure of electricity generation and supply. Throughout this section, emphasis will 
be placed on the variation in state responses to these pressures and demands over time and 
how they have led to current electricity governing and management frameworks. The second 
section outlines the current frameworks for U.S. state level electricity generation and supply 
and how they vary across the country.  
This section draws out key themes that emerge from the history of electricity generation and 
supply including the relationship between the federal and state governments in electricity 
pricing, subsidies and regulation, the relationship between municipalities and state level 
intervention, the tensions and conflicts in those relationships, political will, business models, 
supply logics and energy mixes. Finally, the third section discusses the impact low carbon may 
be having on decisions made about U.S. state level electricity generation and supply. The 
understanding of factors shaping decisions about low carbon electricity requires an 
understanding of the institutional framework and inherited business models. 
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3.1 THE HISTORY OF U.S. STATE LEVEL ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY 
This section examines how electricity generation and supply networks have developed across 
the United States over the last century, from 1882 to 2010. The history will be divided into six 
eras which began with the origins of the modern utility beginning in 1882 and ending in 1900, 
which comprised of small-scale electricity provision by multiple privately-owned companies to 
cities and regulated through municipal franchises and state laws (Hausman & Neufeld, 1990, 
2011). This period ended due to technological advancement and realised economies of scale 
(Hirsh & Finn, 2002). This era also included the rise and peaking of municipally owned electric 
utilities in the late 1890s (Hirsh, 2003a; U.S. Census Bureau, 1905).  
The municipal provision era is followed by the centralisation of electricity generation and 
supply (Hirsh, 2003a) and the consolidation of nearly 2805 private utilities to form a few 
holding companies between 1901 and 1932 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000) 
who grew from municipal boundaries to cross state lines. This growth prompted the creation 
of state public service commissions from 1907 and the replacement of municipal regulation by 
state regulation through legislation and state public service commissions (Hausman & Neufeld, 
2011). Furthermore, concerns about the consolidation of private utility ownership and financial 
misconduct (Hausman & Neufeld, 2004) prompted federal government oversight of electricity 
networks across state lines and breaking up holding companies (Hausman & Neufeld, 1999).  
The period of consolidation was followed from 1933 to 1951 by increased federal government 
involvement in electricity generation and supply, the introduction of rural electrification, the 
increased electricity generation capacity of privately owned utilities and increasing efficiency 
in electricity networks (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). 
The next era from 1951 to 1970 can be summarised as one of successful growth of private 
utility companies in terms of predictable growth in electricity demand due to economic growth, 
drops in electricity prices, the introduction of nuclear energy in electricity provision, 
investment in excess coal and nuclear to match predicted demand and environmental 
awareness and environmental legislation in 1970 (Morgan, Apt, & Lave, 2005; U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000). 
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This period of prosperity of private electric utilities was followed by the energy security era 
from 1970 to 1984 which was marked by the oil embargo of 1973 and the energy crisis of 1978, 
these crises, resulted in increasing costs of electricity generation from fossil fuel power plants, 
increased costs of electricity generation due to the environmental legislation passed in 1970 
and cost overruns from excess plants from the growth era and finally reduced electricity 
demand due to conservation efforts. These events would raise concerns about U.S. energy 
security, prompting the intervention of U.S. federal government in the electricity sector. The 
interventions included a combination of laws, policies, and incentives which had the impact of 
introducing external producers into the electricity market in some states, increasing coal 
development generation capacity in others, increased renewable energy electricity in western 
states and aggressive natural gas development strategies across the country.  
The effects of the cost overruns from excess capacity from private utilities, expensive nuclear 
plants and competition from non-utility power producers and expensive contracts signed in 
the previous era meant increasing costs of electricity in some states and marked the 
restructuring era from 1984 to 2002. The high rates of electricity in the late 1980s in mainly 
western states led to restructuring of investor-owned utilities by unbundling the generation of 
electricity from its transmission and distribution by the late 90s.  
 
a. Private provision with municipal franchises: 1882 – 1900 
On September 4th, 1882, the first electricity power station in New York City was opened by 
Thomas Edison’s Pearl Street (Hausman & Neufeld, 1990). By the end of the year, nearly 150 
small power stations modelled after Edison’s Pearl Street had spread to other cities (Hausman 
& Neufeld, 1990). Private individuals and companies started acquiring franchises from 
municipal governments (Hirsh & Finn, 2002). By 1890, the changing demand from only street 
lighting to fully 24 hours electricity led to the creation of small electricity stations in U.S. cities 
which were located within a mile or a block to the city being supply (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000). The mile or block restriction was due to the Direct Current transmission 
power loss over long distances (Hirsh, 2003a). By 1896, the first centralised power plant was 
created that allowed for the transmission of electricity about 20 miles away (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000) due to improved technology, specifically, the switch to 
Alternating Current (AC) transmission which improved upon power losses over long distances 
(Hirsh, 2003a; Hirsh & Finn, 2002).  
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By the end of the era in 1902, there were 3620 electricity power stations in total across the 
United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 1905), with multiple companies, both private and public 
invested in electricity generation and transmission (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2000). This total was made up of nearly 2805 private stations and 815 municipal stations (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2000), meaning that private companies dominated the 
market, providing nearly 78% of electricity. For example, Alabama had 2 individual, 13 
corporations and 1 municipal companies; California had 23 individual and 82 corporations; 
Georgia had 5 Individual and 19 corporations; Illinois had 137 individual and 127 corporations; 
New York had 63 individual, 164 corporations and 1 municipal and Nevada only had 1 individual 
and 4 corporations involved in electricity provision by 1902 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1905). 
This era operated on the use of contracts or licenses also known as franchises obtained from 
the municipal governments and municipal authority over utilities was ingrained in varying 
forms of state laws. These franchises were required because of the placement of distribution 
systems within city streets, where ownership of the street i.e. the land belonged to the city 
governments and not private companies (Hausman & Neufeld, 1990). The U.S. Department of 
Commerce and Labour, Bureau of the Census in 1902 found that: 
“Electric lighting, street railway, and other analogous corporations derive their charters 
which give them the right to exist and which regulate them in a general way their internal 
government, from the state through the medium of either a general or special statute. 
Usually further authorization is necessary before wires may be run along a specific street or 
highway, and it is this authorization that is designated the term “franchise” in a more limited 
sense. By some state constitutions the legislatures are strictly prohibited from granting any 
use of streets or highways without the consent of the local authorities; and in nearly all the 
states where tis express provision is not found the practice of legislatures is to leave to the 
local governing body an effective control in this matter. This control ordinarily involves and 
implies the right of local authorities to impose such conditions as they may see fit at the 
time the franchise is granted, and these conditions are endless in their variations.” (Chapter 
VII, p. 82) 
Municipal regulation of the utilities was done by controlling the number of franchises and 
therefore the level of competition as opposed to rates (Knittel, 2006). Municipal authorities 
did not control the electricity prices directly, however they made sure that prices were not 
higher than the maximum of current prices (Knittel, 2006).  
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On the details of franchises, Hausman and Neufeld (2011) describe municipal franchises as 
follows:  
“These franchises were contracts specifying the rights and responsibilities of both the 
utilities and the municipalities in which they were located. Franchise terms were fixed but 
usually long – 20 to 50 years. The terms of the franchises varied considerably among 
municipalities and often included terms and availability of service, maximum prices, 
competitive conditions, discounts to the municipal governments, and many other 
requirements.” (p. 725). 
Since the requirements in franchises varied across cities, this would lead to variation in the 
distribution of small centralised power stations in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 
1905). Finally, the era also was marked by intense and open competition especially in larger 
cities (Hausman & Neufeld, 2002) because franchises were non-exclusive and utilities did not 
receive monopoly protection (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011). A consequence of this structure was 
the duplication of transmission lines and an inefficient network (Knittel, 2006) as companies 
competed to serve the same cities. Another consequence was financing: electric utilities in the 
genesis era were not very profitable and as the demand for electricity continued to increase, 
so did the cost of the electricity networks. During this time, earnings from the electricity sold 
were far lower than the cost of investment made by utilities and utilities struggled to make 
further investments (Hausman & Neufeld, 2002). 
There is literature which considers “bad practices”, in the form of exploitation of utility 
contracts by municipal authorities leading to a push for state-wide utility regulation (Hausman 
& Neufeld, 2011; Knittel, 2006; Lyon & Wilson, 2012; Neufeld, 2008). Ultimately, this method 
of regulating through franchises and allowing open competition with the inability to properly 
recover costs, exploitation by municipal authorities, in combination with technological 
advancements as well as economies of scale (Hausman & Neufeld, 1990; Hirsh, 2003a; U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2000), would prove to be significant causes of transition in 
the era.  
Towards the end of the century, state-led regulation and the growth of public service 
commissions were seen as the solution to these issues and by 1905, New York and Wisconsin 
had created Public Utility Commissions and adopted state wide utility regulation, with Georgia 
in 1907, and other states following each year after (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011).  
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Massachusetts was the outlier as it had created a Public Utility Commission in 1887. Municipal 
ownership was also proposed as a means to solve the issues of finance and exploitation 
because according to Hirsh (2003): 
“Because municipal governments paid no dividends to shareholders and could obtain low-
cost loans by issuing tax-exempt bonds, they often could produce electricity at lower cost 
than private companies. Civic reformers, trust-busting politicians, and muckraking 
journalists supported the public power movement during an era when “big business” as 
typified by John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, acquired negative connotations. By 
1902, 815 municipal systems had already formed in the United States and their combined 
capacity accounted for 9.3% of the nation’s total. Supposedly insulated from business 
corruption, these public power systems constituted an alternative model for the utility 
industry.” (p.22). 
Nevertheless, the idea of municipal-owned utilities would remain contested over the next few 
decades, always recurring but never achieving enough popularity to grow. Hausman and 
Neufeld (2011) explicitly state about municipal ownership: 
“Disagreements over this issue were intensely ideological, emotional, partisan, and 
characterised by arguments that, at best, contained half-truths.” (p. 726). 
This resulted in the number of municipal utilities peaking and privately-owned utilities 
controlling the majority of electricity generation and supply and competing for city provision 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). State-wide utility regulation became the 
dominant method across the United States of electric utility regulation. 
b. Consolidation and centralisation of private provision: 1901 – 1932 
The period of centralisation beyond city boundaries began in 1902 as part of a period of 
improved technology leading to falling residential electricity prices and the growth of electric 
power networks (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration’s electricity power report: 
“Competition and technological improvements served to lower electricity prices steadily, 
with nominal residential prices falling to less than 17 cents per kilowatt-hour by the 
beginning of the 20th century.” (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000, p. 111). 
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The growth of electric power networks during this era increasingly went beyond the city limits 
(Hirsh, 2003a) as companies placed transmission lines outside the single city of origin, with 
many growing the service territories to include multiple cities. For example, the U.S. Census 
Bureau reported in 1907 that the Boston Edison Company grew from operating in an area 
estimated to be an eighth of a square mile in the late 1880s, to operating within an estimated 
509 square miles, covering 35 cities and some towns within Massachusetts. Furthermore, the 
customers served had grown to nearly a million by 1907 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1907). In 1912, 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company operating in central California supplied electricity across 30 
counties and served 187 neighbourhoods (U.S. Census Bureau, 1912). The Central Illinois Public 
Service Company in 1912 served 87 communities (U.S. Census Bureau, 1912).  
Nevertheless, the system of individual electric utilities performing all aspects of electric power 
supply (i.e. generation, transmission and distribution) remained unchanged. Furthermore, with 
this growth, many utilities took the view that state-level regulation could be to their advantage 
(Hirsh, 2003a).  For example this was recognised by  Samuel Insull, the President of the Edison 
company in Chicago, where the electricity network was the most advanced in the United States 
(Hausman & Neufeld, 2011). California was also another state where utility executives 
campaigned for state regulation in order to reduce or end competition and to boost financial 
valuation of their firms and reduce financial risks (Hausman & Neufeld, 2002). In many states, 
Public Service Commissions (PUCs) were introduced from 1905 with a duty to regulate the 
utilities. Overall, Public Service Commissions had a very specific purpose, which was to regulate 
the utility. According to Hirsh (1989), the general purpose of the Public Service Commissions 
was: 
“To assure the public that it would receive a socially and economically significant commodity 
electricity at reasonable rates and with reliable service; and to enable utility companies to 
earn a “reasonable” return on investments so they could produce electricity, construct new 
facilities, and, in general, maintain their financial integrity.” (p. 22) 
Hausman and Neufeld (2004), expand this purpose to include the following: 
“The primary job of the commissions was to ensure by setting the utility’s rates that the 
profits earned by the regulated utilities were not excessive. The rates were supposed to be 
set at a level that just enabled the utility to cover its operating expenses and receive a “fair” 
return on the value of its capital facilities. What constituted a “fair” return depended on the 
utility’s capital cost: what it had to pay bondholders and stockholders to obtain the funds 
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needed for investment. This system reduced the apparent risk to utility bond and stock 
investors, and modestly reduced the interest rate regulated utilities paid for borrowed 
money.” (p. 13). 
Furthermore, the formal process of the PUCs electricity decision making as described by 
Hausman and Neufeld (2008) was as follows: 
“The commissions that regulate utility rates operate as quasi-judicial agencies. Each 
commission has several commissioners, and decisions are determined by vote. Before a rate 
can be established or changed, a formal hearing is held. Testimony is given under rules of 
evidence based on accounting data provided for a ‘test year’. Commissioners also have 
power to decide whether a particular utility investment is ‘prudent’, and can therefore be 
included in the value of the total investment on which the fair return is calculated. The 
utilities participate in these hearings, of course, but they are also open to essentially anyone 
wishing to provide testimony. The decision of a commission can be appealed to the 
judiciary. Commissions generally have fulltime staffs reviewing the evidence presented and 
providing technical support, although their budgets are a small fraction of the 
administrative budgets of the utilities they regulate.” (p. 724). 
Regulation also included the introduction of indefinite terms and removing municipal 
franchises with fixed terms (Hausman & Neufeld, 2004), the assignment of existing utilities to 
specific service areas (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011) and rules which protected the investments 
of existing utilities. The process of regulating utilities via PUCs also became more sophisticated, 
as certain concepts were introduced which included: revenue requirements, rate of return, fair 
value, rate base (Preston & Vesey, 2008) and the controversial regulatory compact (Regulatory 
Assistance Project, 2011a).  This is summarised by Phillips (1965) as follows: 
First, the “cost of capital” standard, under which the rate of return should enable a company 
to attract capital on terms that will (a) maintain its credit standing, (b) protect its financial 
soundness, and (c) maintain the integrity of its existing investments. Second, the 
“comparability of earnings” standard, under which the rate of return to equity owners 
“should be commensurate with return on investments in other enterprises having 
corresponding risks.” (p. 268). 
These were general utility accounting methods at the time with variations in detail across the 
country (Preston & Vesey, 2008). 
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c. Consolidation of private utilities: 1933 - 1951 
Another mark of this era was the consolidation of privately owned utilities to form holding 
companies controlling stock of many utilities. By 1920s, due to the technological improvements 
in turbine technology (Balling, Termuehlen, & Baumgartner, 2002; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000) and continued demand growth, many of the smaller municipal-owned 
electric lighting and railway companies merged with or were acquired by the private owned 
utilities who were investing in larger and more efficient electricity systems (Hausman & 
Neufeld, 2002, 2004, 2011). 
Additionally, many of the private owned utilities merged into a few number of holding 
companies, with those few holders in control of multiple subsidiary companies (Hausman & 
Neufeld, 2002, 2004). The main purpose of the holding companies was obtaining better 
funding, but other benefits included combining technical expertise in engineering, 
management expertise in business operations in an effort to assess larger networks and 
technological improvements (Hausman & Neufeld, 2002). By 1929, an estimated 16 public 
holding companies controlled nearly 75% of electricity provision (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000).  
Examples of existing well known holding companies are Exelon Corporation with three 
subsidiaries including; BGE serving Maryland, ComEd serving north Illinois and PECO serving 
south Pennsylvania. Duke Energy with five subsidiaries including; Duke Energy Progress, Duke 
Energy Florida, Duke Energy Ohio, Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Indiana. Finally, 
Southern Company with four subsidiaries including; Georgia Power, Alabama Power, 
Mississippi Power, Gulf Power Company and Southern Power Company. However, alongside 
the formation of these holding companies also came the concerns about abuses in business 
practices like inflated electricity rates for consumers, hiding inflated rates in regulated rates, 
creating difficulties in application of regulation due to interstate electricity sales and debt 
problems from the crash in the stock market and depression (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 1993b).  
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These concerns and events forced the U.S. federal government to intervene in electricity 
governance to act in an effort to protect consumers (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
1993b). The U.S. federal government carried out extensive investigations of the holding 
companies’ transactions, finding the need to curb holding company excesses. 
In August 26th of 1935, the Public Utility Holding Company Act was introduced which would 
prevent regulated electricity consumers from subsidizing unrelated practices. The law also 
made clear that companies involved in interstate sales would additionally be monitored by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Finally, the SEC, authorised by the law, forced the 
bigger holding companies to divest and be reduced to individual companies providing 
electricity to a specific geographic territory. Research into various state commissions would 
suggest that, following authorisation by state legislation, Public Service Commissions could 
then carve out territories and boundaries based on counties, cities, parishes and other factors 
including transmission and distribution infrastructure in existence (Floyd, 2009; U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000). This process would be negotiated with all utilities involved 
and eventually, official territorial maps were drawn (Floyd, 2009). 
This is the first major event in which the United States federal government intervened in 
electricity generation and supply. Still, its powers were limited. The legislation did not wholly 
change the structure of electricity generation with electricity regulation still essentially a 
function of the states. Specifically summarised by Baum (1942), as follows: 
“‘Reasonable’ rates and services is one of the primary aims of utility regulation. Direct 
control of these matters is now largely within the authority of the states, with Federal 
control now limited chiefly to interstate phases beyond the constitutional authority of the 
states.” (p. 174). 
The law would later be repealed in 2005. In summary, the most significant changes that came 
out of the events of the consolidation and centralisation era were the continued growth of 
electricity utilities, the strengthening of state regulation through legislation and state public 
service commissions, but most importantly the strengthened governing structure of the 
vertical integrated utility, with monopoly franchises and guaranteed rates of return (Morgan 
et al., 2005). The consolidation and centralisation era would be followed by unfettered and 
uninterrupted utility growth and prosperity from 1951 to 1970 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000). 
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d. The growth of private utilities: 1951-1970 
Overall, the period of 1951 to 1970 was one of rapid, unhindered growth for electric utilities 
in terms of an increase in supply and sales of electricity due to electric consumption for 
residents and technological advances for manufacturers after World War Two (Hirsh, 2003b, 
2003c; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1986; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). 
The U.S. Congressional office (1989) found: 
“From 1950 to 1970, electric utilities experienced a strong and stable period, marked by 
steadily increasing returns on equity, relatively high stock prices, and robust growth in 
electricity demand. With economies of scale and technological advances encouraging larger 
and larger plants, and with integration within and across firms improving efficiency, 
generating capacity more than quadrupled while real prices decreased by about 30 percent. 
Reserve margins the difference between total generating capacity and anticipated peak 
demand — were comfortably maintained at an average of 22 percent. These margins helped 
ensure a reliable supply of electricity even if demand increased faster than expected.” (p. 
6). 
At the beginning of the growth era in 1950, there were a total of 4,007 electric supply systems, 
1,495 utilities with generating plants and 3,867 generating plants (U.S. Census Bureau, 1952, 
1972). By the end of the growth era in 1,970, there were a total of 1,092 utilities with 
generating plants and 3,519 generating plants (U.S. Census Bureau, 1952, 1972). The 
ownership of the plants, production, installed capacity and prime movers are summarised in 
tables  
 
 
Table 3-1: Electric Utilities - Supply Systems and Generating Plants, By Class of Ownership: 1950 to 1970 
Source: U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract 1972 
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Table 3-2: Electric Energy Production and Installed Generating Capacity by Class of Ownership and Type of Prime Mover: 1950 
to 1971 
Source: U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract 1972 
The 1950s was marked by strategies pushing for growth to utility sales and rapid expansion of 
the electricity network along with technological advances, all of which hit a peak in the 1960s. 
The successes of the 1960s included the highest efficiencies in electricity generation, the 
highest sales most utilities had ever seen, profits and capacity expansion for electric utilities 
across the United States and no controversy (Hirsh, 2003b; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000). Hirsh (1989) provides a summary of the early 1950s context: 
“The coming of World War II interrupted the concerted effort by most investor-owned 
utilities to increase electricity usage. Expanding defence industries and a reinvigorated 
economy rapidly drove up consumption without the need to promote it (after an increase 
of only 38% for the ten years after the depression began), and utilities did their best to 
provide adequate service. But even after the conflict, it took a few years before utilities 
regained the momentum of promoting electricity usage. For one thing, the industry 
experienced a shortage of capacity.” (p. 48). 
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Therefore, to counteract the shortage in capacity and reduced sales, there began an aggressive 
push by electric utility managers to increase electricity consumption. The dominant post-war 
strategy was advertising, for example, the ‘Medallion Home’ program launched in March of 
1956, where the home would get a gold medallion badge if all appliances within the home 
were completely electric (commonly known as ‘all-electric homes’) and where this medallion 
represented higher economic welfare and prestige (Southwest Museum of Engineering, 2007). 
Overall, the entire country experienced economic prosperity. According to Hirsh (1989): 
“As the country enjoyed post-war economic prosperity, consumers spent money on 
automobiles, televisions, and other “luxuries” as never before. Many of these, such as air 
conditioners and electrical space-heating systems, helped push electricity consumption up 
almost beyond belief. In 1955, managers marvelled at a 17% leap in electricity from the year 
before. This jump followed other big years making an annual growth rate of 10.8% for the 
immediate post-world war II decade. While annual sales growth moderated in the late 
1950s and 1960s to a more “traditional” 7 to 8% range, the years still were punctuated by 
spurts of 10.1% in 1959, and 8+% figures in 1966, 1968, and 1969.” (p. 56). 
Overall, this strategy worked and created a cycle whereby residential growth increased, utilities 
increased the scale of generation plants, and manufacturers built bigger plants. According to 
Hirsh (1989): 
“Manufacturers adopted the approach because it yielded rapid advances in the capacities 
of components – exactly what utilities demanded. But vendors benefited too by developing 
increasingly powerful turbines and generators – equipment for which they could earn good 
profits.” (p.63). 
Furthermore, in order to keep up with the demand from utilities for new and larger plants, 
manufacturers changed some aspects of design philosophy: 
“Though the utilities’ post-war grow and build strategy appeared similar to the traditional 
and successful approach used earlier in the century, the extra emphasis on large scale in 
the 1950s and 1960s put new pressures on manufacturers to develop a novel design 
philosophy. One element of it consisted of foregoing some of the conservatism in the 
design-by-experience approach by planning new and bigger machines before practical 
knowledge had accumulated from previous units. Called ‘design by extrapolation’ by some 
people in the industry, the new approach differed dramatically from its predecessor. Instead 
of waiting for experience – and learning – to accrue while observing how earlier machines 
operated in the field, manufacturers made abrupt jumps in design to the next stage.” (Hirsh, 
1989, p.63). 
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Generally, this period was marked by shared interests between customers (residential, 
commercial and industrial), utilities, manufacturers and regulators with limited conflict in the 
regulatory process. Utility companies generally worked to reduce their costs of producing 
electricity and increase the efficiency of the electric system (Hirsh, 2003b). Cost savings were 
passed on to consumers: 
“Few people complained about a service whose costs countered this general trend toward 
cost of living increases. As a result, regulatory actions tended to reinforce the grow and 
build strategy.” (Hirsh, 1989. p. 85). 
He also adds: 
“Yet as long as costs declined while utilities continued to supply electricity with ease, they 
received good treatment from state regulatory bodies. This happy situation by which 
utilities won monopoly status in return for providing cheap and abundant supplies of 
electricity has been called a ‘social contract’ by some utility managers. It was a contract that 
served the industry well for more than half a century.” (p. 85 – 86). 
The period was marked by increases in power plant efficiency and a rise in the growth of fossil 
fuel power plants (Hirsh, 2003d; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). The growth in 
generation capacity was estimated to be 7.5% per annum, mainly attributed to oil and natural 
gas plants (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). Unlike the other fossil fuels (natural 
gas and oil), which were growing at record capacity, coal stagnated and declined from the mid-
1940s (Coal Age News, 2012a, 2012b; Gordon, 1975; Vietor, 1987). This stagnation and decline 
was caused by a combination of issues including an inability to compete with natural gas and 
oil, disagreements between coal workers and coal managers primarily over wages and 
increased costs from transportation which led to decreased output of coal. The signature coal 
industry magazine, Coal Age puts these issues with coal into context: 
"Fighting between union and management in turn curtailed output and raised prices and 
with America’s economy modernizing rapidly, the railroads, the public and much of the 
nation’s industry turned increasingly to the coal’s more predictable competitors: natural gas 
and oil.” (Coal Age Magazine, September 14th 2012) 
The predominant issue however, was the persistent disagreements between coal unions and 
coal managers with regards to wages (Coal Age News, 2012b; Vietor, 1987), which spilled over 
to the 1950s.  
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Coal Age magazine reported: 
“Negotiations between coal operators and the union went well in early 1950 and the 
contract they collectively settled on created precisely the labour stability needed for coal to 
move ahead. Deemed “a sick industry” by President Truman, full government takeover or 
nationalization—at the time happening worldwide—was looming unless all parties could 
find some middle ground, roll up their sleeves and get back to it.” (Coal Age Magazine, 
September 14th 2012) 
However, this was not all, in the domestic electricity market, coal was also losing energy 
generation share to natural gas, oil and nuclear, heightened by the fact that coal was not 
profitable and competitive after transportation, preparation and combustion costs were 
factored in, in comparison to the other fossil fuels (Gordon, 1975; Vietor, 1987) but also coal 
producers did not have the political influence that oil producers had. Vietor (1987) explains: 
“By 1956, coal was a ‘sick Industry’ in more ways than one. Coal production had declined 
39% from its peak in 1947; three thousand mines had closed, and the number of mines fell 
by nearly half. Coal’s share of the energy market had fallen by 18%, with no end in sight. 
Although insufficient was not necessarily the coal industry’s principal problem, it was 
amenable to political redress. The industry’s real problems – inter-fuel competition, adverse 
energy policies and structural fragmentation, were less tractable politically.” (p. 163) 
Additionally, the coal industry’s lack of profitability in comparison to natural gas and oil was an 
ongoing issue because there was no growth due to lack of integration at the time. Vietor (1984) 
summarises: 
“The absence of either horizontal or vertical integration in the coal industry was a basic 
cause of non-competitiveness and political ineffectiveness. Coal was among the least 
concentrated and least profitable of primary industries. There were an estimated 4,000 
concerns, of which less than 1,000 reported any net income. The average net income for 
reporting firms was $82,000 in 1950 and $26,000 in 1953. After-tax profits averaged 
$22,000 during that period. The 20 largest companies, responsible for 39% of total coal 
production, averaged a return on net worth of only 5.8% from 1950 to 1955. This compared 
unfavourably with other fragmented industries, let alone the largest oil companies with an 
average return of 14.8%.” 
This decline continued until the late 1950s when a combination of strategies allowed coal to 
become the prime fuel of electric utilities and the coal industry to become the main partner 
with electric utilities. 
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The strategies included an agreement between coal management and the coal labour union 
on increased wages in 1951 (Coal Age News, 2012b), coal companies switched to using barges 
as opposed to rail to reduce freight rates and save costs, improving coal mining technology and 
improved electric transmission capacity. Some electric utilities acquired coal companies and 
some leased coal lands from the federal governments (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
1993a), which allowed the relocation of power plants to near the mines themselves to secure 
supplies of coal, cut transportation costs and finally to hedge their bets on a potential synthetic 
fuels boom triggered by federal government energy policy (Vietor, 1987). Ultimately, the 
significant investments made by electric utilities in coal reserves, coal mining and coal fired 
plants at the time, meant that by 1961 the electricity industry had become the only significant 
industry for coal (Coal Age News, 2012a; Gordon, 1975). The industry magazine Coal Age, 
covering the news and history at the time, summarises: 
“The saving grace of the industry was the development and build-out of America’s new 
electrical power grid. Though in 1960, coking coal and industrial users were the largest 
consumers of coal, by the end of the decade, the electrical industry was by far coal’s biggest 
client, receiving more than 310 million tons in 1969 as production increased to a high of 573 
million tons that year—virtually all of it bituminous coal.” (Coal Age Magazine, September 
14, 2012) 
The era was marked by the beginning of commercial nuclear operation in 1957 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000). At the time, nuclear energy was seen as a promising 
technology and no significant problems were anticipated. As a result, in the 1960s nuclear 
power generation started to be used to address electricity demand with electric utilities placing 
large orders for nuclear power plants (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1986). The Northeast 
Blackout in 1965 prompted the first major concerns about system reliability and forced the 
creation of North American Electric Reliability Council or NERC (Warwick, 2002). NERC would 
be a completely voluntary organisation, managed by utilities overseeing ten regional reliability 
councils, covering all states in the U.S. (Warwick, 2002).  
Finally, the period saw the rise of environmental concerns amongst the general public, as coal-
fired plants came under increased scrutiny by the public and federal government (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000). However environmental concerns had limited impact 
because power plants started introducing few pollution controls. 
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e. The era of energy security 1970 to 1984 
The ‘energy security’ era was marked by multiple unanticipated challenges to the electric 
power industry which would impact the decisions made about electricity generation and supply 
mix across states. Additionally, the energy security era was also marked by unprecedented 
federal Government intervention in the energy industry. Finally, this era was marked by energy 
policy tailored to energy independence in the United States (Grossman, 2013; Joskow, 2001b; 
Tomain, 1990).  
The energy security era began with an inflation crisis attributed to increased federal 
government spending (Edison Electric Institute, 2012a; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2000). The inflation caused significant cost increases in operations, maintenance, building and 
material costs and finally higher interest rates (Edison Electric Institute, 2012a; U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000). These cost problems would be heightened by new 
environmental requirements but more seriously, by the Oil Crisis of 1973. Hirsh (1989) 
describes the impacts of inflation on electric utilities as follows: 
“Inflation struck the industry hard from several angles. Because building new plants formed 
an integral part of the utility business – one utility executive called his firm ‘a construction 
company’ – the inflated costs of building greatly affected its financial health. The Handy-
Whitman index of the cost of labor and materials going into steam power plants rose 120% 
between 1970 and 1979, in contrast to a rise of 23% for the previous ten years. Meanwhile, 
as investors sought bond yields that exceeded the inflation rate, utilities watched their old 
bond prices plummet and new bonds carry soaring coupon rates – reaching an average of 
11.85% in December 1979, up from an already stratospheric 10.28% in September 1974. 
For the most capital-intensive industry in the United States, the cost of borrowing became 
a major balance sheet concern, especially when plant construction took longer than 
expected.” (p. 111). 
 
— Oil Crisis of 1973 
What has come to be known as the Oil Crisis began on the 17th of October 1973, when the 
Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) declared an 
embargo on crude oil relating to the United States’ support of Israel in the Arab-Israeli Yom 
Kippur War of 1973 (Edison Electric Institute, 2012a; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1986; 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000). The effects of the embargo were generally fuel 
shortages and price increases in petroleum related products including gasoline and residential 
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heating fuels (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002a) triggering an energy crisis. In 
electricity generation and supply, the effect on electric utilities was marked by high fuel i.e. 
generating costs and retail costs. According to the Congressional Budget Office: 
“Higher oil and gas prices resulting from the 1973-1974 oil embargo and the 1979-1980 oil 
shortage caused even greater increases in utilities' operating costs. In 1973, for example, 
electric utility plants paid an average of 87.6 cents, 169.8 cents, and 73.1 cents (in 1984 
dollars) per million Btu for coal, heavy oil, and natural gas, respectively. By 1981 the real 
prices of these fuels had risen twofold for coal, fourfold for oil, and fivefold for gas-to 181.6 
cents, 627.6 cents, and 403.8 cents (in 1984 dollars) per million BTU, respectively.” (p. 8). 
For electric utilities, the energy crisis was so severe because oil-fired power plants had become 
increasingly important in electricity generation, since coal-fired plants had to comply with the 
1970 Clean Air Act (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002a, 2011). To make up for some 
of the financial troubles, utilities sought to raise rates. In some states the changes in fuel prices 
were accounted for through an adjustment clause. This was preferable to constant rate cases 
to determine how to account for new fuel prices in electricity generation during the energy 
crisis. However, 15 states passed legislation which would ban this practice (U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office, 1986). Nevertheless, consumers struggled. Due to the rate increases, consumers 
increasingly complained to state regulators: 
“By the time of the crisis in 1973, consumers had already become accustomed to regular 
rate hikes, though they probably could not have anticipated the increases precipitated by 
radically higher fuel costs. The 94 companies that obtained more than $827 million in 
increased rates in 1972 preceded 235 that obtained $3.1 billion in 1975. To put these hikes 
in better perspective, consider the extreme case of the residential rate payer in New York 
City.  Already paying the costliest electricity in the country in 1969 – these customers 
became indignant when Consolidated Edison raised rates soon after asking them to reduce 
consumption during summer capacity shortages. By January 1971, Customers paid $16.41 
per month for 500 kilowatt-hours of energy – 11% more than two years earlier. But worse 
was in the offing. Retaining the position as the nation’s most expensive provider of 
electricity. Con Ed continued to receive rate hikes that pushed the cost of 500 kilowatt-hours 
of energy up to $40.15 by January 1977 – 92% greater than the national average and up 
171% since 1969.” (Hirsh, 1989, p. 147). 
The finances of electric utilities were further put under pressure due to the heightened 
environmental awareness about pollution, which led to new regulations in the form of the 
Clean Air Act of 1970, aimed at curbing emission pollution through the use of pollution controls 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2013b; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2000).  
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The Clean Air Act required the Environmental Protection Agency to establish standards which 
controlled common pollutants including sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
lead, particulate matter and ground level ozone (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). This 
meant that electric utilities needed to install pollution controls on fossil fuelled power plants 
to curb emissions from flue-gas stacks (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013b; U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office, 1986).  
Overall, the federal government’s passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 was a response to the 
American public’s growing concern with environmental pollution and this influenced many 
regulators and politicians at the state and federal level (Hirsh & Finn, 2002; U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2000), leading to increased capital and operating costs on electric 
utilities (Hirsh, 2003e; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1986; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000). Although these pollution controls were expensive, environmental 
regulations in the late 1970s had bipartisan support and so were implemented without too 
much conflict because: 
“Newly emerging public values concerning the environment found ready expression by 
politicians who saw a good issue around which to rally. (Even President Nixon did not want 
to be perceived as opposing “clean air and water.”) Perhaps as importantly, however 
Congressmen concerned with problems relating to the power industry also discovered a 
severe regulatory lacuna: except for local zoning limitations, no federal agency (including 
the Federal Power Commission and the Atomic Energy Commission) and few state bodies 
had jurisdiction over the siting and construction of power plants and transmission lines that 
would have an impact on the environment. (Hirsh, 1989, p. 149). 
Additionally, there were also differing effects amongst states on environmental regulation. 
Hirsh (1989) explains: 
“Environmental regulations also forced utilities to shift from dirty coal to cleaner burning oil 
in the early 1970s, causing some companies – especially those in the heavily oil-burning 
north-eastern states – to watch their fuel costs sky-rocket.” (p. 112). 
Aside from the fossil-fuelled power plants, nuclear energy power plants were also subject to 
environmental concerns and new, additional safety requirements were introduced, including 
increasing the number of nuclear reactor simulations, improving the instrumentation in 
nuclear plant operations, technological upgrades to plant components, fire safety regulations, 
increased staff training, fitting every reactor with an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 
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and reducing public exposure limits to radiation from nuclear power plants from 0.5 rem per 
year to 100 mrem per year (Komanoff, 1981; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1979; U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014a; Walker & Wellock, 2010). New regulatory standards 
for nuclear power plant safety and in equipment designs meant there were increased material 
costs associated with updating existing nuclear plants, increased capital costs for new plants 
and finally delays in the construction times of nuclear plant (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 
1986). Construction costs became significant for nuclear power plants as they increased rapidly 
in time of inflation. According to the Congressional Budget Office: 
“The cost (in 1984 dollars) of a typical nuclear plant entering commercial operation 
increased from about $715 per kilowatt (kw) in the 1971-1974 period, to about $1,389 per 
kw in the 1981-1984 period. The average cost of a plant expected to enter service in 1985 
or 1986 has risen to about $2,600 per kW measured in 1984 dollars. For a nuclear plant 
begun in 1972, with debt financing at 12% and labour and materials inflation at 9%, the final 
cost of the plant would be 30% higher if the plant were completed in 1984 (12 years from 
start of construction) than if it were completed in 1980 (eight years from start of 
construction).” (Congressional Budget Office, 1986, p. 11). 
The cost increases were such that multiple planned nuclear energy plants were cancelled. The 
Congressional Budget Office and Department of Energy, also calculated that the sunk costs 
associated with the cancelled construction of nuclear energy plants was $10 billion (U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office, 1986). During this era, the reputation of nuclear energy was 
further diminished by the Three Mile Island accident occurring in Pennsylvania in 1979 which 
led to more safety requirements, especially in eleven states including, California, Connecticut, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Oregon, Vermont, Wisconsin and 
Washington who passed laws and regulations prohibiting new nuclear plants (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1984; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1986). The environmental 
requirements were an ever present regulatory and cost concern for utilities and for their coal 
and nuclear plants throughout this era of energy security.  
Therefore state regulators were under pressure to balance and seek ways to ensure that utilities 
could cope financially with the crisis but at the same time protect consumers from unfair 
practices and ensure consumers got fair prices (Hirsh & Finn, 2002). This meant that the 
regulatory process and relationship that had served the regulators, utilities and consumers well 
during the growth era came under scrutiny during this energy security era (Hirsh & Finn, 2002). 
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Therefore, in addition to the fuel adjustment clauses introduced by state regulators, other 
suggestions included: 
“State regulatory action took several forms. In many cases, for example Public service 
commissions simply disapproved the full extent of rate hikes requested by power 
companies, disappointing utility managers who felt that the commissions yielded to political 
forces and represented the public’s immediate interests only. Perhaps more disturbing to 
utility managers, a few utility commissions tried to impose new innovative approaches to 
encourage conservation – the opposite of what utilities have been for so long – especially 
after the energy crisis had put greater pressure on rate increases. Some regulators even 
insisted that utilities re-evaluate their, grow and build strategy and give up their declining 
block rate structures that previously contributed to its success.” (p. 151). 
It is unclear how many of these new strategies were adopted or effective during the era and 
the literature demonstrates that in the end most states allowed electric utilities to increase 
their retail costs, passing the costs to customers (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1986). 
Ultimately, most of these actions at the state level would not be enough. These unanticipated 
changes regarding inflation, environmental regulations and the oil embargo (no utility could 
have foreseen) affected electricity demand, regulations and costs, therefore electric utilities 
struggled to recover financially. The response to the energy crisis were the wide ranging 
proposals from the United States federal government, and specifically President Richard Nixon 
to address electricity generation and supply concerns, including more nuclear, coal and 
renewable fuel use and development. In a special address to the U.S. Congress on energy 
policy, President Nixon highlighted a push for coal: 
“I urge that highest national priority be given to expanded development and utilization of 
our coal resources. Present and potential users who are able to choose among energy 
sources should consider the national interest as they make their choice. Each decision 
against coal increases petroleum or gas consumption, compromising our national self-
sufficiency and raising the cost of meeting our energy needs.” 
President Richard Nixon, April 18, 1973, Oval Office, American Presidency Project 
 
These proposals became “Project Independence” and included more specific measures such 
as prohibiting coal-fired electric utilities from switching to oil, stopping ongoing construction 
of oil-fired electric power plants, expediting nuclear power plants and permits and plants and 
increasing drilling on federal lands (Grossman, 2013).  
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This was the first time the federal government set coordinated policies geared towards energy 
independence. The next president Gerald Ford continued the Nixon strategy. There was a slight 
shift in emphasis during the Jimmy Carter administration, who also promoted domestic oil and 
gas production, but was more focused on energy conservation and renewable energy. An 
excerpt of Jimmy Carter’s National Energy Program Speech is provided, because it underlines 
his main principles: 
“We must reduce our vulnerability to potentially devastating embargoes. We can protect 
ourselves from uncertain supplies by reducing our demand for oil, making the most of our 
abundant resources such as coal, and developing a strategic petroleum reserve. We must 
be fair. Our solutions must ask equal sacrifices from every region, every class of people, 
every interest group. Industry will have to do its part to conserve, just as consumers will. 
The energy producers deserve fair treatment, but we will not let the energy companies 
profiteer. The cornerstone of our policy is to reduce demand through conservation. Our 
emphasis on conservation is a clear difference between this plan and others which merely 
encouraged crash production efforts. Conservation is the quickest, cheapest, most practical 
source of energy. Prices should generally reflect the true replacement cost of energy. We 
are only cheating ourselves if we make energy artificially cheap and use more than we can 
really afford.” 
President Jimmy Carter, April 20th, 1977, American Presidency Project 
 
Hence, the proposed National Energy Plan (NEP), promoted renewable energy. President 
Jimmy Carter went on to propose further energy efficiency and conservation measures, 
including the use of renewable energy resources which was seen as key to long term economic 
growth (UC Santa Barbara, 1999). In a visual bid to promote clean energy the White House 
installed solar panels on its roof. 
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Figure 3-1: President Jimmy Carter promoting domestic clean energy in 1977 
Source: NBC News, 2010 
As a result, electric utilities rapidly started switching generation plants, back to nuclear and 
coal electricity generation. Hence, coal, which had suffered a severe decline in the 1950s, 
became more important for electricity generation. The energy crisis also triggered more energy 
conservation amongst consumers and utilities due to cost concerns with electricity (Edison 
Electric Institute, 2012a). 
The signature legislature to come out of Jimmy Carter administration during the energy 
security era and a significant intervention in electricity generation and supply by the Federal 
Government would be the passing of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 
and this is considered below. However, another significant policy intervention by the Federal 
Government included pursuing a natural gas strategy and repealing the Power Plant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA) 1986, which also had a direct impact on electricity generation and 
supply decisions. These laws and strategies were significant because before 1973, federal 
energy policy had been largely uncoordinated but intended to support consumption (Joskow, 
1997). Joskow suggests: 
“Prior to the first oil shock in 1973-74, federal energy policy consisted primarily of 
uncoordinated industry specific support policies: various tax subsidies for oil and natural gas 
production, the leasing of federal lands for oil and natural gas exploration and production, 
quotas on imported oil to protect domestic suppliers from cheap imports, substantial 
research and development expenditures devoted to promoting the production of electricity 
using nuclear power --- a legacy of the development of nuclear weapons during WW II ---, 
the regulation of the prices charged for transportation by interstate natural gas pipelines 
and, beginning in the early 1960s, a complex system of price controls on natural gas sold in 
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interstate commerce. The states were primarily responsible for regulating prices for 
electricity and the local distribution of natural gas since these services were provided by 
state-franchised monopolies. State agencies in Texas, Louisiana and a few other states also 
played an important role in regulating supplies of oil and natural gas” (p. 8). 
This is arguably the first time which the US federal government made a concerted effort 
towards creating a comprehensive energy policy. Additionally, this is first time aside from 
PUHCA in 1935 that the federal government played a significant role in altering electricity 
generation and supply decisions made by state regulators and utilities. The full implications of 
this extended role for federal government would be felt in subsequent eras i.e. the 
restructuring era and low carbon and fracking era. 
— Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) 
The promotion of energy independence continued into the Gerald Ford era and subsequent 
administrations (1974 - 1977). The U.S. federal government again intervened in the 1978 
energy crisis, during the Jimmy Carter administration and influenced state electricity 
generation and supply by enacting five laws with the purpose of solving the energy crisis. Two 
laws especially influential on electricity generation and supply were the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) (amended in 2005) and the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use 
Act (FUA) (repealed in 1987). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was the 
federal agency created to implement PURPA with the state public service commissions.  
In regulated markets, state public service commissions would govern the process of 
determining the avoided costs, Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) and requirements for 
Qualifying Facilities. PURPA was designed to open-up electricity generation to external power 
producers, in order to encourage the development of renewable energy, where before the 
passage of PURPA, electricity generation and supply was exclusively provided by the electric 
utilities. New decentralised power producers targeted by the legislation included cogeneration 
and renewable energy plants. Grossman (2013) explains: 
“Probably the most consequential act was PURPA, which gave independent power providers 
the ability to enter the market dominated by franchised monopoly electric power 
companies. Whereas previously independent generators could not sell power to the grid, 
PURPA required utilities to buy power from independent producers who could generate 
electricity for less than what it would have cost for the utility to generate the power itself, 
called the “avoided cost”. (p. 342). 
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In a time of crisis, the U.S. federal government needed to encourage electric utilities to develop 
other sources of energy, as opposed to gas, oil and coal which had been the focus for a long 
time. As Joskow notes: 
“PURPA required states to determine whether they should and would introduce new pricing 
mechanisms to encourage energy conservation and obligated electric utilities to purchase 
power from cogeneration plants and small power production facilities using renewable and 
waste fuels.” (p. 9). 
The enactment of PURPA is credited for developing significant generation of renewable energy 
and changing many state profiles for electricity generation and supply (Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2016).  It was enacted in a time of crisis when oil prices were at a historic high and 
predicted to increase. Some state governments saw this as an economically viable option to 
reduce electricity generation prices. These same states would later restructure their electricity 
markets. Joskow (2001) describes PURPA’s effect as follows: 
“Several states, including California, New York, all of the New England states, New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania embraced PURPA with great enthusiasm. In addition to requiring utilities 
to pay high prices for QF power under 20 to 30 year contracts, the implementation of PURPA 
was also accompanied by the creation of public “integrated resource planning” (IRP) or 
“least cost planning” (LCP) processes to determine “appropriate” electric utility investment 
and contracting strategies which were eventually implemented with competitive bidding 
programs.” (p.12).  
State Public Service Commissions that embraced PURPA set rates at the highest levels ensuring 
and encouraging that renewable energy and cogeneration would be developed (Thomas & 
Ayres, 2007). As Joskow (2001) notes: 
“The costs of these subsidies, in turn, were funded through higher regulated electricity 
prices. These states (California, New York, Massachusetts, Maine, Washington and a few 
others) led the development of an increasingly close linkage between energy policy and 
environmental policy. Many of these states were also the pioneers in electricity sector 
restructuring and competition in the mid-1990s, stimulated in part by the high costs and 
high electricity prices resulting from the PURPA initiatives of the 1980s.” (p. 12). 
 
In contrast to the states that embraced PURPA, some public service commissions were not 
receptive to PURPA and worked hard to weaken the law (Thomas & Ayres, 2007).  
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According to Sovacool and Brown (2007):  
“In other cases, commissions asked the regulated utilities to specify what plant they would 
build as the next electric generating unit, and then used the economics of that plant as a 
bogey for avoided costs. Some states did nothing. In the 28 years since PURPA enactment, 
we are unaware of any contract ever issued to a QF in Louisiana, South Carolina, South 
Dakota and Kentucky.” (p. 154). 
Aside from regulators trying to weaken the law, many utility executives were not overtly happy 
about PURPA, because they could lose out financially in a more competitive environment; 
additionally, they had genuine concerns about the role of independent power producers on 
the overall system. Richard Hirsh in the conclusion of his 1989 work writes about PURPA: 
“The resistance reflects some very reasonable concerns. For example, if too many industrial 
firms produce power for themselves, utilities would be left serving the remaining residential 
and commercial customers and that are more expensive to serve. In other words, the 
utilities would be losing some of the diversity that previously held down overall costs. Utility 
managers also feel that unregulated PURPA producers could decide to withdraw from the 
electricity producing business, thus leaving utilities “holding the bag” and jeopardizing 
system reliability. Finally, PURPA requires utilities to purchase electricity from independent 
producers even when regulated firms have sufficient capacity to meet demand or when 
they can provide electricity at lower costs. In both cases, consumers could suffer by paying 
more for electricity than if the utility provided it alone.” (p. 169 – 170). 
Additionally, Hirsh (1989), draws on some concerns with the way the electric utilities struggled 
to adapt due to PURPA and indeed the entire energy security era and as will be seen later in 
the restructuring and low carbon eras, this issue of changing the business model to adapt to 
changing circumstances will be brought up again and again: 
“These valid concerns notwithstanding, perhaps the greatest reason for resistance stems 
from utility managers’ desire to retain control of an industry that they feel has served its 
stakeholders well. To be sure, the industry has faced some problems in recent years, but 
over the long run, haven’t managers consistently provided a necessary commodity at 
reasonable prices? Most utility executives would answer “yes” and they generally do now 
want the industry structure to be altered. Rather they would prefer to see the industry 
retrogress – returning to the “good old days” when financing and construction of large base-
load (preferable nuclear) power plants could be accomplished easily without outside 
interference. Unfortunately for many managers who think like this, public pressure and new 
laws such as PURPA make a return to 1965 impossible, with the result that utility managers 
are indeed losing control of their industry. Meanwhile, a long history of relative stability and 
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sameness has blinded many managers to the fact that in a changing world of technology 
and business, the structure of industries sometimes does change. This is exactly what is 
occurring in the electric utility industry, and like similar change that occurred in the 
deregulated long-distance telecommunications industry, managers must realise that they 
need to change as well” (p. 169 – 170). 
Overall, PURPA succeeded in introducing independent power producers, increasing the 
development of renewable energy, and leading to development in natural gas due to the 
reduced cost in electricity generation and supply. The full effects of PURPA contracts were not 
experienced in the energy security era, but rather in the late 1980s to 1990s, during the 
restructuring era. In fact, expensive PURPA contracts would be a fundamental driver in the 
pressure to restructure the electric industry. Nevertheless, the enactment of PURPA has been 
useful for the federal government in influencing state electricity generation and supply and 
during a time of crisis. 
— Repeal of the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA) 1986 
Although the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA) was repealed in 1986, it was still a 
package of the energy security era interventions made by the Jimmy Carter administration and 
so has been included here. The repeal of the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA) in 
1987 was influential because the act had limited the use of natural gas in electricity generation 
and supply, during the 1978 energy crisis. Grossman (2013) notes: 
“The Power plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 had a very clear goal: to end the use 
of oil and natural gas in electric power generation. Over the next decade, most new power 
plants burned coal, and oil was largely phased out as a generating fuel. The bill was premised 
on the belief that natural gas would become increasingly scarce and expensive. When this 
premise was disproven – gas was far more plentiful than forecast – the bill was repealed. 
But the Power Plant Act has been the exception.” (p. 556). 
Joskow (2001) adds: 
The Fuel Use Act prohibited the use of natural gas and oil, whose prices were kept below 
market clearing levels by federal price controls, in new power plants and phased out natural 
gas use in existing power plants by 1990. These regulations reflected an effort to alleviate 
natural gas shortages and reduce the demand for oil burned “inefficiently” to generate 
electricity. These regulations pushed utilities to increase their use of coal to generate 
electricity (p. 9). 
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This repeal of FUA was brought by energy-state lawmakers, who felt that electric utilities should 
be able to use the fuels with least cost to serve their constituents. They had fought against the 
law in 1987 but lost. Coal-state lawmakers, on the contrary, wanted the law to stay in place 
(Journal of Commerce, 1987). Nevertheless, the repeal passed and new power plant designs 
did not have to include coal burning capability, increasing the usage of natural gas in electricity 
generation significantly. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, natural gas 
use in electricity generation increased by about 119% from 1988 to 2002 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2002b). 
— Support for natural gas in the 1970s 
One of the features of the energy security era was the increased pursuit of natural gas 
production in U.S. territories. Coordinated gas development in the U.S. began in the late 1970s, 
spurred by the energy crisis between 1973 and 1976 (Z. Wang & Krupnick, 2013a). From the 
late 1970s, the federal government focused on gas production by creating unconventional gas 
research programs in partnership with the private sector. The Department of Energy and the 
Gas Research Institute, in combination with private firms, organised demonstration projects, 
tests and information sharing in an effort to bring unconventional fuels to commercial 
quantities. The Federal government also created and designed a broad package of financial 
incentives to encourage domestic energy production. The Production Tax Credit (PTC) given by 
the federal government was an incentive needed by private companies from the 1980s to 2002 
because,  during the late 1970s to 1980s, most private U.S. gas firms did not have the capacity 
in size or finance to undertake the necessary research and development (Trembath, Jenkins, 
Nordhaus, & Shellenberger, 2012).  
However, it was Mitchell Energy, a private company, in the late 1970s, which had the financial 
backing to explore the potential of shale gas extraction. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the 
company persisted in shale exploration in Barnett in Northeast Texas. The company needed 
the gas supply because it had a long term contract to supply gas to the Natural Gas Pipeline 
Company of America (NGPL), so the firm also invested heavily in the natural gas shale 
formations in north Central Texas within the Fort Worth Basin (Oil & Gas Journal, 2016), 
commonly known as the Barnett Play from the 1980s to the mid-1990s (King, Nordhaus, & 
Shellenberger, 2015).  
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were technical innovations marked by successful 
horizontal drilling projects in 1986 in West Virginia and in Texas Shale in 1991. By 1995, Mitchell 
Energy had drilled 264 wells (Z. Wang & Krupnick, 2013b). By 1998, Mitchell Energy was viably 
able to extract commercial and profitable quantities of shale gas in Texas. Since 1998 
improvements in the process of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (known as fracking) 
has opened up abundant reserves of gas. Figure 3-2 shows the current shale gas distribution in 
the United States compared to what was commercially available in 1998. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Shows the Current Shale Map within the United States 
Source: American Petroleum Institute based on EIA Data 
The U.S. Energy Information also predicts an increased production of alternative forms of 
Natural gas up to 2035, as shown in figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3: Shows the projected use of Natural Gas production in the United States 
Source: American Petroleum Institute, based on EIA Data, September 2014 
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As will be seen in the subsequent restructuring and low carbon and fracking eras, the 
development of unconventional gas came to fruition in the late 1990s. Shale gas alone is 
calculated to have contributed to domestic gas supply from 1990 to 2010 to be about nearly 
0% to 20% (Jacoby, O’Sullivan, & Paltsev, 2012). In electricity generation and supply, it 
gradually started replacing coal in the overall electricity generation mix from the late 1990s 
(Figure 3-4). 
 
Figure 3-4: Electric Power Sector Energy Consumption 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
 
The energy security era ended with state legislators and regulatory commissions seeking ways 
to alleviate the costs of the energy crisis on their utilities and consumers. Despite the federal 
and state government' intervention, ongoing issues with high rates for consumers meant that 
by the late 1980s the federal government and certain state regulators, especially in states with 
the highest electricity costs, felt the need to restructure their electricity sectors, or at the very 
least look for ways to introduce competition and to allow customers to choose their electricity 
providers (M. Brown & Sedano, 2004; Joskow, 1997; Morgan et al., 2005; Warwick, 2002) and 
there was intense political pressure for restructuring. Additionally, the pressure for 
restructuring was in many of the states which had embraced PURPA during the energy crisis 
combined with the ongoing nuclear energy cost overruns or overcapacity at some point during 
or before the crisis, environmental (Northeast and California) had higher electricity retail rates 
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compared to their counterparts across the country and these disparities strengthened the 
demand for restructuring. 
f. The Restructuring era: 1984 – 2000 
The restructuring era began with pressure from large industrial customers as well as 
independent power producers and energy marketers (Joskow, 1997; White, Joskow, & 
Hausman, 1996) for industry restructuring. The pressure for restructuring was based on 
decisions made by many state regulators and utilities during the energy crisis in the early 1970s, 
including the expensive PURPA contracts in the Northeast and California due to nuclear energy 
construction cost overruns and contracts, the rate increases needed to make up for the drop 
in demand and excess capacity that some utilities had incurred (M. Brown & Sedano, 2004; 
Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a; Warwick, 2002). Underscoring the problem is Chao and 
Huntington (1998): 
“Once regulators approve the construction costs of a generating plant or the terms of an 
energy supply contract, these costs (amortized in the case of capital investments) continue 
to be included in regulated prices over the life of the investment or contract, independent 
of whether the market values of these commitments rise or fall over time as energy prices, 
technology, and supply and demand conditions change.” (p. 17). 
As shown by the quote above, the restructuring era highlights the issue that investment in 
electricity infrastructure involves long term decisions in a changing external context.  
For example, PURPA was credited during the energy security era by environmental activists, 
independent power producers (IPP), and consumers for encouraging cogeneration, renewable 
energy and cost effective electricity production in California and the Northeast (Joskow, 2001b; 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016).  Yet the duration and locked-in price of those contracts, 
became a problem in the restructuring era for California and the North-eastern states. Because 
the forecasts which underpinned the decisions of the regulators and utilities in those states 
did not occur, Borenstein & Bushnell (2000) summarise this as an impetus for restructuring: 
“The result was that many utilities signed long-term purchase contracts at very high prices. 
Those prices looked especially bad as the cost of natural gas fell in real terms through the 
1980s and 1990s, making most other generation sources much less economic. Over about 
the same period of time, accidents, unforeseen construction costs, increased safety 
Page 74 of 311 
 
regulation, and higher than-anticipated upkeep and waste disposal costs changed nuclear 
power from the cheap, clean power source advocates had promised to expensive white 
elephants. Under the regulatory agreement between states and the utilities, consumers still 
had to pay for the plants despite the fact that they turned out to be unwise choices. 
Uneconomic PURPA contracts and nuclear power investments were the primary reasons 
that some states found themselves in the 1990s with electricity prices that were well above 
the going-forward cost of building and operating new gas- or coal-fired power plants.” (p. 2 
– 3). 
This was not just an issue for California: 
“Other states — those that had not pursued nuclear power and had been more cautious in 
signing long-term contracts under PURPA — retained relatively low prices. That contrast 
was probably the driving force behind the restructuring movement in the United States.” 
(p. 3). 
The result of this problem were wide disparities between electricity retail rates across the 
country by the early 90s to the late 90s (see Figure 3-5). Joskow (1997) explains: 
“In the Northeast and California, the average price of electricity is around 10 cents/kWh, 
while in Indiana it is about 5.5 cents/kWh and in Oregon less than 5.0 cents/Kwh. Some of 
this variation in prices can be explained by regional differences in fuel costs, the mix of 
customers, average utilization rates and load factors, and differences in population density 
and construction costs. However, a large fraction of the variation in prices reflects 
differences in the sunk costs of generation investments and long term purchase power 
contracts made during the 1970s and 1980s. As already noted, regulated retail prices reflect 
the amortization of the sunk costs associated with past regulator-approved investments in 
generating plants (for example, nuclear power plants) and prices paid for energy under long-
term purchase contracts mandated by PURPA signed many years ago, when expectations 
about fossil fuel prices and demand growth were very different from what eventually 
transpired.” (p. 8). 
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Figure 3-5: Shows the Average Retail Electricity Prices by State, 1997 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 1997 
The differences in generation were also significant, for example in electricity generation, 
Joskow (1997) explains: 
“Thus, in much of the northeast and California, the average cost of generation services 
reflected in regulated retail prices is in the 6–7 cent/kWh range, reflecting historical 
investments in nuclear power plants and high-priced PURPA contracts that regulators 
required utilities to sign. In Indiana and Oregon, the average cost of generation services 
reflected in retail prices is 2–3 cents/kWh, reflecting low-cost coal-fired and hydroelectric 
generation resources, limited commitments to nuclear power and state regulatory policies 
that did not require utilities to sign expensive long-term PURPA power supply contracts.” 
(p. 126). 
Another reason for popularity of electric restructuring according to Neufeld (2011) was that 
other industries including, airlines and telecommunications had already tried to restructure: 
“The idea that electricity could be produced competitively was encouraged by two other 
concurrent developments. First, all types of regulation, but especially the type of regulation 
used for electric utilities, in which regulators set prices and controlled entry, were under 
attack. Such regulation had recently been eliminated for both the airline and trucking 
industries, some regulations had been removed from the natural gas industry, and 
significant restructuring allowing competition was occurring in the telephone industry. 
Second, the disastrous experience with the huge waste of capital that had occurred in the 
electric power industry made competitive markets seem especially attractive: the risk 
associated with investment decisions would be borne by the companies making the 
decisions rather than passed along to consumers.” (p. 737). 
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Therefore, by April 1998 many states aside from/other than California and the Northeast, had 
initiated studies to explore deregulation (shown in figure 3-6).  This would involve studying the 
separation or unbundling of the generation of electricity from its transmission and distribution 
and the costs including stranded costs. 
 
Figure 3-6: Shows the 1997 status on Utility Restructuring across States 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 1997 
 
The average retail price of electricity in 1998 is shown in figure 3-7. 
 
Figure 3-7: Shows the Average Retail Electricity Prices by State, 1998 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 1998 
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As stated earlier, whilst most states proposed the opening up of electricity generation and 
supply and had initiated feasibility studies, the events from the 1970s and early 1980s meant 
that the prevailing business and regulatory model was exposed to rapid cost increases and 
reduced electricity demand (Joskow, Bohi, & Gollop, 1989).  
Concerns about dealing with stranded costs of utilities and how best to restructure electricity 
in states with already low cost emerged as fundamental to the topic of restructuring during this 
period. On the issue of utility costs, Neufeld (2011) explains that the focus on stranded costs 
and who would bear the burden of increased prices nearly derailed the overall goal of 
restructuring electricity: 
“Switching generation providers seemed to offer huge savings to electricity users, but those 
savings exceeded the economic benefits of competitive generation because regulated utility 
rates had become much greater than marginal costs. The question was who would bear 
those costs in a regime where customers could abandon the utilities that had incurred 
them? Perhaps those costs would be borne by the utilities, their shareholders and 
bondholders. Perhaps they would be borne by those customers who would not or could not 
change their suppliers, a solution that would have required those electricity users to bear 
even larger rate increases.” (Neufeld, 2011, p. 739). 
Additionally: 
“The question of who would bear stranded costs absorbed significant time and resources in 
all considerations of industry restructuring to the possible detriment of the institution-
creation activities that should have been the primary goal.” (Neufeld, 2011, p. 739). 
Nevertheless, the investor-owned utility industry representative group, the Edison Electric 
Institute, explains that for the states which decided to restructure, stranded costs were 
eventually addressed: 
“The design of the retail choice programs varied considerably across the states, but in 
virtually all of them the issue of stranded costs was addressed. Stranded costs generally 
referred to the portion of the original fixed generation costs incurred to meet the obligation 
to serve retail customers while there was still a retail monopoly that would be lost if the 
utility was immediately forced to sell at the market price. In addition, restructuring involved 
a so-called transition period to allow a gradual movement to retail competition. This was 
designed to serve two purposes. First, the incumbent utility would be given some time to 
undertake the necessary business transformation. Second, mass-market customers would 
continue to be served by the utility, providing stranded cost recovery for the utility and a 
safety net service for customers until retail markets had evolved sufficiently to serve the 
Page 78 of 311 
 
mass markets. In some cases, this period lasted as much as a decade and in others just a 
few years.” (Edison Electric Institute, 2012, p. 33). 
States that benefited from low cost electricity were hesitant to implement any serious reform 
due to the fear of losing their competitive advantage in energy prices:  
“In low cost-states, the fear that low-cost generation might benefit other regions while 
increasing in-state average costs made regulators reluctant to support any changes. 
However, the availability of profitable export markets for power in some cases encouraged 
legislative and regulatory decisions to consider competition. Although “domestic” 
consumers might potentially stand to lose if their own rates rose if their utility sold power 
to neighbouring high-price states, excessive capacity reduced that potential impact relative 
to the gains in trade, which could be shared with home state consumers. This explains early 
consideration and decisions to adopt retail competition by state legislatures in low-cost 
states such as Montana and Oklahoma. On the other hand, some states acted to protect 
their monopoly utilities from competition. In Florida, the state supreme court interpreted a 
state power plant siting statute to limit plant siting to Florida utilities or suppliers who have 
contracts with Florida residents. The result was to close Florida’s wholesale power market 
to merchant power plants. Taking their cue from Florida’s success in blocking the 
development of wholesale power supply, other state and local governments, particularly in 
the South, imposed moratoria on merchant power plants.” (Isser, 2015, p. 203 - 204). 
Ultimately, debates about stranded costs, cost savings and low cost electricity would recede 
temporarily as most of the restructuring plans across the country were suspended or 
abandoned completely, due to the defining event of the era, the California electricity crisis 
from 2000 to 2001 (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015; Joskow, 2001a; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2000). The Californian energy crisis began in September 2000 and lasted for 
about a year (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2001). Electricity demand was greater than 
electricity generation capacity, leading to a shortage in electricity supply (U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office, 2001) which spiralled out of control and led to record level wholesale electricity 
prices (Joskow, 2001a). The record wholesale electricity prices were followed by severe 
financial losses by the states’ three investor-owned utilities since they could not cover losses. 
The inability to reduce wholesale electricity prices and cover these severe financial losses had 
been due to a combination of rigid policies related to the restructuring law (Bushnell, 2004; 
Joskow, 2001a; Sweeney, 2002). One of which was the freezing of electricity retail rates of the 
three IOUs (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 1998). 
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A casualty of the financial issue, was the largest investor-owned utility in the state, Pacific Gas 
& Electric (PG&E), filing for bankruptcy due to a $9 billion debt by April 2001 (Bushnell, 2004; 
Holson, 2001; Joskow, 2001a; Public Broadcasting Service, 2001). Another major utility 
Southern California Edison owed an estimated $596 million to its creditors and was unable to 
repay (Public Broadcasting Service, 2001). Ultimately, the combination of interdependent 
factors and decisions soon translated to the electricity grid in California experienced periodic 
blackouts. 
“Some observers began to question whether the old regime (power monopolies overseen 
by state regulators) did a better job of meeting the demand for electricity than the new 
ideal (many independent producers interacting with consumers in a deregulated market). 
Observers pointed out that the parts of the California market outside the restructuring plan 
(mainly in the Los Angeles and Sacramento areas) faced fewer problems than the rest of 
California, as did the other western states. By mid-2001—in the wake of one bankrupt 
utility, even higher wholesale prices, and rolling black-outs — skeptics blamed deregulation 
for putting California in a perilous position” (Congressional Budget Office, 2001, p. 12). 
All of which culminated in intervention by the state and federal governments and eventually, 
at the end of the crisis, the California Public Utilities Commission took the decision on the 
September 20th, 2001 to suspend direct retail access to energy service providers (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2001, 2010). 
Accounts of the crisis also discuss the loss of excess generating capacity over time, the pending 
status of new investments, the underwhelming number of consumers who switched suppliers, 
the financial crisis the utilities came under and the refusal of independent wholesale 
generators to sell electricity to the IOUs until finances were in order which included federal 
and state emergency orders. All these issues can be used as evidence to show how the state’s 
restructuring efforts and rigid and flawed market came to be blamed for the crisis (Bushnell, 
2004; Joskow, 2001a; Sweeney, 2002, 2006; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2001; U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 1998).  
By 2010, the status of various state efforts at opening up electricity generation and retail to 
competition showed no new development, as shown in figure 3-8. 
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Figure 3-8: shows the status of United States Electricity by State in 2010 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
The full status of the United States energy regulation is shown in figure 3-9 and highlights a 
complicated energy generation and supply structure. 
 
 
Figure 3-9: United States Energy Deregulation in 2010 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2010 
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The other significant events of the restructuring era were the introduction of the Integrated 
Resource Planning (IRP) process also known as least cost planning across the country in the 
1990s and the passing of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT). Originating from the states 
with the most expensive electricity, the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) process spread 
rapidly across the country. Many state legislatures required their state regulators to take a more 
central role in the planning, investment and policy of their electricity infrastructure (M. Brown 
& Sedano, 2004; Joskow, 2001b; Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a; Warwick, 2002), to strike 
a balance between utility and customer needs as opposed to a previous system of simply 
approving or dismissing plans submitted by utilities. Joskow (2001) and Warwick (2002) both 
argue that this process became very popular amongst state regulatory commissions.  
Joskow (2001) states: 
“By 1990, least cost planning was the all the rage among state regulatory commissions and 
was spreading quickly from its origins in California, the Northeast and the Northwest. And it 
is these policies that are heavily reflected in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.” (p. 35). 
Warwick (2002) states: 
“IRP was successful in holding rate increases in check and stimulating consumer choice, but 
the process was highly adversarial, time consuming, and expensive. Regardless, rates were 
still high and significant differences among adjacent electric utilities and between gas and 
electric utilities caused political problems. Economic development efforts were stymied 
where electric rates were high, resulting in firms expanding in low-cost states. (p. 58). 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) established on October 24th, 1992 and signed by 
President George Bush, promoted restructuring and competition by creating another set of 
independent power producers, referred to as Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWGs), who 
would be independent non-utility power producers with open access to transmission (Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 2010; U.S.C., 1992). The open access to transmission was 
enforced by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 888, under the 
authorisation of the United States federal government. FERC Order 888 took effect on April 
24th, 1996 and the order required all electric utilities involved in interstate electricity 
generation and transmission to provide transparent and non-discriminatory access to electric 
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tariffs, to seek stranded costs recovery and unbundle wholesale electricity generation and 
supply (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2010).  
All of these measures combined were ways of assisting state efforts to restructure the 
electricity generation and supply system but the California electricity crisis derailed many 
states (Figure 3-10). This meant that since March 2010, after California suspended its efforts 
at restructuring (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010), the energy governing modes 
across the United States have remained unchanged. Some states fully restructured, others 
partially-restructured or none at all. Since restructuring, electricity rates, resources for 
electricity generation and laws have differed across the country. The series of maps below 
highlights the differences. 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Average Residential Electricity Rates in 2010 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2010 
By 2000, there was significant regional variation in the fuel mix of electricity generation across 
the United States due to a combination of natural resources, historical decisions, 
transportation costs, climate, regulation and structure of utilities. To summarise, historically 
the Pacific Northwest has been largely dependent on hydroelectric power because of the 
proximity to the Columbia River. The Southeast and Midwest have relied heavily on coal due 
to mining in the Appalachian region covering West Virginia, Kentucky, and up to Pennsylvania. 
Significant coal mining also exists in Wyoming and Montana (Edison Electric Institute, 2012b). 
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The Southeast and Midwest also rely heavily on nuclear energy, which could be significantly 
due to the existing large regulated electric utilities (Edison Electric Institute, 2012b; U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014b). The regulatory structures in these regions allow 
utilities to earn a guaranteed rate of return on the plant as well as to amortize the plants (World 
Nuclear Association, 2015). The south-central region has relied on significant natural gas 
reserves in Texas and Oklahoma. Finally, New England originally relied on coal and oil for 
electricity generation but now relies heavily on natural gas due to costs of transporting coal 
and the region’s harsh winters. It is also increasingly importing electricity from neighbouring 
regions in Canada (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014b). The complete map of 
regional electricity variation is show in figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3-11: Regional Electricity Generation Variation 
Source: Edison Electric Institute, 2014 
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g. The era of low carbon and fracking: 1994 to the present 
The era of low carbon and hydraulic fracturing (fracking) began in the mid-1990s during the 
Kyoto negotiations, has spanned three presidential administrations including President Bill 
Clinton, President G.W. Bush, President Barack Obama, and is still emerging. From 1994, the 
era of low carbon and fracking has been marked by the following developments in electricity 
generation and supply: 
• Contentious and politicised debates across the United States on climate change 
mitigation in electricity generation and supply by the federal government 
(Harris, 2009; Kraft, 2012).  
• The use of hydraulic fracturing in increasing the supplies of natural gas and the 
opposition to hydraulic fracking from some cities and state governments 
(Baddour, 2015; Z. Wang & Krupnick, 2013a) combined with the onset of cheap 
natural gas displacing coal in electricity generation (Haddadian & Shahidehpour, 
2015; Krupnick, Wang, & Wang, 2013). 
• More states driven by climate change, energy security and competition are 
diversifying their electricity generation and supply, through renewable energy 
portfolios, natural gas and third party owned distributed energy providers 
(Byrne, Hughes, Rickerson, & Kurdgelashvili, 2007; Rabe, 2002, 2004b, 2006a, 
2008; Rabe, Roman, & Dobelis, 2005). 
• State undertaking low carbon energy, increased energy efficiency, renewable 
mandates and subsidies (Chandler, 2009; Rabe, 2006a). 
 
This section begins with the ongoing contentious debates about climate change policies at the 
federal level. Followed by, the natural gas expansion and transformation of the electricity 
sector across the United States. Then, the drivers for ongoing state restructuring of electricity 
generation and supply are explored and finally, the chapter analyses the ways in which states 
are undertaking low carbon energy restructuring. 
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— Federal contention over climate change 
From 1994, international negotiations geared towards a global response on climate change 
strengthened (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997a) the presiding 
Clinton administration belief that climate change was real (Harris, 2009), that the United States 
was one of the highest contributors of global CO2 emissions (European Commission Joint 
Research Centre, 2016) and that the federal government should take action towards reducing 
U.S. CO2 emissions (Harris, 2009; Joskow, 2001b). Indeed, Bill Clinton’s Vice President, Albert 
Arnold Gore, Jr. had been an environmental advocate during his time in senate and considered 
climate change a major issue (Harris, 2009; Joskow, 2001b). 
However, the Clinton administration was constrained by the Republican Party majority in 
Congress in 1994. Commonly referred to as the Republican Revolution (Clymer, 1994; 
History.com Staff, 2010), the Republican party gained control over both the United States 
House of Representatives and the United States Senate on November 8th, 1997 (Clymer, 1994). 
The Republican-dominated Congress proceeded to weaken many environmental departments 
through budgets cuts in research programs and subsequently climate change reduction efforts 
(Harris, 2009; Kraft, 2012). Multiple debates took place in Congress around what constituted 
“valid scientific views” (G. J. Brown, 1997), especially as climate change came under intense 
scrutiny and scepticism. The late Representative George Brown Jr., a Californian Democrat, 
expressed at the time: 
“In their call for regulatory reform, members stated that “sound” science would be a basic 
element of the process. Apparently, sound science dictated the need for repeals, rollbacks, 
and research budget cuts. The majority justified proposed cuts in the budget of the global 
climate change research program, for example, by arguing that the program was merely 
politicized science, the product of “the Vice President of the United States’ zeal for this 
particular issue,” a zeal equivalent to “environmental fanaticism” (Brown, 1997, p. 1). 
On the nature of the hearings He adds: 
“Supposedly a contest between equally valid scientific views, the hearings were in reality 
nothing less than a scientific court. The subcommittee played the role of judge and sought 
to determine scientific truth by soliciting testimony and asking questions. In reality, by 
substituting its own judgment for that of the scientific community, the subcommittee 
achieved exactly what it purported to condemn-the politicization of science. In the end, the 
hearings produced no credible substantiation of any of the claims of scientific misconduct. 
Instead, they made it quite clear that the science related to these issues was being 
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conducted in an objective and apolitical manner, consistent with the traditional norms of 
scientific integrity. It was never demonstrated that the alleged incidents leading, to the 
charges had any influence on the interpretation of science for policy” (Brown, 1997, p. 14). 
On the politics of Congressional members conducting these investigations Brown adds: 
“The witnesses and subcommittee members making these allegations seemed to 
fundamentally mistrust not only government-funded science but the process of peer review 
as a means of ensuring scientific quality and integrity. Scientific truth, they seemed to 
believe, was more likely to be found at the fringe than at the centre. This belief represents 
not only a repudiation of the validity of the scientific process and peer review but a serious 
misunderstanding of the history of science” (Brown, 1997, p. 14). 
However, the most significant action was under the 105th Congress; on July 25th 1997 the 
United States Senate voted on a resolution known as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (Library of 
Congress, 1997) to oppose any greenhouse gas reduction agreement made by the Clinton 
administration under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Harris, 
2009; Kraft, 2012; Library of Congress, 1997). This was because even though the Clinton 
administration had expressed concerns about the binding emissions reductions targets at the 
time, especially those related to developing nations (Kraft, 2012; Woolley & Peters, 1997), it 
did negotiate actively and reach an agreement of an emissions reduction target of 7% below 
1990 levels (Kraft, 2012; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997b).  
Nevertheless, it was the binding targets and their effects on the United States economy that 
the United States Senate was particularly wary of, and this was reflected in the vote. The Byrd-
Hagel Resolution passed by a vote of 95 – 0 (Library of Congress, 1997). The main arguments 
made during the Congressional debates on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution included the effects on 
the economy and the need to include developing nations in the U.N treaty: 
“This resolution rejects the United Nations’ current negotiating strategy of binding United 
States and other developed nations to legally binding reductions without requiring any new 
or binding commitments from 130 developing nations, such as China, Mexico, and South 
Korea. In addition, this resolution rejects any treaty or other agreement that would cause 
serious economic harm to the United States” (p. 3, Congressional Record, Proceedings and 
debates of the 105th Congress, First Session, Friday, July 25, 1997).  
 “What this means to everyday Americans is very clear. The AFL–CIO has estimated the 
treaty would mean the loss of 1.25 to 1.5 million jobs. Energy prices will rise dramatically. 
Individual Americans will pay for this treaty either in their electric bills, at the gas pump, or 
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by losing their jobs.” (p. 4, Congressional Record, Proceedings and debates of the 105th 
Congress, First Session, Friday, July 25, 1997). 
Some of the sponsors of the resolution also exemplified the problem: 
“Some – like Senator Robert Byrd, who represented West Virginia, a major coal-producing 
region whose source of income would be hurt by a reduction in demand for greenhouse-
gas –intensive fuels like coal, almost certainly intended the resolution to prevent U.S. action 
on climate altogether, rather than simply signal the necessity of involving developing states 
in emissions reductions. (The same may be true for Senator Chuck Hagel, from Nebraska, 
where industrial agriculture is heavily dependent on fossil fuel use.)” (Kraft, 2012, p. 217 - 
218). 
Ultimately, the Senate resolution meant that the Clinton Administration would not be able to 
ratify the agreement: 
“President Bill Clinton signed the agreement on behalf of the United States (something 
George W. Bush tried – unsuccessfully – to undo once he took office), but he knew that 
efforts at ratification would be fruitless” (Kraft, 2012, p. 218). 
Since 1997, international climate change mitigation strategies have been ongoing within most 
industrialised nations including within the European Union (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1997c). 
Nevertheless, the United States legislative and executive branch of the government continue 
to be politically polarised and contentious because of significant political, ideological, 
economic, governing and regional disparities around electricity generation and supply. The 
conflict is political in the sense that environmental and energy policy has become increasingly 
partisan, with both political parties significantly at odds on the subject of climate change 
(Fuller, 2014). Ideological differences remain on the role of the U.S. federal government in 
intervening in state electricity generation and supply through CO2 reduction measures. 
Regulatory and natural resource differences across the states and regions have resulted in 
highly varied electricity generation profiles. All these issues have resulted in gridlock, with 
multiple attempts to pass laws explicitly relating to CO2 reduction but never being successful. 
The gridlock at the federal government has been an ongoing issue for the U.S. since 2001. For 
example, whilst the Clinton administration had reservations about international climate 
change binding targets, the administration did create pro-environmental policies specifically 
promoting low carbon technologies and energy efficiency: 
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“The Department of Energy’s policies were heavily influenced by the Administration’s 
environmental policy agenda, including concerns about global climate change. The DOE 
gradually reallocated R&D funding and policy initiatives away from coal and nuclear R&D 
programs toward programs focused on promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy 
supplies, and the development of more efficient vehicles that use fuels other than 
petroleum. Federal expenditures supporting energy efficiency, renewables, and alternative 
fuel vehicles increased significantly while funding for coal and nuclear technology declined. 
After 1994, these initiatives were impeded by a Republican Congress that was hostile to the 
DOE in general and the Clinton administration’s favourite energy programs in particular” 
(Joskow, 2001, p. 17 – 18). 
The G. W. Bush administration was however very different in its dealing with climate change 
as a concern: 
“Perceptions of US disinterest in international climate change mitigation efforts have been 
fuelled by several key Bush Administration policy decisions: (1) the Administration’s refusal 
to support adoption of the Kyoto Protocol; (2) its prioritization in US energy policy of next-
generation fossil fuel and nuclear energy technologies over renewables such as wind and 
solar; and (3) its efforts to cast doubt about the phenomenon due to scientific 
‘‘uncertainties,’’ while also denying a scientific consensus exists about the need to reduce 
GHG emissions (Byrne, Hughes, Rickerson & Kurdgelashvili, 2007, p. 4556). 
 
Additionally: 
“Despite the Environmental Protection Agency declaring the dangers of global warming, he 
actively sought to prevent domestic regulation of carbon dioxide. His policy proposals 
involved voluntary measures and research on new technologies. Meanwhile, Republicans 
of Congress in particular, using their party’s control of Congress, pushed and advocated 
scepticism about climate change, building on similar efforts by fossil-fuel industries” (Harris, 
2009, p. 969 – 970). 
 
Despite the administration’s efforts, the closest and bipartisan attempt at passing climate 
change legislation came during the 110th Congress (2007 – 2009), where the America’s Climate 
Security Act of 2007 – 2008 was introduced. The bill was commonly known as the Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2007 – 2008, because it was the original work of an 
Independent Joseph Lieberman [ID-CT], Republican John Warner (R-VA) with 7 Democrats and 
4 Republicans as the co-sponsors ("America's Climate Security Act of 2007," 2007).  
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The bill in essence proposed “Cap and Trade”,  a cross-sectoral bill which sought to establish a 
federal greenhouse gas registry, set up an allowable emissions quantity and made 
requirements for trading, transferring and offsetting emissions (Library of Congress, 2008). The 
bill’s supporters were hopeful for its passage, as there was reluctant support from both 
environmentalists and businesses. 
In terms of numbers, the sponsors were confident that they had enough Republicans to 
support the bill as well Democrats from politically difficult areas in the South and other coal 
burning regions. However, many concerns started to emerge as debates took place; concerns 
from those needed to be on board with its passage were not only partisan and ideological but 
regional as well, as the nature of the bill would inadvertently penalize the South and industrial 
Midwest more because of the greater proportion of coal use in those areas. There was also 
uncertainty because even though the sponsors had tried to gather support from 
environmentalists and businesses, there was still the issue that carbon reduction targets were 
seen as too aggressive by the business community, while environmentalists saw the targets as 
not strict enough, acerbated by the bill containing too many give-aways; even though the give-
aways were needed to back it. 
Permit auctions were a sticking point for environmentalists and critics of the bill. The bill sought 
to auction about 25% of the credits and have 75.5% of the carbon credits given for free to 
power plants, oil and gas refineries and processing plants, manufacturing companies and states 
in order to benefit consumers (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2008) in 2012. The 
auctioned carbon credits would then be increased from approximated 59% by 2032 (Center 
for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2008). Critics argued that instead all the credits should be 
auctioned off and also argued that the biggest polluters historically would benefit the most 
whilst the cleaner and more environmentally-conscious companies would lose out. 
Furthermore the funds raised from the auctions should be rewarded straight to the consumers 
to offset the higher energy prices, anticipated in the short term (Los Angeles Times, 2007). 
Instead, as it stood the bill was estimated to raise $6.7 trillion for the duration of process (40 
years) but the funds raised would be used to compensate polluters (Los Angeles Times, 2007; 
Pooley, 2008). 
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While both Democrats and Republicans agreed that climate change was real, points of 
disagreement included the solutions to the problems, the cost and how the bill would drive up 
energy prices and destroy the economy (Pooley, 2008). The bill needed 60 votes to pass the 
senate; the bill was defeated on the Senate floor on June 6th, 2008, in a vote of 48-36 
("America's Climate Security Act of 2008," 2008). Nevertheless, some of the bill’s sponsors 
were positive about the process, because this was the closest the United States congress had 
come to reaching an agreement on climate change. In addition the bill’s sponsors and the new 
President now knew the difficult areas, the areas of agreement and even who the deal breakers 
where (Pooley, 2008). 
The Barack Obama administration continued to experience the same gridlock, consistently 
urging Congress to act on climate change. An example can be seen in an excerpt of the 
President’s 2013 State of Union address, whereby, after acknowledging the role of increased 
domestic oil and natural gas production in the U.S. economy, still calls for congressional action 
on climate change and hinted at the use of executive action on climate change: 
“But for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat climate 
change. Now, it's true that no single event makes a trend. But the fact is, the 12 hottest 
years on record have all come in the last 15. Heat waves, droughts, wildfires, floods—all are 
now more frequent and more intense. We can choose to believe that Superstorm Sandy 
and the most severe drought in decades and the worst wildfires some States have ever seen 
were all just a freak coincidence. Or we can choose to believe in the overwhelming judgment 
of science and act before it's too late. Now, the good news is we can make meaningful 
progress on this issue while driving strong economic growth. I urge this Congress to get 
together, pursue a bipartisan, market-based solution to climate change, like the one John 
McCain and Joe Lieberman worked on together a few years ago. But if Congress won't act 
soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive 
actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities 
for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable 
sources of energy.” 
President Obama, February 12th, 2013, United States Capitol, American Presidency Project 
 
The U.S. Congress has not sent any bill and as the history of low carbon highlights, there is 
currently too much contention and not enough of political support in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate to pass any stringent CO2 emission reduction measures. 
Additionally, the development of the electricity network, which resulted in considerable 
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variation in state generating profiles and governing structures means that there are significant 
details like cost which are proving difficult to overcome by the federal government. 
 
— State low carbon actions since the Kyoto Protocol 
A key development in the era of low carbon and fracking has been that whilst the U.S. Congress 
and subsequent administrations spar over the Kyoto Protocol and climate change in general, 
from the late 1990s certain state governments were more proactive than federal government 
for a range of reasons, including a stronger commitment to climate policy and an economic 
rationale for decarbonisation (Rabe, 2002, 2004b, 2006a, 2008; Rabe et al., 2005). A timeline 
of state actions on climate change would acknowledge that there was a period in the late 1980s 
of heightened climate change awareness during which 12 state legislatures, including Arizona, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, Wisconsin, introduced bills and laws detailing the reduction targets of 
greenhouse gas emissions (U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). The focus of these 
reduction targets were chlorofluorocarbons and increased energy efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the rapid growth in state Climate Action Plans (CAP) to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions across all sectors of the economy essentially began in the late 1990s. Rabe (2004) 
describes the contents of the Climate Actions Plans: 
“Dozens of states produced detailed “greenhouse gas inventories”; some used these to 
formulate “action plans” outlining various strategies for emission reduction. These analyses 
provided an empirical foundation for much subsequent state policy activity and also served, 
in many states, as an initial opportunity to bring together constituents from diverse state 
agencies, industries, universities, and advocacy groups to meet and consider climate change 
as a state policy issue” (p.19). 
Other literature including Stephen Wheeler’s 2008 account of first generation state and 
municipal climate change plans gives a detailed breakdown on particular action plans, from the 
early to the late 1990s. As shown in figure 3-13: 
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Table 3-3: Shows Characteristics of State Climate Action Plans 
Source: Wheeler (2008). State and Municipal Climate Change Plans: The First Generation 
 
Furthermore, these initial greenhouse gas reduction activities from the 12 states also coincided 
with federal policy on air pollution in the early 1990s – the 1970 Clean Air Act, amended on 
November 15, 1990 (Rabe, 2004a). These amendments increased state commitments to 
greenhouse gas reductions. Additionally, this first group of states set a platform for more 
greenhouse gas policies in the late 1990s with discussions around the Kyoto Protocol and also 
passed some important laws specifically targeting CO2 emissions. Rabe (2004), uses the 
examples of Minnesota in 1993 and Oregon in 1997: 
“Some significant state laws were approved during this period, ranging from Minnesota’s 
1993 legislation to include the environmental and economic impacts of carbon dioxide 
releases as a formal component of decisions on energy development to Oregon’s 1997 law 
that established carbon dioxide emission standards for any electrical power plant opened 
in the state” (p. 20). 
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Concurrently, an estimated 16 states resisted making any changes with regards to greenhouse 
gas reductions, Kyoto and anything relating to climate change. These state legislatures showed 
resistance to the United States Senate by resolving to oppose any Kyoto related decision by 
the United States Senate, should it be considered. Some of these 16 states created and passed 
legislation to the same effect. These states were Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, Colorado, Illinois, Idaho, 
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana and Mississippi (Rabe, 2002). Rabe uses the example of West 
Virginia in 1998, which by means of legislation barred any state agencies from contracting with 
any federal agencies on greenhouse gas reduction. These states were a combination of heavy 
coal use states, coal producing states and heavy industrial states located across the Midwest 
and the Southeast of the United States. Since this period (1990s to 2004) of climate action and 
resistance, more states and cities across the country have created some form of action on 
greenhouse gases (Byrne et al., 2007; Rabe, 2004b; Wheeler, 2008).  
Rabe (2004) states: 
“New legislation and executive orders intended to reduce greenhouse gases have been 
approved in more than one-third of the states since January 2000. Multiple programs have 
been enacted in some states, and many new legislative proposals are being advanced in a 
large number of states. These new programs include formal carbon dioxide caps on 
particular industries, state-wide goals for greenhouse gas reductions, formal agreements 
with utilities and industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, mandates to generate 
specified levels of electricity from sources that generate no greenhouse gases, mandatory 
reporting of carbon dioxide emissions, voluntary registries for industries seeking credit for 
reductions in any future regulatory regime, and de facto “carbon taxes” on utility bills that 
create pools of funds for energy efficiency, among others” (Rabe, 2004, p. 20). 
 
Wheeler (2008) and Byrne (2007), also show that large and small cities across the United States 
have embraced climate change and initiated policies to that effect: 
“Since 2000, municipal efforts have been further advanced by the Sierra Club’s Cool Cities 
campaign, launched in 2005, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection 
Agreement, initiated by Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels, also in 2005. More than 500 mayors 
have signed this agreement, in which cities commit to meet Kyoto Protocol goals and to 
urge state and federal governments to take action” (Wheeler, 208, p. 482). 
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“The US CCP participants represent some of the largest urban centres in the country and 
account for 19% of US population. American CCP commitments have been amplified by the 
US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, launched in February 2005 and endorsed 
unanimously by the US Conference of Mayors in June 2005. Under the agreement, 435 cities 
have committed to meet or exceed the US Kyoto reduction target, and to lobby state, 
regional, and federal officials to take more aggressive action on climate change” (Byrne, 
2007, p. 4559). 
 
Detailed breakdown of the large cities and the characteristics of their climate action plans is 
shown in Table 3-4. 
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Table 3-4: Shows Characteristics of Large Cities Climate Action Plans 
Source: Wheeler (2008). State and Municipal Climate Change Plans: The First Generation 
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— State-wide adoption of energy efficiency and renewable mandates 
An ongoing development in the era of low carbon has been increased state-wide adoption of 
low carbon energy policies in the form of energy efficiency and renewable energy mandates. 
There is evidence of more state governments and public service commissions’ mandating 
renewable energy development of some sort. Some of the more popular tools are Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS), Energy Efficiency Standards (EEPS), and Net-Metering, all attempts 
to create a state market for renewable energy, potentially save on capital costs of new 
centralised power plants and increase energy efficiency measures and customer savings. 
Since 2000, more state governments and regulators have created varying forms of renewable 
energy requirements and energy efficiency standards. Currently an estimated 29 states have 
increased their renewable energy generation and some have made their targets stricter. No 
longer predominantly motivated by climate change, there are increasing pressures on states 
to use renewable portfolio standards to enhance job creation, reduce wholesale electricity 
prices and possibly raise consumer savings (Rabe, 2006b, 2008; Ryan et al., 2016). 
The state of Iowa was the only state to adopt an Alternative Energy law in 1983 (Iowa General 
Assembly, 1983). This was officially the country’s first Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) and was the only renewable energy mandate for nearly 10 years. The 1983 legislature’s 
reasons were stated as the need for increased conservation and efficiency of finite energy 
resources (Iowa General Assembly, 1983). Other states officially began to adopt renewable 
energy portfolios in the late 1990, at the beginning of the low carbon era. The Renewable 
Energy Portfolio (RPS) is a regulatory measure requiring an increase in renewable energy in 
electricity, until a specific amount of electricity is generated from renewable energy resources 
by a specified date, For example, 15% by 2020 (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2014), 
hence specific targets and carve-outs vary across states. Figure 3-12, shows the timeline for 
state renewable energy portfolio adoptions from its inception to the present. 
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Figure 3-12: Shows the timeline for Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards 
Source: Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2011 
 
Furthermore, the renewable energy portfolio, whilst not being the most cost-effective 
mechanism to reduce carbon emissions (Rabe, 2006a), is the most politically attractive. This is 
because it can be argued as a “cost-free” approach by decision makers, because it achieves 
numerous objectives including a reduction in carbon emissions (environmental benefits), 
investments, tax revenues (economic benefits) and comes with support from across the 
political spectrum. It is described as a political calculus with benefits (Rabe, 2008). The RPS also 
has the advantage of being perceived as not being a carbon tax by decision makers but rather 
a way to diversify the electricity generation mix. As can be seen in figure 3-13, the entire South- 
eastern region, with the exception of North Carolina, has very little renewable energy and has 
not adopted any renewable energy portfolios. This is supported by empirical studies on factors 
driving renewable energy portfolio adoption which show that the more heavily a state relies 
on coal or other fossil fuels, the less likely they are to introduce renewable energy (Chandler, 
2009; Lyon & Yin, 2010; Rabe, 2004b, 2008).  
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Figure 3-13: Shows Renewable Energy Portfolios in 2015 
Source: DSIRE, 2015 
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Additionally, even states without renewable energy mandates at the time of writing were still 
increasing renewable energy production compared to where they were in late 1990s and 2000. 
A reason for this growth could be the federal incentives for renewable energy development 
becoming more consistent and substantial since the 1990s. Some states and municipalities 
have taken advantage of federal incentives such as the Production Tax Credits (PTC) and 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and combined them with in-state tax credits to develop low carbon 
energy technologies at a cheaper cost. The most prominent example being Texas, which used 
the Production Tax Credits (PTC) signed into law by President Bush, and has since developed an 
estimated 10,00MW of wind energy generation (Byrne et al., 2007).  
Federal incentives such as the Production Tax Credit (PTC) have clearly been important to the 
growth of renewable energy since 2000. The tax credits have become a prominent feature of 
the low carbon era because, whilst not always consistent due to being a casualty of the federal 
level climate change politics, they have increased in value, therefore assisting in the overall 
costing and financing of the projects (Bolinger, Wiser, Cory, & James, 2009). An incentive like 
the Production Tax Credit (PTC) is an inflation adjusted tax credit for electricity generation from 
renewable energy resources (in kWh) by a company (North Carolina Clean Energy Technology 
Center, 2005; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2015). It has been significant for wind energy 
growth in the U.S. The wind energy incentive is listed at 2.3 ¢/kWh during the initial 10 years 
of operation. Some technologies like landfill gas, open-loop biomass and even municipal solid 
waste are listed at 1.1 ¢/kWh. The impact of the PTC on wind energy installed capacity is seen 
in Figure 3-14: 
 
Figure 3-14: Shows the history of the PTC cycle 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2015 
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The map in figure 3-15 captures this development, whilst noting the major growth is on the 
West coast. 
 
Figure 3-15: Compares the shares of renewable energy generation across states between 2001 and 2011 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012 
Finally, the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS), also began in the late 1990s in the 
state of Texas.  It is a similar tool to the RPS but instead of renewable energy, it focuses on 
energy savings. Hence, the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) is a target for energy 
savings established by state governments and regulators for utilities and non-utilities to 
achieve through efficiency measures on the customer side and on the electricity generation 
and supply network i.e. operational infrastructure efficiency (American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy, 2015). 
— The use and opposition to increasing hydraulic fracturing 
The rapid development of shale gas and the increased use of fracking has come under 
increasing and sustained opposition (Baddour, 2015; Jopson, 2014); due to concerns about 
water (treatment, demand, waste disposal, spills), air (greenhouse gas emissions), seismicity 
(induced earthquakes) and health in some cities and states, opposition (Arent et al., 2015; 
Krupnick, Kopp, Hayes, & Roeshot, 2014; Logan, Medlock, & Boyd, 2015; Q. Wang, Chen, Jha, 
& Rogers, 2014). According to the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2015): 
“Conflicts regarding environmental impacts have also emerged in certain areas of the 
country, leading to restrictions and moratoria on drilling by state, county, and municipal 
governments and raising questions about the industry's continued social license to operate 
in specific jurisdictions. Efforts by local governments to exert more control over shale gas 
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development have resulted in litigation in several states as well as new legislation and 
regulations intended to resolve some of these conflicts. Recent public opinion surveys 
reveal a general appreciation for the economic benefits of shale gas development but 
continued concerns about potential health and environmental impacts” (p. 4). 
State and city governments that have introduced controls over fracking include, New Mexico 
County, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, four cities in Ohio, Beverly Hills, New York State and Boulder, 
Colorado (Baddour, 2015; Jopson, 2014). These states, cities and local communities have 
banned or temporarily suspended fracking until environmental studies on the effects of 
fracking in their communities are complete. Assessments about environmental impacts are still 
ongoing and as of yet, it remains unclear how these bans will affect the associated electric 
utilities ability to buy cheaper natural gas for electricity generation. 
Another development in the era of low carbon and fracking has been the now common 
practice of using hydraulic fracturing to increase the supplies of natural gas, resulting in cheap 
natural gas domestically. A result of the availability of cheap natural gas has been that, since 
2007, natural gas has started competing with coal in electricity generation across the country, 
reducing the demand for coal-fired electricity and increasingly displacing coal in electricity 
dispatch across the entire country by natural gas (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2016b). In short, natural gas has become favoured over coal by utility managers (Krupnick et 
al., 2013). Estimates of a 29% reduction in utilisation rates of coal-fired power plants from 2007 
to 2015 have been recorded (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016b). 
Electricity generation from coal is reported to have peaked in 2007 and started to decline in 
2008 (Logan et al., 2015; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016b). What makes this 
recent development in the decline of coal electricity generation different, compared to its 
decline during the utility growth era has been the stable increase of coal’s prices in relation to 
falling natural gas prices and environmental regulation. Before the shale boom (2007 – 2008), 
when natural gas capacity grew, coal also consistently grew (Logan et al., 2015), however, in 
the era of low carbon and fracking, low natural gas prices, the compatibility of natural gas with 
renewable energy systems, stricter environmental regulations for coal and coal transportation 
costs combine to effectively reduce the demand for coal. Figure 3-16 shows the drop in coal 
usage across all states: 
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Figure 3-16: Shows the Electric Power Consumption of Coal by State from 2007 – 2015 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual, 2015 
 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s electricity annual power report 
(2011): 
“The increase in delivered coal prices and the decrease in delivered natural gas prices, 
combined with surplus capacity at highly-efficient gas-fired combined-cycle plants resulted 
in coal-to-gas fuel switching This occurred particularly in the Southeast (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina) and also Pennsylvania” (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2009, p. 9). 
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The U.S. Energy Information Administration provides data to that effect and shows how gas 
plants are increasingly being run in a way they were not necessarily designed to be (peaking 
plants to baseload plants) even in the Southeast. The graphs can be seen in figures 3-17 to 3-
19. 
 
 
Figure 3-17: Shows the electricity dispatch curve of Power Plant Operations in the Southeast for 2010 
Source: (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012a) 
 
Figure 3-18: Shows the electricity dispatch curve of Power Plant Operations in the Southeast for 2011 
Source: (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012a) 
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Figure 3-19: Shows the electricity dispatch curve of Power Plant Operations in the Southeast for 2012 
Source: (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012a) 
 
The significance to a region like the Southeast – and to a lesser degree the Midwest, cannot be 
overstated because of the historical dominance of coal in its electricity generation mix (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2012a). Some states in the Midwest like Ohio which 
reduced coal consumption by 49% lie in close proximity to the Marcellus and Utica shale gas 
formations (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016b). Other states in the Midwest, 
(figure 3-14) including, Michigan – 19%, Iowa – 26%, Illinois – 23%, Missouri – 13%, Wisconsin 
– 9%, Minnesota – 23%, Indiana – 37%, had reduced coal consistently between the 2007 and 
2015 period, but much more slowly than the other regions (Logan et al., 2015).  
However, what these state reports indicate that the reduction in coal can not only be 
attributed to natural gas and that the entry of renewable energy into the generation mix of 
some of these states accounts for some coal reduction (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2016b). In the Southeast and Northeast regions, some of these reductions in 
coal are not only happening by underutilising coal plants, but also by converting coal-fired 
plants under threat of closure to gas-fired power plants (figure 3-20). 
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Figure 3-20: Shows the utilities converting coal plants to natural gas 
Source: National Geographic, 2014 
 
In summary, the impacts of cheap natural gas on electricity generation and supply in U.S. are 
ongoing, especially in terms of the impact on renewable energy contributions to electricity 
generation (Krupnick et al., 2014; Krupnick et al., 2013). This is especially the case where coal 
is the electric utility’s fuel of choice. Nevertheless, it is clear that by 2012 in many states coal 
usage was in decline and was no longer competing on price with natural gas (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2012b). Low natural gas prices encourage and give electric utilities 
the option to increase the use of gas-fired plants in electricity generation by increasing the 
utilisation factor of existing natural gas-fired turbines, which means running the gas-fired plants 
as a baseload option as opposed to being used solely as a peaking plant. It also gives utilities 
the option to convert coal fired turbines due to be closed due to environmental (emissions) 
reasons, costs and other regulatory concerns to natural gas turbines (Nunez, 2014). 
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3.2 FRAMEWORKS FOR U.S. STATE LEVEL ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY BY 2013 
This section summarises the context for electricity generation in the USA by the time of 
research (2013), including, the different electricity management models within states and the 
existing mode of electricity generation. It also highlights potential tensions between federal 
and state governments on electricity CO2 emission regulation, potential challenges to the 
business models of incumbent power companies and changing consumer preferences.  
3.2.1 Current electricity management models within states 
At the time of the research, there were roughly three models of electricity management in 
operation across the U.S. They are: 
• The Restructured model, which involves a wholesale market for electricity generators 
controlled by Independent System Operators (ISO), and allowing competition for the 
customer at the retail level (picking their suppliers). This model can be seen in most of 
the Northeast states as well as Texas. Generators can also specialise in the type of 
electricity generation they wish to offer e.g. renewable energy as well as the customer 
segment e.g. industrial or residential (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a). This 
electricity model emerged from the energy security era mainly through the 
introduction of PURPA by the federal government and the restructuring era (3.1.c - 
3.1.e). Reflecting back on the energy security era shows that most states which 
embraced PURPA, including California and the north-eastern states, were eventually 
stuck with uneconomic contracts and went on to attempt to restructure their electricity 
markets by unbundling electricity generation from transmission and distribution and 
providing retail choice. The process meant allowing independent power providers the 
ability to enter the market. Whilst the California energy crisis suspended many 
deregulation attempts across the country, the entire northeast with the exception of 
Vermont successfully deregulated their electricity markets. 
• The traditional cost of service regulation model, is guided by an Integrated Resource 
Plan, a State Public Service Commission, a utility granted a monopoly franchise. It is 
negotiated through docketed proceedings where energy plans are debated, countered, 
and amended by all parties with an interest in state energy planning. Utility managers, 
regulators, technical experts, consumers and other advocates are all part of the 
electricity planning process. This model is predominantly found in the Southeast, the 
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Midwest and some states in the Pacific Northwest with strong regional and federal 
utilities (Boyd, 2014). Reflecting back to the energy security and restructuring era, 
these are the states which generally resisted PURPA and they have remained the same. 
These states, like Georgia, North Carolina and most of the Midwest except for Ohio, 
Illinois and Michigan, did not pursue deregulation and consumer retail choice. These 
states had some of the lowest electricity rates in the late 1990s and although they 
proposed restructuring studies, the regional powerful investor-owned utilities 
(Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015) and the California crisis combined to resist any further 
attempts. These regions have continued with the traditional model of electricity 
generation. 
• Finally, the partially restructured or hybrid model, which involves a wholesale market 
for electricity generators controlled by Independent System Operators (ISO) but with a 
retail level controlled by utility monopolies and granted service areas (Boyd, 2014). 
The models of electricity governing are distinctly geographical, specifically regional. There are 
five outlier states including, Oregon, Montana, Texas, Illinois and Vermont. The rest follow a 
regional pattern. The reasons why some regions ended up with either a restructured, 
traditional monopoly with cost of service regulation or partially restructured model of 
electricity management are due to the events and decisions taken from past eras, specifically 
the energy security and restructuring eras (3.1e) and (3.1f). Certainly, over the last two eras, 
crucial decisions taken by Public Service Commissions and state legislatures with regards to 
investments in nuclear generation, power plant construction cost overruns, high electricity 
prices, PURPA (embraced or opposed) and restructuring (embraced or opposed) have resulted 
in quite distinct modes of governing across the United States. 
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3.2.2 The relationship between the federal level and states on carbon regulation 
The relationship between the federal level and states on CO2 regulation is one defined by 
jurisdictional and legal boundaries. In electricity generation and supply the federal 
government’s role is governed by the 10th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which helps define the relationship between federal and state governments generally. It states 
“the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people” (Cornell Legal Information 
Institute, 1992) Electricity generation and supply falls under state jurisdiction and is governed 
at the state level, through public service commissioners and state legislature. However the U.S. 
federal government is never fully separate from state level electricity generation because of 
its ability to intervene in an energy crisis and also through the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s role (EPA) in air and water pollution control (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2015a). 
A current and ongoing source of legal and jurisdictional conflict between federal and state 
governments has been when some states pushed back on the federal level (such as through 
the Environmental Protection Agency) to act on CO2 emission pollution, in the way that 
resulted in the landmark case “MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY et al.” The states petitioning for CO2 emission regulation included Massachusetts 
(main petitioner), California Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, the District of Columbia. The cities included 
New York City and Baltimore. The states which sided with the Environmental Protection Agency 
included, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, 
and Utah (Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2007).  
Ultimately, the outcome was that the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the EPA 
had a duty to regulate greenhouse gas emissions including CO2 emission (Cornell Legal 
Information Institute, 2007). This duty to regulate CO2 emissions led the Environmental 
Protection Agency to propose CO2 emissions standards for emission control from new power 
plants on March 27th, 2012 (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015a, 2016). 
Furthermore, a consequence and significance of this ruling was that in the absence of federal 
government action on climate change, the Environmental Protection Agency has sought to 
regulate CO2 emissions from new and existing power plants in electricity generation 
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(Environmental Protection Agency, 2013d), causing conflict between the federal agency and 
some state electricity regulators in a sector primarily governed by the states. 
3.2.3 The relationship between the states and cities on carbon regulation 
One feature of US energy-carbon restructuring is the growth action by cities and municipal 
authorities as they seek to reduce CO2 emissions, promote renewable energy and ensure their 
competitive energy security (Byrne et al., 2007; Hodson & Marvin, 2009; Lutsey & Sperling, 
2008; Rutland & Aylett, 2008). The municipal scale impetus for action might overlap with or 
create tensions with the state level approach. For example, overlaps include helping to meet 
state level targets for energy efficiency or helping to meet state level targets for renewable 
energy goals. Some examples are presented below to highlight geographical variations in cities  
undertaking renewable energy development (Byrne et al., 2007), the overlaps/conflicts with 
state leaders and motivations. 
Two cities in the state of California – San Francisco and San Diego – have set 100% renewable 
energy electricity generation for 2030 and 2035 respectively (City of San Diego, 2016; San 
Francisco Department of Environment, 2012) as part of their climate change action plans. 
There is overlap between these renewable energy targets and the state of California’s energy 
goals in the solar energy development for example. Both cities are set in a regional context of 
a state (California), which had an electricity crisis from 2000 to 2001 (Sweeney, 2002) resulting 
in high electricity costs and bankrupt utilities and which led to policies to drive renewable 
energy generation and decentralisation such as the California Solar Initiative (CSI). California 
since then has set some of the most ambitious clean energy goals in the United States  
(California Energy Commission, 2015). The state senate established an RPS in 2002, mandating 
33% of renewable energy from utilities by 2020 (California Energy Commission, 2015). This 
target was amended to 50% by 2030 by Governor Jerry Brown on the 7th of October 2015. 
This means that at the local level, rates of electricity are high in California. In keeping with the 
context, the average electricity costs in the San Francisco were 23¢/kWh in July of 2015 and 
20¢/kWh by July 2016 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). The 100% renewable target for 
San Francisco was established in 2010 by then mayor Gavin Newsom (San Francisco 
Department of the Environment, 2012) and commitments included attempts to tackle climate 
change (San Francisco Department of the Environment, 2013), reduction in fossil fuel pollution, 
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reducing high electricity costs and boosting the local economy (San Francisco Department of 
Environment, 2012). The city’s plan to get to 100% renewable energy includes: energy 
efficiency programs, local renewable energy funding for technologies such as rooftop solar, 
net-metering advocacy, virtual net-metering, Pacific Gas & Electric’s green power purchase 
and the CleanPowerSF (San Francisco Department of Environment, 2012).  
The CleanPowerSF is the main method by which city authorities intend to reach their 100% 
renewable energy goal. CleanPowerSF is a Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) and means 
that the city of San Francisco, instead of creating a municipal electric utility, takes over the 
generation component of electricity, contracting with a supplier to provide the renewable 
energy required. However, the other electricity supply components remain functions of the 
investor-owned utility (San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, 2016). California is one of the 
few states that legally permit community choice aggregation (Stoner & Dalessi, 2009) but in 
spite of the legitimacy of the program there was still opposition, delay (Lagos & Baker, 2013) 
and legal challenges from external groups on behalf of PG&E (Baker, 2010), primarily because 
it undermined utility control. After a 10 year delay the CleanPowerSF began (Johnson, 2016) in 
May 2016. This example of San Francisco, represents one of the ways/strategies where a city 
is trying to take control over its energy generation and strengthen its energy security (Hodson 
& Marvin, 2010b). 
Another example is of Georgetown, Texas, whose municipal utility switched to 100% 
renewable energy in 2012 (City Hall, 2015). The utility did so by changing its electricity 
providers to out of state renewable energy companies (City Hall, 2015). This was made easier 
by the partially restructured electricity market in Texas (Public Utility Commission of Texas, 
n.d.). This example, shows where the city of Georgetown goals differs from or are similar to 
the state of Texas. The state of Texas had a renewable energy portfolio (North Carolina Clean 
Energy Technology Center, 2016), but voted to end the program in April 2015, not wanting to 
give renewable energy any more advantages (Malewitz, 2015b).  
On climate change however, Georgetown’s leaders share the state of Texas climate change 
scepticism (Satija, 2014), with city authorities making clear that the efforts to develop 
renewable energy had no connection to climate change whatsoever (Dart, 2015) but was 
instead about locking-in competitive, cheaper electricity rates than had been previously 
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obtained (Dart, 2015) as well as hedging against any future spikes in coal or natural gas price 
from changes regulations or market (Malewitz, 2015a). 
Section 3.2.1, highlights the regional differences, when cities attempt control of electricity 
generation and supply across the USA. It is apparent that the traditional regulated mode of 
electricity governing which dominates the south is more rigid than the restructured electricity 
markets in electricity governing. Therefore, compared to the Georgetown, San Francisco, San 
Diego and even Portland (Rutland & Aylett, 2008) examples, municipal renewable energy 
generation and supply across the South-eastern region continue to be limited to 
demonstration projects: 
“Energy and climate mitigation projects are usually primary and include efficiency 
improvements to government and community buildings. Renewable energy demonstration 
projects are frequently proposed, though not to the extent that they will become dominant 
suppliers of local power” (Morsch, 2011, p. 9). 
Renewable energy development in the South-eastern region is generally constrained by lack of 
local ownership of electricity infrastructure. Therefore, the lack of legal ownership of electricity 
infrastructure and subsequent development of renewable energy by municipal authorities or 
any other third parties at least in the Southeast indicates a more rigid and complicated system:  
“Stakeholders interested in efficiency improvements or renewables face a complex and 
highly regulated electricity system as well as a maze of legal parameters” (Morsch, 2011, p. 
10). 
 
3.2.4 The climate and energy goals of large firms in US 
In July 2014, a group of initially 12 major companies which grew to 58 companies, created a 
“Corporate Renewable Energy Buyers’ Principles” document which argued that in order to 
meet their pledged climate and energy goals, the marketplace should allow for increased 
access to renewable energy (Tawney, Baker, & Spitzer, 2014). All of these corporations were 
large Industrial and commercial users. They included big box stores like Walmart, Ikea, Staples, 
Target, hotel chains like, Starwood, Hilton and finally renowned corporations (blue-chip) 
including, Google, Microsoft, Bloomberg, Amazon, Hewlett-Packard, Facebook, 3M, GM.  
Page 112 of 311 
 
These industrial and commercial customers called for electricity providers to create more 
flexible options to buy renewable energy, the ability to buy renewable energy directly and 
crucially, at rates competitive to traditional electricity rates (Tawney et al., 2014).  
A crucial part of the principles list was the call for more access to third party renewable energy 
providers. Along with policies which encouraged clear and uncomplicated long term contracts 
for projects with third party renewable energy providers (Tawney et al., 2014). This meant 
making use of renewable energy power purchase agreements, leases and other types of 
contracts which reduced the cost of renewable energy projects and reduced price volatility: 
“A significant part of the value to us from renewable energy is the ability to lock in energy 
price certainty and avoid fuel price volatility. Many companies would like to have options 
for entering into contracts over various time periods” (Corporate Renewable Energy Buyers’ 
Principles, 2015, p. 2). 
This creates a potential tension between some electric utilities and commercial and industrial 
customers. Additionally, the combined commercial and industrial demand for electricity taken 
off the grid through self-generation or alternative forms of competitive electricity generation. 
The electric utility sector places high value on customer reliance, modelled load profiles and 
long established cost recovery methods (Edison Electric Institute, 2012a). However, according 
to the Edison Electric Institute: 
“A combination of technological innovation, public/regulatory policy, and changes in 
consumer objectives and preferences has resulted in distributed generation and other DER 
being on a path to becoming a viable alternative to the electric utility model” (Disruptive 
Challenges, 2013, p. 7). 
As such, there are or could be financial (costs and revenues) and technical threats to traditional 
electric business models, if electric utilities are not able to address or accommodate these new 
preferences and entrants (Kind, 2013). Concurrently at the time of research, there was also 
evidence to show that increasing numbers of residential customers across the country were 
starting to engage with renewable energy in new ways, including net-metering programs for 
solar energy (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012c). Net-metering is a way to credit 
residential and commercial customers who generate electricity from solar photovoltaics for 
the excess electricity sold to the grid at the full retail rate (Solar Energy Industries Association, 
2013).  
Page 113 of 311 
 
Not without controversy, net-metering programs started in the late 1990s as a means of 
encouraging renewable energy generation and have since spread across the U.S. (North 
Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, 2013). Encouraged by state government policies, by 
2010 all states except Tennessee had net-metering customers, with California having the 
largest share (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012c). These new developments in 
consumers producing their own electricity and third party providers being able to enter the 
market, have opened up discussions about what the future of the electric grid will look like, 
how it will be paid for and what are the fair ways to charge for electricity services provided to 
customers (Aggarwal & Harvey, 2013). Additionally, some of the influences of these changing 
consumer preferences i.e. a willingness to pay more for cleaner energy (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2014a), have resulted in existing electric utilities expanding their products to include 
green tariffs.  
Green tariffs (or green pricing) is the buying of renewable (green) electricity from an electric 
power provider. Generally, providers sell the renewable electricity at a premium 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2012b). Green tariffs are offered in both traditionally 
regulated electricity markets with assigned service territories and restructured electricity 
markets (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014b). Some of the reasons for offering green tariffs are 
to encourage renewable energy development and in other cases due to the decreasing costs 
of renewable energy. In 2002, across 32 states an estimated 300 IOUs and many publicly 
owned utilities offered green tariffs to approximately 26 million customers (Bird, Swezey, & 
Aabakken, 2004). By 2006 sales from green power were estimated to have developed 1GW of 
renewable energy capacity (Bird & Kaiser, 2007). By 2014 an estimated 850 utilities (IOUs and 
POUs) in the U.S. have green tariff options (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014a). 
Therefore, what can be seen in competitive markets and also in traditional regulated markets 
in the U.S. is a changing system where low carbon development is being increasingly 
incorporated into electricity generation and supply. These programs are being mandated by 
energy governing bodies across the country and come with strong political support. In 
summary, at the time of research there was uncertainty about how utilities are able to adapt 
not only to industrial but residential customers demands and how they intend to serve these 
customers. Additionally, an area of tension is how states with powerful Investor-owned utilities 
would deal with third party providers and potential competitors, examples include the 
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Southeast and the Midwest electricity markets. This is an issue because these are markets, 
where the monopoly utilities have been protected historically from competition. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
The low carbon and fracking era is introducing new challenges in the USA, and is forcing a major 
rethinking and restructuring of the entire system of electricity generation and supply systems. 
Additional pressures include the introduction of distributed electricity generation and supply 
in the form of third party electricity providers, self-generating customers who install rooftop 
solar, consumers demanding more renewable energy, shale gas and an uncertain regulatory 
and investment environment. There are significant disruptions to the current utility business 
model. The motivations for distributed generation and low carbon restructuring vary across 
the country.  What is clear from the literature are the many ways in which low carbon energy 
restructuring is becoming a key strategy to solve multiple local issues including electricity 
prices, economic competitiveness and climate change mitigation.  
Nevertheless, there is evidence of a regional divide in low carbon restructuring with the 
northeast, west coast, showing the most activity in terms of efforts aimed at renewable energy 
development and consumer integration. It would appear that restructured markets like the 
Western region, North-eastern, Mid-Atlantic states might be more exposed to low carbon 
restructuring whilst the traditional monopoly modes like the Southeast and the Midwest are 
more rigid. 
It is unclear to what extent progressive ideals about climate change and environmental 
protection have driven the issue of low carbon energy restructuring in states within the 
Western region and Northeast, for example, California, New York, Pennsylvania and Hawaii, or 
whether the motivation for low carbon restructuring has been primarily rooted in energy 
prices. This is important because the most extensive changes are currently being experienced 
in states with the highest electricity costs e.g. Hawaii and California. Further research is 
required to understand how the various pressures and challenges mapped in this chapter are 
influencing infrastructures and management choices in relation to energy generation and 
supply across the US.  The energy generation and supply system is different in each state and 
so is the impact of pressures for energy and low-carbon restructuring. It is in this context that 
the research now turns to the state of Georgia and the research objectives and questions are 
shown below. 
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the research objectives and questions that the thesis seeks to achieve 
and answer, the methods of data collection, the process of qualitative analysis that were 
followed and it addresses the ethical considerations that arose during the fieldwork and 
throughout the research. 
 
The aim of the research is to examine the changing context for decisions about electricity 
generation and supply in the USA. 
 
4.1.1 The Research Questions 
The following research questions are intended to address the objectives of the research: 
1. What are the governance and management structures for electricity generation and 
supply in Georgia? How and why are they changing? 
2. Who are the key actors and interests in energy restructuring and what is their impact? 
3. What does the Georgia case study contribute to understanding of low carbon energy 
restructuring and the changing institutional context for energy generation and supply 
in the USA and internationally? 
 
4.1.2 The Research Objectives 
The objectives of the research are as follows: 
1. To examine the impact of low carbon priorities on electricity generation and supply in 
the United States focusing on a case study of Georgia 
2. To investigate the relationship between low carbon priorities and other factors that 
might influence investment in electricity generation and supply 
3. To develop empirical and conceptual understanding of the restructuring of energy 
generation and supply systems in the current phase of low carbon restructuring   
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4.2 THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The thesis examines those questions through a single case study of the changing context for 
decisions about electricity generation and supply in the state of Georgia, focusing on state-
level frameworks and decisions taken by local government, firms and citizens within Georgia. 
The following section explains the reasons for choosing that approach and case study and 
potential strengths and limitations of the single case study method. 
 
4.2.1 The Case Study Approach 
Yin (2003), presents five strategies to social science research which include experiment, survey, 
archival analysis, history and case study. Yin (2003) explains that a case study is appropriate 
when ‘a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over 
which the investigator has little or no control’ (Yin, 2003, p.9). This means that the case study 
method is useful when the circumstances in that setting are relevant to the research. Since this 
research looks at how energy decisions are taken in the context of ongoing changes, 
uncertainties, challenges and opportunities and employs mainly how and why questions, the 
contextual conditions of this are critical to the research and the case study method is 
appropriate. Whilst experiments, history and sometimes surveys can answer “how” and “why” 
research questions, experiments require control of behavioural events/context in the study 
and historical method is used when studying the past and not contemporary events (Yin, 2003). 
The case study approach allows for a detailed understanding of how energy decisions are 
made, the context in which they are made and the factors driving or shaping those decisions, 
with interview participants, over whom I have no control, in a context that is new and under 
researched. This thesis adopts an embedded single case study approach, where the state of 
Georgia is considered as a general problem for the factors shaping decisions about energy 
generation and supply, recognising the specific context for decisions in Georgia. The study is 
conducted by analysing the changing contexts for energy governance and management and 
potential challenges to existing modes of electricity generation and supply at state level and 
within the state. The number of case studies was limited to one. 
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The decision was taken at the outset of the thesis to examine electricity generation and supply 
in the United States because of the interesting changing context which include a highly-
politicised debate on climate change, which has left the United States Congress at a gridlock 
over the passage of any low carbon law by the federal government. Second, technical 
breakthroughs in hydraulic fracturing have ushered in low cost natural gas, whilst 
simultaneously being opposed in more cities and states. Finally, citizens, firms, cities and states 
are increasingly and rapidly incorporating varied forms of low carbon restructuring, thereby 
changing and challenging the traditional relationships in electricity generation and supply 
between cities and states, firms/citizens and utilities. 
As set out in previous chapter, the geography of the United States is important for electricity 
generation and supply, since it has a mixture of electricity markets, economic, political and 
cultural circumstances. The research therefore presented a choice about whether to compare 
similar or different state contexts. Whilst there is value in comparing different geographical 
contexts including their response and vulnerability to the changing U.S. context, low carbon 
reduction commitments, pressures on the existing energy system, pressure for energy 
restructuring and the relationship between state-levels and cities in governing electricity and 
determining the lock-ins that exist across energy systems, it nevertheless became clear that 
fully understanding decision making would be a significant research task and that two 
comparative studies would limit the depth of the research. Fully understanding decision 
making requires capturing sufficient knowledge of wide ranging discussions, debates and 
interests in electricity generation and supply, given different markets, attitudes, values, 
regulatory frameworks, economic, political circumstances, and so the decision was taken to do 
one case study and to look in depth at the different interests shaping decisions. 
 
The researcher took the decision to do one case study and to look in depth at the different 
factors shaping decisions. The question was what to explore, why, the type of place and the 
spatial scale of analysis. These were based on an initial small piece of analysis of states which 
showed the following; regions and states in the U.S. which never restructured in the late 1970s 
and remain traditional vertically integrated include the Southeast and Midwest regions. These 
regions have also relied on one or two resources, predominantly coal for their electricity 
generation mix.  
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These states have an existing industrial sector or growing industries and have historically cheap 
electricity price. It was felt that this research could advance most by selecting a case study from 
these states. 
The state of Georgia was chosen as the case study for this research because having relied on 
coal for a large proportion of its electricity generation (Southern States Energy Board, 2012) 
since the early 2000s, the state energy company has started having interesting discussions and 
debates about low-carbon energy restructuring. Georgia was selected because it has been 
under-researched but also because it is a context where electricity prices are low and low-
carbon would not be expected to be a significant drive of change to the dominance of coal-
fired power stations. However initial research revealed evidence of pressures on the state 
electricity provider to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel and also pressures to open up the 
energy system to decentralised energy supply.  
Characteristics Georgia 
Capital Atlanta 
Region Southeast 
Population 9,992,167 
Demographics White 62.8%, Black or African American 31.2%, 
Hispanic or Latino 9.2%, Asian 3.5%, American Indian 
and Alaska Native alone 0.5% 
Governor Nathan Deal (R) 
Legislature State Senate 
Total - 56  
38 - Republicans 
18 - Democrats 
House of Representatives 
Total - 180 
118 - Republicans  
60 - Democrats 
1 - Independent 
Electricity Market Traditional Regulated (Cost of Service) 
Regulator Georgia Public Service Commission  
Utility Companies Georgia Power Company (IOU)  
42 - Electric membership corporations (EMCs)  
52 - Municipal electric power companies  
Average Electricity Retail Cost 9.63¢/KWh – 2013, 10.03 ¢/KWh - 2014 
Electricity Generation Mix Coal 35%, Natural gas 39%, Nuclear 23%, Hydro 3% 
Table 4-1: Characteristics of the Case Study; Georgia 
Source: Georgia General Assembly, October 2013, U.S. Census Bureau, 2012, Georgia Public Service Commission, 1997d, U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, State Electricity Profiles, 2013 & 2014 
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4.2.2 Research Methods 
After the case study area was chosen, the next step was the choice of methods for data 
collection. A strength of the case study approach is its compatibility with a range of data 
collection types including documents, observations, interviews, artefacts, archives and audio-
visual materials (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2013). The researcher chose to conduct interviews and 
observations. Interviews are a popularly used method in qualitative research (Mason, 2002; 
Yin, 2013). The fieldwork was conducted over a 6-month period beginning in October 2013 and 
concluding in March 2014.  
In choosing observations, the researcher gets the chance to observe individuals who currently 
or have been involved in projects, discussions, events, developments on electricity generation 
and supply. However, some limitations of observations are that it can be difficult to make notes 
whilst simultaneously observing and therefore some reliance on memory is needed. 
Additionally, the researcher can only be present in one place at a time and as such, important 
events may be taking place, elsewhere, that the researcher may miss (Yin, 2016, p. 434). 
For interviews, Yin (2013), explains that interviews in case studies “resemble guided 
conversations rather than structured queries” (p. 288). Additionally, in a case study interviews 
would be “fluid rather than rigid” (p. 288). They can also be beneficial because interviewees 
can provide historical background information or when interviewees or events cannot be 
directly observed (Creswell, 2013, p. 190). Another strength of the interview is that participants 
can be interviewed multiple times if needed (Yin, 2016, p. 393). For some researchers, 
interviews may be the more pragmatic method, especially when data which helps answers the 
researchers’ questions may not be accessible (Mason, 2002).  
The researcher chose semi-structured interviews. Limitations of interviews include the fact that 
some interviewees may not as articulate and perceptive as others, so documents may be 
needed to understand/ corroborate/contradict these ideas (Creswell, 2013). During the 
interviews, some interviewees may provide third-hand evidence about an issue and whilst this 
data is valuable, the researcher needs to consider that information is being filtered through the 
perception of the interviewees (Creswell, 2013) and this information may need to be checked. 
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Other methods which could have been used instead of semi-structured interviews include 
questionnaires or structured interviews, however in the case of the questionnaire, whilst this 
method has the advantage of “easy to process” answers (Bryman, 2012, p. 249) due to closed 
questions being simple for participants to complete and “availability of answers” provided 
(Bryman, 2012, p.250), questionnaires would not give the researcher the ability to probe or 
prompt participants on specific questions or for participants. Therefore, unusual or interesting 
answers may not be introduced, potentially missing out on important/interesting issues 
relevant to the research and only a few open-ended questions can be asked because questions 
with complicated formats would cause difficulty in a questionnaire format (Bryman, 2012, p. 
234). 
These are similar reasons for not using the survey or structured interview format. In the 
structured interview, participants need to be asked the same questions and the process mainly 
uses a closed-question format. Probing in a structured interview is difficult, because of the 
closed question format and the need to standardize responses. Additionally, the researcher 
would not be able to vary the order/wording of questioning, which ruins reliability and validity 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 470). Overall, these interview types would be inflexible interviewing 
techniques, which may not produce the necessary depth the researcher seeks to achieve and 
may be more suited to survey research. 
 
— Secondary data sources 
During the research period documents were used as secondary data to build on the responses 
gained from the semi-structured interviews and to ensure valid interpretation of the data. 
Documents mainly related to Georgia while others on the wider Southeast region were 
collected. Documentation included government reports, state, city and federal maps, 
newspaper articles, official statistics, weblogs, press statements, webpages, reports, policy 
documents and dockets of organizations. Other sources included the blogs of interview 
participants. A number of interview participants permitted and directed me to their own 
opinion pieces in blogs and newspapers articles. Some interview participants also provided 
organisational documents. Some individuals had continuing Op-Ed pieces in state newspapers, 
other individuals had rebuttal pieces which followed energy developments within the state.  
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In this research dockets (case filings) of the energy regulatory body, the Georgia State Public 
Commission, were analyzed which showed the issues being addressed in Georgia’s energy 
generation and supply context. These documents introduced some new actors that were not 
previously considered, and outlined their roles, arguments and opinions in energy decision 
making and specifically, low carbon restructuring. This allowed for further insight into the 
decision-making process and the differing perspectives of the actors involved. Data was 
triangulated between interviewees and also between interviews and secondary data to explore 
and assess differences in opinion and perception arising from interviews (Mason, 2002). 
 
4.2.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
It was decided to undertake interviews because the research is concerned with how decisions 
about energy investments are taken.  It was important to gather data by speaking with key 
groups in electricity generation and supply, about their views, understanding, knowledge and 
interpretation (Mason, 2002, p. 63) of the decision-making context. The semi-structured 
interview method refers to, “a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions in the 
general form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of questions. The 
questions are frequently somewhat more general in their frame of reference from that 
typically found in a structured interview schedule. Also, the interviewer usually has some 
latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as significant replies” (Bryman, 
2012, p. 212). Semi-structured interviews were used so participants would have the freedom 
to bring up and explain their perspectives on what they considered important details of energy 
generation and supply and climate change in Georgia whilst still allowing for specific, topic-
centered questions (Mason, 2002).  
The interview method provided the needed “depth, nuance, complexity and roundedness in 
data, rather than the kind of broad surveys of surface patterns which, for example, 
questionnaires might provide” (Mason, 2002, p. 65). Finally, this method also allowed flexibility 
to tailor questions to different interviews in order to ensure that the necessary, relevant 
context, depth and understanding issues from the interviewees perspective, in a way that a 
rigid, inflexible set of standardized questions would not allow for (Mason, 2002) and to adjust 
to unexpected issues as they come up (Bryman, 2012a).  
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a. Sampling and Recruitment 
The sampling approach used by the researcher was purposive sampling. According to Bryman 
(2012), purpose sampling is the sampling approach which involves a non-random, strategic 
sampling of individuals that are relevant/pertinent to the research questions but whilst 
maintaining variety in the sample. Purposive sampling was used by the researcher to search, 
identify and compile an initial list of individuals involved in general electricity governing and 
supply, academics who had authored energy/climate change papers and actors speaking at or 
hosting energy or sustainability summits in the state of Georgia. The purposive sampling 
technique used by the researcher was snowball sampling (Bryman, 2012c).  
In this research, some participants proposed new individuals who could be interviewed either 
because these new individuals had been part of similar projects or developments in the state 
of Georgia or because they had a different or more-in depth perspective on the questions being 
asked. Therefore, the sample expanded to include individuals involved in some of the most 
recent energy developments in the state of Georgia. After contacts/potential participants were 
identified they were contacted via email, which presented the researchers topic/credentials, 
having confirmed the researcher’s credibility, formal interview invitations and interview 
schedules were made via email. Personal interactions during these meetings or events created 
opportunities to gain contacts, who would later become interview participants. The researcher 
presented and exchanged, business cards with contacts made during business events, 
following which, formal interview invitations and interview schedules were made via email. 
 
b. Preparing for interviews 
The researcher created an interview protocol. The researcher used the conceptual framework 
and documents to create broad, open-ended questions to be asked during the interview. 
Questions were placed into topic groups and probes written to accompany them. The question 
topic groups were focused on electricity managing, governance and decision making, 
ownership of electricity infrastructure, demand and pressures for or against low carbon 
restructuring. In addition to open-questions, specific, topic-centered questions were asked. 
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a. Conducting Interviews 
Semi-structured, one-to-one individual interviews were conducted with key actors involved in 
Georgia’s energy generation and supply including representatives from the electric utilities, 
state energy regulators, federal, regional and state agency representatives, state departments, 
state government i.e. members of legislature, industrial (trade) associations, and city hall 
representatives, as well as Fortune 500 companies, clean energy businesses, environmental 
advocates, consumer protection agency, political organisations. The total number of interview 
participants was 25 (see Table 4.2 for details).  
Interviews were often conducted in the local offices of the participants but in the rare cases 
where a local office did not exist, as was the case for a few self-employed participants, 
interviews were conducted in a quiet cafe or restaurant. Interviews typically lasted between 
45 minutes and 1 hour. All interviews followed the same conversational, open-ended format, 
with variation on the order of questions. The questions followed an open-ended format 
because this was the best ways to get interviewees to respond, flexibly and offered the 
potential for  revealing unusual or new issues that may be useful data (Bryman, 2012d). The 
use of open-ended questions allowed for probing into some responses. If required 
interviewees were offered the chance to expand on their responses, giving greater clarity and 
information to the researcher. 
  
Interviewees Atlanta, Georgia 
Public Officials 4 
Advocates 2 
Energy Providers 2 
Federal and State Agencies 5 
Business Associations 2 
Business Community 5 
Academics 2 
Legal experts 1 
Political Organisations 1 
Table 4-2: Shows Interviews conducted with Key Groups in the Fieldwork 
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From the above table of interviews specific groups were of note; interviews with 
environmental advocates were important because the South-east region has a long history of 
coal dependence and an ongoing scepticism of environmental issues including pollution 
control and climate change. Opinions of environmental advocates on electricity generation and 
supply and low carbon restructuring in Georgia were an important component to this research. 
Interviewing businesses and trade groups was also important because of the growth coalition 
that exists between the government and business groups in Georgia - the interests of 
businesses in the state has been a key part of decision making in the state of Georgia. It was 
important to understand what this meant for low carbon restructuring in Georgia’s electricity 
generation and supply.  
 
Interviews with academics were useful because of the contextual knowledge of South-eastern 
energy, due to ongoing research in renewable energy, energy efficiency and decision making. 
Finally, interviews with public officials, including members of Georgia state legislature, state 
energy regulators and city hall representatives were useful as there was ongoing debate and 
discussion over investment changes to Georgia’s electricity mix. It was important to gain insight 
from the decision makers involved. 
 
These interviews with individuals from these key groups provided insight into the perspectives 
on the recent and ongoing developments in the state of Georgia and the drivers of these issues. 
These interviewees provided insight into the politics in decision making, priorities, visions, 
attitudes and values of key actors, the barriers, opportunities and lock-ins in Georgia’s 
electricity generation and supply system. 
 
— Challenges 
Interviewing, legal-regulatory energy analyst and electric membership corporations (EMCs), 
presented a challenge. For this research, a legal-regulatory energy analyst would have been 
useful to explain and give depth to the understanding of ownership of electricity infrastructure, 
distributed generation and third-party entrants, traditional and competitive electricity markets 
in electricity generation and supply. 
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The electric membership corporations (EMCs), would have been useful in understanding their 
roles in electricity generation and supply in Georgia, how decision making for EMCs worked in 
Georgia, and how they differed from or agreed with the investor owned utilities with regards 
to energy-carbon restructuring. These individuals were not hostile to the researcher, but 
despite best efforts to schedule dates and times for interviews, they could not participate due 
to their own schedules.  
These challenges were overcome by the researcher attending energy and climate change 
events based in Atlanta including the Sustainable Atlanta Roundtable, Green Chamber of 
Commerce, World Affairs Council of Atlanta and Southface conferences. These events helped 
broaden the energy context because many were legislative luncheons and roundtables, which 
offered an insight on the current issues in the city of Atlanta and State of Georgia. These 
challenges were also overcome by including questions about legal/regulatory and governing 
issues in my interview protocols. 
4.2.4 Observation  
Case studies take place in a real-world setting of the case which gives the researcher the 
opportunity for direct observations in real time (Yin, 2013). Observations can be conducted in 
formal or less formal settings including observing meetings, activities, and work places. (Yin, 
2013). Observation when used together with other research methods including interviews and 
documents can provide additional contextual information to the issue being studied (Yin, 
2013). In some cases, the researcher was invited to sit in on energy cases being discussed in 
the regulator’s office, to observe a formal session of the way the state energy regulators work. 
Finally, I read through, energy bills, rules and laws for the state of Georgia. In a few occasions, 
there were opportunities to view media broadcasts of certain key actors, discussing ongoing 
or past energy developments in the state of Georgia, to understand what their issues and 
opinions were. 
 
Diary 
A research diary was kept, for the duration of the fieldwork, where personal comments of 
observations, interviews and documents were made. 
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4.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
For the analyses of the data, ongoing triangulation was conducted as the field work went on, 
assisted by the research diary. These following steps were undertaken for the analyses of the 
data, after the completion of the fieldwork: 
First Stage: After all interviews were conducted the recordings and transcribed over a four-
month period, during which each recording was played back two to three times and listened 
to. Recording was done with a Dictaphone and transcription was done verbatim. There were 
no paraphrases and missing or unclear words were indicated (Bryman, 2012d). The analysis 
began with coding transcripts. The researcher first coded concepts and phrases from 
responses frequently occurring across in the interviews (Bryman, 2012b). Then, codes were 
created for phrases and concepts occurring in the interviews, consistent with the secondary 
data. 
 
Second Stage: Codes were created for concepts and phrases brought up during interviews and 
that were identified in the existing literature. Then codes were created for specific issues not 
identified from existing literature which were unexpected and mentioned by few interview 
participants. This meant that new issues, previously unidentified by the researcher, were not 
missed.   
 
Third Step: Linkages between the codes were found and themes were created to properly 
organize groups of code (Bryman, 2012b), sub-themes were created to add complexity and 
structure to the major themes. As patterns appeared between the interviews, documents and 
theory, the themes and subthemes were refined and the story became clear. Finally, thematic 
groups which emerged from the data were analyzed in the empirical chapters. 
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4.4 INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS 
This section explains the type of data derived/generated by the interviews, how the data was 
analysed and interpreted and how it was used in the empirical chapters. The interviews 
generated a range of data in terms of the positionality of the interviewee and their perspective 
on key events and issues and decisions (what those were and how they might be explained). 
The interview data reflected different accounts of these events. Interview transcripts were 
initially coded to allow for comparison and triangulation of different accounts. Key coding 
categories were: attitudes and values, utility planning factors, environmental/Climate change 
beliefs, key energy actors in Georgia, actions/plans of key actors, cities, legal barriers to 
renewable energy and decentralization, business models, carbon regulations, costs of energy 
resources and CO2 price. 
All transcribed interviews and documents were loaded onto single folder. In a computer 
database, a notebook of quotations was created, using the key categories as tabs. Interviews 
had been anonymised before the process, so the extracted quotes had identifiers, so the 
researcher recognised the interviewee. Coding and triangulation were undertaken. Extracted 
quotes were coded according to the key categories shown above. All interview transcripts were 
reread to ensure that the quotes were presented accurately or if the quote needed to be 
moved to another category or a new category needed to be created. The process was repeated 
for documents.  
The research drew on documentary evidence which included, opinion editorials, rebuttal 
editorials, newspaper articles, organisations’ web articles and newsletters, to cross check if the 
opinions/perspectives of interviewees were consistent with those given in the interviews. This 
was done for individuals involved in the ongoing public debates about solar 
energy/decentralisation, nuclear energy development and carbon regulations. Finally, docket 
documents of past and ongoing cases at the state energy regulatory (Georgia Public Service 
Commission), which included petitions, testimonies, rebuttal testimonies and planning 
documents were reviewed, to check if the official statements of organisations and individuals 
were consistent with the interviews. If opinions of interviewees were not consistent across all 
data sources, second interviews were requested, conducted or media broadcasts were used 
to gather more clarity on what had changed. 
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The initial coding formed the basis of chapter 5 in the thesis. Chapter 5, was written to provide 
the different perspectives on; the makeup of the local economy, the political context (political 
parties at state and city level), the prevailing energy strategy in the state and the main actors 
and institutions involved in energy decision making. The different perspectives of the 
interviewees needed to be understood to make sense of the different accounts given and the 
points of agreements, inconsistencies or points of disagreement across interviews. In general, 
the analysis which follows presents different opinions rather than seeking to resolve these, and 
that is a key part of the study. These formed the basis of the analysis of interpretations of key 
issues and decisions chapter 6, 7 and 8. 
Chapter 6, introduces the three main issues ongoing in the case study including, the utility scale 
solar development/decentralisation, nuclear energy development and federal carbon 
regulations, the debates/discussions involving these issues and the different interests involved. 
The chapter was written to understand the politics of low carbon investment in the case study. 
Chapter 7, was written to take forward the idea of lock-in and introduce the idea of lock-out. 
The chapter was written to explore the components of lock-in/lock-out including technological, 
organizational, industrial, societal, and institutional barriers to renewable energy investment 
and energy restructuring. Chapter 8, was written to serve as an example of the way, the factors 
introduced in chapter 2, 6 and 7, came together during the main solar debate in the case study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 129 of 311 
 
4.5 LINKING CONCEPTUALISATION TO EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The key conceptual ideas set out in chapter 2 were: 
• Ownership and control of existing infrastructure 
• Vested interests 
• Lock-ins (Technological, Organizational, Industrial, Societal, Institutional, Cultural) 
• Politics and Ideology 
• Capacity to act (Financial, Political support, Knowledge & Governing authority) 
These underpin the approach to the empirical analysis in a number of ways. 
a. Ownership and control of existing infrastructure 
Interviews and documents were used to review the history of the energy system in Georgia 
(how it emerged the way it did, why and which groups were involved) and how the current 
energy system operates to understand the impact of ownership and control of existing 
infrastructure on energy investment decisions in the case study, past and ongoing 
projects/proposals of the different individuals, organisations and corporations actively 
involved in renewable energy, energy efficiency, fossil fuel and nuclear energy development in 
the state were reviewed. These included the activities of individual entrepreneurs, Georgia 
Watch, BLT Sustainable Energy, Georgia Institute of Technology, Sierra Club, Southface, Suniva, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Georgia Public Service Commission, GreenLaw, Georgia 
Power Company and Coca-Cola. 
Interviewed with the above groups and official documents from the public service commission, 
were combined with analysis of documents from the Georgia General Assembly, opinion 
articles by commissioners, utilities and these groups to review laws in Georgia which 
established ownership and control of energy infrastructure including the Territorial Electric 
Service Act of 1973. The research explored how the Territorial Act by guarantees assigned 
territories to incumbent utilities, restricts retail choice to the assigned provider, encourages 
infrastructure investment by the monopoly and therefore ensures that infrastructure 
(generation to retail) is owned by the incumbent utility. The research examined how the law 
was interpreted across all groups involved in energy projects, especially the incumbent utility 
and renewable energy developers. The research used interviews to explore how transmission 
and distribution infrastructure, controlled investments by dictating what investments were 
made, who made the investments and costs of the investments.  
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These included advocating for laws which favoured centralised energy and restricted 
decentralised energy (Nuclear Financing Act of 2009 and Distributed Generation Act of 2001), 
restricting the capacity of distributed generation accepted on the grid, restricting the access of 
alternative energy providers through T&D costs and restricting the behaviour of consumers. 
The final step, was reviewing the decisions taken by customers, alternative energy providers, 
advocates, businesses in response to these restrictions. 
b. Lock-ins (Technological, Organizational, Industrial, Societal, Institutional, Cultural) 
The research reviewed the history of the energy system, exploring how decisions were taken 
and what decisions have been taken in the past and what decisions have not been taken and 
why. Interviews were important in examining the details of recent and ongoing events 
involving energy investments and examining the perceived barriers to renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and emissions reductions amongst different groups involved in these events. 
The research explored the projects of a range of individuals, groups and organisations 
including, Atlanta Tea Party, Ygrene, Georgia Watch, Georgia Institute of Technology, Sierra 
Club, Southface, Suniva, Environmental Protection Agency, Atlanta Office of Sustainability, 
Southeast Energy Efficiency Alliance and Coca-Cola. Using Unruh’s sources for lock-in as a 
model (Section 2.3.c), the research used documents and interviews to explore sources which 
hindered the renewable energy, energy efficiency and emissions reductions projects of these 
groups. 
The research used interviews to get the opinions of these groups on the barriers to projects 
and to renewable energy, energy efficiency and carbon regulation. For interviews which 
referred to technical and economic barriers including grid reliability and stability, business 
models, regulatory frameworks, costs of infrastructure, the research used academic journals, 
technical primers from system operators, independent NGOs, federal laboratories and 
institutes (California Independent System Operator, Regulatory Assistance Project, National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory and Edison Electric Institute) and books on integrating 
distributed generation resources. Next, the research reviewed additional documents and data 
from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), to explore if these 
barriers were found in other states (California, Minnesota, Colorado and Hawaii) and how they 
were being dealt with, in contrast with Georgia. Interviews added an important dimension in 
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terms of, exploring how the different groups perceived Georgia’s barriers in comparison to 
other states. 
For legal barriers, including the Territorial Electric Service Act of 1973, Distributed Generation 
Act of 2001, the research reviewed the language of the current laws, current proposed bills 
and past failed bills to counter these laws, using documents from the Georgia General 
Assembly, Georgia legal code and Georgia Public Service Commission. Finally, for institutional, 
cultural and political barriers including regulatory capture, environmental scepticism and a 
least cost approach to decision making, the research reviewed articles from New Georgia 
encyclopaedia, opinion editorials and rebuttal editorials and books on Georgia’s special 
interests, politics and culture. The final step, was to compare the lock-in sources found in 
Georgia, to those used in Unruh’s theory of lock-in. By comparing and contrasting these from 
the theory, the research introduced a new perspective to the theory of lock-in. 
c. Vested interests 
To study vested interests as a factor in investment decisions in Georgia, the research initially 
used newspaper articles, weblogs and interviews with clean energy businesses (Suniva, 
Ygrene), academics (Georgia Institute of Technology), state government agencies (Georgia 
Public Service Commission, Atlanta Office of Sustainability, Georgia Centre of Innovation), 
environmental advocates  (GreenLaw and Sierra Club) institutes (Southface), federal agencies 
(EPA) and nongovernmental organisations (Georgia Watch, Southeast Energy Efficiency 
Alliance), business associations (Georgia Chamber of Commerce, Green Chamber of 
Commerce) and corporations (Coca-Cola), to explore what the projects of these groups were, 
how involved these organisations were in the ongoing cases involving nuclear energy, carbon 
regulations, solar energy investments and decentralisation, what were their demands and 
rationale for energy investments. 
In addition to the interviews, docket testimonies, petitions and integrated resource plans from 
the Georgia Public Service Commission from past and ongoing cases involving rates, renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and integrated resource plans were reviewed. Books on Georgia’s 
politics, special interests’ groups and activities were reviewed. This was done to explore the 
history of interest groups involvement in energy, to explore their past and current 
proposals/demands.  
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This process introduced more interest groups including Atlanta Tea Party, Southern Alliance 
for Clean Energy, Georgia Solar Utilities and Americans for Prosperity. Interviews were 
conducted with members of the Atlanta Tea Party, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy and 
Green Tea Coalition.  
Finally, interviews, events and documents, were used to establish the different activities of 
these groups involving energy decision makers, geared towards seeking favourable decisions 
including, case hearings, legislative luncheons, networking events, roundtables, energy 
summits and town hall meetings. 
d. Politics and Ideology 
To understand whether and how politics and ideology were a factor in energy investment 
decisions in Georgia, the research used articles from New Georgia encyclopaedia to review the 
history of the state government, local politics in the state and economy. In addition, the 
research reviewed the websites, newsletters and articles of the all groups, to explore the 
mission, belief and issue statements of these organisations. Especially, the environmental and 
consumer advocates and the political and trade associations, including Americans for 
Prosperity, Atlanta Tea Party Patriots, Conservatives for Solar, Georgia Tea Party, Georgia 
Chamber of Commerce and Sierra Clubs. This was done to understand what the motivation, 
beliefs and purpose of these groups were. Interviews were conducted to dig deeper into those 
beliefs and explore what they mean for energy investments in Georgia. Therefore, questions 
asked of these interviewees included, is decarbonising a priority for the grid, have carbon 
emissions or climate change been the reasons for any of the projects, how do you feel about 
Renewable energy portfolio standards, support of the EPA regulations or a cap and trade 
mechanism, what is meant by Georgia is a conservative and can you and how do you a 
conservative case for solar energy. 
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4.6 ETHICS 
Interview participants were told the purpose of the research, what was expected of the 
research participant, including the amount of time likely to be required for participation, and 
the availability of transcriptions and audio of the interviews. Interviewees were also made 
aware that participation was voluntary. All information, including my name and contact details 
were provided, in the event that participants had questions or concerns with the research. 
Participants were made aware that their confidentiality would be protected. Participant 
confidentiality was protected by anonymizing the participant information. Participant 
information was stored, changed and assigned classifying labels, recognized only by the 
researcher. Finally, there was no familiarity with any of the contacts personally or 
professionally, nor could they be called acquaintances, these were contacts made during the 
research process. Due to the nature of the research, politics was important, however, the 
personal politics of the researcher was not made known to interviewees, to allow the 
researcher a degree of neutrality and not to give interview participants the impression of 
approval or disapproval. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the research strategy used in this research. It explains the 
researcher’s data collection methods including the usage of semi-structured interviews, 
observation and documents. It also discussed the researcher’s data analysis process and the 
ethical considerations of the research. The following chapters present findings from the 
empirical research.  The structure for the remainder of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapters, 6,7, and 8 explore how the state of Georgia increased the renewable energy in its 
electricity mix, from 21.4MW in 2011 to 800MW by 2014, by adding solar energy to the utility’s 
Integrated Resource Plan and the debates to open the grid to new market entrants. These 
chapters discuss the factors which led to the development of solar, the interests involved in 
these decisions, the resistance to these decisions due to forms of lock-in and the politics of 
electricity-carbon restructuring in Georgia. 
Chapter 6, discusses the factors which led to low carbon investments by Georgia Power in the 
electricity generation mix and the politics of energy investment decisions in conservative 
Georgia. 
Chapter 7 explores the resistance to electricity-carbon restructuring in Georgia, through the 
different types of lock-ins found in electricity generation and supply. 
Chapter 8 reflects on the utility-scale solar investments in Georgia, known as “The Advanced 
Solar Initiative” and the politics of electricity–carbon restructuring in Georgia.  
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5 THE CONTEXT FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY IN GEORGIA 
The following chapter sets out the context for decisions about the restructuring of electricity 
generation and supply in the state of Georgia. It describes the demographic, historical and 
economic context for governing in the state of Georgia. It also describes the context in which 
energy decisions are made, including the key actors who govern electricity generation and 
supply, the specific roles of these groups and the formal process of making decisions. The key 
arguments of the chapter are that Georgia is a politically and culturally conservative state and 
over time the relationship between the business and governing community is such that 
government decisions take into consideration the expectations of the business community. In 
addition, the state of Georgia, despite relying heavily on energy imports, has no formal energy 
policy created by state legislature which shapes the direction of electricity generation and 
supply decisions strategically away from imports. Instead, the Integrated Resource Plan 
developed by the investor owned utility Georgia Power, acts a de facto energy policy, subject 
to approval, disapproval and amendments by the state regulators and intervention by key 
groups. 
 
5.1 THE POPULATION, HISTORY AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA  
This section presents the history, the current population context and the political context of 
the state of Georgia. The state of Georgia was founded in 1733 by James Oglethorpe (New 
Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, n.d.), in the Southeast region of the United States and has 159 
counties (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, n.d.). Georgia had a population of 9,994,759 in 2013 
and 10,097,343 in 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014) and Atlanta, the state capital and most 
populous city, had an estimated population of 443,775 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). 
 
Figure 5-1: Shows the location of Georgia in the United States with Capital, Atlanta. 
Source: Google Maps, 2013. 
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5.1.1 The Political Context of Georgia 
The 82nd and current governor is Nathan Deal and political affiliation is the Republican party. 
The Georgia state legislature is broken into the House of Representatives and a Senate, both 
of which make up the primary decision-makers within the state. The party affiliations of the 
senate and its committees are proportional to the party affiliations of the senate. The state has 
had a Republican majority in both houses. The legislative branch is as follows:  
• House of Representatives: The State of Georgia has a total of 180 members. It 
comprises of: 60 Democrats, 118 Republicans & 1 Independent. 
• The Senate: is much smaller and made up of the 56 members who represent districts 
from around the state. It comprises of: 18 Democrats and 38 Republicans. 
Source: Georgia General Assembly, October 2013. 
The state legislature has not always been dominated by the Republican Party, although it has 
always been conservative. Historically, Georgian leadership and its politics have also revolved 
around white farmers in rural areas, civil rights, segregation and economic issues (Fleischmann 
& Pierannunzi, 2007d). Georgia has largely been a one-party state and had been governed by 
the Democratic Party specifically from 1831 – 2003. Nevertheless, the 19th century Democrat 
controlled Georgia is not the same as the party after the American Civil War. The early 
Democratic party in Georgia aligned itself with rural white farmers but also segregationists 
(New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2005b). It wasn’t until 1963 under the leadership of Carl 
Sanders, that Georgia’s politics turned moderately in the sense that, the then Governor was 
anti-segregationist and not focused on the rural vote (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2002) 
or a dominant agricultural economy.  
Nevertheless in 2003 the state elected its first Republican Governor since its reconstruction 
era (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2005a). The state has elected Republicans ever since. The 
state’s post war history suggests that a core principle in Georgian political leadership has been 
one focused on economic growth and development and most state’s leadership has been 
elected on those principles (Stone, 1989). The reasons for this will be shown in the overview 
section of Georgia’s and Atlanta’s economy and history. However, it is important to briefly 
describe Atlanta as the capital of the state of Georgia as it plays an important role in the state 
politics and economy. 
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5.1.2 The Economic and Development Politics of Georgia 
Pre-World War One, the Georgian economy was largely based on agriculture (New Georgia 
Encyclopedia Staff, 2004a), the main crops being cotton and tobacco. However, due to 
intensive cotton farming farmers were forced to diversify into poultry and livestock. The 
destruction of cotton farm land by pests, combined with low prices for the produce meant that 
cotton started to prove unprofitable but the chicken farms and livestock remained (New 
Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2004b, 2008). 
Post-World War Two left Georgia without a large industrial sector since the original economic 
focus had been in rural Georgia because of the agriculture. State Government was more 
aligned to rural interests outside the capital city of Atlanta (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 
2005b). Calls to change the economic foundations of the economy from primarily agriculture 
to an industrial one had been made by Henry Grady in 1885 post the civil war and supported 
by business owners, landowners and the media (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2015), but 
whatever gains had been made where eradicated by World War Two. 
Therefore post-World War Two saw a poor and struggling Government opposed to the Federal 
government’s New Deal (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2004c) but needing to restructure 
in a way that promoted business growth and economic development. Therefore both the 
would-be mayor William Hartfield and Governor Eugene Talmadge allied themselves with city 
business leaders (New Georgia Encyclopedia Staff, 2008; Stone, 1989). The alliance between 
city hall and businesses collectively focused on transforming the economy into a service-based 
one with a strong and central business community (Stone, 1989). At the time the dominant 
businesses were the Coca-Cola company, the state utilities, the media and the banks (Stone, 
1989). Since then, the partnership between City Hall and businesses has been long standing 
(Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007d). The coalition focused on growth has since then left 
Georgia with major and renowned companies headquartered in parts of the state and 
contribute to the economy as well as the decision making, depending on the issue. Other 
companies involved in discussions include companies such as: The Coca-Cola company, UPS, 
Delta, CNN, Southern Company and Georgia Power (Metro Atlanta Chamber, 2014). 
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The strength of the business and government coalition continues to be critical to decision-
making. Stone (1989), in a discussion on the extent of leadership, cooperation and influence 
that emanates from this relationship, explains that in an effort to have any sort of influence for 
business contacts, organizational support and even development projects and funds, it was 
important to be part of this network or coalition (Stone 1989, pp.192). The coalition was not 
defined by a single organization or group but rather overlapping organizations or groups 
amongst the business and governing community (Hunter, 1953). 
Therefore Georgia continues to be a good state for business in part due to its regulatory 
environment and costs (Couret, 2012). A key reason and recurring theme in the state, 
especially outside of Atlanta, is the focus on business growth and development by limiting 
restrictions on investors. Therefore major selling points for the state have been its low tax 
rates, low cost of doing business and low-cost of energy (Georgia Department of Economic 
Development, 2012). This is not particularly surprising as Georgia is a home to a very strong 
business community in the sense that collectively, the community takes part in many civic 
activities, it has a broad network and it is staffed and organises for involvement in community 
activities, it controls funds and resources and dominant companies like Coca-Cola, UPS, Home 
Depot and Georgia Power which all have established foundations which are often put towards 
significant projects (Stone, 1988, 1989). The coalition has also invested heavily in the central 
district and growth of Georgia State. 
5.1.3 State and Local Municipal Government 
Georgia’s cities are governed by the municipal charter which is a fundamental law that grants 
a municipality the authority to exist and function (Georgia Municipal Association, 2002). The 
charter establishes a municipal’s structure and form of government, boundaries, powers  and 
every municipality in Georgia has a charter (Georgia Municipal Association, 2012). General 
services provided by the municipalities include, but are not limited to, emergency services, 
budgets, public transportation, waste disposal and collection, environmental protection, police 
and fire protection, planning, zoning, taxes, codes, construction and maintenance (roads), 
water and sewage (Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007a). The state of Georgia has four forms of 
municipal government including a strong mayor-council, a weak mayor-council, a council-
manager and a commission. These structures separate the legislative branch from the 
executive branch (Georgia Municipal Association, 2012).  
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So, in the strong mayor-council form of municipal government, the city council is the legislative 
branch and the mayor is the executive. In a weak mayor-council form, policymaking is shared 
and the mayor has limited powers. Finally, the council-manager form, operates like a business 
corporation, where the city council hires a professional manager to run the city’s everyday 
functions, whilst the mayor retains a somewhat ceremonial role (Georgia Municipal 
Association, 2012). Whilst municipalities have their policy making legislative branches, local 
policies are constrained by state laws, the Georgia constitution, the municipal governing 
structure and political support (Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007a). For example, aspects of 
environmental protection are included in municipal powers but by 2006, only two of Georgia’s 
largest cities (Atlanta and Savannah), had a local climate initiative (Morsch, 2010). Finally, 
municipalities have the power to contract with public utilities for the provision of services 
(Georgia Municipal Association, 2012). 
 
5.1.4 Local Economy 
Central to the Georgia State economy are private services-providing industries, private goods-
producing industries, and civic government (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013). In 2012 
the strongest growth to the local economy came from its private sector, business and 
professional services. Georgia has multiple tax exemptions which make it an attractive location, 
this has led to new companies starting up or relocating to metro Atlanta. By 2025 there is 
expected to be a further 1.8 million jobs in the state (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2000) Atlanta 
is home to numerous fortune 500 companies and Georgia has important ports used for freight, 
one of which is the fastest growing in the country. Industries like freight and logistics are critical 
to the Georgia economy, as the cost of logistics and extensive combination of tax credits make 
Georgia a chosen destination for new businesses (Selig Centre for Economic Growth, 2013). 
Finally, Atlanta, is beginning to add a significant number of clean energy jobs to the state 
including conservation, water, and waste management, transportation, green architecture and 
green buildings and construction. The city of Atlanta has added an estimated 43,000 jobs in 
the clean sector from 2003–2010 but these jobs only make up for about 1.9% of the overall 
economy (Muro, Rothwell, & Saha, 2011). 
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5.2 THE ENERGY CONTEXT 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the Georgia energy strategy and energy mix, to 
describe the main actors and institutions involved in energy decision making and to analyse 
the knowledge of the main actors involved in energy governance i.e. the actors who carry out 
electricity production, transmission, distribution and regulation in the region. It is hoped that 
this can lead to an understanding of how ownership and control of infrastructure influences 
decision making. 
 
5.2.1 Georgia State Energy Strategy 
The state of Georgia does not have its own crude oil or natural gas reserves and imports most 
of its energy resources (Governor’s Energy Policy Council, 2006). Georgia relies heavily on 
imported coal resources from Kentucky and Wyoming delivered via railways, liquefied natural 
gas through pipelines from Elba Island LNG terminal, petroleum through pipelines from the 
Gulf Coast (Governor’s Energy Policy Council, 2006) and local nuclear energy development 
(Governor’s Energy Policy Council, 2006). Therefore, the state’s energy strategy: 
“Strives to balance a number of significant issues including the affordability, reliability and 
environmental sustainability of our energy resources as well as to maximize the benefits 
derived from locally available energy resources, industries and expertise” (Georgia 
Environmental Finance Authority, 2006, p.3) 
Despite these imports, the state energy strategy does not contain fixed net energy targets in 
terms of achieving, developing or reducing ‘X’ amount by ‘Y’ date. Nevertheless, it has key 
themes, which it organises around, involving renewable energy, energy efficiency, advanced 
nuclear and coal technologies and conservation: 
“State Energy Strategy recognizes the need for a combination of all resources with the 
assumption that no single resource can or will be sufficient. Relying on efficiency, 
conservation, and renewable energy first, supplemented with advanced clean technologies, 
including nuclear and advanced coal technology as needed, will ensure our ability to meet 
our future energy needs in an environmentally responsible and economic way” (Georgia 
Environmental Finance Authority, 2009, p. 12). 
Objectives which emerged from the energy strategy included conducting analyses of the 
potential for renewable energy and energy efficiency in the state, estimating the risks of 
potential carbon regulations by the federal government, investing in feasible, clean, next 
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generation technologies such as advanced coal and nuclear technologies like integrated 
gasification combined cycle, developing alternate fuel resources including biofuels, advocating 
for more renewable energy, with a focus on biomass resources and solar water heating and 
exploring potential for other technologies (Governor’s Energy Policy Council, 2006). 
Subsequent energy strategies since 2006, including 2009, 2012 and 2014, have continued with 
those bases (Governor’s Energy Policy Council, 2009, 2012). 
5.2.2 Georgia’s State Energy Mix 
This sub-section will describe the energy portfolio of the sole investor-owned utility in Georgia 
which has Atlanta as its service territory. The energy portfolio of the utility should show what 
fuels dominate the mix, its total generation capacity and furthermore, where renewable 
energy and other low carbon resources rank in its portfolio. The fuel mix of Georgia Power’s 
generation profile from 2010 to 2014 are shown below. 
 
Georgia Power generation and purchased power 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Total generation (billions of KWHs) 69.9 66.8 59.8 65.5 75.3 
Total purchased power (billions of KWHs) 23.1 21.4 28.7 26.8 21.7 
Sources of generation (percent)  
  
  
Coal 41 35 39 62 67 
Nuclear 22 23 27 23 21 
Gas 35 39 33 13 10 
Hydro 2 3 1 2 2 
Costs of fuel, generated (cents per net KWH)      
Coal 4.52 4.92 4.63 4.70 4.53 
Nuclear 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.78 0.66 
Gas 3.67 3.33 3.02 4.92 5.75 
Average cost of fuel, generated (cents per net KWH) 3.40 3.32 3.07 3.80 3.82 
Average cost of purchased power (cents per net KWH) 5.20 4.83 4.24 5.38 5.68 
Table 5-1: Georgia Power generation and purchased power 
Source: Georgia Power Company Annual Report, 2012, 2013 & 2014 
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There are 6 existing nuclear reactors. Their capacities and ages are shown below: 
Plant Capacity (MWe) Date of Operation Reactor Design 
HATCH-1 924 1975 Boiling water reactor 
HATCH-2 924 1979 Boiling water reactor 
VOGTLE-1 1215 1987 Boiling water reactor 
VOGTLE-2 1215 1989 Boiling water reactor 
VOGTLE-3 1117 2017 Pressurized water reactor 
VOGTLE-4 1117 2018 Pressurized water reactor 
Table 5-2: Shows Georgia Power Nuclear Reactors, Generation Capacity and dates of commercial operation 
Source: (World Nuclear Association, 2013) 
 
There are 11 coal fired plants in Georgia, the profile of coal plants in 2013, 2014 and 2015 is 
shown below: 
Name Date of 
Operation 
2012 Capacity 
(MW) 
2015 Capacity 
(MW) 
Bowen 1975 3,160 3,160 
Crisp N/A N/A N/A 
Hammond 1954 800 800 
Harllee Branch 1961 N/A N/A 
Jack- McDonough  N/A N/A 
Kraft  N/A N/A 
McIntosh 1979 163.117 163.117 
Mitchell 1964 125 125 
Scherer 1982 750.924 750.924 
Wansley 1976 925.550 925.550 
Table 5-3: Shows Georgia Coal Reactors, Generation Capacity and dates of commercial operation 
Source: Georgia Power, Facts and Financials, 2012, 2013, 2014 & 2015  
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The breakdown of these in real KW Capacity is shown below. 
Total Georgia Power kW Capacity  
Hydro 1,087,536 1,087,536 
Fossil 9,110,427 8,791,427 
Nuclear 1,959,852 1,959,852 
Solar  705 
Other (Diesel, Combined Cycle and Combustion Turbine) 5,825,209 5,746,409 
Total 17,983,024 17,585,929 
Table 5-4: Shows Georgia Power's Total kW Capacity in the Year 2012 and 2013 
Source: (Georgia Power Company, 2014b) 
Data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the United States shows a similar 
pattern of energy production and consumption within the state of Georgia. 
 
Figure 5-2: Georgia Net Electricity Generation GWh 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 5-3: Shows Georgia Electric Power Sector Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
It is clear, that from 2001 to around 2011, the dominant fuels for electricity generation have 
been coal and nuclear as the generation graphs show above. The emission graph also shows a 
steady emission reduction from coal and increased emissions from natural gas.  
5.2.3 Mode of Energy Provision in 2014 
Energy generation and distribution is governed through the Georgia Public Service Commission 
(GPSC), which is the state of Georgia’s energy regulator. They operate on state laws and 
regulate the state’s main investor-owned utility Georgia Power, a subsidiary of Southern 
Company. There are other power providers active in the state of Georgia including the 42 
electric membership corporations (EMCs) and 52 municipal electric power companies. 
Nevertheless, the Georgia Public Service Commission does not regulate the EMCs or municipal 
power companies, but rather assists on issues of service territories and financing (Georgia 
Public Service Commission, 1997d). A map showing the service territories of utilities in Georgia 
and a summary of key organisations involved in generation and supply in Georgia is provided 
below. Following this is a description of how the energy governing process works in Georgia. 
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Figure 5-4: Shows the Electric Service Territories for Georgia's Utilities 
Source: Planters Electric Membership Corporation 
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a. Governing energy in practice 
The Georgian state law has provision for the Georgia Public Service Commission to supervise 
the utilities to ensure it is acting in the public interest (Georgia Public Service Commission, 
1997c). Georgia state law requires that every electricity supplier in the state be subject to 
regulation by the public service commission. The regulated suppliers are then required by law 
to submit an integrated resource plan, which is critical to meeting energy demand in the state 
(O.C.G.A., 1981). Furthermore, the investor owned utility (IOU) works with the Georgian Public 
Service Commission to set the rates for electricity in a process commonly referred to as a rate 
case. Rate cases are negotiated and debated in a way that enables recovery of expenses by the 
utility e.g. capital, maintenance, operational costs, metering, billing, etc. (Georgia Public 
Service Commission, 1997a). 
The entire process of rate cases and cost recovery is governed by a mechanism often referred 
to as rate of return regulation (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a). The rate of return 
regulation is a regulatory tool, which follows an agreement and is a guarantee by Georgian 
state law that for a service territory assigned to the utility by the state, the utility has a duty to 
provide reliable, affordable and safe electricity power in a way that is just, reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory. In return, the utility gets to spend in a way that maintains and improves 
the electricity power network, recover its capital and earns a return on its investment 
(Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a). 
Integrated resource planning is not unique to Georgia. It emerged out of the energy security 
and restructuring era (See 3.1e and 3.1f), which required long term planning to avoid an energy 
crisis. It is, essentially, a long-term energy planning partnership in the states. One interviewee, 
who was also a Georgia Public Service Commissioner explains below: 
“The way that Georgia has set up its energy regulation is much like other states did with the 
trend that was sweeping the country called integrated resource planning and this integrated 
resource planning swept through the country, in the late 80s and the late 90s and integrated 
resource planning or IRP involves, more co-operation between utilities and states and 
regulators” (2Bi, Georgia Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013). 
Since the PSC operates as a semi legislative-judicial agency (Georgia Public Service Commission, 
1997b), these IRP hearings and the subsequent proceedings take the form of judicial 
proceedings, held at the Commission in Atlanta, before the Commissioners. 
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Organisations/groups who file a petition to join in the hearings process are referred to as 
intervenors. During the IRP hearings rate cases and other issues, testimonies, rebuttal 
testimonies and exhibits are presented by the utilities, adversary staff, intervenors and public 
witnesses. Witnesses are cross-examined by the PSC, the utilities, adversary staff and 
intervenors (Georgia Public Service Commission, 1997b). The adversary staff and intervenors 
and public witnesses may also be cross-examined by the utilities. Finally, the staff of the Public 
Service Commissioners also conduct reviews which establish the position of the Commission 
and recommendations are made. In Georgia, the IRP process is perceived by the state energy 
regulators and electric utilities as democratic and transparent because state regulators are 
elected not selected by a governor, the process has hearings which are open to everyone: 
“Now you have to remember that only in 12 of the U.S. States are regulators elected. Most 
of the states they are appointed by a Governor or Senator and so their turnover is a lot more 
frequent than an elected regulator. An elected regulator can stay in office for a long time” 
(2Bi, Georgia Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013). 
People with a stake in the state’s energy policies including advocates, residents, businesses, 
etc. and interested parties can intervene in the decision-making process and an energy policy 
and planning director at a utility in Georgia also echoed the same idea, as shown below: 
“To make a long story short, to get back to the IRP, it’s a very open process, we file it every 
3 years and then other stakeholder groups such environmental groups like the Sierra Club, 
they can come into the docket, they can questions us, there will be hearings and we are on 
the witness stand and we answer questions about the IRP, they can file their own testimony, 
they can put their witnesses up to testify what they like about the plan what they don’t like 
about the plan, we have consumer groups that will be represented in it, groups that 
represent large industrial customers, so all different types of stakeholders can come 
forward during these proceedings and offer their views on what they like about the plan, 
what they don’t like about the plan and then the commission certainly they have a staff that 
evaluates certain things for their opinions and typically what we do is we’ll reach a 
settlement agreement with the different stakeholders to finally agree upon the plan and 
then the commission will vote on it and approve it and it generally takes about 6 months 
from the date that we file the plan to go through all the hearings process and then get a 
vote and like I said it basically establishes the roadmap that the company follows but again 
then we are right back again doing it again in 3 more years, so it’s always in a fine tuning 
process” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014). 
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It is also a process, that reduces risk in the energy investments made by the utility, because 
state regulators can approve, deny and exert control over utility investment decisions with 
input from all stakeholders. This was stressed by a state energy regulator below: 
“So, but Integrated Resource Planning, allows power companies to consult and get pre-
approval, pre-certification before building something, where before we had integrated 
resource planning, a power company would evaluate their energy needs, they would build 
it and then they would come to the commission and say "we need to get re-imbursement 
or recovery" after the fact and it was much riskier for them because what if the regulators 
didn’t feel like they needed all that power. So now we approve in advance with gas plants, 
with coal plants and with nuclear power plants and that’s what I was saying at the end today 
as part of my speech was that because the Power company already has this plan certified 
by the 5 commissioners they're going to get their money for the plant. So, it’s a lot less risky 
for the power company to use the integrated resource planning because they are no longer 
building what’s called "spec or speculation” (2Bi, Georgia Public Service commissioner, 
October 21, 2013). 
Finally, outside opinions reflected the same idea as the utility and commissioner above 
showing that the process was well understood. Everyone knew who to talk to about energy 
decisions and how the process worked which reflected a consistency to energy decision making 
in Georgia. Two interviewee comments reflect that the process is well understood outside the 
utility and commission. The first comment is from an interviewee who was a member and 
director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia and the second comment is from an 
interviewee who was a manager of a non-profit technical, research and advocacy, institute 
based in Atlanta. Their comments can be seen below: 
“So, in the state of Georgia, the Georgia Public Service Commission requires Georgia Power, 
every 3 years to put together an Integrated Resource Plan that looks 20 years into the future 
and forecasts what they think Georgia's energy needs will be and it’s their job as the 
regulated utility monopoly to make sure, that people have their energy needs met. So, that 
they have enough base-load capacity so that when it’s a hot day in the summer and 
everybody wants their air conditioner to work, there’s enough power generation to meet 
that need. So they say we think that there will be this amount of needed capacity and then 
they propose how to meet that with the various ways they generate, so whether it’s through 
their coal-fired plants or through their nuclear facilities and they are building two new 
nuclear facilities, its recently announced wind power purchase agreements, they've got 
some new biomass contracts and they've through this last IRP process were required to add 
another 525MW of solar to their capacity plan” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, 
January 9, 2014). 
Page 149 of 311 
 
The second comment is shown below: 
“You have discussions with the public service commission. You have discussions with 
Georgia Power, the utilities.  You have discussions with elected officials” (7E, Manager 
technical & research Institute, February 24, 2014). 
Furthermore, the Georgia Public Service Commission based in Atlanta where energy decisions 
are made, is completely open to the public and the commissioners also engage with the public 
at town meetings or other avenues. This was confirmed by an interviewee who was a public 
service commissioner in the statement below: 
“Well I certainly participate in public hearings around the state. I was in Savannah last 
Thursday night for a public hearing about energy prices, so I'll go out in the public but you 
can’t make the public come and listen to you, you can’t make the public pay attention” (2Bi, 
Georgia Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013) 
Whilst the decision-making process was clear and open amongst all the groups involved and 
members of the GPSC made themselves available to the public, there was disagreement over, 
whether the public was involved in the energy decision making process or even knew about 
the GPSC. This was reflected in three comments. The first two comments shown below were 
made by an academic consultant for the Atlanta city government sustainability plan who 
explains public unawareness about their own importance and influence in energy decision 
making through the electoral process. The third comment was also a consultant for the Atlanta 
Office of Sustainability and director of an energy efficiency company: 
“They [the GPSC] are elected in a state-wide election. So, there would be a coin flip, as to 
whether you thought the city would exercise more influence or the city-citizens would 
exercise more influence across the state” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, October 
29, 2013). 
Furthermore, public unawareness about the Public Service Commission elections: 
“Well the difficulty with that, so they run at the same time that you have all the other 
elections on-going. So, the emphasis tends to be on the governor’s race or who's running 
for state senator or state representative and the commissioners are down ballot elections, 
so they are just a little down ballot, a bit further down. Of course, they don’t read that, I 
mean, they vote, but no one knows who any of these people are, because they are not, they 
are not direct representatives for them that they may interact with on a daily basis. People 
are used to thinking of their state senator, their state representative or their governor as 
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their elected officials who they need to interact with. Commissioner is kind of like a step 
below voting for a county judge for people. So, it is not really considered, it is not thought 
about most of the time. Which also makes it so that in terms of, so this is where the story 
thickens, the plot thickens” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013). 
 
The second interviewee on public unawareness: 
“Here's my answer, are they involved, I don’t think so. You know, if you and I went and 
starting knocking on doors and pitched around these neighbourhoods and said; are you 
involved, do you know who your public service commissioners, do you know what they do, 
do you know how to get in touch with them? I'd say 98% have no idea. Now this is me, this 
is my opinion. I'm not representing anyone else, but I don’t think so. I don’t really, I mean 
I've been in this industry too long, I don’t think people know who they are, what they do, 
where they are, how to get in touch with them. So again, I think people at the end of the 
day when you look at the residential side [um] consumers pay electricity bills because they 
know they have to, they need light, they need power in their house. A bill is a bill, you know 
it’s not, yeah there may be a spike in it and if there's a spike, your kind of try to figure out 
what’s going on but for the most part, it’s just you know, it’s a month to month and they 
don’t think about it” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 2013) 
Nevertheless, groups representing other aspects of energy such as consumer advocacies like 
Georgia Watch, environmental groups like the Sierra Club and organisations representing 
business and industry like the chamber of commerce, are often part of the energy decision 
making process in the state because they can feed in information or intervene depending on 
the specific case at the hearings. Furthermore, these organisations also make use of experts 
from academia, industry or others to feed-in information in the decision-making process. An 
interviewee who was a representative of the chamber of commerce said: 
“You know, we’ve all got those education institutions that have high quality research 
facilities, they all, one way or another-, now, if they don’t directly fit in, they might feed in 
because they do work with Georgia Power, Georgia Power feeds in or they might do work 
with a solar provider, and the solar person feeds in, so one way or another we get the 
benefit of what they do, because there’s a lot of integration with those experts in the 
industries around Georgia so, you know, either way, their research capability influences the 
policy discussion, even to the point where they may give expert testimony and legislative 
hearing or to public service commission, so again, we’re exposed to seek into their 
technology achievements, and we can, you know, see what the benefits might be or, you 
know, work with them to identify if there will be benefits of new technologies or what 
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they’re thinking, so they’re very active in the development of the energy technology 
platform” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013). 
Finally, the last organisation involved in energy issues is the city government of Atlanta, 
represented by the Mayor’s Office of Sustainability, however they are generally not involved 
in the state’s energy decision making and instead focus on the city of Atlanta. Now that the 
process is understood, summaries of the profile of the principle organisations involved in 
energy decision making in Georgia are shown below. 
 
Georgia Power Profile 
Georgia Power provides electricity to around 2.36 million customers in 155 of the state of 
Georgia’s 159 counties (Georgia Power Company, 1945). It is a subsidiary of Southern Company 
who owns electric utilities in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and Florida and is a leading and 
dominant company in the South-eastern parts of the United States, it has an approximated 
generating capacity of 46,000MW. Georgia Power is the largest of these four. The 
headquarters of Southern Company is in Atlanta and Georgia Power has a total customer 
uptake of roughly 4.4 million customers (Southern Company, 1945). Other subsidiaries of 
Southern Company include brands such as Southern Power which is the operator of Southern 
Nuclear, the owner of three nuclear energy generating plants. The company also has Southern 
Telecom and Wireless. At the core of all these subsidiaries and brands are the low retail prices 
or more specifically prices below the national average. 
 
Organisational Structure of Georgia Power 
The organisational set up for Georgia Power is as follows: Georgia Power has a separate CEO 
and President from the president of Southern Company. A ten-member management council 
sits beneath the CEO, whose duties include, planning the company vision, offering community 
information and execution. Finally, a board of directors exists which consists of independent 
elected members from the community. Georgia Power has co-ownership of 17,000 miles of 
transmission lines and serves as the operator for the system. Other transmission line owners 
include: Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG), Georgia Transmission Company (GTC) 
and the City of Dalton. 
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Georgia Power Electricity Programs and Rates 
The company has low residential, commercial and industrial rates; with the average retail price 
of electricity in (cents/kWh) being 9.55¢/kWh, bringing it under the national average (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2015). Furthermore, it offers variety of energy plans 
including green energy supply for its residential, commercial and business customers. 
Generally green energy programs are referred to as premium programs and come at an 
additional cost (Georgia Power Company, 2011a, 2011b). In terms of standard programs, the 
company has programs tailored to energy use, the varying seasons and low income usage. 
These include a standard service based on normal electricity rate based on usage, a flat bill 
with a fixed rate for a period of 12 months, a nights and weekends plan which shifts peak hours 
and finally a budget bill which can be effective for low income customers (Georgia Power 
Company, 2014e). 
The green programs for residential, commercial and industrial customers usually require more 
commitment on the part of the customer. This involves purchasing green energy in 100 kWh 
blocks for 12 months at a time with an extra charge of $3.50 plus tax if the green energy source 
is biomass or $5.00 plus tax if 50% energy comes from solar power, the other 50% comes from 
biomass (Georgia Power Company, 2011b). The company also offers the option of a special 
event purchase which is essentially a one off purchase of renewable energy for special 
functions (Georgia Power Company, 2011a). 
The concept of green energy as a premium is clearly shown within the state, as it is priced a 
higher cost. Nevertheless, the company’s rates have managed to stay low and its low-cost 
energy is a key selling point for consumers. There is a however a side note according to Georgia 
Power: given the way electricity is produced, transmitted and distributed, the renewable 
energy option purchased by the customer may not be delivered to the customer specifically 
but rather it may be added to the grid and used as a substitute for traditional electricity power 
sources (coal, nuclear or natural gas). These add on charges tend to be written in parts into the 
state law (O.C.G.A. 46-3A-9 (2010). 
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The Georgia Public Service Commission Profile 
The GPSC is the other state body which regulates the utilities by law. The commission’s duty 
and responsibility is to make decisions which balance the service needs of Georgia's residents 
with the financial needs of the utility. Therefore the commission requires utilities to provide 
adequate service at fair and reasonable rates to all its customers (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 1997c). This is in line with the U.S. Supreme Court which determined that utility 
rates approved by the commission must permit the utility to earn a return that does not place 
the utility at unnecessary risk, does not compromise its financial integrity and hinder its ability 
to attract investors. The process is governed by the Integrated Resource Planning Act (HB 280, 
1990). 
This act outlines the job of the commission and the process starts with the utility presenting a 
plan to the commission every three years. Generally, the commission deals with resource 
procurement plans, monitors reliability in electricity provision service i.e. plants as well as grid 
environmental cost and compliance, deals with service territories and rates, charges etc. and 
finally investigates and audits powers (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2005). Formerly 
known as the railroad commission, the Georgia Public Service Commission have an elected 5 
members of staff, who serve six year staggered terms. The commissioners work with their own 
group or staff which tends to include experts on utility operations issues and these serve useful 
during proceedings as they may be called to give a testimony and or recommendations 
(Georgia Public Service Commission, 1997b).  
Finally, the proceedings which take place at the Public Service Commission are open to the 
public. Since the PSC operates as a semi-legislative and judicial agency (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 1997b), these hearings take the form of judicial proceedings, held at the 
Commission in Atlanta, before the Commissioners. Organisations who file a petition to join in 
the hearings process are referred to as intervenors. During the IRP/rate cases and other issue, 
testimonies, rebuttal testimonies and exhibits are presented by the utilities, adversary staff, 
intervenors and public witnesses. Witnesses are cross-examined by the PSC, the utilities, 
adversary staff and intervenors (Georgia Public Service Commission, 1997b). The adversary 
staff and intervenors and public witnesses may also be cross-examined by the utilities. Finally, 
the staff of the Public Service Commissioners also conduct reviews, which establish the position 
of the Commission and recommendations are made. 
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The chairman is elected by the Commission for a two year term with the opportunity to be re-
elected for an additional two year term (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2014c). 
Consumer Advocates Group 
Georgia Watch is a state-wide consumer advocacy group founded in 2002. It acts on behalf of 
residents and small business owners in various sectors of the Georgian economy. One area is 
the Consumer Energy Program (CEP), which includes working for fair utility rates and 
diversifying energy options at the state level. Georgia Watch is involved in the decisions made 
by utility providers and public service commission. Georgia Watch says it stands for lowering 
utility rates and utilising cleaner and more efficient energy solutions (Georgia Watch, 2002): 
“Primarily residential, some small and small business customers but primarily we are 
speaking up for the average every day, you know homeowner or apartment renter or you 
know people who live in Georgia who have to pay their power bill whether its Georgia power 
or whether it’s one of the gas marketers, natural gas marketers” (6E, 14A, Director 
consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014). 
 
b. Arrangements in Atlanta 
Energy governance, is generally done at the state level. State law dictates that energy decision 
making must go through the legislative and regulatory process. This means that the city of 
Atlanta’s office of sustainability is a customer of the dominant energy provider, governed by 
the state process, not independent of it. Furthermore, legislature on electricity means the 
mayor’s office of sustainability focuses on a broad package of sustainability which includes 
water, buildings, greenhouse gas reduction, energy conservation within city limits (Mayor’s 
Office of Sustainability, 2012a). Below is a profile of the office of sustainability and its targets 
and goals. 
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The Mayor’s Office of Sustainability for the city of Atlanta 
The role of the Atlanta office of sustainability is to drive environmental and economic 
sustainability for city government operations and throughout the city. The office creates 
programs and policies for the following sectors: water and energy conservation, solid waste 
reduction, emissions reductions and recycling rates. A major goal for the office of sustainability 
is to make the city a top tier sustainability city (Mayor’s Office of Sustainability, 2012b). Part of 
this includes all the different city departments developing their own sustainability plans that 
target their major goals and to align those with greenhouse gas reduction goals. The office has 
broad collaborations with other urban leaders to encourage policy development and reform in 
select areas.  
These urban leaders include representatives from academia, residential groups, faith groups, 
and non-profits. In terms of financing of the goals, the office of sustainability has secured 
significant funds for at least 25 new projects. The projects focus on increasing the municipal 
use of renewable energy to 5% by 2015, reducing city hall’s greenhouse gas emissions by 25% 
by 2020, 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050 and reducing energy consumption in existing municipal 
operations by 15% by 2020, 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050 (Mayor’s Office of Sustainability, 
2012a). The city of Atlanta’s office of sustainability has achieved many environmental and 
sustainability goals but in terms of electricity, it is limited in its ability due to the state’s energy 
governance structure.  
An interviewee, who was an academic consultant for the Atlanta city government sustainability 
plan summarises the limitations in the statement below: 
“This is part of where Atlanta's context is tricky. Um, so, climate change, you don’t have any, 
there is not broad scepticism related to global warming or anything like that in City Hall. 
Everybody is pretty much on board with, this is the science and this is where we are. There 
is not [pause], most of the people that are involved with the city operations on the 
sustainability side either have kind of like an engineering or legalistic background so it's not 
as controversial for them, I feel. The difficulty is that Atlanta does not have control of its 
utilities. So, the utility that supplies power for Atlanta is Georgia Power, which is a state-
wide enterprise, it’s a state sanctioned monopoly” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, 
October 29, 2013). 
In terms of low carbon decision making the context of Atlanta differs in terms of the political 
dynamics within the state and city in a way that makes it different from other cities that could 
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be considered progressive cities on low carbon energy development. The same interviewee, 
who was an academic consultant, goes on to explain this context in the statement below: 
“The other part is political dynamics within the state are interesting on this front where, so 
Atlanta is kind of viewed negatively by the rest of the state. So, there’s Atlanta and there’s 
the rest of Georgia and they, you see this very clearly if you look at the way the state house 
operates, that the state legislature operates. So Atlanta is the capital, so everything happens 
here, but you get a lot of people who are not from the city that are really pushing agendas 
that are anti-Atlanta. All that’s to say that is complicates Atlanta’s ability to make changes 
that impact its own electricity supply. Because the regulatory bodies. So, there’s the two 
main regulatory bodies that are going to be the state legislature and the public utilities 
commission and those two bodies are state wide bodies they are not tied to Atlanta. So, if 
Atlanta wants to do things that change the carbon emissions profile of its electricity supply, 
it really has quite limited ability to do so. That’s what I was saying it would be really different 
than say Austin or San Francisco” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, October 29, 
2013). 
Another challenge for the city office is that it often has to work in a state setting where a 
climate change message is met with scepticism and thus reduction in carbon emissions 
becomes a hard sell. An interviewee who worked within the Mayor’s Office of Sustainability 
summarises this point in the statement below: 
“It is definitely something that we, take into consideration but it is not a metric that is 
commonly used for us. We do have a greenhouse gas inventory which measures our carbon 
annually and then um and within certain groups we’ll speak in terms of carbon. But, 
generally people don’t want to hear that here. It is not, that’s sort of; it’s just not what 
people understand” (1C, Manager, Office of Sustainability, October 16, 2013). 
Finally, given this context of environmental, specifically climate, scepticism, legal energy 
structures, and uncertain political dynamics, it is perhaps understood why the city does not or 
cannot play a more active role in energy decision making: 
“The main players would be, the city can agitate for a change in electricity composition and 
we are seeing that happen a lot lately, nationally. In Boulder, Colorado, just told Xcel get 
out, we're going to buy the power plants that you providing us, right, we are taking it back 
from you, you have not provided with the amount of carbon free power that we want. That’s 
happening everywhere, that’s been happening a lot this year. Minneapolis threatened to do 
the same thing which is where Xcel is actually based. That was the result when Minneapolis 
threatened to pull out, so they went okay, okay, we're going to buy 400MW more of wind. 
There are a couple of cities in Florida that have done the same thing, so Atlanta; the cities 
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have leverage if they have the willingness and the political backing to pursue it. I think 
Atlanta knows but I'm not sure if they know whether they've got the backing or not so I 
think they are kind of testing the water a little to see” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia 
Tech, October 29, 2013). 
Nevertheless, despite the challenge in any sort of environmental or climate change message, 
the city leadership continuously makes a conscious effort to look at emissions, efficiency and 
cost in a practical way. An interviewee who was a member and director of a consumer 
advocacy group in Georgia summarises these points in the comments below: 
“Like the Mayor’s office, that was a decision by the mayor and he has his sustainability team 
working on that and city council I believe had to approve, might have just been an executive 
order but that’s something that, that goes before the current mayor, mayor Franklin 
introduced that standard first but those are, again those are the kinds of things that we are 
encouraging homeowners to do. That’s the decision the city is making, they are changing 
out their light bulbs, they are, stepping up their recycling, you know they are doing things 
that we, they are making personal choices to reduce energy consumption. So, the city said 
we want to have the standard of and there are specific things that municipals can do to 
reduce their carbon footprint and that’s a choice thing, right, that’s not a state policy, that’s 
a city saying independently we are going to do some things to reduce our carbon footprint 
and that’s an important platform of the mayor of Atlanta right now" (6E 14A, Director 
consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014) 
Overall, this shows the city of Atlanta being active within its jurisdiction on the issue of 
sustainability but also unable or unwilling to expand this into electricity generation and supply 
decisions. 
 
5.3 KEY ACTORS IN ENERGY DECISION-MAKING 
The key actors involved in Georgia’s electricity decision-making include: 
 
• The Georgia state legislature, whose duty it is to create, amend and pass laws which 
govern electricity generation and supply. 
• The Public Service Commission, who are bound by law and regulate the investor-owned 
utility, balancing the utility’s and consumers’ interests. 
• Georgia Power, the only investor-owned electric utility in Georgia, after the merger 
with another Southern Company subsidiary Savannah Electric and Power Company 
• Georgia Watch, the consumer advocacy group which monitors rates on behalf of utility 
customers. 
Page 158 of 311 
 
Finally, the representatives of any other groups involved will be those with a specific interest 
in the case, for example, the Sierra Club for environmental reasons, the Georgia Industrial 
Group or the Georgia Association of Manufacturers. Evidenced by the statement by a Georgia 
Tech academic consultant: 
“I think you have to have some interest and so what is happening, the types of people that 
normally will show is the lawyers for everybody. You know, so the utility will always be there. 
When you have, when they are doing renewable types of stuff, you will have the renewables 
advocates appear and then there’s another group of peoples who have traditionally been 
the ones there who are more focused on rates.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, 
October 29, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 PUBLIC DEBATES ON LOW CARBON ENERGY 
In the state of Georgia, public debates and citizen concerns related to energy has focused 
mainly on rates, including rate increases and managing bills. Citizens care about rates and are 
sensitive to rate increases, primarily because cheap electricity has been an essential part of 
Georgia’s electricity generation and supply. The consumer advocacy group, whose duty it is to 
know and advocate for what Georgia’s utilities’ consumers need, explain that managing bills 
was the most popular topic for customers of utilities in Georgia. This is evidenced by this 
statement from a member and director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia:  
State legislature
Georgia Power 
Company
Georgia Watch
*Other interests e.g. 
Sierra Club
Georgia Public Service 
Commission
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“They're very interested. This is one of our most requested topics. Carla's not here today, 
she can tell you about that. People are very interested in how they could save money on 
their power bills” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014) 
However, evidence from some consumers, technical, research and environmental advocates, 
suggest that Georgia is experiencing a shift whereby consumer choice and cost savings are 
perceived as being obtained through energy efficiency and renewable energy.  
For an interviewee who was a manager of an Atlanta-based technical, research, advocacy 
institute, energy efficiency is no longer an outlier amongst the Georgian public anymore: 
“I’ll tell you one of the things that has happened recently two or three times is that people 
have asked me about LED light bulbs as I am shopping for them. Seriously, but that is, people 
actually stopped and joined in the conversation I’m having with someone because there’s a 
realisation that these energy-efficient light bulbs just aren’t outliers anymore. They see 
someone holding a $10 light bulb and looking at them and they have thought this as well, 
‘Should I buy a $10 light bulb?’  They stop and we start engaging in a conversation and other 
people with stop and listen too” (7E, Manager technical & research Institute, February 24, 
2014) 
For an interviewee and director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia, public engagement 
with energy now includes clean energy: 
“Yeah, people are not only interested in how they can lower their bills but also, they are 
certainly interested in making cleaner choices” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, 
January 9, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, there is more emphasis on energy efficiency for consumer cost savings, in 
comparison to renewable energy. This is evidenced by a manager of an Atlanta-based, 
technical, research, advocacy institute: 
“We are definitely, definitely, definitely advocates for increasing the renewable energy 
capacity of the state without a doubt, but we also will always remind people that the most 
cost effective source of energy is not using it in the first place” (7E, Manager technical & 
research Institute, February 24, 2014). 
This conversation about energy efficiency has extended to include electric utilities as well, 
where some environmental advocates believe that with the preponderance of coal in the 
electricity mix, energy efficiency may need to be given some priority over renewable energy in 
the short term: 
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“But when it comes to the energy efficiency phase which is obviously for, as it relates to 
carbon emissions in an area like ours or the Midwest where you've got such a high 
predominance of coal in the mix, the efficiency stuff can be as important or much more 
important than very quick or at least very short term, in the very short term it can be that 
much more important than doing renewable capacity expansion” (6E 7G, Sierra Club 
Chapter Organiser, February 26, 2014). 
Therefore, the main groups for whom low carbon has become a political issue are the growing 
number of clean energy companies including solar and wind manufacturers, energy efficiency 
companies along with environmental and sustainability advocates who can benefit directly or 
indirectly from energy-carbon restructuring. In Georgia, there has been a growing push from 
the green business community whose businesses grow when forms of energy-carbon 
restructuring are undertaken in Georgia’s electricity generation and supply. Illustrated by a 
comment from the manager for the Atlanta office of sustainability:  
“So, there’s not a lot of push in the south. It has grown. It is a growing push.” (1C, Manager, 
Office of Sustainability, October 16, 2013).  
For example, solar manufacturers, many of whom are associated with the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, are coming together to grow solar in the state of Georgia, because despite being 
based in Georgia, renewable energy is estimated at 1% (See 5.2.2). This presents an 
opportunity to expand their businesses and impact upon Georgia's own electricity generation 
and supply. This is illustrated by comments from the manager for the Atlanta office of 
sustainability: 
“Solar is because of Georgia Tech, I know one of the bigger companies; Suniva. They are 
Georgia Tech alone. I mean, they just stay in Atlanta. That’s where they base their 
company.” (1C, Manager, Office of Sustainability, October 16, 2013). 
“Oh, but they are not a utility provider, just a bunch of manufacturers coming together.” (1C, 
Manager, Office of Sustainability, October 16, 2013). 
However, growing the solar energy market in Georgia, has become a political issue due to the 
regulatory and legislative nature of the traditional regulated market, dominated by single 
monopoly providers. This is illustrated by a director of one of the largest solar manufacturers 
in Georgia: 
“Yeah, I think, it’s only been an active role since I joined Suniva start-up solar company here 
in Atlanta and I learned that Solar is part of the electricity markets which are very much 
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regulated, in Georgia and in the United States and its very political and at first, I wanted to 
be apolitical and just think about the technology but I realised that if we were going to have 
solar in our own backyard, Suniva is headquartered here in Atlanta Georgia, then we needed 
to affect policy.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, February 
20, 2014) 
Similar reasons exist for energy efficiency or other companies who gain from energy-carbon 
restructuring. Examples include individuals involved with financing renewable energy and 
energy efficiency installations or retrofits in buildings and construction. These are illustrated 
by two comments below. The first from an interviewee, who was a director of an energy 
efficiency company looking to advance Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing in 
Atlanta, describing the difficulties in getting the program approved: 
“So, I am actually working to get this program established here in Atlanta, so again step 
back, a PACE program requires a public partnership, the city of Atlanta is our partner, you 
need state enabling legislation as well, so you need some policy at the state level which we 
did in 2010, it just takes time. So, I like to say that there's three steps and there's not really 
three steps but it’s easy to bucket them. State enabling legislation, city sponsor and then 
you have to validate the program legally and so in Atlanta we've done the first, we've done 
the second, we've got the state, we've got the city and we are in that final step of legally 
validating the program and you are just at the mercy of working in the court system because 
in essence you are taking a legal structure to validate the program and the bonds that get 
sold for the project through a legal discussion and it just takes time, it’s just a timing thing. 
See, you know through-out the last year we've had city council votes, we've had resolutions 
passed, ordinances passed, resolutions that different agencies passed locally so all our work 
has been done, it’s just getting us to the point of being able to launch where you need that 
final stage, that final step and that’s where we are.” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 
2013) 
The second was an individual from the construction industry, seeking to expand business 
opportunities: 
“I’m doing it because nothing’s more fun than pissing off a monopoly, just great, but you 
also, for us in America, you have to have a business model because that’s how I get Georgia 
Tech interested in what I’m doing. They’re now hopefully going to help set me up so my 
business has a chance to succeed. Help introduce me to people who can get the things that 
I need and then possibly if the business is likely to be worth anything. They might invest and 
then everybody makes money so, I’m not doing any new technology as a matter of fact, 
what I’m doing is helping to get the technology more widely distributed. If my company 
works it will bring more solar to people than currently is being done. In other words, I’ll 
Page 162 of 311 
 
greatly expand the market for solar and so that’s what I’m trying to do.” (4Ai, Business 
developer, February 19, 2014) 
Finally, low carbon is a political issue for environmental and sustainability advocates, for whom 
getting cleaner energy into the Georgia’s energy mix is a goal; such as the Sierra Club, which 
has a political campaign designed to end the use of coal in U.S. electricity generation. Sierra 
Club has a local chapter in the state of Georgia and one of the it’s campaign manager confirms 
this position: 
“So, I primarily work on a campaign called the Beyond Coal campaign, and that’s the Sierra 
club’s largest national co-ordinated campaign, and the goals are to move, um, America’s 
electricity sector, off, of coal, by 2030.  We want to see the electricity sector move off, of all 
fossil fuels, natural gas, oil, coal, by 2050 and we want to see all of that capacity replaced 
by wind, solar, geo-thermal, hydro, energy efficiency.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club, Georgia Chapter 
Organiser, February 26, 2014).  
These are the groups, for whom, low carbon has become a political issue in the state of 
Georgia.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
In summary, Georgia is a conservative state whose government is dominated by the Republican 
party in most branches of state government; from the executive branch, down to the state 
energy regulators. The state’s economic policies are geared towards growth and as such, its 
energy strategy has been to use the least cost resources in electricity generation and supply; 
traditionally this has been coal. However, the city of Atlanta, due to its history, has emerged 
politically different to the rest of Georgia; It is the liberal city in a mainly conservative state, 
predominantly governed by the Democratic Party. Although Atlanta is a liberal city, one key 
point is that the city does not have its own electricity utility and hence is limited in its ability to 
enact to change.  
Due to the traditional regulated structure of the electricity market in Georgia and the heavy 
use of coal and nuclear, electricity rates have been low in comparison to other states; so, the 
focus of residents in Georgia has been on rates or rates increases, not on low carbon energy. 
However, energy efficiency and renewable energy are starting to be perceived as means of 
cost savings. Finally, there is starting to be a small but growing push from the green business 
community for policies which grow renewable energy and energy efficiency in Georgia, to 
expand business opportunities and to benefit from energy-carbon restructuring. Recent 
developments in Georgia involving the federal energy regulations, new nuclear energy 
development, rate increases and distributed solar generation, (explored in the next chapter) 
describe the politics of low carbon advocacy in Georgia. 
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6 LOW CARBON ADVOCACY IN GEORGIA 
So far, the PhD has examined the context in which energy decisions are made, including the 
key actors who govern electricity generation and supply, the specific roles of these groups and 
the formal process of making decisions. The following chapter discusses the debate and 
decisions surrounding low carbon investment shaped by different interests in Georgia. Of 
particular interest are the debates about EPA regulations, solar development and new nuclear 
development. Between 2011 and 2014, the state of Georgia was involved in three intertwined 
debates about energy-carbon restructuring and the direction of its energy generation and 
supply.  
This chapter investigates the decisions taken on low carbon investment by Georgia Power, the 
investor owned utility. This investment, it is argued, in part reflected persistent intervention 
and lobbying in the Integrated Resource Planning process and rate cases by a mix of renewable 
and energy efficiency business advocates, consumer advocates, conservative law makers, 
three Public Service Commissioners, a group of Atlanta Tea Party Patriots and environmental 
organisations. However, the decision for low carbon investment energy-carbon restructuring 
was also a response to federal climate protection policies, notably the recent Environmental 
Protection Agency proposal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in April of 2012. The chapter 
brings out the complex politics of pro-low carbon lobby in the state of Georgia between 2011 
and 2014, reflecting the overlap between environmental interests and conservative political 
support for reduced state intervention and energy freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 165 of 311 
 
6.1 DRIVERS FOR LOW CARBON AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN GEORGIA 
This section of the case study explains the drivers for low carbon in Georgia, including the 
proposed energy regulations by the EPA making its way through the regulatory process, the 
pressures for solar distributed generation and decentralisation and the pressures to invest in 
new nuclear capacity.  
 
6.1.1 Developing federal government regulations as a driver of low carbon in Georgia 
In April 13, 2012, the national EPA proposed new standards of performance for greenhouse 
gas emissions from new fossil fuel power plants. The proposal received 2.5 million comments 
and based on these, issued an updated proposal on the 20th of  September 2013 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2013d) aiming to curb emissions directly from power plant 
output from new fossil fuelled power plants. These actions signalled steps by the EPA and the 
current administration to form a federal climate change strategy for the United States in the 
absence of congress (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015b).  
The 1970 Clean Air Act is an exhaustive law comprised of six parts, covering issues ranging from 
air pollution prevention to ozone protection (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013b), 
nevertheless, of importance in this proposal are rules governing air quality and emission 
limitations (U.S.C., 1970), relating to standards of performance for new stationary sources 
(United States Congress, 1970). In April 2012 the EPA proposed new standards of performance 
(NSPS) which essentially set limits on CO2 emissions from new fossil power plants 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2013d), notably (a) new coal fired plants would have a limit 
of 1,100 pounds of CO2 per MWh; and (b) natural gas-fired plants would have a limit of 1,000 
pounds of CO2 per MWh. 
After establishing new standards on new fossil fuel power plants, section 111(d) also requires 
the EPA to regulate CO2 emissions on existing power plants (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2013e; Tarr, Monast, & Profeta, 2013). This section of the law has rarely, if ever, been used in 
the past and utilities coped with environmental regulations by installing environmental 
pollution controls for reducing emissions such as scrubbers, low NOx burners, and electrostatic 
precipitators. Furthermore, aspects of section 111 in the Clean Air Act have also in the past 
been designed in partnership with the states and utilities.  
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An interviewee, who was the Energy and Climate Change co-ordinator for EPA region four, 
which includes eight southern regions and Georgia, explains the implications of the proposed 
rule: 
“The President of the United States came out with his National Climate Plan of Action in 
June. So, he’s come out with his actual plan to address climate change both on mitigation, 
so now he’s proposing new power plant rules for carbon reduction, which has not been 
done in the United States before. Power plants have been allowed to produce as much 
carbon emissions as they’ve wanted. So, we’ve already submitted for new power plants, 
rules for new power plants and that’s currently under public review right now, public 
comment period. Then next year we’ll be releasing rules on existing power plants, which is 
going to be a more, tougher rule, at least in the aspect of it’s going to be harder to tell 
current power plants what to do than it would be their building new ones.” (10A, EPA 
regional co-ordinator, January 16, 2014) 
 
The proposal also puts the spotlight on expensive, pollution controls often used by utilities, 
with cost estimates of installation for these technologies often ranging from hundreds of 
millions to a billion dollars (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011b) , making it in the best interest 
for the power generation utilities to rethink the way they produce power and what fuel sources 
work in the long run (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013d). In Georgia, key decision 
makers including state energy regulators and utilities were aware the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s proposed carbon regulation was developing and gave similar responses to 
how they had adjusted their decision making in anticipation of it becoming a legal rule.  
As Georgia relied predominantly on coal for energy generation, it became clear that the new 
regulation would have a significant effect on the state’s energy generation mix. An interviewee, 
a public service commissioner aware of the developments of the proposed regulation, 
explained that the regulation could potentially be very expensive, for Georgia, since the state 
had very low existing renewable energy capacity: 
"I think there is some value to getting ahead of potential federal regulation, so if the federal 
government in 20 years said that Georgia has to be at 25% renewable energy and right now, 
we are only at 1%, it’s going to be expensive to get to 25%, in a way, if we did have a standard 
it would ease us into this." (2Bi, Georgia Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013) 
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In addition, the main utility, whilst acknowledging the pressure of federal regulation on coal 
plants, emphasised that potential regulations are incorporated into their planning process for 
electricity generation but signalled that coal would be replaced with mainly natural gas. One 
interviewee, a director of energy policy and planning at one the utilities in Georgia, 
acknowledged that carbon regulation was a key factor in their future electricity generation 
planning process: 
“Obviously and it’s probably true in the UK, the coal fired generation is the fuel type that’s 
under the most pressure with new environment regulations and so as part of our IRP filling, 
we conduct what we call unit retirement studies on the coal fleet and we look at, if we know 
we are going to get new environmental regulations coming down the pipeline in the future 
and we model what we think the cost of those regulations is going to be to comply with and 
we compare continuing to operate that coal unit on what these environmental regulations,  
we compare that to retiring the coal unit and replacing that it with a different type of 
technology which typically will be a natural gas combined cycle or a combustion turbine 
technology.” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
Nevertheless, there were suggestions by some interviewees, that the utility’s response to the 
EPA regulations has been and will be disputed due to the costs associated with compliance or 
noncompliance. This is illustrated in the comment made by a senior technical analyst for a 
southern interstate non-profit organisation: 
"Well, the rule for new plants is, the proposal has a year before it’s implemented there. So, 
people will complain, they still have a comment period, but the rule for existing plants is 
just, hasn’t been developed yet, so they’re collecting comment now for that one, so the 
utilities are screaming, I mean they are so, unhappy because it is going to increase the cost, 
screaming like babies. Cost, cost, cost, you’re not going to get out of it." (6E, Snr. technical 
analyst, October 31, 2013). 
There were also environmental advocates, consumer advocates and green businesses 
interviewees, who were unconvinced about the EPA proposed rules as a main driver for low 
carbon in Georgia. One interviewee, a manager of a non-profit technical, research and 
advocacy organization based in Atlanta, believed that the main driver for low carbon in Georgia 
was extremely low natural gas prices: 
"There are incremental changes that are going to be put in place about emissions. Not all of 
it is carbon emissions. Some of it is other types of pollutants but what we have here is a 
confluence of tire regulation on the air quality or the air pollution and a dramatic drop in 
the price of natural gas because of fracking. So, those two things have combined to change 
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the fuel mix of Georgia Power’s electricity which has reduced their coal use increased their 
natural gas use. That has impacted the carbon intensity of electricity at the smokestack 
because to me it’s still unclear what the lifecycle carbon impact of fracked natural gas is. 
I’ve had that conversation with folks at Georgia Tech." (7E, Manager technical & research 
Institute, February 24, 2014) 
However, a consultant and director of an energy efficiency company raised the issue that the 
drive to low carbon resources was also driven by the need to renew aging electricity 
infrastructure in Georgia: 
“So yes, the EPA is obviously putting into place restrictions on air emissions from coal plants 
but the majority here, the utility, the coal plants are in essence on their last legs. Most of 
them are getting shut down.” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 2013) 
6.1.2 Low cost natural gas as a driver for low carbon electricity in Georgia 
In 2011, the state of Georgia had an energy generation mix of coal 48%, nuclear 26%, natural 
gas 21% and other resources including wood, hydro and petroleum making up the remaining 
share of 5% (Southern States Energy Board, 2012). By 2013 and 2014, Georgia’s energy mix 
was coal 35%, natural gas 39%, nuclear 23%, hydro 3% (Georgia Power Company, 2014a). This 
reduction in Georgia’s coal use (Figure 6-1), indicated a form of carbon reduction, but the 
degree indicated it was not driven by a low carbon strategy.  
 
Figure 6-1: Net Generation for Electric Utility Annual from 2001 – 2014 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration Electricity Data Browser 
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An interviewee from a Georgia consumer advocacy group explained that the coal reduction 
was an economic decision, due to the current era of cheap gas and the expense of 
environmental retrofits for coal plants: 
“The decision to close the coal plants was because it wasn’t economic to open anymore 
because they are old and installing environmental controls is costly and the cost of natural 
gas has come so far down, right.” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 
2014).  
 
The perspective that it was not economic to run the coal plants was expanded by a senior 
technical analyst for a southern interstate non-profit organisation to include issues of profit 
maximisation: 
“They will run whatever is the cheapest thing to run because they’re trying to maximize 
their profit and minimize cost” (6E, Snr. technical analyst, October 31, 2013).  
Georgia Power tends to position itself as technology agnostic, being open to different 
approaches to solve problems, not relying on a specific strategy and considering all 
technologies. A director from a utility in Georgia said: 
“On the supply we take into account a myriad of things, certainly we look at our existing 
fleet of generation resources and how they are operating, how old they are, what new 
controls are going to be needed to ensure they stay in compliance with existing and new 
environmental rule making and then we also look from a expansion if we are going to need 
to have to add additional generation, we model what the expansion may look like, so if we 
are going to need to add generation in 2019, how much generation we think it would be 
and what would be the most economic technology to, that would be available then” (13A, 
Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014). 
 
But there were no indications of a low carbon plan or strategy in utility planning: 
“And what it does, it puts together what we call an indicative plan, it’s not set in stone 
because you know obviously, conditions change, economic conditions change, 
environmental conditions change over a 20-year period. We look at fuel costs, so we see 
which way natural gas prices are going, coal prices, nuclear, we also look at renewables, 
what’s happening with technology costs on renewables and are they becoming cost 
effective” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014). 
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Some business interests, like the Georgia Chamber of Commerce, embraced the advent of low 
cost natural gas, describing expanding its use, into other sectors of the Georgia economy: 
“We don’t mine coal, and I don’t believe we have any significant shale gas reserve, it might 
be little tiny pockets but, so as a state we’re a net importer of both coal and various, you 
know, the natural gas supplies, irrespective of where they are sourced from, but Georgia is 
very supportive of the use of natural gas for energy generation, and there is a significant 
movement now to include natural gas for transportation” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, 
October 30, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, an environmental activist and campaign manager for the Sierra Club indicated 
that the utilities were responding more to natural gas than other technologies, because whilst 
they had shut down some coal plants, they had retrofitted others for natural gas generation to 
replace some of the free generation capacity. Additionally, the environmental activist also 
indicated that the Sierra Club wanted to shut a further five or six coal plants in the state of 
Georgia by 2020, with an eventual goal of closing even the retrofitted gas plants: 
“Yes, and we also want to see the retrofits that they did to natural gas, we want to see those 
turned off by 2050” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter Organiser, February 26, 2014). 
 
These comments demonstrate pressure for low carbon restructuring in the state of Georgia. 
Overall, by 2012, the oversupply of natural gas was making wholesale electricity prices for gas-
fired power generation cheap in comparison to other fuels, to the degree that utilities in 
Georgia were retrofitting plants, evidenced by the comment below: 
“Yes, carbon emissions in the United States are lower than they have been in two decades, 
and that’s partially because methane emissions, from natural gas are higher than they’ve 
been in a long time, ever been, excuse me” (6E 7G, Sierra Club, Georgia Chapter Organiser, 
February 26, 2014). 
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6.1.3 Attitudes on energy policy in Georgia 
In Georgia, there were no formal goals or targets related to greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions or energy security measures. To some actors in the state legislature, this represents 
an absence of a formal energy policy and is often seen as regressive: 
“Why are we so dependent on foreign oil, we don’t have a state energy policy and I think 
the last state energy policy I saw was back in 2012, I mean we’ve never had a state energy 
policy and it’s just, I mean it’s regressing, I have to say” (2A 3D, Georgia state representative, 
April 11, 2014) 
Key actors in Georgia’s electricity investment decisions (utilities, regulators, legislators and 
businesses), shared a similar attitude of having a reliable, affordable, energy supply, which 
governed, much of the decisions made about electricity generation and supply in the state. 
This attitude overlaps with a strong prevailing priority of keeping the energy price low to 
support economic development. For businesses like large manufacturing companies, these 
principles are long established in Georgia, evidenced by a representative of the Georgia 
Chamber of Commerce: 
“The way energy strategy or energy policy was initially developed was to ensure that 
everybody around the state had fair, equitable, reliable and affordable power, so there were 
policies and programmes set up to ensure that delivery” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, 
October 30, 2013). 
Yet, whilst businesses may see, fair, equitable, reliable and affordable power as the main 
priority for of energy policy in Atlanta, representatives of the electric utilities stress that cleaner 
energy with each new investment also features as a core principle in Georgia: 
“I think the energy policy in the state is been focused on providing a reliable affordable 
energy supply to our customers to the citizens of the state to encourage growth, economic 
development you know quality of life, at the same time the policy is implemented by the 
commission is been focus too on how do we generate cleaner and cleaner energy, to every 
Kilowatt that we generate is cleaner than the last kilowatt” (13A, Director of energy policy 
and planning, April 1, 2014). 
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6.1.4 Other pressures and demands for and against low carbon restructuring in Georgia 
In 2012, Georgia Power started seeking plans to close or convert around 15 units of its coal 
plants to natural gas or biomass (Reuters, 2014). The reasons included old or aging plants, 
possible federal regulations and cheap natural gas (Southern Company, 2013a). The 15 coal 
and oil units make up a substantial generating capacity and it was reported that the retired 
power units would free up over 2,000MW. This reduced capacity created a demand for newer 
resources, especially energy resources for baseload power, including new nuclear, natural gas 
and biomass. Some of the freed-up capacity was initially scheduled for biomass projects, but 
eventually did not come to fruition (Swartz, 2013a).  
Other freed-up capacity was added to a new nuclear expansion project (Vogtle 3 & 4), to be 
developed by Georgia Power which became very expensive and incurred cost overruns (Swartz, 
2012). The result of this nuclear expense created pressure on the utility and Georgia PUC from 
green businesses, environmental, technical, consumer advocates and a small sect of Tea Party 
members, for the development of decentralised energy, specifically solar energy. 
a. Pressure for renewable energy and energy efficiency 
In Georgia, the key actors lobbying for greater low carbon investment in the electricity mix 
were largely from the business and government sectors with some crossovers and advocates. 
Some of these groups saw renewable energy as an untapped resource, in a state which had 
sufficient resources. Some actors from the consumer advocacy groups were part of larger 
groups, exploring the technical potential of wind energy resources, confirmed by a member 
and director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia: 
“I'm part of the Georgia Wind working group and we hope to see more wind generation 
here in Georgia, although Georgia Power did recently announce a power purchase 
agreement for wind from Oklahoma, well there's a working group that's looking at the real 
potential on the coastline and in some mountain areas but it’s something that is still in the 
studying stage. Georgia power is going to be doing this, coming out of this IRP they are going 
to be studying, Georgia Power will be studying the potential for wind energy generation 
Georgia” (6E, 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014). 
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Other groups including Southface, a non-profit technical, research and advocacy organization, 
were exploring energy efficiency as an untapped and underutilised resource: 
“Georgia has done a good job at adopting energy codes that bring our residential energy 
efficiency to the next level.  The next task is for the individual governing municipalities, 
either at county level or the city level, to actually go out and enforce the code.  Now the 
reason that’s important for a low-carbon electricity standpoint is because the lowest carbon 
electricity is electricity that’s not used. So, we begin with energy efficiency as an attempt to 
do what we can at the municipal level because the city-, so, the City of Atlanta cannot 
control necessarily the fuel mix at Georgia Power” (7E, Manager technical & research 
Institute, February 24, 2014) 
An independent sustainability company was also looking to advance Property Assessed Clean 
Energy (PACE) financing and energy efficiency into the state of Georgia: 
“Well I mean there's a lot that can be done, we're just the tip of the market. I mean we're 
not even, if you look at the trajectory of efficiency programs just in the Atlanta market, we're 
still at the bottom of the curve. We've got a long way to go. There's much more market 
penetration or many more programs, efficiency programs that could be developed from the 
utility standpoint” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 2013). 
Finally, there were groups who wanted to develop the solar energy market, and were 
eventually successful in pushing the utilities and PSC to develop 800MW of solar energy. They 
included consumer advocates like Georgia Watch, some members of the Tea Party, 
environmental advocates like Sierra Club, renewable energy businesses associations like the 
Georgia Solar Energy Industries Association, solar energy companies and state and regional 
groups like Southern Alliance for Clean Energy. The focus on solar energy was deliberate: in 
2012, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s resource map of technical potential for 
renewable energy in the United States (Figure 6-1), shows that there are not significant 
resources of wind, geothermal, tidal or wave energy resources in the state of Georgia. This fact 
is widely recognized by the advocates. An interviewee, who was a manager for the Office of 
Sustainability, said: 
“In Georgia, solar is an awesome resource, we get a lot of sun here. Wind, we don’t get a 
lot of. There are a couple pockets, we have the Appalachian Mountains, on top of some 
mountains there are some good pockets and off-of the coast of Georgia there is a great 
opportunity for wind but that’s outside of our cities” (1C, Manager, Office of Sustainability, 
October 16, 2013). 
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Figure 6-2: Shows Renewable Energy Technology Resource Maps and Technical Potential for the United States in 2012 
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2012 
 
However, advocates from the construction industry and solar companies also pointed out that, 
unlike wind energy, a lack of state policy not resources, had been the issue for solar 
development. One interviewee from the construction industry and a solar advocate said: 
“You know what Georgia probably gets more sun in a week than Germany gets in a year, 
solar deployment follows policy, it doesn’t have anything to do with the sun believe it or 
not, it has nothing to do with the sun, it depends on the policy. If your state has a good 
policy, solar will flourish, if it doesn’t it won’t, it doesn’t matter where it is” (4Ai, Business 
developer, February 19, 2014). 
 
This is backed up, by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s solar resource map (Figure 
6-2), showing that Georgia falls into tiers 2 and 3 as it has an above average solar insolation of 
5.0 – 6.0 kWh/m2/day. This represents a significant amount of solar energy given that the 
highest states are in tier 1-2. The states with high solar insolation and are as follows: California, 
Arizona, New Jersey, Nevada, and Colorado (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2013a). 
These states also have the highest solar installations in the country and the strongest solar 
incentives. 
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Figure 6-3: Shows Photovoltaic Solar Resource of the United States 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2012 
 
The gap in solar deployment, despite its generation potential, created some of the pressures 
for low carbon restructuring in the state of Georgia. 
 
b. Demand for baseload power 
A key part of Georgia’s low cost of electricity has been its reliance on baseload coal and nuclear 
plants (Figure 6-1) which are inexpensive to run, however the reduction in coal generation has 
led to new natural gas plants, along with demand for the first new nuclear plants in the United 
States in 30 years (Echols, 2015): 
"First, our state has no Columbia or Colorado River to produce big hydro power. We have 
no power plants on mine-mouths, natural gas fields, or Hoover Dams. A significant portion 
of Georgia’s fuel for electricity production has to be transported over 1,000 miles. Yet, our 
energy prices are still low. Chalk that up to good planning and management by Georgia 
Power and constructive regulation from an all-Republican public utility commission-elected 
state-wide every six years. What we do have is nuclear power, and it enjoys widespread 
support” (Echols, November 13, 2015). 
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The support and demand for more baseload power is situated in the prevailing attitude of low 
cost, reliable, affordable energy supply (6.1.3), perceived as key to business success and 
economic growth in the area: 
“Only time will tell if Georgia and South Carolina can “jump-start” a nuclear renaissance. 
Let’s hope we can, because low-cost base-load energy — the amount of electricity available 
24 hours a day — is a key to economic growth” (Echols, July 25, 2013, Online Athens, Athens 
Banner-Herald) 
 
To a great degree, this reliability and affordability in Georgia are distinctly perceived by the 
state energy regulators, the utilities and business associations like the Chamber of Commerce, 
as being achieved through building more nuclear baseload power, in a way that the other fuels 
are not: 
 “In the case of nuclear, at the time that that was proposed, it was simply, you know, a 
response to the best alternative or base power. In the long term, what was the best 
economic opportunity to deliver affordable, reliable base-energy, and at the time, nuclear 
was the outstanding economic opportunity” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 
2013). 
 
The outcome of the current demand for baseload power is low carbon restructuring in the 
form of new nuclear energy construction:  
“We use the IRP process to identify what we believe is going to be the lowest cost resources 
to meet our needs and so several years ago, we identify nuclear as being a cost-effective 
option for our customers and, and keep in mind we already have 4 nuclear unit on our grid 
today and they have been providing reliable load cost energy for several decades now” (13A, 
Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
 
But this does not exclude future consideration of other baseload plants like advanced coal and 
newer combined cycle natural gas plants. 
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6.2 OUTCOMES OF PRESSURES AND DEMANDS FOR AND AGAINST LOW CARBON RESTRUCTURING 
The outcome of the demand for baseload nuclear power and pressure for solar energy resulted 
in the commissioning by Georgia Public Service Commission of three solar initiatives; the 
Georgia Advanced Solar Initiative, the Large-Scale Solar Initiative, and the Integrated Resource 
Plan Expanded Solar Initiative (Table 6-1). 
Georgia Power Solar Programs MW 
Final Order Integrated Resource Plan 525 
GPASI Distributed Generation 100 
Utility Scale Projects 110 
Large Scale Solar 50 
Existing Solar 22 
Total 807 
Table 6-1: Georgia Power Solar Programs Progress 2012 – 2015 
Source: Georgia Power Company 
 
These initiatives developed solar energy capacity in the state from 22MW in 2011 to a total of 
800MW by 2016. In 2011 and 2012, renewable energy held a less than 1% share of generation 
capacity (Georgia Power Company, 2014a, 2014b), but by 2015/2016, after the solar addition, 
it would be a 2% share of generation capacity (Georgia Power Company, 2015). 
In 2008, Georgia Power filed an original plan for two new nuclear reactors. The project was 
said to be a $14 billion capital investment in the state and the new nuclear reactors were 
originally funded by a United States Department of Energy loan guarantee. The loan was 
estimated at $6.5 billion (Mundy, 2014). The new nuclear expansion (Vogtle 3 & 4) is owned 
by all the major utilities in the state of Georgia; with each owning a percentage of the expansion 
plan, including; Georgia Power - 45.7%, Oglethorpe Power - 30%, Municipal Electric Authority 
of Georgia - 22.7% and Dalton Utilities - 1.6% (Southern Company, 2013b).  
The demand for new nuclear by the utilities, became key in the debate to develop solar 
because the construction of the new reactors had incurred significant budget overruns and 
delayed schedules. The reasons for the significant delays and budget problems were a 
combination of various factors including a five-year project approval timeline by the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an issue with the design of the reactors, causing the 
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design to be altered 19 times (new design type in the United States) and legal issues between 
the nuclear contractors and the utilities involved (Swartz, 2012).  
In 2013, Georgia Power filed a series of requests including a $1.46 billion request of increased 
rates which would fund pollution controls for existing coal plants and grid maintenance, a bill 
by state legislature to assist in the financing of the new nuclear project and a tax on owners of 
solar panels. This nuclear energy financing act in 2009 was passed by the state legislature and 
it allowed a recovery of financing costs during construction whereby utility customers were 
paying for the nuclear plant before the plant was finished and operational. Instead, customers 
paid whilst it was still under construction and before entering service (Georgia Power, 2014). 
The nuclear costs were incorporated into the customer’s monthly power bill and stand 
currently at 9.3% (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2014b).  
The requested new tax on owners of solar panels was rejected by the Public Service 
Commission and an $873 million rate increase was approved, as opposed to the initial $1.46 
billion originally proposed. These series of actions added to the demand and pressure for 
renewable energy on the utilities and regulators, because the entire budget, delay and rate 
increase development was not well received by groups pushing for solar energy or energy 
efficiency in the state of Georgia. It is in this context, of the new nuclear delays and budget 
overruns, that the solar development story is analysed and told in chapter 8; where positions, 
attitudes, values, ideologies supporting or opposing solar energy development, could also be 
seen mirroring the nuclear energy development. 
6.3 THE POLITICS OF ENERGY-CARBON ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING ADVOCACY 
Georgia is a politically and culturally conservative state and its policies tend towards 
conservativism (Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007c). Fleischmann & Pierannunzi (2007), 
“Georgians have long been known for traditional values, conservative politics, and a general 
distrust of government” (p. 85). 
In Georgia’s decision-making environment, conservative views are dominant, influential and 
sometimes may unfold in unexpected ways with regards to what aspects of low carbon energy 
policy are resisted and supported. In Georgia, the pressure from the EPA regulations to reduce 
carbon emissions plays out differently to the pressures to develop solar energy and nuclear 
energy.  
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EPA regulation is strongly resisted as a federal imposition and sometimes as an unnecessary 
liberal climate policy. Within that resistance there is a feeling that federal government is 
forcing Georgia to take decisions that are not in the best economic interests of the state; 
however, that resistance has limited impact on decisions. In this case, the power of the Georgia 
government is preferred over that of the federal government. 
Conservative influence over solar development plays out rather differently because this low 
carbon initiative is supported on the grounds that it is about individual freedom versus 
regulatory control from the government. In this case, the power of the individual is preferred 
over the government. 
Conservative influence over nuclear development also plays out differently. In this case, strict 
attitudes towards least-cost electricity generation and federal interventions are compromised 
to support nuclear energy development in a way that is not afforded to other technologies, 
especially renewable energy. The perceived benefits of baseload power to the utilities and 
businesses and state economy, supersede the subsidies, high capital costs, budget overruns 
and even rate increases associated with nuclear energy development.  
This section explores each of these issues separately, beginning with EPA regulations, solar 
development and finally nuclear energy development. 
6.3.1 Conservative influence over Federal Environmental Regulation 
Environmental policies from the federal government have been and continue to be a source of 
conflict and resistance in Georgia, especially in relation to EPA regulations requiring power 
plants reduce carbon emissions. Much of the conflict arises from conservative ideology about 
state autonomy. This view of autonomy does not accept the EPA role in setting national 
regulation and is therefore resistant to the Environmental Protection Agency’s plan to force 
existing power plants to reduce carbon emissions. Therefore, the EPA’s proposed section 11-
1(d) regulation on power plant carbon emissions reductions, is resisted based on two grounds: 
(a) an ideological opposition to federal power, and (b) an opposition to climate policy. 
In Georgia, all five public service commissioners critiqued the EPA regulations. The concerns 
were that the EPA was exceeding its authority, it diminished state authority over governing 
electricity, it was an indirect mandate for renewable energy and the regulations were not 
Page 180 of 311 
 
grounded in science (Echols, 2014a). All these criticisms were rooted in opposition to federal 
power and climate policy. Illustrated by the comments from a Georgia Commissioner below: 
“’Climate talk’ is en vogue right now and is receiving unprecedented media coverage. That 
doesn’t give the EPA the right to exceed its authority. Historically, the EPA has focused on 
the power plant itself and little else. Until Congress expressly authorises it to do so, the EPA 
has no business impacting energy efficiency, solar and even the power plants we get to turn 
on.” (Commissioner Echols, Athens-Banner Herald, June 14, 2014). 
 
This opposition was characteristic of conservative Georgia, but it may be considered to be 
representative of southern Republicans: 
“You know again that’s kind of the southern United States, Republican thinking is, less 
regulation, less government is better and I think you'll find that on renewables here, don’t 
pass a government mandate to tell me how much renewables I need, let me go figure it out 
and make a business decision.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market 
Development, February 20, 2014) 
 
Georgia’s influential business organizations like the Georgia Chamber of Commerce also 
oppose the EPA on those two grounds. According to Chamber, the EPA regulations provide 
another means for the federal government to reduce CO2 emissions, since climate change 
policy is at an impasse in Congress: 
“Okay, our response to that last one actually gave testimony at the EPA, on that it’s to slow 
down-, there is an unhealthy pace that EPA is putting on, and it is political, we know that, 
you know, we know that president Obama cannot get his preferred legislation through the 
congress because he can’t get it through the house of representatives, that’s the political 
reality, that’s what democracy has given, so actually he is trying to use whatever regulations 
EPA can provide to get the same or a similar, or a progressive outcome. Now, the point that 
we emphasised last week in the testimony was don’t establish an artificial timeline to do 
this, because investments in power generation are not things that you turn on and off 
overnight, they are long term.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
To the Chamber of Commerce, whilst the current issue is climate related policy, the opposition 
is to the federal government using its power to push through contested legislation whether it’s 
a Republican or Democrat administration: 
“Except that, what you’ve got is, and I suspect it’s the same with the Republicans, it’s been 
some time since one or the other party has had sufficient control of the congress to be able 
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to make sure that the EPA look like what they want it to look like, so they’ve all had a lack 
of numbers in some area where they’ve had to, the EPA had to go and finesse the rules and 
regulations they’ve got to fit a political ideology and some would argue that that’s what’s 
happening now.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30,2013) 
Furthermore, the Chamber of Commerce, perceives that despite having complied with the 
regulations, Georgia’s utilities are still penalised in the long-term when a new policy is pushed 
through: 
“So if you are going to put in place a policy that says a certain power source, generation 
source, must do X and is going to cost billions of dollars, be mindful that that could have 
a 20 or 30 year life span, or, alternatively as one of the generators, well hang on a minute, 
we are coal because about 20 years ago when we wanted to build-, or when we built our 
new power plant, we wanted to use natural gas, but there was a specific federal law that 
prohibited the use of natural gas. Now, they’re going to be taxed through a new EPA 
regulation. So, they’ll spend billions of dollars on the coal power plant that they never 
wanted to build in the first place, but the law said that they couldn’t build it with natural 
gas, so they’re all these unintended consequences.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, 
October 30, 2013) 
Ultimately, the perspective of the Chamber of Commerce, is that investments in low carbon 
should come about as a result of market signals and not regulations. The recent investments 
in natural gas plants are examples of responses to the market: 
“Well, people would very much support it if it was only the market, but it’s not exclusively 
the market. Obviously, at the federal level, there hasn’t been any consensus on climate 
change legislation, so there’s no legislative driver, but EPA is doing its best at the president’s 
direction to use existing regulations to put in place appropriate controls or directives. Now, 
the market is responding to those, and the market’s responding to competitive pressures 
between natural gas supplies, which have increased rapidly over the last four or five years 
and coal, so that is why you’re seeing a lot of coal supplied power plants being converted to 
natural gas.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
Conservative political groups like the Tea Party also oppose government regulations because 
they believe in freedom, especially individual and economic freedom and in the case of the 
EPA regulation, the belief is that the utilities should be free to make their own business 
decisions. However, they also perceive these regulations to come at some cost to rate-payers. 
Therefore, the free market is preferred to deliver more economic, efficient and advanced 
solutions.  
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A Tea Party founder and solar advocate argues that removing regulatory barriers for clean 
energy from electricity markets whilst ensuring that polluting energy sources, pay for 
environmental or health damages, would be a more effective solution to reducing carbon 
emissions than EPA regulations: 
“Well, number one, I think the PSC is on top of that but you know, I oppose excessive 
regulation. I don’t support excessive regulation, whether it be from the EPA or anybody else. 
I think, we need to be deregulating, you know, I think we need to be removing some of the 
regulatory barriers. I think if, and I believe the free market is the way. I believe that, remove 
the barriers, allow clean energy to compete on a level playing field, in the free market and 
let the market decide what energy is best. I believe, energy that damages the environment, 
should be fully responsible for the repair and any health-related cost.” (15D, Tea Party 
activist, October 5, 2016) 
Furthermore, given the traditional regulated electric market in Georgia, some of the 
investments costs (upgrades, pollution controls, etc.) will be incorporated into the rate 
structure and passed on to the utility customers. So, there is a cost to the consumer, in direct 
response to the federal regulation. These are illustrated in comments by solar and consumer 
advocates. The first comment was by a director for a solar firm:  
“So, Georgia Power makes the argument every time that I go to their corporate customer 
meetings and they'll their corporate customers, we are really trying to fight that EPA. They 
are adding cost to us and we have to pass that cost unto you and that environmental 
compliance cost is bad and we can make power cheaper for you if we did not have the EPA 
breathing down our necks. Well, so every home owner has to pay, environmental 
compliance and Georgia power puts that on there, to rub the nose of the EPA that if the 
president and the EPA are going to tell us we’ve got to clean up these dirty smoke stacks, 
we're going to tell the rate payer exactly how much that costs.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director 
International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014) 
The second comment was from the director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia: 
“Well no, we support the need for environmental controls but, that’s a good thing, but they 
are wanting to, Georgia Power is then saying, ‘so we are closing 15 units but we are going 
to keep these units open and we are going to collect this additional money from rate payers 
a hundred and something million dollars to install these controls.’ and we've said, ‘shut 
more units because you don’t need that excess capacity.’” (6E 14A, Director consumer 
advocacy group, January 9, 2014). 
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So, when the EPA regulations come through, they become an indirect cost to the consumer. 
Finally, even some members of the state legislature, who were Democrats or considered 
themselves to be progressive on the issue of climate change, perceived the EPA regulations to 
have a cost to jobs in the region, specifically coal jobs. This meant that, due to the high 
economic dependency on coal within the region, a gradual phase out of coal would be less 
drastic. It also meant allowing coal to play a small part of the electricity generation in the south. 
This was illustrated in a comment by a state legislator who was a Democrat and an energy 
committee member, who supported the EPA regulations: 
“I think that it’s you, being naïve, because, if you think about the region, the region where 
coal predominantly comes from is from the south, so, you are talking about a huge 
dependence economically on utilising coal and the southern states of course threw a fit 
when EPA followed these regulations, the cheer we hear today, you know, ‘policy revolution 
that’s against them’, ‘No new coal plants in the south’, ‘putting hundreds of thousands of 
people out of work.’ So, I hear a lot of the conversation about new coal technology and I 
think that conversation, the one Obama started with originally was all-of the above, it has 
to be all-of-the-above strategy with an incremental change towards a low carbon platform 
and it can’t be as noticeable or overnight especially in the south because you have such an 
over reliance on it and you are not really going to cost parity yet. You know, I’m from West 
Virginia so I’m a coal person and my undergraduate degree was in radiation physics so I’m 
a nuclear person and I’m a renewables person as well, so I believe it’s an all of the above 
strategy that all of us should pursue but the portfolio has got to be more balance in a way 
that Georgia looks.” (2A 3D, Georgia state representative, April 11, 2014). 
Overall, these groups were focused on the types of costs that are incurred when the federal 
government, acting through the EPA, ‘overreaches’, and imposes regulations on coal states 
such as Georgia as opposed to letting the market dictate the change in technology. In addition, 
the fixation on opposition to federal power and climate change policy sometimes masked the 
more substantive critiques of the EPA regulations which included stranded assets, equity 
between states, pressure on rates, interstate issues, economic dispatch, penalties for non-
compliance (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2014a). Whilst the leadership generally 
understood the point of the rules, they did have legitimate concerns about the impacts on 
Georgia: 
“I think there is some value to getting ahead of potential federal regulation, so if the federal 
government in 20 years said that Georgia has to be at 25% renewable energy and right now, 
we are only at 1%, it’s going to be expensive to get to 25%, in a way, if we did have a standard 
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it would ease us into this however I probably wouldn’t get re-elected if I did that.” (2Bi, 
Georgia Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013) 
In summary, the values of the numerous groups that do not want federal environmental 
regulation align to make a powerful statement about the state’s rights for energy provision. 
The main point being made consistently by all the interviewees was that the majority of 
conservatives wanted to be in charge of their energy policy in Georgia and did not want energy 
decisions to come from the federal government, especially at an additional cost. The federal 
government could not have a one size fits all approach to energy policy. These conservative 
organisations wanted these geographical and ideological differences to be respected and they 
also do not want to go above and beyond simple compliance with the clean air and clean water 
acts but it could be argued that this is what the Environmental Protection Agency is trying to 
get the states to do i.e. simple compliance is not enough. The research also shows, from 
statements by the chamber of commerce, the conservative Georgia Public Service commission 
and the multiple advocacy groups, that low carbon energy advocacy and decision making in 
Georgia must navigate complicated cultural, political and economic views of the role of 
government intervention and free markets; and in the case of the EPA regulation, these views 
hinder carbon restructuring. The outcome is that Georgia would attempt to resist the EPA 
regulations through the court system. 
 
6.3.2 Conservative influence over solar development 
In Georgia, the pressure to introduce solar energy development came from a variety of groups, 
including consumer advocates, some members of the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots, the Sierra 
Club, the Georgia Solar Energy Industries Association and regional groups such as the Southern 
Alliance for Clean Energy. Whilst all of these groups want more solar development, most are 
also pushing for distributed solar generation and consumer choice. In the case of solar 
development, conservative influence over solar development plays out rather differently: 
whilst there is resistance to renewable energy in general, low carbon energy may be supported 
on the grounds that it supports and values individual freedom over regulatory control from 
government. Here, the power of the Georgia government is preferred over the federal level 
but the power of the individual is preferred over any form of government. It is important to 
explore the views of these groups as they have influence over energy decisions making and 
may present opportunities or barriers to low carbon restructuring. 
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The views of the main decision makers, such as the utilities, regulators and the Georgia 
Chamber of Commerce, are presented first below. Then the views of the groups pushing for 
solar development are offered, with comments from the Tea Party, solar manufacturers and 
other businesses. 
The utilities, public service commissioners and the Georgia Chamber of Commerce would resist 
solar energy development if it comes mandated by the federal government. These groups 
argued that renewable energy is only competitive with subsidies or mandates and without 
these subsidies/mandates cannot compete. While the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 
the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and Production Tax Credit (PTC) have arguably been 
responsible for significant growth in utility-scale solar, distributed solar and wind energy across 
the United States, many of these groups, prefer to end subsidies for renewable energy, 
especially solar: 
“Now, you know, we think now that the market, especially when you look at solar, over the 
last 12 to 18 months, the installed price of a kilowatt of solar has become significantly more 
competitive to the point where it probably doesn’t need subsidies and it doesn’t need 
renewable energy targets and that is how we would prefer to see the market develop, 
because long term it’s going to be more sustainable, than being propped up by a tax payer 
subsidy somewhere along the line.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
 
In addition, groups such as the chamber of commerce, also oppose a mandate requiring 
specific amounts of renewable energy on the grid, especially when that technology is not 
considered to be cost-effective.  
In theory, these groups maintain that there would be support for using as much of any 
technology as was technically possible, for so long as the technology is cost-competitive. This 
is illustrated in the comment by a consultant for the Georgia Chamber of Commerce: 
“I mean, as I said earlier, the chamber has found energy solutions, we have support for an 
all of the above policy, but we don’t support something that says there must be 30% solar 
irrespective of the cost. If solar is cost-competitive, we don’t have a problem with 100% of 
the energy being supplied by solar if that was technically and economically possible.” (9A, 
Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
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This debate on ending renewable energy subsidies, extends beyond the state of Georgia, 
where at the federal level there have been persistent efforts to selectively portray solar 
companies as in need of substantial government backing and failing: 
 
“There was a big conservative push in 2010, against the Obama administration, that as one 
of its central talking points was the end of, this government picking winners and losers, 
particularly in the energy industry. There was a lot of hype about companies like Solyndra, 
that got a few hundred million dollars, to one or two hundred million dollars for their 
operations. Now, you know, conservative groups in the Obama administration, are giving 
billions of dollars to the nuclear industry, for one facility, and there’s not that same amount 
of outcry.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter Organiser, February 26, 2014) 
This perception of solar companies may not be helped by the lack of solar representation 
amongst big business networks such as the Georgia Chamber of Commerce, which is often 
backed by many large industrial firms and heavy energy users and other organizations that may 
be skeptical of solar energy: 
“A standard chamber of commerce basically represents big business, it doesn’t represent 
small businesses, big businesses for you know Georgia Power or somebody and I don’t want 
to pick on them, they do a lot of great things, but when it comes to solar they, those big 
businesses represent huge interests that are entrenched interests, small business and start 
ups and things like me, we are bringing new ideas that threaten the existing business model. 
(4Ai, Business developer, February 19, 2014) 
 
Contrary to the views of the Georgia Chamber of Commerce, the utilities and other 
conservative groups, the groups pushing for solar are not requesting a renewable energy 
portfolio. Instead most pro solar groups are pushing for distributed solar.  
The pro-solar groups include representatives of the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots, solar developers 
and others from the business community. They want distributed solar on the grounds of 
individual freedom, economic freedom and general free market competition. Comments by a 
Republican director of a solar company, illustrate the point below:  
“All we need is, we want free access, free market and the obstacles removed and if we get 
that, we're going to be even closer to grid parity here and quicker.” (4Bii, 9B, Snr. Director 
International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014) 
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In fact, many solar manufacturers also wanted limited federal Government involvement in the 
development of solar, citing concerns of the freedom of businesses to operate without 
government interference: 
“That's the philosophy you'll find here. If it makes sense for me as a citizen or as a 
businessman, I'll do it. Don’t get in my way, or if anything come clear out the obstacles.” 
(4Bii, 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014) 
 
Therefore, in the same way, that the government should not forcing private companies like 
utilities to develop solar, businesses and individuals should have the freedom to develop 
distributed solar energy as needed. The Tea Party reinforced this perspective and disagreed 
with the characterization of solar as being dependent upon subsidies: 
“If you remove the subsidies, number one, if you remove the subsidies and loan guarantees 
for nuclear, it would not exist! because nuclear cannot survive without the subsidies. During 
the first fifteen years of nuclear development, their federal subsidies accounted for 1% of 
the federal budget. At the highest level, the subsidies for solar, has not even been one-tenth 
of 1% of the federal budget. So, I say to them, you remove both the direct and indirect 
subsidies for coal and nuclear, they won’t exist, they won’t exist. Coal got its first subsidy in 
1932.” (15D, Tea Party activist, October 5, 2016) 
 
And: 
“I think we need to remove all energy subsidies both direct and indirect and let the market 
decide. I just think, if we had a different approach, we would be much further ahead than 
what we are.” (15D, Tea Party activist, October 5, 2016) 
 
Overall, the Tea Party argued for distributed solar on the grounds of energy freedom and that 
individuals should have the freedom to choose any energy sources, energy providers and 
access the best financing options available on the market:  
“I think, it is time for, in a lot of states, to actually look at slowly unplugging monopolies and 
allow for true competition and true choice, because a monopoly is not free market, a 
monopoly is the government’s way of picking winners and losers.” (15D, Tea Party activist, 
October 5, 2016) 
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Overall, the debate between these groups reveals key issues such as the creation of unlikely 
alliances, while coalitions normally unified against federal intervention from the EPA are being 
split over solar development. There is ongoing development in conservative politics, where 
solar energy, especially distributed solar, is perceived to provide the kind of freedom that is a 
core part of conservative principles. These concepts of energy freedom, national security and 
free market competition are being selectively applied amongst the groups. Some of these 
groups, are likely to gain or lose by solar development and are using free market arguments to 
that effect.  
Furthermore, whilst the debate is highly partisan, there is a level of pragmatism around solar 
development, whereby all groups acknowledge that solar is not yet at grid parity in the state 
of Georgia. It is in other states, such as California, for example. Conservatives pushing for solar 
realise that solar growth across the United States has not only been due to the falling PV 
module price but also due to the voluntary renewable energy portfolios made by state 
governments, the growth of third party financing as a way to develop solar and the 30% federal 
government solar investment tax credit (North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, 
2014). In the same way, long-standing financial support for dominant energy sources such as 
coal and nuclear are being challenged by some conservative groups in Georgia. Finally, the 
adoption of solar energy in U.S. conservative politics may depend on this type of framing of 
distributed generation as a property rights and individual freedom issue.  
 
6.3.3 Conservative influence over nuclear development 
Conservative influence over decisions regarding nuclear energy development plays out in 
unexpected ways. Given that a key component to electricity decision making is the adherence 
to a least-cost approach and the dislike for subsidies, amongst Georgia’s decision makers, 
subsidies, high capital costs and even rate increases are accommodated due to preference for 
baseload technologies and a desire for a nuclear “renaissance”. Adequate baseload power is 
perceived to offer the stability needed for economic growth. The recent nuclear development 
is evidence of this peculiarity in Georgia’s electricity decision making. In order to develop new 
nuclear generation capacity, Georgia Power had taken an estimated $6.5 billion loan guarantee 
provided by the United States Department of Energy (Mundy, 2014).  
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This was part of a $8billion loan guarantee package provided by the United States Department 
of Energy (Mundy, 2014). In addition, Georgia Power requested and succeeded in getting the 
state legislature to pass a nuclear energy financing act in 2009 (O.C.G.A., 2009). The law 
allowed a recovery of financing costs during construction whereby utility customers were 
paying for the nuclear plant before the plant was finished and operational. The nuclear costs, 
were incorporated into the ratepayers’ power bills (Georgia Public Service Commission, 
2014b). 
A point of consideration was that the traditional utility regulation structure in Georgia allows 
for long-term planning and cost recovery and so permits this type of large investment. A 
manager at Georgia Power argues that undertaking nuclear investment in a restructured 
competitive market would pose too much of a risk to cost recovery: 
“One main reason is the regulatory structure we have here in the southeast, in other parts 
of the country, you have seen up in the Mid-Atlantic States, the Northeast, California and 
the Midwest a lot of restructuring of the wholesale markets, the electricity markets and 
people kind of look at the southeast and say ‘you guys are kind of the sleepy southeast’ and 
we still operate a very traditional regulated utility, what we call a vertically integrated 
market structure, so Georgia Power we are involved in every aspect of generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity. The other markets, are competitive wholesale 
markets, power plants are bidding in their power plants on a day-ahead basis. They have an 
independent system operator that says ‘I need this particular MWs on the grid at this 
particular time of the day’ and people bid in and for the pure economic theorists, it sounds 
wonderful, you know this is the way America is supposed to work, but what’s happened in 
a lot of those markets is that, it’s a very short term transactional market and our view is that 
it doesn’t generate the price signals that would promote the development of a big 
investment, nuclear plants are big investments, I mean Vogtle is a 14 billion dollar project.” 
(Kyle Leach, “Forecasting Our Energy Future”, World Affairs Council of Atlanta, February 27, 
2014) 
 
In addition, Georgia Power believed that the high capital costs were a compromise for long-
term, low operating costs in nuclear energy development: 
“Nuclear is high upfront capital costs and very low operating and fuel cost and that’s the 
trade-off. You can’t have the cost recovery assurance in those types of markets and get the 
financing. We just recently submitted a DOE loan guarantee, actually it was just last week, 
so we are getting financing from the federal financing bank, it’s going to lower our cost of 
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borrowing, those benefits would flow through to our customers. The merchant nuclear 
plants in the northeast they can’t get that because there’s just too much risk in their ability 
to recover that type of investment in those very dynamic markets.” (Kyle Leach, 
“Forecasting Our Energy Future”, World Affairs Council of Atlanta, February 27, 2014) 
 
It was not only the utility that pursued this deal; the development of new nuclear capacity was 
presented as having overwhelming political support from most decision makers in the state, 
whilst the financing of the nuclear development was described as a bargain: 
“Understand Georgia politics. The Georgia legislature passed a bill that allows Georgia 
Power to collect the financing cost of the Vogtle project during construction. The PSC, prior 
to my arrival, approved a similar measure. Why? Because it reduced the certified costs of 
the project by $300 million and reduced the company’s borrowing cost by tens of millions 
of dollars. But let’s be clear, it also vested the leadership of the legislature. So, with all the 
utilities investing in Vogtle, and many of the politicians vested in the project’s success, the 
state was “all-in” on new nuclear. The addition of production tax credits, the federal loan 
guarantee, and the current low-interest cost environment further sweetened the deal.” 
(Commissioner Echols, Power Engineering Magazine, November 13, 2015). 
 
Despite the loan guarantees and financing method, the project still incurred cost overruns, 
some of which would be passed on to ratepayers. Furthermore, in accordance with the nuclear 
law, the Public Service Commission needs to decide if the spiralling costs were prudent or 
imprudent, because prudent costs may be paid by the ratepayers whereas the utilities pay for 
imprudent costs (Kempner, 2015). Despite these issues, key decision makers including the 
utilities and the Public Service Commission and specific influential organisations like the 
Chamber of Commerce, were not reconsidering the new nuclear project in Georgia.  
The rationale for developing new nuclear capacity was consistent amongst these groups, 
arguing that nuclear energy presented the best economic, baseload power option and would 
bring economic growth: 
“In the case of nuclear, at the time that that was proposed, it was simply, you know, a 
response to the best alternative or base power. In the long term, what was the best 
economic opportunity to deliver affordable, reliable base-energy, and at the time, nuclear 
was the outstanding economic opportunity.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 
2013) 
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The perception of baseload nuclear which aids economic growth is widespread in Georgia. 
Regulators and some media personalities argued that having Plant Vogtle 1 and 2 has been 
fundamental to a low cost, stable and secure energy supply (Augusta Chronicle Editorial Staff, 
2015; Echols, 2013b). Furthermore, it was clear that some state energy regulators, had clear 
visions about the broad benefits of nuclear energy to the state. Amongst decision makers, the 
connection between nuclear energy development as a creator of jobs in the state was a 
powerful motivator: 
“First, anything remotely related to nuclear means jobs — many of them good-paying jobs. 
There are 12,000 people working at SRS, there are 800 private-sector jobs at V.C. Summer 
and another 800 at Vogtle. The last two figures will double once the new units come online. 
Add to that the cumulative construction jobs, which should peak at more than 7,000, and 
the impact is enormous. Remember, jobs let you buy houses, cars, clothes and widgets — 
and cheap energy is a magnet for manufacturing these, as the Germans testified.” 
(Commissioner Echols, Athens Banner-Herald, July 25, 2013) 
 
In addition, the development of nuclear energy in order to reinforce national security like 
nuclear reprocessing and recycling (Echols, 2013b) and reduce Georgia’s carbon emissions also 
justified the investment decision according electricity regulators: 
 
“I am thinking about the carbon which is one of the reasons I wanted to finish the nuclear 
power plant because I know that it is carbon free” (2Bi, Georgia Public Service 
commissioner, October 21, 2013).  
 
The statement by the regulator on the decision to invest in new nuclear generation appears to 
be the pathway chosen by utilities and regulators to low carbon restructuring in the South-
eastern region also: 
“I think that they are putting the nuclear investment into a low carbon kind of framework, I 
know we are at TVA, we’ve got a reactor which is going to be completed in the year 2015, 
December 2015. Well it’s not a new AP1000, it’s the old type, boiling water but still it’s a 
reactor coming on board and everybody is talking about it as a very important climate 
change mitigation approach. Now again, keep in mind that they don’t put the value of CO2 
into the calculations but they talked about it.” (8Aii, Professor, Georgia Tech, March 24, 
2014) 
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And 
“That’s right, there have been as in England lots of vocal backlash but they’ve been able to 
get it all approved through this Public Service Commission and we’ll see what happens, 
there are about five reactors being built in the South now and we’ll see how successful they 
and I think that’s going to lay the groundwork for whether or not another phase of these 
are to get built.” (8Aii, Professor, Georgia Tech, March 24, 2014) 
 
Finally, a justification for the new nuclear development in Georgia, is that of cultural and utility 
familiarity with the technology. A Georgian-based academic explained that the South is 
comfortable with nuclear energy development, it has confidence in the workforce for such a 
development and has an affinity for baseload power: 
“I often put it in the context of, the South is very familiar with nuclear and comfortable with 
nuclear, and different states have different unique capabilities and I think in the South, has 
just been, it’s been a forte, we have the workforce, we have existing contracts and 
agreements with providers. So, it’s a familiar, easy way to go and of course utilities love 
baseload and nuclear, it’s the baseload.” (8Aii, Professor, Georgia Tech, March 24, 2014) 
 
Granted, the consensus was that nuclear energy development had significant benefits in 
Georgia, there were signs that the consensus was being challenged. Some influential groups in 
Georgia’s electricity sector, having accommodated the nuclear energy decision initially, had 
since changed their minds due to some changed conditions in the advent of cheap natural gas 
and the spiralling costs. For example, the consumer advocates explain that the nuclear energy 
project was economic when it was first proposed in 2008, but since then the project’s capital 
costs had spiralled out of control, customers are facing rate increases and gas has become so 
cheap that the rationale for the project is no longer valid: 
“Well we have argued before the Public Service Commission that units 3 & 4 are not 
necessary and there were lower cost ways including combined cycle natural gas plants and 
even the company's witnesses on the witness stand when we asked them, acknowledged 
that, knowing today how far down the cost of natural gas has become and other things, that 
if you were to make that decision today you would not make that decision to build those 2 
nuclear units. That it would not be in the best economic interest but at the time, they felt 
and they made the case and they still make the case because you've got to factor in the sub 
costs that they've already spent, so they will still say in the witness stand that they think it’s 
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in the best economic interest but don’t, we simply don’t agree, if your building those units.” 
(6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014). 
 
Georgia Watch were not against nuclear energy development per se, because of the potential 
benefits of baseload power for consumers, nor were they particularly environmentally driven 
because of the suggestion to switch to cheap natural gas. Instead they were against 
technologies that could increase rates or be passed onto consumers in any way. There were 
also individuals who whilst not supportive of nuclear energy development, understood why 
the decision was taken at the time by Georgia Power and the PSC, but saw the issue as one of 
uncertainty in making predictions about energy: 
“Nuclear plants when they are online, they are really cheap to operate and they operate 
really, really well. I mean they are expensive to build and it takes so long to build them so 
these plant Vogtle. I mean they started getting approvals 6 or 7 years ago, back when 
demand growth was a little higher than it is now and the forecast was higher demand.” (6E, 
Snr. technical analyst, October 31, 2013). 
 
Ultimately, the underlying factor in the investment in new nuclear capacity is the business 
model of the utility and the political support for the utility. A primary reason for why Georgia’s 
utilities, typically very aware and opposed to any investment which would put upward pressure 
on rates, would continue with this project despite all current failings, is that new nuclear is 
associated with a long lifespan, is financed by the federal government and costs can be passed 
onto consumers, making the project a profitable venture. This perspective is held by solar 
advocates, evidenced in the comment by a representative of the construction and solar 
industry: 
“Well how does a utility in America get paid, it gets paid in cost plus, so in other words they 
get to earn a certain amount on their invested base amount. So, let’s say they get 10% on 
everything they spend, that’s a super simplified amount, roughly that, so the more they 
spend the more money they can make, and there is no more concentrated way to spend 
money than a nuclear plant. Nothing sucks up more cash per square inch than a nuclear 
plant, plus you can be guaranteed that whatever the budget was you set is going to be a lot 
higher-, and the other, it is so bad that and for what’s interesting is conservatives which we 
call republicans, conservatives in this country always say, ‘Well let the market decide, let 
the market decide.’ Okay well let the market decide about nuclear plants, well you can’t get 
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insurance for them in the open market, the insurance companies won’t touch them, you 
can’t get financing to build them in the open market, the banks won’t touch them. So, the 
only way you can build these things they need the government to guarantee you the loan, 
so for some reason the Obama administration let them build. So, the only way you can build 
these things, these two plants for Georgia Power couldn’t have been built without the 
government coughing up $8 billion worth of guarantees, so I guess one could consider that 
as a subsidy so how about coughing up $8 billion for solar and see what happens.” (4Ai, 
Business developer, February 19, 2014) 
The comment also suggests that those conservative principles held amongst decision makers 
(utilities, regulators, state legislature) which include free market competition amongst energy 
technologies, the removal of subsidies and generally limiting federal support, were not 
consistently applied to nuclear energy development. Nevertheless, the utility business model 
remains the main issue in this investment. Investments in nuclear energy are consistent with 
the traditional, utility business model which supports a highly-centralised form of 
infrastructure, ownership and control by the utility.  
This was and remains a view held by some solar manufacturers: 
“No, it means they want to control the asset. Utilities in the United States and probably 
around the world, used to be in the business of having big, centralised generating plants 
and that’s what a nuclear plant is and so they know how to finance at a fixed capital cost, a 
plant that is going to run for 50 years, they know how to amortise that, how to run the 
numbers, the finances and the ROI and that’s great and that’s good for their business model 
and they’re a publicly traded company that needs to make profit. They're not in for doing 
public good; they are in it to make corporate profit.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International 
Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014) 
In addition, the financial strategy using loan guarantees and those newly permitted method of 
pre-charging customers for the construction costs of the new nuclear facility, could also be 
applied to renewable energy investments, especially solar energy, but it was not. This suggests 
that the financial gains to be made from nuclear investments by the utility may outweigh those 
of solar investments: 
“I had that same argument with the CEO of Georgia Power when he came to visit our solar 
factory and he got very upset, he got very upset that I would challenge, when I said the ROI 
on solar would be better if you let people prepay it on their bills before it was even 
constructed and he said, that’s not a fair thing to say, that we're saving the rate payers 
money by financing the construction costs in advance and I said I'm not arguing with that, 
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I'm arguing with the fact that you do it for nuclear but not for solar (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director 
International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014) 
 
Nevertheless, Georgia Power’s representatives argue that the technologies should not be 
compared, that the two technologies provide value and can be used to meet different goals. 
Baseload generation technologies provide different benefits to intermittent renewable energy 
resources: 
“It’s an intermittent resource so, we caution people not to try and compare, and you have 
heard the expression apples and oranges. Nuclear units, coal units, natural gas units, they 
are all dispatchable, they can be controlled even when the winds blowing and sun’s not 
shining, we can operate those units and we can rely on the fact that they will be there and 
so trying to compare those types of units versus renewables that are intermittent in nature, 
are what we called apples and oranges. They all can provide value; it’s just how do you 
properly assess that value and so I think we’ve done a pretty good job with that and we are 
starting to bring more and more renewables in and they are at a price that’s not going to 
drive up customer rates, at least as they’re currently structured. You know what we are 
finding though, is that the biggest competition for renewables is probably low natural gas 
prices.” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
 
Finally, despite the rate increases and cost overruns, Georgia Power maintain that the nuclear 
project still represents the lowest cost option: 
“Remember too that, when I said earlier, that when we have a need and we go out to the 
market we do a request for proposals that all these different resources can submit proposals 
into that and then we will evaluate them on a total cost basis, so every resource that we’ve 
added and even when we’ve had to add increased rates to incorporate some of these 
resources, they have represented the lowest cost resources that have submitted and taken 
part in our request for proposals. So, you know, you can, that’s when I say it’s a market, you 
can have a reliance on the free market to determine what is the lowest cost resource to add 
to our fleet, so even when we add nuclear, natural gas combined cycles those kinds of units, 
they have represented the lowest cost option that have responded through our request for 
proposal process.” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
The chapter has demonstrated that despite drivers for low carbon energy development, 
baseload generation and distributed generation in the state of Georgia, the politics of low 
carbon restructuring in the conservative state is complicated. The influence of conservative 
views on decisions over EPA regulations, solar energy and nuclear energy developments 
indicate that certain avenues for low carbon restructuring may encounter less resistance than 
others. 
It is clear that, amongst Georgia’s electricity decision makers including the PSC, Georgia Power 
and influential groups like the Georgia Chamber of Commerce, the value placed on nuclear 
energy superseded arguments about subsidies, federal involvement and upward pressure on 
rates or rate increases. The perceived value of nuclear generated baseload power, including 
job creation, economic growth and low cost of electricity by decision makers, mean that the 
need for a loan guarantee from the federal government to support the new nuclear 
development, the increases on customer’s bills and near-term rate increases, could be 
rationalised. Furthermore, nuclear energy clearly suits the dominant mode of electricity 
generation in Georgia, which is a highly-centralised form of electricity generation and supply, 
delivering low cost electricity, adding to its perceived value. Nuclear could also help with CO2 
emissions reductions in the state. 
Resistance to EPA regulations are widely shared by decision makers but also influential 
organisations like the Georgia Chamber of Commerce. Amongst decision makers, EPA 
regulations are unnecessarily costly, an unwanted liberal policy and a challenge to state 
authority. Instead, belief lies with the free market over federal intervention in energy policy. 
Nevertheless, resistance to the EPA is limited once a law has been passed or rule upheld. 
However, resistance to the EPA also reinforces the idea that environmental views do not gain 
traction in Georgia. Environmental bills, rules and regulations are contested in the political 
setting. Therefore, it may be necessary and more effective for advocates for low carbon to 
come from within the state of Georgia and for the issue to framed differently, in a way that 
reduces resistance from the largely conservative decision makers. 
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Finally, this chapter has shown that any mandates for renewable energy development, 
especially solar energy, would be resisted. Unlike nuclear energy, solar energy is not perceived 
to have the benefits of low cost electricity. Instead, it is perceived to be a technology which is 
highly subsidised and not cost effective without federal support. Conversely, distributed solar 
generation presents an opportunity for low carbon restructuring because individual freedoms 
are preferred over state government control. 
The next chapter explores the sources of resistance which create lock-in or lock-out to energy-
carbon restructuring in the state of Georgia. 
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7 RESISTANCE TO ENERGY-CARBON RESTRUCTURING AS LOCK-IN AND LOCK-OUT IN GEORGIA 
The previous chapter explored the drivers for low carbon restructuring in Georgia and the 
complicated politics of low carbon advocacy. This chapter explores resistance to energy-carbon 
restructuring in the state of Georgia. A key aim of the chapter is to take forward the idea of 
lock-in as explored in chapter 2. In particular, the chapter introduces the idea of lock-out in 
addition to lock-in. The chapter especially highlights the need to think about the ways in which 
alternatives get locked out by a range of factors, including the ownership of infrastructure, the 
utility business model and the least cost approach, the legal and regulatory frameworks 
operating within the state of Georgia, regulatory capture, and the political and cultural 
resistance to environmental goals. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.1 
reviews the theory of lock-in, section 7.2 explores the types of lock-ins identified in the 
Georgian electricity system and section 7.3 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
7.1 EXPLORING LOCK-IN IN GEORGIA – THE IDEA OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE LOCK-IN 
7.1.1 Reviewing “lock-in” from the conceptual framework 
Unruh (2000) describes lock-in through the concept of a Techno-Institutional Complex. Unruh 
(2000) argues that large-scale technological systems made up of interconnected physical, 
social and informational components in a network or infrastructure are established “through 
a co-evolutionary process among technological infrastructures, organizations, society and 
governing institutions, forming a “Techno-Institutional Complex” (Unruh, 2002, p. 317). In this 
research, the large-scale technological system is the electricity generation and distribution 
network. Unruh (2000) explains that in the early stages of development and commercialisation, 
technologies may show increasing returns to scale which help them expand rapidly in 
comparison with competitors. Increasing returns to scale mechanisms include;  
• Economies of scale: cost reductions per unit, as production is increased. 
• Adaptive expectations: increased use of technology results in increased confidence 
from users and producers. 
• Learning economies: cost reductions as knowledge and skills are improved. 
• Network externalities: the value of the technology system increases as the network of 
interdependent industries and users grows. 
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These different increasing returns create a technological lock-in. In addition, firm-level 
technological lock-in may be created, where incumbent producers of the technology, through 
repeated investments in infrastructure, reinforce the lock-in condition since the infrastructure 
is large, durable and cannot not be traded (Unruh, 2000). In addition, firm-level technological 
lock-in may be created as producers develop core competencies which initially allow the 
technological system rapid expansion and a competitive advantage over competitors but later 
become rigidities (Unruh, 2000).  
Essentially, core rigidities happen when, having established the technological system, firms 
become too dependent on their existing advantages and become resistant to change. Both 
these firm-level technological lock-ins reinforce the technological lock-in, because when 
challenged by new market entrants introducing an alternative or superior technology, 
incumbents are unable to adapt and instead put more effort into making improvements in the 
current technology. 
Both public and private Institutions may reinforce the lock-in already existing within a system. 
Private institutions (formal and informal), such as industry associations, unions and other 
professional organisations, develop as the technological system grows and therefore may form 
an influential and invaluable lobby for the specific technological system (Unruh, 2000). Finally, 
public institutions can intervene in a way that favours the incumbent technological system, for 
example government policies and regulations which favour a dominant mode of electricity 
production may also reinforce the lock-in. 
The Techno-Institutional Complex develops through “a path-dependent, co-evolutionary 
process involving positive feedbacks (from increasing returns) among technological 
infrastructures and the organizations and institutions that create, diffuse and employ them” 
(Unruh, 2000, p. 818). 
Once established the Techno-Institutional Complex creates continuous stability and reliability 
in the technological system, but this also means that the complex develops a resistance to 
change in the long run, locking-out alternative technological systems (Unruh, 2000). 
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In the conceptual framework (see 2.3), the lock-in categories used were based on Unruh (2002) 
which included technological, organizational, industrial, societal, institutional: 
• Institutional lock-in: Institutional support systems i.e. government policy, legal and 
economic frameworks that create stability of the electric power system not specifically 
fossil fuels but have a long-term impact on the ability of alternative low carbon 
technologies to gain market share.  
• Societal/cultural lock-in, the individual or existing societal perceptions about what the 
system should deliver i.e. dominant technologies are likely to be embedded in broader 
values in a way that hinders low carbon alternatives.  
• Organisational lock-in, can occur when firms/companies will have specific methods of 
operation. They may sort tasks, per function, process or even products which lends to 
operational routines or decisions, hindering alternatives. 
• Industrial lock-in occurs over time, where members and firms of an industry develop or 
improve practices or criteria for products and operation which often guarantee their 
continued use. This is often done because there is a degree of dependence between 
firms and members in the industry.  
 
In the state of Georgia, these lock-in categories have been refined to better suit the analysis of 
the state of Georgia’s complex electricity system. 
 
7.2 EXAMINING LOCK-IN AND LOCK-OUT IN GEORGIA 
As indicated in previous sections, there are powerful forces that maintain the dominance of a 
single supplier of electricity generation that favours the centralised electricity generation 
business model and the usage of fossil fuels. The following section will use the lock-in and lock-
out framework to outline and explore the factors that contribute to the dominance of the 
monopoly provider which resists alternative energy in the electricity grid. Five key sources of 
lock-out are explored: 
a. Infrastructure lock-out: Grid Infrastructure 
b. The utility business model: lock-out of external providers 
c. Institutional lock-out: regulatory and legal framework 
d. Societal and cultural lock-out: shared resistance to low carbon 
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a. Grid Infrastructure 
This section will discuss aspects of the power grid network, that could be argued cause 
stagnation in low carbon development. 
 
— The issue of grid balancing and reliability 
Electric utilities have been charged with the task of continuously balancing the grid at all times. 
In order to secure grid stability, the supply and demand must remain in balance in real time. 
The grid is especially responsive to load shape, voltage variations and variability in the output 
of energy sources. This is important because the introduction of supply-side distributed 
generation introduce challenges on the grid network design and operating procedures for 
system operators. It is not that grid operators do not know how to manage load profiles, 
voltage variations and output variability, but rather that variability in generation resources 
have been typically small compared to the load being served (Bird, Milligan, & Lew, 2013). An 
attractive quality of distributed renewable technologies is that they are often built and 
consumed at the point of need (Momoh, Meliopoulos, & Saint, 2012).  
However, the interconnection of these technologies on the distribution grid introduces a set 
of challenges on that section of the system. Therefore, distributed generation systems need to 
be properly planned for in order to realise their full benefits. The distributed generation 
technology referred to in this case study is solar photovoltaic (PV). For customer owned 
photovoltaic rooftop solar installations which are still connected to the utility grid, there will 
be dominant technical issues at increased solar up-take rates. These are:  
• Variability: the output of solar is varying with time but also with weather events like 
cloud-cover and storms, this comes with uncertainty over accurately managing or 
forecasting a load profile. This is not necessarily helped by the fact that solar is a non-
dispatchable resource, meaning it is a must take resource i.e. regardless of prices or 
other conditions and utilities must plan around this resource to continuously meet 
demand. The increased percentage of customer-owned distributed generation means 
that the utility must manage the variability over the demand side as well as the supply 
side (Bird et al., 2013; Cochran et al., 2014; Denholm & Hand, 2011). 
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• Ramping issues: Utilities have historically needed to be able to respond to variability 
and uncertainty by fast ramping with the use of operating reserves which are essentially 
added capacity available to help in balancing power. It is a legal requirement in the 
United States for utilities, and every power system has these reserves planned for. 
Increased or uncontrolled renewable growth especially on the distribution side calls for 
increased and steep ramping on grid by spinning reserves which rely on mainly natural 
gas because of its flexibility, ease and rapidity of build but also ability of quick start-up 
times and faster ramp rate (Hummon et al., 2013). This will lead to more stress on 
generation components as well as cost to increased ramping requirements i.e. fuel, 
construction and overhead and maintenance  (Cochran et al., 2014; Lazar, 2014). 
• Voltage variations: The transmission network has been configured for bidirectional 
power flow, which has given utilities and system operators of the system more control 
over the design and process of power flow, however the distribution grid has been 
generally configured with radial, one way power flow from the substation to the 
customer (Bollen & Hassan, 2011a). One of the ways in which distributed solar impacts 
the grid is in the voltage variation and voltage variation is currently a significant concern 
for power network operators. 
• The increased incorporation of customer owned generation leads to upstream power 
flow voltage rise, which can occur in a somewhat unpredictable manner because as 
clouds move over the solar panels, there is a time variation in output. Initially the 
distribution grid would manage voltages within predetermined standards using tools 
like voltage regulators and other electromechanical devices. However, since the 
changes cause a break from those standards, things like regulating voltage in the 
presence of high ranging sources of power and maintaining the supply and demand 
balance problem within distribution means managing the end-points instead of just 
reacting to the fluctuations. Ensuring that there is no over-voltage or under-voltage 
along the feeders but rather voltage maintained within the standard range, means that 
there is a new planning problem for grid operators to improve on the standard tools. 
There is a need for new devices along the distribution grid that can observe and react 
to changes in real time. Discussions taking place around how this could be done are 
ongoing (Bollen & Hassan, 2011b) with network operators, solar developers and 
utilities.  
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An example of a real, ongoing context of some of these issues can be seen in California and 
Hawaii’s current experience with high solar penetration of the grid. The images below show 
the current and projected grid reliability problem of increased solar penetration. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Shows California's and Hawaii’s Load and Balance problem at high renewable penetrations 
Source: California Independent System Operator, 2013 
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The California “duck chart” explains the load balance difficulty that grids operators expect to 
encounter and handle with increased levels of renewable energy specifically solar energy on 
the customer side of the meter. The current load profile is a camel i.e. two peaks, 1st Afternoon 
and 2nd early evening, but quickly an over-generation problem is seen in the afternoon i.e. the 
belly of the duck, followed by steep ramping in a short time i.e. the neck of the duck. As 
discussed above, the variability, voltage and ramping issues manifesting in the duck chart 
means that California and Hawaii are now seeking solutions for their grid (Bade, 2014). The 
incorporation of large amounts of distributed solar with some of the technical issues discussed, 
has made leading edge states in solar energy generation (California and Hawaii) to be referred 
to as bleeding edge in Georgia by energy decision makers.  
It must be said though that these are quite high levels of renewable energy inclusion into the 
grid, arguably because there are quite high carbon emission targets in those areas. 
Furthermore, it is currently unknown what the hosting capacity of the electric grid in Georgia 
is i.e. the amount of distributed generation which causes the performance of the grid to 
deteriorate (Bollen & Hassan, 2011a), so direct comparison may be imprudent. This 
notwithstanding has meant that in Georgia these technical challenges are cited as a reason for 
a restrictive growth of renewables by utilities, consumer advocates and even renewable 
advocates. There is a consensus that nobody wants a California or Hawaii-style grid. 
The focus on technical issues, whilst prudent, obscures the fact that more distributed solar can 
be incorporated onto the grid but the management of the grid, especially on the distribution 
side, must be proactive and not reactive by the utilities and system operators. Grid architecture 
needs to be properly designed if increased distributed solar is a target. The technical issues 
lead on to more economic and regulatory issues around clarity about grid access, ownership 
of the transmission and distribution, cost of distribution, regulations and resolution. The grid 
could be configured or managed to accommodate alternatives, but it is difficult because these 
technical solutions need to be combined with value judgements. These judgements revolve 
around who pays for these infrastructure upgrade, how upgrades are paid for, etc. 
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— Transmission and Distribution Costs and Ownership 
The ownership of transmission and distribution lines in Georgia have locked out efficient 
distributed generation alternatives and the costs associated with partial use of the grid 
potentially enhances the lock-out of these alternatives and the lock-in of customers.  
In Georgia, Georgia Power (See 5.2.3a) owns the entire infrastructure from the point of 
generation to the meter. The ownership of the lines mixed with the geographical assigned 
service territories given to the utilities by the state government and regulators (Figure 5-4), does 
dictate who is authorised to build what, the location of the build and ultimately who pays for 
the build. Power grid infrastructure by Southern Company, was constructed on decades of 
investment and expansion in fossil fuel energy generation and for Georgia Power, the earlier 
expansion by its holding company means there are significant embedded costs at the time of 
the study period.  
The embedded costs are the cost of transmission and distribution infrastructure i.e. poles, 
wires, voltage corridors, transformers and other devices on the distribution feeder. 
Furthermore, this ownership of the transmission and distribution network also implies 
associated costs with operation, maintenance and distribution of those devices. Costs which 
will remain even with increased distributed generation (Bouffard & Kirschen, 2008; Zichella & 
Hladik, 2013). 
Furthermore, the impending investment in low carbon sources if EPA regulation holds (See 
6.1.1), means there are going to be significant investments made to that effect. Therefore, the 
use of the distribution grid in Atlanta suggests, dealing with the utility assigned the Atlanta 
region i.e. Georgia Power, which locks out external providers; unless agreements are made on. 
Agreements based on how the transmission and distribution grid is used, how it would be paid 
for between the solar installers, solar owners and Georgia Power. 
These debates around agreements are very contentious in Georgia because firstly on the issue 
of transmission, solar advocates argue that transmission infrastructure has already been built 
out, in addition, there is too much expense involved in constructing new transmission 
infrastructure, therefore, they currently need access to the existing grid to support the costs 
of installation.  
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One interviewee, a consultant for the Atlanta Office of Sustainability and director of an energy 
efficiency company, reflected that since T&D infrastructure was expensive, solar developers 
could not simply construct their own transmission infrastructure and had to make use of 
existing grid infrastructure: 
“It’s too expensive, they could not do their own, and you have to use transmission that’s 
already there” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 2013). 
Secondly, the utility ownership of grid infrastructure mean that policies regarding grid-tied 
distributed solar systems are considered by solar advocates to be too restrictive. An academic 
consultant for the Atlanta city government sustainability plan from Georgia Institute of 
technology said: 
“It had some pretty restrictive measures that said that you couldn’t have distributed 
generation in total. So, like all renewables and combined heat and power and just like 
personally owned generators, whatever. They couldn’t exceed 0.2% of summer peak 
demand. Summer peak demand is like 16GW in the state and so you couldn’t have more 
than 320MW deployed, which is pretty, pretty restrictive” (8Ai, Academic consultant, 
Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013). 
In addition, of the permitted solar under net-metering there are severe restrictions on system 
size. An interviewee who a consultant and director of an energy efficiency company explains 
the relationship between ownership of infrastructure and restrictions on net-metered solar: 
“So, we've talked about this, so the case is not strong because of the territorial issue related 
to who can produce and how they can produce. There’s also a net-metering restriction. So, 
anything, well basically its anything under a 100kW is net-metered and anything over 
100kW goes into another a whole other bucket and it’s a whole other level of discussion 
and negotiations and it gets messy” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 2013). 
However, critics of the restrictive policies argument make the case for system reliability and 
efficiency as paramount, which is that more concern should be placed on how distributed solar 
technology impacts the efficiency of the network, not just the growth of solar on others 
property. A statement by an interviewee who was a representative of the chamber of 
commerce provides evidence for this:  
“What you make sure is you differentiate between the technology and how it integrates 
with the market, and that’s where part of the tensions rise now, because the solar people 
want to put in big facilities everywhere, but they want to do it on infrastructure that is 
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owned and operated by somebody else, it has an impact on the efficiency, or can have an 
impact on the efficiency of how those networks are operated, and they are arguing about 
whether or not they should be either restricted in their access to ensure supplier reliability 
or whether they should even pay for that access so, you know, those access charges and 
how it impacts on the reliability of things that we’re very concerned about but we’re also 
very concerned that, that becomes a tariff barrier” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, 
October 30, 2013). 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the situation is settled and grid interconnection policies 
are being worked out:  
“So as far as solar, it’s probably fair to say that it’s not necessarily a free and open market 
for, you know-, I mean, you know, if you want to go and put up a solar now to run your 
business, you can do that no problem at all, if you want to put up 100 acres of solar and 
feed it into the system, so just to generate power, that is where the policies are still being-, 
the interconnection policies are still being refined. So, while it’s not any impediment, well it 
is an impediment, there’s not scope of access” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 
30, 2013). 
These debates reflect tensions between the utilities, advocates and solar developers. Tensions 
about the restrictive nature of the grid policies lead to a third issue, which is the appropriate 
costing of transmission and distribution in a way that is fair and allows all parties involved to 
benefit from the infrastructure owned by the utilities. Specifically, this means what can utilities 
charge and distributed solar customers pay for the partial use of the grid. The electric utilities 
in Georgia argue that supporting solar should be done in way that does not infringe on other 
customer’s power quality and costs but also finding the method of making sure that the use of 
the grid is appropriately paid for.  
The evidence is in the following statement from an interviewee, who was a director of energy 
policy and planning at one the utilities in Georgia, below: 
“I think the balance is and you’re getting to the crux of the discussions going on right now, 
not only in Georgia but throughout the country. You want to ensure that customers, who 
choose to install solar, that they are paying for the fair value of the grid services that they 
still require. So the generation what we call the spinning reserves that’s ready to go when 
the sun doesn’t shine and we have to bring generation up to respond to the decline in solar 
production, to the transmission and distribution investments that are necessary to ensure 
that the consumer can continue to have reliable service if they should suffer a malfunction 
and their solar facility, you know an inverter goes out and now they are totally reliant on 
the company’s grid” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014). 
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Some utilities and regulators across the country are contemplating new rate design 
methods; rate designs that accurately determine the value of distributed solar. New concepts 
such as the value of solar tariff (VOST), have been floated and the state of Minnesota and the 
city of Austin are currently testing out this method (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
2015; Trabish, 2014). Since these new rate designs are undergoing tests, there is uncertainty 
about the outcome. Nevertheless, the reference to ‘other states' shows Georgia’s utilities are 
aware of these issues and anticipating problems, although Georgia has not yet experienced the 
levels of distributed solar that can start to cause significant problems. Evidence is provided in 
the following statement from the director of energy policy and planning at a utility in Georgia, 
below: 
“So, we need to make sure that our rates are designed to ensure that customers continue 
to pay for the fair value that they get from the grid. And at the same time, the company 
needs to make sure that we’re paying, because many of these customers have the ability to 
sell back to us and so we need to ensure that our prices and what we are willing to pay for 
their solar energy is fair to the customer too. So I think it’s all about fairness, in terms of the 
customer paying for the fair value of what they get from the grid, from the network because 
of they don’t, other customers have to step up and pick up that responsibility and that’s not 
fair to the customers who may not want to install solar or other types of distributed 
generation and likewise, from the customers perspective, if they choose to install solar and 
they have the ability to sell back to the company, that the company’s prices are fair and they 
properly reflect the benefits that, that solar provides to the grid also” (13A, Director of 
energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014). 
Overall, these statements point to a complex debate unfolding in a context of much 
uncertainty, which even solar advocates acknowledge is difficult. According to business 
associations such as the chamber of commerce, now that solar energy has disrupted a 100-
year-old electric utility business model these ‘legacy issues’ will need to be resolved, whether 
they be about costs, price or policies. In the meantime, the situation is a work in progress and 
a lock-out of alternatives: 
“There are debates around what level of price should-, so Georgia Power pay for my surplus 
solar, couldn’t pay for my surplus solar, or if I’m the solar provider, should I be the one who 
suffers a loss if I produce more than I can sell so, you know, that whole issue of the 
interconnection and the net energy metering and the charges etc., that is where the debate 
is very, very active right now as we speak.  I suspect-, I won’t say it’ll be resolved in the next 
legislative session starting in January, but it will be a significant topic because there is 
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legislation on this very issue that will lead to the state legislature just a couple of days before 
it’s adjourned in March this year, and that will be debated, or it’ll be discussed this 
afternoon, and it will be debated come January, February, March next year, so it’s just fair 
to say that is where there is a contentious issue, and it is still, kind of, open to all sorts of 
debate and discussion” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013). 
 
Georgia is not unique in this aspect of issue of transmission and distribution. 43 out of the 50 
states have implemented net-metering policies (Solar Energy Industries Association, 2012a). 
Out of the 43 states, public service commissions and utilities in more than half have examined 
or are currently examining the imposition of fixed charges, also known as grid access charges, 
to distributed generation owners because it is argued that simple net-metering charges do not 
consider the full of the grid services. States which are currently involved in this process include: 
Wisconsin, Arizona, New Mexico, Florida, and Idaho (Inskeep, Kennerly, & Proudlove, 2015). 
 Wisconsin Utilities is currently seek to increase the customer connection fee of every 
customer from to $16 - $25 per month from the current connection fee which is $9 - $10 
(Huebner & Klein, 2015). In Georgia, Georgia Power initially proposed a $22 a month fee to 
distributed solar owners (Howland, 2013) but the Georgia Public Service Commission staff 
recommended against the solar fee (Henry, 2013) and they argued that at the time the utility 
had not proven that solar customers were dodging any costs.  
Nevertheless, this debate continues and in Georgia there was no clarity as what the 
appropriate direction would be:  
“There are issues that are constantly being discussed, even as we talk, and I know there will 
be some more legislative action, and in fact I’m actually off to a committee meeting at the 
legislature this afternoon on this very issue. It is work in progress on how do you get the 
balance right, so that if I put up 100 acre solar field in one area, that it blends in with the 
management of the whole energy system, because solar is only good where at the moment 
while the sun’s shining, but lots of people still need power, you know, when the sun goes 
down, so there is obviously a benefit for everybody using the existing infrastructure so, you 
know, balancing out those needs and charges and costs, that’s where the debate is right 
now, and I think that’s fair to say that it’s probably a significant debate pretty much 
everywhere.  I don’t know too many people that have actually got it right; I mean everybody 
is dealing with what is the right answer to that?” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 
30, 2013).  
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The monopoly Georgia Power exerts over generation and supply, the sunk costs of 
infrastructure, the revenue gained from continued investment in more power plants and 
infrastructure and the lack of an established method of compensation for grid access results in 
an unwillingness economically and politically to open-up that infrastructure to other energy 
generators and suppliers, thereby locking-out efficient distributed generation alternatives. The 
lock-out also remains because despite the complex rhetoric, there is a lack of established 
analysis demonstrating the value of distributed solar to the grid and a lack of will to conduct 
these analyses.  
Finally, another explanation for the unwillingness to open-up the infrastructure and to clarify 
complex financial discussions as evidenced by the comments made by renewable energy 
advocates and the utilities, could be the financial business model for many utilities including 
Georgia Power that rely on volumetric sales of electricity which means that the shift to 
distributed solar would be a direct reduction of kwh’s sold. Therefore, the utility business 
model as a form of organisational lock-in will be discussed in the next section. 
 
b. The utility business model: lock-out of external providers 
This section will argue that the utility method of rate-basing an asset as well as the volumetric 
charge of electricity does not allow for a decentralised model of electricity generation where 
the major beneficiary is the consumer. Rate basing an asset also does not allow external energy 
providers to bring in distributed generation technologies as this would cause a reduction in the 
revenue stream and create a cost recovery problem for utilities. In order to discuss the business 
model of the utility it is important to first rehash the regulatory atmosphere that governs 
utilities and creates this business model and incentivises sales.  
 
— Regulatory Summation 
 Georgia state law has provision for the Georgia Public Service Commission to supervise utilities 
to ensure they are acting in the public interest (See 5.2.3a). In Georgia, the investor owned 
utility works with the Georgia Public Service Commission to set the rates for electricity in a 
process commonly referred to as a rate case.  
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Rate cases are negotiated and debated in a way that enables recovery of expenses by the utility 
e.g. capital, maintenance, operational costs, metering, and billing (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 1997a). The process of rate cases and cost recovery is governed by a mechanism 
often referred to as rate of return regulation (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a). The rate 
of return regulation is a regulatory tool, which follows an agreement and is a guarantee under 
Georgian state law that for a service territory assigned to the utility by the state, the utility has 
a duty to provide reliable, affordable and safe electricity power in a way that is just, reasonable 
and not unduly discriminatory and in return, the utility gets to spend in a way that maintains 
and improves the electricity power network, recover its capital and earns a return on its 
investment (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011a).  
 
— The Revenue Model 
For the utilities this is critical, because inherent in the rate design is a method of taking into 
account fixed and variable costs from all parts of electricity production to delivery (generation 
to retail) and is allocated to differing customer segments i.e. residential, commercial and 
industrial on a total cost to expected revenue basis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2011). In other words, it makes an estimation of projected sales by the different customer 
segments, the total costs are then allocated to the different customer segments and finally, 
the segment costs are shared over the projected sales to get a rate (Edison Electric Institute, 
2012a). The rate is a $/ kWh (rate) basis and a volumetric consumption pattern with a small 
fixed monthly charge (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011). These rates are then fixed 
for a regulatory timeframe but can change if a rate case is petitioned. 
The rates cases in Georgia happen when the utility files a petition requesting a rate increase 
and unless the GPSC suspends them, the rate takes effect within 30 days. If the increase is 
suspended, the GPSC orders a 5-month suspension, in an effort to study the petition and set 
up formal hearings to answer all the commissioners’ questions and other details. However, 
within the first 30 days of filing the petition all interested parties intervene at the commission 
and all interveners are considered by the commission. Formal hearings usually last between 5 
and 6 months, after which the GPSC makes its decisions (Georgia Public Service Commission, 
1997a). 
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The relationship between the utility revenue and rate is: Actual revenue = Rate × number of 
sales (Edison Electric Institute, 2012a). In this relationship, however, if the utility sells more 
than the estimated sales the extra revenue is considered a profit. Simply put, within the 
window of an established rate, the more the utility sells above and beyond the projected sales, 
the more profit is made. Therefore, a reduction in number of sales clearly reduces the revenue 
stream. Nevertheless, this means that the incentive of the utility is to maximise sales. This is 
often called a throughput incentive (Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011c). This throughput 
incentive worked for utilities in the period of high demand growth i.e. 1940 – 1960s, because 
it allowed utilities to invest into the system, recover their costs and earn their return. On the 
customer part, it allowed as much consumption of electricity as possible with relatively low 
rates. At the time the volumetric revenue model for selling electricity and the consumer and 
utilities incentives were aligned.  
 
— The lock-out of alternative providers 
However, the current onset of distributed solar represents a period where the consumer and 
utility interests are misaligned, because the increase in customer energy efficiency measures 
and self-generation through distributed solar is at odds with a business model that needs to 
invest in an asset and rate-base and then charge on a volumetric basis for use of those assets. 
They are at odds specifically because the reduction in energy consumption through self-
generation or energy efficiency by the consumer is a reduction of the volumetric Kwh sales by 
the utility. 
This results in fewer customers left to bear the burden of the fixed and operating costs of the 
grid infrastructure as well a shift in asset ownership and control from the utility to the customer 
since currently distributed solar is customer-owned or at least owned by a third party that is 
not the main utility. In other words, the utility rate-base and rate design model which operates 
on selling of as many “electrons” as possible will struggle to be viable due to changing consumer 
patterns because it opens-up problems for utility cost recovery due to declining revenue 
streams and cross-subsidisation concerns: 
“The more penetration of solar under the current volumetric revenue model, the sources of 
revenue go down, now that’s adjusted based on the capital cost that utilities must make to 
maintain a reliably distribution of power but fundamentally it gives rise to a kind of subsidy 
by those that do not adopt local generation of those that do. The impact of lost revenues is 
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minimal at the current low penetration of PV but again if the predicted high level comes 
online by 2020, this issue of a potential cross-subsidy as well as revenue impact becomes 
significantly measurable.” - Naimish Patel, CEO of Gridco Systems, March 4th 2014, The 
Expansion of Distributed PV in the Age of the Grid Edge, Clean Energy Connections 
Conference 
 
This leaves the utilities with an economic problem with solutions currently being debated. In 
Georgia, the renewable energy advocates, consumer advocacy groups and even utilities 
recognise that there is a conflict between the utility throughput incentive and the 
incorporation of distributed solar by customers and other solar developers into the grid. An 
interviewee who was also a consultant and director of an energy efficiency company argued 
that the real reason Georgia Power resisted the increased distributed solar generation were 
not technical reasons as they had cited, but rather the economics of the business model they 
operated on and this is where the focus needed to be. This can be seen in the comment below: 
“In a city with the utility that’s extremely conservative and has low cost of energy and wants 
to keep low cost of energy and their business model is predicated on selling, so the more 
they sell, the more they make and they've got to protect shareholder investments, energy 
efficiency is not cheap, right so at the end of the day, energy efficiency reduces revenues, it 
does yeah it cuts back revenues and therefore for a utility to grasp onto it, they need to be 
compensated for reduction and lost revenues and on and on and on” (4Bi, company 
president, October 31, 2013). 
 
 
This opinion was a reoccurring theme especially amongst the renewable energy advocates, 
especially the obligations of the investor-owned utilities to earn a return on investment on 
behalf of their shareholders. However, one interviewee who was a director at a regional energy 
efficiency organisation, makes the point that utilities particularly focus on how best to generate 
those returns, in the comment below: 
“It is all a shareholder, they’re only thinking about the shareholders. You know, it’s like, ‘And 
how am I going to generate that 10% return? Oh, most of the time it’s going to be on the 
back of the consumer.’ So, the utility-, granted, these are not bad people, but there is 
something, there is an obstacle in terms of how that system operates between the utilities 
and the regulators and the state government, and how that all works together” (7G, 
Director, regional energy efficiency agency February 25, 2014). 
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In general, most interviewees focused on the utility-shareholder relationship, perhaps because 
of the utility in question, Georgia Power Company or because investor-owned utilities in the 
U.S. controlled most electricity generation. Only two interviewees noted that the structure for 
costs and revenues in a monopoly, whether public or private, is designed in a way that is 
resistant to change. This is illustrated in the comment below: 
"It’s resisted by all of the monopoly utilities that are in place, because you start taking away 
their revenue generation. You change their business model. You've actually taken money 
out of their revenue, because you're generating your own power and if you come in and 
your Solarcity and you say, with no money down homeowner, I will put, uh 10kw system on 
your roof and we'll pay your electric bill for you or we'll sell these electrons because we own 
the systems and your only leasing it, where we sell electrons to the utility or to you, suddenly 
a 3rd party is in the middle, selling electrons or buying electrons and that’s what the utilities 
don’t want” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 
2014). 
 
In Georgia, there was consensus that for distributed generation (specifically solar) to grow, the 
utility business model would need some form of change; yet the debate had become partisan 
with many vested interests, such that only few perceptions showed consideration for both 
utility and alternative providers interests, illustrated in the comments below. The first was a 
manager of an Atlanta based, technical, research, advocacy institute: 
“At the end of the day, I think it’s too easy and it’s too short-sighted to make the utilities 
out to be irrational, bad people. Well, specifically Georgia Power. I mean Georgia Power has 
been providing the state with extremely reliable electricity. Good rates, very reliable 
electricity, but here’s the point. We have a social contract. This is just me talking now. This 
is me thinking about these things. When we have a social contract, that’s when you have 
regulated monopolies, you have a social contract in my opinion. There has been a huge 
tremendous capital outlay on the part of utilities to make sure that we have safe, reliable, 
electricity. We don’t have plants that explode. We don’t have transformer lines that 
explode. Right, so when you get something that’s very disruptive from a technology 
perspective, I can understand where utilities are coming from. On the flip side, I can then 
also understand where the market advocates are coming from whereby they’re looking 
around saying, ‘Hey guys. The time is now. Let’s reach some compromise.’ I personally 
believe that compromise is possible” (7E, Manager technical & research Institute, February 
24, 2014). 
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The second was a director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia: 
“Georgia Power wants to control the way that solar comes into the state because they want 
to benefit from it themselves, they want to have the greatest economic advantage, which 
is, they're a company, I don’t, and you can’t fault them for that but they use sometimes and 
in some ways, they've used the territorial act as a reason to we think, stymie the 
competition.” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014) 
 
In addition, despite the multiple similar opinions about the business model of the monopolies 
being broken or being incompatible with this changing environment, there is no indication of 
a solution on how utilities could start expanding or altering the nature of their businesses in a 
way that provides the consumer with what they want and not lose out on economic benefits 
of distributed solar. This part of the debate is not unique to Georgia, in fact, the opinions in 
Georgia are representative of a broader debate taking place around the country at the time of 
writing about how utilities see distributed solar as a resource and an opportunity, instead of a 
threat to their business model, albeit in states with higher solar energy growth. 
 
The debate between the utility revenue model is still the same even in California where there 
is 690.2MW of installed residential solar capacity (California Energy Commission & California 
Public Utilities Commission, 2015), 351.9MW of which has been installed by third party 
developers on residential sites. Nevertheless, this ongoing debate means that the utilities 
continue to resist distributed solar and developing it themselves in a way that they could 
benefit from the asset, which locks out alternative energy providers. Finally, alternative energy 
providers may continue to be locked out until economic measures which; open-up new 
revenue streams or change the roles of utility (minimum involvement, integrator, energy 
services provider) or find new cost recovery measures for fixed costs are found (Fox-Penner, 
2014; Lehr, 2013).  
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Illustrated in a final comment: 
“I have got a question for you Mr Regulator, Mr Chairman, You want to encourage me to 
drive down my energy sales and all these things are going on to drive down my energy sales, 
so I’m guessing cause you want me to have a fair return on the investment to back up the 
guy that’s got solar on the rooftop when clouds come in or it rains like hell, whatever and 
so I am betting you support a fixed variable rate so I get all my fixed costs back and they are 
allocated to all the customers or you’re so enlightened that you will even adopt a maybe 
formula rate that effectively gets all my fixed costs back regardless of sales” - Jim Rogers, 
Former CEO Duke Energy, March 13th 2013, Technology a Game changer: Future trends in 
Electricity. IEE Conference: Powering the People, Innovations for a Better World. 
The current lack of clarity regarding how to move forward, makes it unlikely that utilities will 
disrupt themselves given the benefits to the status quo. This means in Georgia utilities will 
continue with business as usual with little urgency and restricting the development of 
distributed solar. 
 
c. Regulatory lock-out 
This section argues that there is regulatory lock-out of alternative energy providers in Georgia 
at the state level that is restrictive or unfavourable to low carbon and therefore hinders 
development. It will focus on the specific constraints that lock-out alternative energy providers 
such as legal constraints and the existing regulatory framework that come together in a way 
that hinders development.  
 
— Solar financing overview 
Regulatory lock-out becomes especially relevant when discussing the ways in which distributed 
solar is financed. The premise is that although solar PV costs are reducing, in general solar 
projects still have high initial costs that can discourage many customers. Indeed, the typical 
upfront costs of a solar system are on average $29,000 (Speer, 2012) with slight variations 
depending on the geographic location of installation. The pay back times for most installations 
are estimated to be between 6 and 10 years (Kollins, Speer, & Cory, 2009). Nevertheless, solar 
financing allows for these potential customers to lower their energy costs.  
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Typically, methods of financing solar are as follows: 
• Self-financing: Cash purchase upfront, home equity loans and cash-out refinancing 
from banks or credit unions, mostly on the condition of very good credit. 
• Public financing: financing can come from state or local agencies and even utility 
companies. 
• Property assessed clean energy (PACE) financing:  a financing mechanism designed to 
encourage and assist the installation of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
systems in homes by reducing the initial capital costs of the different systems. The 
borrowed amount is then repaid over a property tax assessment over a certain time, 
typically 20 years. However, disagreements between the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA) and mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over the increased 
risk posed by PACE loans in the event of a failure to pay (Gerdes, 2012; Speer, 2012) 
has resulted in a significant lack of uptake of PACE programs across the country. In 
other words, FHFA was concerned that PACE loans would have priority payment over 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The situation remains unclear at the time of writing. 
• Third-party financing: solar leases or power purchase agreements. Third party financing 
is the most recent funding tool that is growing the solar market and in states that have 
favourable solar legislation is allowing for massive solar installations. 
a) Solar Power Purchase Agreements (PPA): The power purchase agreement is one 
where a solar developer (third party) owns, designs, and installs the solar panel 
but uses the roof space of a customer (residential or commercial) to operate 
and maintain the solar system with little or no upfront costs to the consumer. 
The power generated from the solar panel is sold back to the owner of the roof 
space at either a fixed or lower rate than the current utility rate, for a fixed 
period, typically 10 to 25 years (Solar Energy Industries Association, 2012). The 
customer does not have to deal with large capital costs, the task of maintenance 
and operation, but in return gets certainty in their electric bills. The developer 
(third party), also gains by taking advantage of electricity sales revenue as well 
as state and federal tax credits and incentives. The end of the contracts gives 
the customer three options: (a) extend the contract (b) remove the panels (c) 
Transfer to a new home. 
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b) Solar leases: a similar model as the power purchase agreement but the payment 
is made for the panels itself i.e. renting the panels and the benefits include the 
use of all the electricity produced by the system. 
 
— Legal constraints 
The foregoing discussion drew attention to a utility business model that was created because 
of a regulatory framework designed for rapid growth, sales maximisation and ultimately 
favoured incumbent utilities. These resulted in conversations of how a new regulatory model 
be designed to properly compensate utilities and enhance distributed solar in the grid. 
Nonetheless, there currently exists in Georgia, specific legislation about energy provision which 
indirectly prohibits adoption of solar distributed generation by restricting energy provision to 
utilities. It is known as the ‘Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act of 1973’. Concurrent to the 
restructuring of the electricity provision to single providers in 1910 and 1970 and the assigning 
of geographic service territories to utilities, was the legal language barring the generation and 
sales of electricity by utilities or developers not authorised by the state regulators. For Georgia, 
this law was created in 1973 and it states that “in the interest of the public, for efficient, 
economic, safe and reliable supply of electricity, geographic areas within the state of Georgia 
will be assigned a specific electricity supplier or declared unassigned” (O.C.G.A., 1973a). 
The assigned area has only one supplier with exclusive rights to electricity provision and the 
responsibility of assigning geographic areas is carried out by the public service commission 
(O.C.G.A., 1973b). Therefore the state of Georgia has a service territory allocated to the main 
investor owned utility which is the Georgia Power Company, as well the 42 electric 
membership cooperatives (Georgia Public Service Commission, 1997b). This law was 
established during the high growth of electricity in the United States. The regulated suppliers 
are then required by law to submit an integrated resource plan, forecasting how energy 
demand in the state will be met (See 5.2.3a). Crucial to Georgia’s electricity regulation is the 
definition of a utility, which according to state law is “an electricity supplier whose rates are 
regulated by the commission” (O.C.G.A., 1981). In Georgia, the definition of a utility and 
Territorial Act (territories assigned to the utility) affect the ways in which distributed solar can 
be financed.  
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Since Georgia state law defined a utility as an electricity supplier whose rates are regulated by 
the commission, points of contention between solar installers, advocates and utilities were 
focused on which third party solar financing mechanism (PPAs or Leasing) was illegal and why, 
if the third-party providers were acting as utilities and how the Territorial Act should be 
interpreted. 
 
— Solar financing and territorial Issues 
In Georgia, there were differences in opinion about the extent to which the Territorial Act was 
being used by utilities to hinder solar energy financing and the subsequent development of 
renewable energy amongst clean energy advocates. First, there were clean energy advocates 
who perceive the Territorial act to have been engineered by Georgia’s utilities, specifically to 
block solar energy from developing in the state. An interviewee from the construction industry 
and solar advocate had very strong views to that effect: 
“Well here, not in the state of Georgia because the main utility in the state Georgia Power 
which I say is who the state is named after because they have so much power has decided 
that they don’t want solar power in the state,’ and in the early 70s back when solar first 
raised its head, they got something through the legislation which is not hard on-, you’ll find 
in America and especially in the Southern states of it, your legislatures are not expensive. 
They’re fairly inexpensive and if you’re a large company you can do whatever you want for 
not much money.  They passed something called the Territories Act of 1973 which basically 
says only incumbent utilities, electricity suppliers as of 1973 are allowed to sell power.” (4Ai, 
Business developer, February 19, 2014) 
 
The extent that territories were assigned to circumvent new solar energy technologies or 
providers is difficult to assess, but the history of electricity development within the U.S. shows 
that most utility territories were assigned in the centralisation and consolidation era and 
growth era (3.1b and 3.1d), when multiple utility companies supplied the same geographical 
area and in order to ensure that transmission and distribution infrastructure was not 
duplicated, efficient, safe, balanced as well as reduce competition and protect existing 
investments, state regulation was introduced and monopoly franchises replaced municipal 
regulation.  
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The Territorial Act of 1973, towards the end of the growth period, 1910 to 1970 was 
acknowledged to be a growth period for the utilities. In Georgia, the state legislature and 
regulatory commission at the time believed this to be the most efficient and economical way 
for energy delivery for all parties involved (Georgia Public Service Commission Staff, 1997; 
O.C.G.A., 1973a), citing duplicates, safety, efficiency, etc. Since the state of Georgia never 
restructured or adopted PURPA, the outcome has been, no choice for consumers and no 
competitors for the monopolies. 
The same interviewee goes on to explain the restrictive nature of the Territorial Act: 
The Territory Act restricts us from putting as much solar as the market would otherwise 
expect so unless-, if you listen to those conservatives, but we already know they’re 
hypocrites and asymmetrical right, but if you actually listen to them, I won’t recommend it 
but if you did and you let the market decide it becomes more solar here, the Territories Act 
removes the market from the decision and says, ‘No this is a monopoly, this is not a market 
and we get to decide how much solar.’ So, that’s the situation in Georgia unfortunately, it’s 
being chipped at, we’re pushing Georgia Power to raise it a little. Eventually a brick or two 
is going to come out of that wall and it’s going to fall.” (4Ai, Business developer, February 
19, 2014) 
 
The view that the Territorial act, reinforces the monopoly status of the utilities was common 
amongst solar advocates, especially in the clean energy sector. A distinction made is that 
different forms of territorial acts exist across the country and their primary use is to prevent 
competition not block solar energy development per se. In other words, this was not unique 
to Georgia. This is illustrated by the comment made by an interviewee, an academic expert on 
clean energy policy in the South-eastern region: 
“I don’t have a reference too it specifically, but I think almost every state has something like 
it that prevents competition. Oh! But it is. I think every state has it.  Well it is a big deal for 
distribution generation; it’s hard to grow competing providers with the Territorial Acts. So, 
it is a common problem; it has been passed by every state. It is a state kind of mandated 
regulation, you know, I’m sympathetic that it’s a problem but it is everywhere.” (8Aii, 
Professor, Georgia Tech, March 24, 2014) 
 
Utilities themselves, were developing their own solar generation, albeit slowly. Therefore, the 
incumbent utilities engaged in legislative lobbying and hired lawyers in Georgia to preserve 
Page 221 of 311 
 
their monopolies. This is illustrated in a comment by a state legislator and energy committee 
member:  
“The territorial act of course originated in 1973 and that’s really the holy grail of all the 
utilities in the state of Georgia. I tried to touch that certain topic and, well if you want to 
bring them out, you start going after the territorial act and distributed generation is the 
same idea because one of the bills that Mike Dudgeon and I introduced this year would 
actually allow people to actually finance the solar panels, the solar arrays like you would a 
car and let them basically to be as the Georgia Power people said a utility, you know once 
we allow people to finance solar arrays, what that was, it was a work around the Territorial 
act so we haven’t been successful in being able to carve out for our school system, to let a 
school system to carve out 2MW a year, they won’t let us do that, there is too much lobbying 
pressure if we start messing with that, Southern Company hires 70 lobbyists, exactly, 
normally we have 4 down at the capital but if you start gnawing in Territorial act stuff they 
hire all these contracts lobbyists, I mean they come out of the woodwork. I mean that’s a 
lot! But see that tells you how important it is to them, its dollars to them” (2A 3D, Georgia 
state representative, April 11, 2014). 
 
In addition, there were disagreements between solar advocates and the main utility, Georgia 
Power, about the scope of the Territorial Act on third party financing, from prohibitions on 
solar bank loans, lending or leasing the solar panels to power purchase agreements. These are 
illustrated in the comments below. The first comment came from a construction industry 
representative who was a solar advocate, who perceived all forms of financing solar to be 
prohibited by the utilities: 
“Yes, from then on, so it’s a flat-out monopoly and so that’s the way it’s been and what that 
means is that you have the money, you can put solar panels on your own house, but right, 
you have to pay for it, you can’t technically get a bank to lend you the money. You can’t get 
a leasing company to lease you the panels because Georgia Power’s attorneys got in the 
courts in one of the biggest legal stretches I’ve ever seen, to enforce that that is providing 
electricity to somebody. So, a bank can lend you money to drive a car or buy a gun, but if 
you hit somebody or shoot somebody they don’t go back and sue the bank and say, ‘You 
enabled that.’ You can’t lend or lease anybody solar panels because Georgia Power will go 
back and sue them and say, ‘Oh well they’re selling you electricity.’ It’s like, ‘No, we lend 
them the money to buy anything they want, we don’t care’” (4Ai, Business developer, 
February 19, 2014). 
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The second comment, from a member and director of a consumer advocacy group, perceives 
power purchase agreements to be prohibited: 
“Yeah, if you have $30 or $40,000, you can hire someone to install solar panels on your 
home and use those heat your home. In some states people are allowed to do what’s called 
a third-party power purchase agreement so that they can basically lease the panels and 
then get the electricity from those, the organisation, the company that they lease them 
from. There are some issues raised by Georgia Power, there's something called the 
territorial act, that they claim would make that a violation of the territorial act but those are 
things that are coming up in this next legislative session but that’s we believe that people 
should have, you know a right, property owners have a right to determine if they want to 
have solar panels on their homes and they should be able to get financing, if they can’t 
afford to do it outright.” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014) 
Finally, the third comment is from a director of an energy efficiency company: 
“You and I can go put solar on our house tomorrow and we can sell it to the utilities or we 
can use it directly for ourselves so but we can't have a 3rd party come in and put in our 
house and give us a power purchase agreement saying, you know you were paying 10 cents, 
I'm going to charge you 8 cents and here's the contract, you can’t do it.” (4Bi, company 
president, October 31, 2013) 
The main utility’s perspective however, has been to argue that solar advocates often mistake 
the ability to lease and use solar panels from a third party with the ability to sign a power 
purchase agreement with a third party, as is evidenced by the statement below. In other words 
solar energy can be financed whichever way possible, with the exception of the buying and 
selling of kilowatt-hours i.e. electricity from an unauthorised or external party (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2014b): 
“The third-party financing, I think there is a misunderstanding on this issue. Customers have 
always been able to go out and buy solar panels and install them on their business or their 
home, take advantage of solar and customers have the ability to lease solar panels. So, when 
someone says: “even with all these tax credits that are available to me, I still can’t afford 
the high upfront costs of putting in solar panels, is there another financing mechanism?” 
Well one financing mechanism is that you can go out and get a loan from a bank or you do 
a home equity loan and you can use the money from that to do solar or you can lease the 
solar arrangement from a supplier, a solar developer. Maybe you enter into a 20 year lease 
the equipment and then basically you get the output of that solar when the sun is shining 
you get the benefit of it, when it’s not shining you don’t obviously, you can do all of that 
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today in the state of Georgia. You can go out and you enjoy solar for whatever the length of 
that lease is.” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
Georgia Power, makes the point that, the real intention of solar advocates is not simply to loan 
or lease the solar panels for electricity, but to sell electricity to their neighbours, which is 
prohibited under current legislative and regulatory structures, specifically the Territorial Act: 
“The other kind of defining feature that you see that some advocates want, is that they want 
to go beyond leasing and say: “well, what I want to be able to do for the solar customers, is 
that I want to put a solar panel on their roof and I want to be able to put an electricity meter 
on it and then I want to be able to just charge them based on the meter, you know, just like 
an electric utility does.” So when my solar starts producing and its finished generating, then 
the customer just pays me on a per kilowatt hour basis on what that solar power produces 
and that’s where there’s been a lot of discussion because the state law, the state of Georgia 
and other states say that only utilities, electric utilities like Georgia Power or Alabama Power 
or whatever can sell electricity on a per kilowatt hour basis to a customer because these 
utilities are regulated by the state, they have certain standards that they have to comply 
with, quality standards that they have to comply with, their rates have to under the 
jurisdiction of our state public service commission so that we can’t charge whatever we 
want to for our electricity because those rates are regulated just like they are in the United 
Kingdom.” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
 
Throughout this debate there is a point of agreement between the utility and solar third-party 
advocates; which is that solar advocates want to be able to sign power purchase agreements, 
hence, the presentation of power purchase agreements as the main/only way to finance solar. 
This is illustrated in a comment by a Tea Party founder and solar advocate: 
“It was against the law, I disagree with, I mean customers where, you know, they could put 
solar panels on their rooftops, when, you know, if they paid for it outright, but until a bill 
passed the Georgia legislature a few years ago, it was against the law to actually, you know 
the way it works, is that whenever, you know, the way solar companies manage it is, they 
put solar panels on your rooftops with no upfront costs and you just agree to purchase the 
electricity produced from the solar panels, you know, for, at certain cost and a certain time 
period and that’s the way that works because I mean, they can install solar panels and you 
have to enter into a contract. Well it was illegal to do that and I am a firm believer in private 
property rights, that the power you generate from solar panels on your private property, 
should belong to you to determine what to do with it.” (15D, Tea Party activist, October 5, 
2016) 
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Finally, the utility maintains, that if the third party solar developers wish to operate as a utility 
by signing PPAs, then there should be consideration given to applying regulation and 
compliance standards for these third party solar developers, because the legislative and 
regulatory structures have served the state extremely well and attempts to remove them need 
to be carefully considered. The statement can be seen below: 
“So, the question becomes well if you allow developers to put solar panels on peoples’ roofs 
and put meters out there and charge them on a per kilowatt hour basis, are they becoming 
a utility? And should they be held to similar standards or requirements and so that’s what 
the discussion is in the state of Georgia and in other parts of the country that if you allow 
this provision, are there any special rules that these developers need to comply with. Well 
that’s the crux, the people who like I said, you can do third party leasing today. It is perfectly 
open. The question becomes can you move beyond that and actually sell on a per Kwh basis 
off those panels and there are some who argue that, yes we should be able to do that and 
not be called a utility or required to act like utility and there are others who say, by doing 
that you are starting to undermine the whole regulatory and legislative structure of the 
utility industry in the state of Georgia and we really need to understand what the long term 
implications are, if we are going to go down this road, let’s make sure we understand what 
the long term implications are because the current model has worked very well in our state, 
the rates are below the national average and reliability is very very good, so let’s make sure 
we don’t mess that up.” (13A, Director of energy policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
 
From the statements, it is easy to see that the Territorial Act is just one part of a complicated 
electricity governing structure. The solar financing debate just highlights this complication. 
Therefore, even though these opinions vary slightly in terms of the degree to which the 
Territorial Act is a barrier to clean energy financing and subsequent growth, all the 
stakeholders in the energy sector agreed that there were strong legislative and regulatory 
structures that needed to be either reviewed or left alone. In addition, the interviewees who 
were solar third-party advocates, agreed that the law tended to favour the incumbent utilities 
who take advantage of the law to maintain control over how energy is produced and delivered. 
There was precedent set by the case of the solar developer known as Georgia Solar Utilities, 
mounting a challenge in early 2012 to Georgia Power through the Public Service Commission 
to be made a solar utility, however the developer was not successful on the basis of the legal 
1973 Territorial Act.  
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This led to further questions about recognising the Territorial Act as a barrier, to debates about 
having it repealed or removed, and to raising questions over the role of the regulatory bodies 
or legislative bodies in removing barriers to clean energy. 
One interviewee, who described territorial assignments as a problem across most states and 
not specifically a Georgia problem, is accurate in that the responses to the problem have played 
out differently. Due to the way electricity grids, have evolved across the country, there have 
been and continues to be regulatory language for territorial assignments of some form in every 
state in a way that complicates third party solar models. These regulations around territorial 
assignments are not limited to the South-eastern region and their regulated markets but 
extend to hybrid states and some elements of deregulated markets. 
Some responses in regulated markets like California and Colorado by state commission and 
legislature have been to exclude or not define third party PV companies offering power 
purchase agreements as a utility, even though they also sell electricity to customers. The 
legislative solution in California was as long as the electricity generated is used on site or used 
by up to two other consumers on the same site then it is in keeping with laws of the state. 
Colorado define developers of a residential system size (10kw or less) as not being a utility. In 
addition, the main utility Xcel energy waived monopoly rights for certain solar projects which 
opened the door to more solar growth.  
It must be said that the states that have come up with solutions to their third party and solar 
language also have quite high renewable energy standards to reach and as such there may be 
more incentive or regulatory and legislative will to sort out these debates in order to reach 
those targets. The targets include: 
• Oregon:  25% by 2025 (large utilities) and 5% - 10% by 2025 (smaller utilities) 
• California: 33% by 2020 
• Colorado: 30% by 2020 (IOUs) and 10% by 2020 (co-ops & large municipal utility) 
Source: DSIRE, 2013 
The solutions written in law required some creativity and trade-offs by all stakeholders 
involved. Therefore, the next issue of discussion will be the legislative and regulatory barriers 
in Georgia that seem to limit alternative energy growth. 
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— Regulatory capture and multiple interests influence 
The previous discussion on the Territorial Act highlighted a monopoly on electricity 
provision as a legal constraint for solar energy developers, but it introduced more 
questions about why this legislative barrier could not be removed, especially given the 
examples of states (California, Colorado and Oregon), which had come up with varying 
solutions in response. It could be argued that the state of Georgia has simply not reached 
that point in the debate on solar and electricity provision where there is a consensus 
amongst state legislature and regulators that solar provision by alternative energy 
suppliers without assigned territories is a better value proposition to customers. 
  
Still, there was evidence in Georgia of significant special interest influence on regulators 
and legislators. Unruh (2000) explains that over time there can be regulatory capture of 
governing bodies by the interests they were supposed to be regulating. Over time, they would 
develop their own language and methods of working together that may not often be 
challenged or questioned. In Georgia, the relationship between some members of the business 
community and state governing bodies is highlighted again when discussing the multiple 
interests influencing energy policy. In Georgia, interest groups are a major element of the 
state’s politics (Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007b). In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, these 
organisations included a few corporations and regulated firms like Georgia Power (Fleischmann 
& Pierannunzi, 2007b).  
 
Since then, there has been growth in the number of interest groups in Georgia and the scope 
of lobbying by these groups is uncertain. More so, because laws governing interest group 
activity were not strict: until the 1990s Georgia was one of only two states which did not 
require lobbyists activities to be regulated (Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007b). Activities range 
from, sponsoring events, testifying at proceedings, dissemination of information, etc. The 
research showed that in Georgia, there were clear activities geared towards seeking favourable 
decisions on energy policy on all sides. Interviewees focused on the fact that there are strong 
influences by special interests’ groups but generally blame the opposing group as the cause.  
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The solar third party advocates argued that the main utility, Georgia Power, had influence in 
the regulatory and legislative process, through long standing accepted behaviour between 
the utilities, regulatory and legislative bodies, like lobbying and campaign contributions which 
many perceived as Georgia Power overtly influencing the electricity decision making process. 
Hence, an absence of free market financing for solar and consumer electric retail choice.  
Groups resisting third party solar like the utility perceived that renewable energy advocates 
were influencing the state legislature and regulators. Still, all groups lobby the state officials 
but perhaps not to the same degree.  
The evidence is illustrated in five comments below which show variation amongst solar third 
party advocates about the extent of influence of the utilities on legislative and regulatory 
bodies. The initial three comments were from individuals who perceived Georgia Power’s 
campaign lobbying and campaign contributions as excessive.  
The first interviewee was from the construction industry and a solar advocate: 
“You try and change one letter in anything that affects Georgia Power, they will have 70 
lobbyists down there, I guarantee you and I am not exaggerating, 70 to try and tell our 
legislature, ‘No please don’t do it.’.” (4Ai, Business developer, February 19, 2014) 
The second interviewee was a state legislator and energy committee member who explains 
how the Public Service Commission could support voluntary or incremental amounts of solar, 
stating, “they’re not because basically they are southern company supporters” (2A 3D, Georgia 
state representative, April 11, 2014).  
The third interviewee was an academic consultant for Atlanta’s government: 
“So, we have five, there’s five commissioners, four of them had more than 90% of their 
campaigns paid for by Georgia power the last time that they ran. The one that ran as not 
being owned by Georgia Power had, 70% of his campaign financed by Georgia Power. So, 
what most people who have been interested in change have been concerned with the 
apparent regulatory capture of the commission by the company that they are supposed to 
be regulating.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013). 
Nevertheless, some interviewees make the point that solar advocates are starting to and 
should try to lobby legislators and regulators to be able compete with Georgia Power. An 
interviewee, a lawyer representing community and environmental groups, explains: 
Page 228 of 311 
 
“Well I mean we engage in a small form of lobbying. We support and then we don’t support 
laws that negatively or may positively affect the environment here in Georgia. So, if a solar 
bill is coming up this session that we are promoting and supporting, I’d have to find what 
the number is for that. So, we have a lobbyist, we know the lobbyist working on it, so we’re 
helping to support it. You talk to the commissioners, you develop relationships with them 
so that you can lobby them and tell them your point of view and get them to understand 
your point of view. That would be one form of lobbying. Then you also lobby the senator 
and the representatives to get them to vote a certain way on a particular bill and tell them 
why they should vote in a respective way. We’ve just really gotten into lobbying this year.” 
(5D, Lawyer, January 23, 2014) 
 
An interviewee who was a director for Georgia’s largest solar firm and Green business 
association explains how the firm engaged with state officials: 
“The Public Service Commissioners have open doors and they are state-wide elected 
officials, there's 5 of them, so it’s very small cadre of people, but you have to convince solar 
makes sense, so all of us started trying to talk to the ones trying to find people who were 
open minded there. We hosted at Suniva, I hosted plant tours, tours of the factory, see 
people working making solar panels, solar cells, look real jobs in Georgia, this is a real 
company. We are not just tree huggers wearing Birkenstocks, we're bringing in economic 
values-add to the state.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, 
February 20, 2014) 
These comments reveal disproportionate levels of influence in electricity decision making in 
Georgia, especially financially. For example, when comparing the ‘70’ lobbyists being retained 
by Georgia Power, with no indication that this number is exaggerated, with a ‘small form of 
lobbying’ used by the Green firm. These comments also reveal that this form of political 
engagement may still be relatively new amongst solar and other clean energy firms in Georgia, 
which could be due in part to the sizes of the solar/renewable energy firms or ages of the firms. 
Therefore, whilst the solar developers’ groups seem to be making a case for the legitimacy of 
their businesses to the regulators and legislators, there is already an established relationship 
between the utilities, the regulators and legislature that may be assured. 
The size of some clean energy firms may be a factor in the regulatory lock-out, as many do not 
seem to be represented by more influential associations such as the chamber of commerce, 
who have a more prominent role in decision making. This is illustrated by a comment from an 
interviewee who worked in the construction industry and was a solar advocate: 
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“Those big businesses represent huge interests that are entrenched interests, small 
business and start ups and things like me, we are bringing new ideas that threaten the 
existing business model. The chamber of commerce represents the big businesses; they 
don’t want me coming in there cussing out everybody which I would do, basically you know 
and all of that. We don’t want to listen to you, exactly, sit down, shut up and so we do things 
like form Green Chambers, the little business chambers of commerce’s that focuses on 
minority businesses or green businesses or things like that, that’s cool, but that’s how it 
goes.” (4Ai, Business developer, February 19, 2014) 
Nevertheless, there were some solar third party advocates, from the solar and energy 
efficiency business community, who remained nonpartisan about interest groups involvement 
in the electricity decision making process and governing bodies. For example, one interviewee, 
a director and consultant of an energy efficiency company, explains that influence comes from 
all sides: 
“I mean you have a commission and its represented by five elected officials and yes they 
are elected and they are supposed to be acting upon political policy decisions that impact 
their constituents right, their people that voted them into office but there's influence, 
there's all kinds of external influences when you're in that role. You've got utility influences, 
you've got the consumer influences, and you’ve got business influences so you have lots of 
different aspects to consider before making a decision.” (4Bi, company president, October 
31, 2013) 
Therefore, even some of the solar developers and other clean energy firms may find it 
necessary to be part of the process illustrated by this comment: 
“I would almost be willing, I would almost say to the solar community, ‘Figure out a way to 
cough up half a million dollars and buy what you need from the legislature, get it done and 
be quick too.’ Since we’re all tiny companies here and none of us is making money in 
Georgia, it doesn’t sound like much money and it’s not, the lobbyists and the other people 
have that much money in their back pocket. Literally, I mean, that’s not a lot. We need to 
get us some legislators just like Georgia Power.” (4Ai, Business developer, February 19, 
2014) 
In addition, the PSC is bound by state law. State legislature would ultimately have to decide 
how to deal with third party solar. So, whilst there is focus on 5 elected officials with influence, 
the decision about third party solar rests in the hands of state legislature: 
“So, the Public Service Commission cannot write laws, they are not policy they are 
regulatory. They are given a mandate, to regulate, used to be telecommunications before it 
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was deregulated and now its utilities, limousines and taxis, just a few other things in the 
telecom area that are still, either regulated, we have probably regulated monopolies. So, 
they are only regulatory.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, 
February 20, 2014) 
Ultimately, Georgia law requires that lobbying expenses including meals, gifts, tickets, 
campaign contributions and the receiver of the expenses, be fully disclosed to the public 
(Fleischmann & Pierannunzi, 2007b). Since there are multiple groups of interest who lobby the 
decision makers, care must be taken not to attribute specific decisions directly to lobbying of 
the one group or the other. There is no direct evidence in this research that votes have been 
cast or changed because of specific activities. However, the perception is that the influential 
power of the interests’ groups involved in the decision-making process is disproportionate. 
Since the state of Georgia never restructured its electricity market there is lock-out of many of 
the alternative energy providers which may need to be changed by law. This is illustrated in a 
final comment from a public service commissioner, who argues that the current model of 
electricity delivery has worked well in Georgia throughout its history: 
“A lot of people ask can we deregulate our electricity market here and allow more choices 
and I am personally against that because I feel like that we've got some of the cheapest 
electricity in the United States, why would I want to take a system that's working and throw 
these unknowns into it. Now if we had, really, expensive electricity and we had a company 
that was running it, that was unreliable and with poor customer service, then I might be 
interested in doing it but I don’t feel like things are broken here in Georgia, I feel like things 
are going very well, so I am not interested in changing in unless there's a problem.” (2Bi, 
Georgia Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013) 
 
The absence of an updated state energy policy since the year 2005 means that significant 
special interests dictate the direction of energy policy. The cases of lobbying and campaign 
contributions to the regulators also show that pro-solar groups and groups resisting solar 
essentially carry out similar functions, the only difference being the political sway that each 
has on energy decision makers. Although, clean energy advocates perceive that there is not 
the same level of influence from clean energy circles compared to the utilities, the statements 
about special interests also ignore the fact that the regulators and legislators are not 
completely without sway in energy policy in the sense that they hold their own political and 
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occupational views about electricity delivery, prices, renewable energy, nuclear energy and 
environmental regulations.  
Furthermore, the hesitancy of regulators or legislators to acknowledge that aspects of current 
energy legislation like i.e. the Territorial Act legislation would need to change, like legislators 
and regulators have done in California, Colorado and the other above examples means that 
significant amount of distributed solar continues to be locked-out of the system. Given these, 
solar developers may have to provide solar energy by contracting with the main utilities in 
Georgia whilst customers will need to finance solar energy with all the available except power 
purchase agreements.  
Finally, the hesitancy of regulators or legislators to open the electricity provision system could 
point to a problem of a political and cultural nature. The political and business nature of most 
of the energy decisions makers is generally conservative. The conservative attitude around 
electricity and the environment could explain the enforcing of old energy policies that do not 
favour low carbon energy. 
 
d. Shared culture and political lock-out: resistance to low carbon 
The previous section highlighted the regulatory lock-out of distributed generation and 
alternative energy providers. More importantly, the section described an energy governance 
system hesitant or resistant to restructure around low carbon goals. This hesitancy by 
regulators, legislators and businesses to open the electricity provision system could point to a 
problem of a political and cultural nature. Therefore, this section will discuss the shared culture 
across government organisations, businesses and individuals within Georgia which combine to 
resist low carbon development. 
In Georgia, there is evidence which suggests that cultural attitudes, specifically shared 
resistance to environmental goals from the utilities, regulators, legislators and businesses, and 
a strict adherence to viewing the low cost of energy as pivotal to economic growth, may in part 
add to the switching costs of low carbon transitions. These cultural values reinforce each other 
to favour the current system of energy provision, i.e. the centralised energy and regulated 
monopoly system, which ultimately mean a change is resisted or limited (Woerdman, 2004). 
All of this strengthens the lock-in in energy governance in Georgia, but more so locks-out 
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efficient distributed generation alternatives. The resistance to environmental goals and 
adherence to low cost of energy as pivotal to economic growth will be explored in this section. 
 
— Shared resistance to environmental goals 
The first shared attitude is one which resists environmental goals being pursued for its own 
sake. It is rare for the environment to be a dominant driver of any energy decisions that are 
made within Georgia. Focusing on a climate related argument for any kind of energy decision 
is not a popular position.  
There is already widespread climate change skepticism amongst energy decision makers in the 
state of Georgia. Decision makers in Georgia tend to see environmental arguments as 
emotional, unworkable and not in the best interests of the bottom line for businesses and rate 
payers in the state of Georgia. 
A Sierra Club chapter organiser argues that bills seen as leading with environmental goals will 
struggle: 
“It’s taken a while to get us to a place where those types of bills aren’t stigmatised in the 
conservative community as-, you know, conservatives have not necessarily adopted, or at 
least not in any widespread way, environmental ethic. So, bills that are seen as promoting 
clean energy have traditionally been stigmatised as being environmental bills, supported by 
environmental radicals. It’s because the economics work now that, I think that they’re not 
stigmatised, not as much.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter Organiser, February 26, 2014) 
 
Groups such as the Georgia chapter of the Sierra Club pushing to move beyond coal, beyond 
natural gas etc. are typically seen as activists by energy decision makers and not in possession 
of the economic details of the production of electricity. Two interviewees who were renewable 
energy advocates explained this point, but were quick to show a difference between 
environmentalists and other renewable energy advocates. 
The first interviewee was a state legislator and energy committee member: 
“I think the issue really for renewable energy supporters is not to be against traditional 
means of generation, so that’s why I have always stuck to all of the above and I’ve have 
been able to talk about cost and finance in a way that is credible to your argument. The 
fuzzy stuff, the warm and fuzzy stuff really has no bearing, you know. I mean that might be 
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your underlying goal is to protect the planet, or reduce CO2, the likelihood of climate change 
getting worse but that doesn’t sell, you don’t gain any traction, when you start talking about 
the costs associated with it, how do you factor in all these costs in environmental fees that 
the companies have, how do you address the fact that the utilities pay for the grid, I mean 
you have to be prepared for logical arguments and instead you know, they come in, these 
feel good people and that has really set the industry back I think.” (2A 3D, Georgia state 
representative, April 11, 2014). 
 
This opinion was echoed by the director for Georgia’s largest solar firm and green business 
association and it also showed a split or difference of opinion between the business-driven 
advocates of solar and the environmental advocates of renewable energy: 
“So, if the clean tech environmental renewable energy activist really could make the case 
that most Georgians want clean energy then they would be able to demonstrate it with 
facts. The fact is that Georgia Power would come back and say we offer an upcharge for 
clean energy, you can buy solar or you can buy renewable energy at an extra cost, only a 
few thousand people have signed up for it in the state. Not hundreds of thousands, not a 
million people.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, February 
20, 2014) 
The last two comments indicate two opinions: first is a split in opinion about the best 
approaches for low carbon development between renewable energy advocates, solar 
developers and environmental advocates i.e. there was a recognition that within the energy 
decision making process in Georgia, the environment was something that did not hold much 
weight, was not critical to decisions made and did not drive energy policy. The approach 
therefore needed to be more focused on the economics of electricity production and 
consumption. The second is an appeal by many renewable energy and solar developers to 
environmental advocates about being informed and open to all forms of energy because of the 
economics of electricity production. Although, there was not a singular explanation of why the 
environment, carbon emissions or even climate change did not hold more weight in the 
decision-making process, it was shared by everybody interviewed. Even on the specific issue of 
climate change, the interviewees discussed the broad origins of why climate change and 
cutting CO2 emissions was resisted and did not hold weight.  
Some interviewees pointed to the conservative constituency as a resistive force of all things 
environmental and some interviewees pointed to a weak to non-existent carbon market as the 
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reason for a lack of action. On the conservative constituency two comments exemplify this 
point; the first was the director of a consumer advocacy group, who describes how climate 
change has been politicised in Georgia: 
“Conservatives are perceived to think that climate change is not real they don’t 
acknowledge climate change, so it doesn’t really, if you're in a conservative state and you 
are trying to influence and you are talking about climate change it doesn’t get very far.” (6E 
14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014) 
The second was a senior technical analyst for a southern interstate non-profit organisation: 
“Currently it’s very republican; every governor in the south is a republican except for 
Arkansas, Maryland is one of our states and Missouri is one of our states. Everyone else is 
republican, so they are very pro-business, pro-oil, pro-gas, pro-coal, so they are very 
supportive of coal and that sort of thing” (6E, Snr. technical analyst, October 31, 2013).  
 
The main point being made by these interviewees was that there were incompatible ways of 
thinking with the climate and environmental issues. It was difficult to support fossil fuels and 
its competitors all at the same time but because of that, the conversation becomes difficult. 
Finally, an interviewee who was a manager of an Atlanta based, technical, research, advocacy 
institute, explains not only the contested nature of the climate debate but the reasons why the 
conversations shifts to economics of electricity in Georgia: 
“It removes the debate.  We can have a gentleman’s disagreement about the environmental 
merits but as long as we see eye-to-eye on the economic benefits, that’s all that matters.” 
(7E, Manager technical & research Institute, February 24, 2014). 
 
The economic arguments which pointed to a resistive environmental ethic were also 
consistent. The first interviewee to show this consistency was a director and consultant of an 
energy efficiency company: 
“So, it depends on where you are and who the audience is here in Atlanta, carbon reduction 
it doesn’t resonate, it's not the driver, it's really comes down, it's really the economic stand 
point of it, it's what’s the return on investment, how much money are you going to save 
that’s going reduce my electricity bill. Yeah, now other places, yes certainly carbon makes a 
difference but we are also in an unregulated carbon market, so there's no really set rules 
about how carbon is quantified, how it's marketed, how it's sold, how it's bought, you know, 
Page 235 of 311 
 
we are not in a sophisticated carbon market in yet in the U.S.” (4Bi, company president, 
October 31, 2013) 
The second interviewee was one of the five public service commissioners in Georgia and he 
argues about valuing carbon in a way it makes an impact: 
“No, I don’t think so at this point, I think because, we haven't yet put a price on carbon in 
Georgia. You know, we don’t have RECS that have value, so there's no trading of these 
carbon credits in Georgia. Like you have in other states where the RECS have a value, so 
because of that the price of carbon and is really not even a factor at this point.” (2Bi, Georgia 
Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013) 
The third and fourth comments are from an academic expert on clean energy policy in the 
South-eastern region, who explains that evaluating CO2 in traditional levelized cost of 
electricity model is difficult without a price on CO2: 
 
“It factors in, only to the extent we can quantity it in cost analysis using the levelized cost of 
electricity type concept, you know and since there is no price on CO2 at the moment, it’s 
only a kind of a sensitivity analysis. Certainly, because it’s my life, my lifetime involvement 
has been on the, some of these other benefits of clean energy options, I’m constantly talking 
about it on the board but it comes right down to maybe that million-dollar investment, you 
know in some power investment Its difficult to get CO2 valued and plugged into the 
formulas.” (8Aii, Professor, Georgia Tech, March 24, 2014) 
 
Also: 
 
 “Well in the financial analysis of different options, we take the position that unless 
regulation is already in place we do not speculate about what future regulations might be 
and so when we do our cost assessment of alternatives we only consider current 
environmental regulations in the U.S which do not cover CO2 at the moment although we 
are always, I am certainly aware of the impending release of new rules and procedures 
impacting fossil, the Impacting the fossil fleet.”(8Aii, Professor, Georgia Tech, March 24, 
2014). 
 
The last sentence of the final comment from the academic highlights why there could be an 
environmental resistance: because it impacts the fossil fleet. In Georgia, there is an idea 
amongst the regulatory officials and the utilities that their coal generation fleet is under attack 
by the current administration through its environmental goals.  
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Regulators in Georgia have also referred to climate change as being in vogue whilst arguing 
that more attention should be paid to the handling of nuclear waste (Echols, 2014a).  
They have also referred to a federal carbon dioxide plan as one which will cost the country 
billions, warning of federal overreach and the erosion of state government regulatory powers 
(IRP process), not based in science but on philosophy, politics and legacy. In summary, 
combined with a perhaps weak environmental ethic, climate scepticism and difficulty with 
evaluating CO2 into energy planning and the heavily contested nature of environmental 
regulations in the South, it is no wonder that the conversation shifts to economic benefits. 
Furthermore, the shared resistance to environmental issues have reinforcing constraints as 
can be seen above. 
 
— Least-cost energy as a function of economic growth 
The last subsection indicated that in Georgia we see a preference for economic benefits and 
growth above all else. Georgian decision-makers may dismiss the idea of environmental 
policies perhaps due to the fact that the region is rapidly growing and is becoming a carbon 
intensive industrial hub. The growth has been due to, in part, the low cost of energy achieved 
by the least-cost approach which prioritises using a combination of lowest cost fuels in the long 
term. The more environmental restrictions are put into place through various agencies 
especially federal affiliates, the more this threatens the lowest cost approach that has allowed 
the economy to grow and has historically been adopted. This value placed on business-led 
economic growth is extremely common in the South-eastern region.  
 
The Director of the Georgia Centre of Innovation for Energy Technology, a state government 
department, explains the common directives given with regards to energy decision making and 
in this case with renewable energy: 
“I want to be clear on this, remember this, our agency here, we don’t regulate, legislate or 
mandate, so we have to operate with what they give us. So, what do they give us, what is 
our mandate? They say bring investment, solve the job creation, increase the tax base that’s 
it and we have to do. So, we are going after this, we cannot legislate or mandate, so we 
cannot say: “state what you got to do is 20% or your energy has to come from this, 30 from 
there, 10 from there or 5 from there, we don’t like this stuff here! So, we said okay let’s go 
and start changing the conversation. So, we started changing the conversation by bringing 
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the players in, in the solar cell. So, our job was to identify, strategically identify the best 
players in the field.” (1S, Director, State government department, February 19, 2014) 
 
The idea of increasing the tax base by bringing in investment was a perspective echoed across 
all the interviewees. All participants acknowledged that state energy officials and locals wanted 
to see economic growth and commonly described Georgia as  being “open for business” in an 
effort to continue to attract heavy industries and energy users (Echols, 2014b). Furthermore, 
the above interviewee introduced another attitude which was shared by most of the 
interviewees like the utilities, chamber of commerce and the majority of business owners, 
about a resistance to Government intervention in the form of mandates and subsidies 
especially in the case of solar energy. 
 
In Georgia, a major factor that has helped with investment, job creation and an increased tax 
base has been the low cost of electricity provided by the utilities. Part of the problem here for 
the energy officials is the need to make the step up from the lowest cost energy mix dominated 
by fossil fuels to the cleanest which adds substantial costs to existing and future fleet. The costs 
involved in reducing or removing an extremely high proportion of baseload coal power for a 
lower carbon source when grid parity has not yet been reached makes for an expensive change 
which would put upward pressure on rates for residents and businesses in the state. This can 
be seen with basic tools, such as the levelized cost of energy approach. 
 
A senior energy official also expressed the opinion of “cheap energy as the secret” to a wave 
of new economic growth and shared concern for countries who want to make wholescale 
changes to the way electricity is produced and in the process have put their utilities at risk and 
incurred serious upward pressure on rates (Echols, 2013a). The clean technology developers 
also agree that presenting a better value proposition of cleaner energy to individuals and 
businesses was extremely difficult due to cost not only in Georgia but in the rest of the South-
eastern region. Three comments summarize this perspective perfectly. Again, the director for 
Georgia’s largest solar firm and Green business association: 
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“So, I think they, all of us, here in Georgia have learned and the legislators, politicians have 
learned that, you've got to be careful, you don’t want to look like you’re doing what 
California does but you can surely learn from it over time. And why California? Why is that 
the Pariah? Well because business costs are higher, energy costs are higher, electricity is 
three times the rate it is here. None of that is good for economic development here, no 
citizen here wants to pay more for their electricity here and it’s just a little more laid back 
conservative approach, to living here and so, you know while the rest of the world may see 
California as a bastion of innovative, business and everything, there are folks in the United 
States that say, it’s a nice place to visit but I wouldn’t want to live there.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. 
Director International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014). 
 
The comments made by environmental advocates and clean energy developers grant some 
legitimacy to the view shared by the state utilities and regulators about opposition to any 
energy decisions that could potentially put upward pressure on rates. Generally, states leading 
on low carbon development (i.e. with a high percentage of renewable energy sources) were 
not seen as successful energy providers because of the high-energy prices in those areas. This 
prism of low cost is shared by residents of Georgia as well. This is a culture that expects and 
places value on a stable, reliable and low cost electric provision. Any change to operating and 
financial procedures is viewed as a deviation from the norm and is perceived as a threat by 
most stakeholders in Georgia especially the residents and any other heavily dependent low 
cost groups. The energy consultant for the Georgia Chamber of Commerce argues on behalf of 
businesses and residents: 
“Atlanta is a big part of Georgia, it’s a driver of economic growth, but a lot of business and 
industry is located in areas beyond the metropolitan boundaries, so is it going to be 
equitable for agricultural industries, for food prep industries, for other industries that are 
located throughout Georgia. So, we look at all legislative proposals through that prism. 
Obviously one of the big take home issues for consumers is, ‘Is it going to up my power bill?’ 
So, you know, that’s another one. They might not look at the intricacies of the policy, but 
they sure understand if it’s going to drive up my power bill by 5%, they’re actually not going 
to like it, so, you know, we’ve got to understand all of those issues.” (9A, Chamber Energy 
Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
 
It is interesting to note that even if the groups involved do not understand all the intricacies of 
energy policy, there is still a consensus that the low carbon approach could put upward 
pressure on rates.  
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The issue then becomes: if all the intricacies of the policy are not understood, how is a 
consensus reached. This notwithstanding, most renewable energy advocates in Georgia are 
starting to argue that, for individuals, the economic perspective is a better way to make energy 
decisions. These are illustrated in the comments below: 
“Seriously, but that is-, people actually stopped and joined in the conversation I’m having 
with someone because there’s a realisation that these energy-efficient light bulbs just aren’t 
outliers anymore. They see someone holding a $10 light bulb and looking at them and they 
have thought this as well, ‘Should I buy a $10 light bulb?’ They stop and we start engaging 
in a conversation and other people with stop and listen too. That doesn’t mean that they’re 
going to rush and buy a $10 light bulb. It’s that it’s entered the consciousness of people that 
there is an economic impact, not necessarily an environmental impact. People are looking 
at this from an economic perspective, and they should be looking at it from an economic 
perspective.” (7E, Manager technical & research Institute, February 24, 2014) 
 
Whilst there is this individual response to energy decision making amongst residents of 
Georgia, an economic perspective in Georgia is the often-uncompromising adherence to low 
cost electricity against all odds, which hinders low carbon development. Furthermore, in the 
absence of a strong environmental belief or ethic, low carbon developments become hard to 
justify because the benefits can be hard to quantify. Normally state regulators, legislature and 
utilities, need to work through and know how to measure the benefits of every energy 
investment, i.e. what is the benefit to the current system and how can these be quantified 
(Fox-Penner, 2014). In Georgia, however, this comes with the need to build upon the current 
mode of energy delivery, not to disrupt it, and to minimise risk and not put upward pressure 
on rates. This reluctance by everyone to incur any additional costs means that most energy 
stakeholders prefer governments, private residents and businesses to make their decisions 
themselves. The final statement by the solar manufacturers emphasises this point: 
“So most people don't want to pay the extra cost for clean energy and it’s just like, you know 
everybody complains about Walmart but you find a lot of people shop for stuff at Walmart, 
not everything but they'll go get something in there, a commodity and if electricity is a 
commodity then why not pay a low cost price as you can, at the end of the day when you’re 
running your electricity in the hot humid South and you need to be here in August to see 
how bad it gets and you'll realise why we treat electricity like we do. You'll see that people 
really do want to buy cheap.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market 
Development, February 20, 2014) 
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A recurring subject across the range of “attitudes” to energy decision making is the specifically 
conservative factor which emerges in the environmental resistance, economic growth and cost 
sections. Those conservative attitudes to electricity decision making have been explored in the 
previous chapter. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to explore the technological, organizational, industrial, societal, 
institutional barriers to renewable energy investment. The chapter however, illustrated a 
serious case of lock-out of distributed energy and alternative energy providers. In essence, the 
lock-out mainly prevented decentralisation, specifically distributed solar generation. It is a lock-
out that holds low cost electricity and the least cost approach to energy decision making as 
paramount. The sources of technological lock-outs, like the technical issues related to grid 
stability, balancing transmission and distribution, which emerge when there is high penetration 
of distributed solar on the grid, are valid but are not the major cause of concern yet, as Georgia 
is not anywhere close to high penetrations of decentralised renewable energy.  
However, the resistant attitude of Georgia’s decision makers to distributed solar and 
renewable energy in general, is much more difficult to overcome, given the technical issues in 
states like California and Hawaii with large sources of renewable energy. The reference to these 
other markets as ‘bleeding edge’ instead of ‘leading edge’, is an indication that Georgia Power 
considers distributed solar energy as high risk. The regulators and Georgia Power also consider 
large amounts of renewable energy to be risky.  
This chapter also showed a powerful institutional lock-out of alternative energy providers exist. 
The combination of the monopoly laws, the restrictions on the distributed solar sizes, the IRP 
process, rate of return regulation and revenue model of incumbent utilities all serve that 
purpose. The close relationship between the regulators, state legislators and the incumbent 
utility, where the utility and regulators share the same values about energy, as well as a 
resistance to environmental goals reinforce the lock-out. It is the decentralisation that comes 
with alternative energy provider, not renewable energy that is explicitly locked-out.  
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A case can be made that as prices for solar and wind continue to drop, renewable energy will 
become part of the least-cost model, required by the Integrated Resource Plan and 
appreciated by decision makers. So, Georgia Power may be able to develop the renewable 
energy and rate-base the asset, similar to the way that it develops other energy resources. 
In regard to solar, although it is evident that alternative energy providers are locked-out of the 
system, it is important to also acknowledge that the entire debate about specific forms of 
financing solar demonstrate that renewable energy is not currently or completely cost ready 
in Georgia. In order words, distributed solar providers may not be at grid parity in Georgia. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the state energy regulators are starting to have debates about 
incorporating renewable energy generation into Georgia’s electricity mix, as well as allowing 
distributed solar energy into the grid and weighing the pros and cons of opening up the grid to 
alternative energy providers, shows that there is a rising challenge to Georgia’s system of 
energy provision. The next chapter explores the story of energy-carbon restructuring 
challenges to Georgia’s electricity generation and supply system. 
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8 THE ADVANCED SOLAR INITIATIVE: A REFLECTION OF ENERGY-CARBON RESTRUCTURING IN 
GEORGIA 
So far, the PhD has explored the main debates and discussions in the case study by focusing on 
three topics including, the utility scale solar development, decentralisation, nuclear energy 
development and federal carbon regulations. The PhD has also explored the idea of lock-in and 
introduced the idea of lock-out. In the following chapter, the focus shifts to Georgia’s advanced 
solar expanded initiative and how the target for solar electricity generation increased from 
425MW to 525MW and how that maps onto a growth in solar generation of electricity in the 
state from 21.4MW in 2012 to 800MW by 2015. The chapter analyses the reasons why the 
increase in solar generation targets and outcomes occurred in the context of conflict between 
pro- and anti-solar groups. This chapter exemplifies the way the factors introduced in chapter 
2, came together during the main solar debate in the case study. 
The pro-solar advocacy interests were members of renewable and energy efficiency businesses 
and associations, consumer advocates, a southern regional organisation and a loose coalition 
of some Atlanta Tea Party Patriots and Sierra Club members. The pro-solar groups were driven 
by decentralisation concerns. These organisations were pushing to open-up Georgia’s 
generation and allow customers a choice in using alternative providers. In formal proceedings, 
five organisations including Georgia Solar Energy Industries Association (GSEIA), Georgia Solar 
Utilities Inc. (GaSU), Georgia Watch, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE) and the Sierra 
Club were listed. However, many other organisations not on the docket still had influence in 
the process in the state. 
The organisations mainly resisting solar were the Georgian utilities including Georgia Power 
and other utilities who owned percentages of energy generation plants, the Georgia Chamber 
of Commerce and initially the Georgia Public Service Commission and some members of the 
Georgia State Legislature. These organisations were not anti-solar per se or anti-renewables 
per se, but were attempting to preserve the existing electricity generation and supply structure 
which locked-out third party distributed energy. 
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8.1 STATE OF THE SOLAR MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES AND GEORGIA BY 2013 
At the end of 2011/2012, renewable energy generation in Georgia was mainly provided 
through hydropower, which made up 1% and 3% of electricity generation capacity in 2012 and 
2013 respectively (Georgia Power Company, 2014a). In 2012, Georgia Power had 
approximately 21.4MW of solar PV capacity. One of the main reasons for the relatively small 
percentage of renewable energy generation was that, at the time, the costs for generation 
from renewable energy were higher than fossil fuel-based electricity generation.  Georgia has 
the lowest costs or very near the lowest costs of electricity in the United States, (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2014a).  
By 2012, solar generation was gaining ground in the US especially in many pro-solar states with 
policies encouraging solar growth including Renewable Energy Portfolios (RPS), net-metering, 
third party financing and generous interconnection limits (Solar Energy Industries Association, 
2012b). The growth was also arguably caused by the introduction of new methods of financing 
solar projects for across the United States. These especially helped the residential sector 
receive benefits in solar power installation because they allowed potential customers to 
reduce the upfront costs of solar installation. Furthermore, third party financing also attracted 
investors aiming to take advantage of federal and state tax benefits (Kollins et al., 2009). These 
pro-solar regulations and subsidies led to significant growth in solar generation (GTM Research 
& Solar Energy Industries Association, 2013) across all solar markets segments (residential, 
non-residential and utility). For example: 
• The United States installed 3.3GW of Photovoltaics, an estimated 76% growth, from 
2011 (GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, 2013). 
• Residential installations of photovoltaic solar were estimated to be 488MW in 2012 
across the U.S., a growth of nearly 62% over 2011 (GTM Research & Solar Energy 
Industries Association, 2013). 
• Non-residential and utility scale installations of photovoltaic solar were estimated to be 
1.04GW and 1.78GW across the U.S., a growth of nearly 26% and 134% respectively, 
over 2011 (GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, 2013). 
• The price of solar in the United States reduced overall due to individual component 
prices reducing from global oversupply. Examples include polysilicon which has been 
the most expensive component in a photovoltaic module. In the U.S. the price for the 
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module at the start of 2012 was estimated at $31.62 and finished at $19.88 by the end 
of 2012 ((GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, 2013) and the single PV 
module started from $0.94 at the beginning of the year but reduced to $0.68 by the 
end in U.S. (GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, 2013). 
• Finally, the five states with the highest photovoltaic installations include California, 
Arizona, New Jersey, Nevada and North Carolina, arguably due to  the high number of 
finished utility-scale, ground-mounted projects and renewable portfolio standards 
(GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, 2013). 
In Georgia, an interviewee who is also a director of an energy efficiency company and acted as 
consultant for the Atlanta Office of Sustainability reflected that solar growth was at the early 
stage of market development in 2013: 
“So the solar market is, it’s a developing market here in Atlanta as well, it really doesn't 
compete, it’s a very, very small portion of generation in the mix and it’s not that it's, so cost 
effectively it's still has a little bit of differential so it’s a little more expensive. I think the 
bigger challenge on the solar side, renewable side for the Atlanta, Georgia market is archaic 
policies.” (4Bi, company president, October 31, 2013). 
 
8.2 THE ADVANCED SOLAR INITIATIVE PROCESS 
In October of 2011, the Georgia Public Service Commissioner Lauren McDonald called for a 
study of renewable energy portfolio standards as means to promote solar development in the 
state (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2011). Lauren McDonald is one of five elected 
Republican Georgia Public Service Commissioners. Commissioner Lauren McDonald is a former 
Georgia state representative and three-time elected Public Service Commissioner. The 
significance is that he is a key actor in Georgia’s electricity decision making and has changed 
his long-standing opinion on renewable energy standards and made a proposal contrary to 
Georgia Power’s and other commissioners’ positions (Henry, 2011). This was influenced by 
evidence of solar generation in other U.S. states especially Arizona.  Justifications for action in 
Georgia included attracting investment to the State of Georgia but also to assist Georgian 
ratepayers with environmental compliance fees currently incurred (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 2011): 
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“Finally, since March of this year, ratepayers have noticed an "environmental compliance" 
fee which can be as much as 6% of their bills. The Commission and the Georgia Power should 
evaluate what, if any, of these charges can be mitigated by increased solar production from 
additional third party Purchase Power Agreements (PPA). This review is in the best interest 
of ratepayers and important information for the Commission” (Lauren McDonald, Georgia 
Public Service Commission, 2011, p. 2). 
And  
“Technology and the market have brought us a remarkable turn of events and one that the 
Commission should explore immediately. Solar prices today give Georgia an outstanding 
opportunity to supplement our fossil and nuclear power sources while creating good jobs 
and immediately assist in Georgia's recovery. Solar also brings significant property value and 
additional enterprise values to Georgia citizens and businesses that are currently not 
available to them through the purchase of electricity” (Lauren McDonald, Georgia Public 
Service Commission, 2011, p. 3). 
However, although the case was made, action was not taken and the reason could be found in 
comments by another commissioner, suggesting that the idea was unpopular and would be 
‘dead on arrival’ (Henry, 2011). The issue moved on in 2012 when a solar developer Georgia 
Solar Utilities Incorporated (GaSu) petitioned the Public Service Commission to be made a solar 
utility. GaSU is a start-up described as a group whose ‘sole purpose is to generate electricity 
through the deployment of solar technologies’ in a fashion that protects ratepayers’ interests 
(Georgia Solar Utilities, 2012). The group’s focus was on the underdeveloped solar market in 
Georgia. The significance is that this group was formed with the intent to operate as a ‘utility’ 
and designed as a copy of Georgia Power’s and guaranteed territorial protection under the law 
(Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012c). They are of interest because this was a formal 
challenge to Georgia Power’s monopoly, selling solely solar electricity directly to customers in 
Georgia. GaSU argued that the petition was a response to Commissioner Lauren McDonald’s 
call for an exploration of renewable energy portfolios and solar development in Georgia 
(Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012d):  
“As part of the Georgia Solar Industry, the Principals of Georgia Solar Utilities (GaSU) 
undertook this investigation. It was found that the problem with solar development in 
Georgia came from the management of Georgia Power” (GPSC, Filing 144119, 2012, p.1). 
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The petition argued that although Georgia Power Company has controlled solar development, 
there was a positive aspect to the lack of solar development because, Georgia’s ratepayers had 
so far been protected from the liability costs associated with early development of solar found 
in countries like Germany (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012c) and GaSU, had learned 
from those examples: 
“We have not made any ‘mistakes’ in our solar development. Ratepayers do not hold any 
liability for the cost of the early solar development. Let us keep that record. GaSU has used 
the wisdom of recent solar history in Germany and other locations to guide our plan” 
(Georgia Public Service Commission, Docket 36286, 144119, p.2). 
 
GaSU pointed to examples of utilities failing, when revenues streams were significantly and 
continually eroded from solar programs. Examples include, Germany’s Feed-in Tariff and 
Power Purchase Agreements (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012c). Finally, the petition 
argued that the due to the Territorial Act, these liabilities have been avoided in Georgia and 
therefore the request by GaSU was to be made a utility with all the legal protections of the 
Territorial Rights Agreement (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012b). During the hearings, 
four organisations including Georgia EMC, Green Power EMC and Georgia Power filed to 
intervene in the hearings (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012a). 
 
The representatives for the EMCs and Georgia Power argued against the petition, citing laws 
and legal opinions relating to electricity generation and supply. They argued that, according to 
the Georgia Supreme Court, the GPSC only had powers granted to it by state legislature and 
law. Since there are no laws that grant the GPSC this authority, granting GaSU the right to 
develop solar energy exclusively or non-exclusively is beyond the jurisdiction of the GPSC. In 
addition, GaSU is currently free to produce solar energy, according to current laws and 
regulations, without the authorization of the GPSC in Georgia. Furthermore, the GPSC cannot 
pick winners and losers in solar energy production market, in this case, picking GaSU as a 
winner. Specifically, the GPSC cannot grant a billion-dollar monopoly on solar energy to GaSU 
and prevent the other utilities and independent power producers in the state the opportunities 
to develop solar energy (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012a). 
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Finally, although GaSU is petitioning to be a solar utility, the company has no infrastructure nor 
plans for infrastructure including, transmission and distribution lines, back-up power, meters, 
staff, electricity dispatch and scheduling, for use in the provision of electricity, obligations that 
are key to utilities. Rather it expects these functions to be provided by the incumbent utilities, 
whilst profiting from solar (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2012a). After three months of 
hearings, the petition to be made a single provider solar utility was not successful. In the final 
decision, the Georgia Public Service Commission passed a motion, supporting the endeavours 
of solar companies in general, to take up the issue with the Georgia Legislature:   
 
“WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, that in recognition of the potential benefits of new solar 
technology to ratepayers, the Commission hereby supports the efforts of solar utilities to 
pursue appropriate legislation in the Georgia General Assembly” (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, Docket 36286, 145077, p.2). 
 
In the 2011-2012 Georgia’s General Assembly legislative session, four Republicans and two 
Democrats of the Georgia State Senate introduced bill SB-401 which sought to amend the “The 
Georgia Cogeneration and Distributed Generation Act of 2001". Little is known about the 
senators, apart from the fact that, of the six sponsors of the bill, the main sponsor was on the 
Senate Regulated Industries and Utilities Committee, one was the Georgia Senate President 
Pro Tem, another was the Georgia Senate Majority leader and finally, one was a consumer 
rights advocate ("The Georgia Cogeneration and Distributed Generation Act of 2001," 2012).  
However, the bill was drafted by a law firm on behalf of leaders in the renewable energy 
business industry (Lee Reece, 2012). The new bill sought to remove barriers to investments in 
alternative energy by proposing the following; removing the caps/limits on projects sizes for 
distributed generation, currently set at 10kW for residential systems and 100kW for 
commercial systems.  
The removal of caps would allow for much larger residential and commercial distributed 
generation projects. It redefined the definition of a distributed generation facility as a facility 
‘provided by or for a customer generator’ for the production of electrical energy ("The Georgia 
Cogeneration and Distributed Generation Act of 2001," 2012). It expanded the eligible 
resources in distributed projects to include biomass, municipal solid waste, landfill gas and 
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hydropower. It clarified that net-metered customers earn a “commercially reasonable rate” on 
their distributed generation systems and finally, it prohibited unreasonable charges to 
distributed generation customers by the utility or other providers. These amendments, it was 
argued, would promote renewable energy investments, especially solar energy by permitting 
any financing and ownership mechanisms available by the market to reduce the upfront costs 
of these residential and commercial distributed energy systems. The proposed senate bill was 
assigned to the Georgia Natural Resources Committee, for a hearing in the General Assembly.  
However, the bill eventually died in the committee when the chairman of the Georgia Natural 
Resources Committee argued that the impacts of the bill needed to be studied further and 
proposed a study committee to “to determine the scope of impact on Georgia families, jobs in 
our state, and economic development opportunities” (Sen. Ross Tolleson, Savannah Business 
Journal, March 5, 2012). Whilst, the proposed ‘SB 401’ bill had died in the Natural Resources 
Committee in late February of 2012, the main sponsor of ‘SB 401’ revived the distributed 
generation push by attaching the provisions of ‘SB 401’ to another bill ‘SB 459’ (a smart meter 
bill) and submitted it to the Regulated Industries and Utilities Committee (Landers, 2012) for 
consideration.  
However, the bill’s sponsor decided to withdraw the amendment to ‘SB 459’ after a realisation 
that the necessary votes were not going to be obtained: 
“Finally, realizing that I don’t have the votes necessary for passage, I decide to withdraw my 
amendment to SB 459 so that the underlying bill dealing with smart meters can continue to 
move forward. The amendment, which was essentially SB 401 dealing with solar power 
purchase agreements, has garnered much attention over the weekend particularly among 
opponents of the bill who have convinced at least four more committee members to oppose 
this piece of legislation. This is a very disappointing setback, to say the least” (Sen. Buddy 
Carter, Effingham Herald, March 5, 2012) 
In September 2012, Georgia Power announced that it had filed a new solar initiative called the 
Georgia Power Advanced Solar Initiative (Georgia Power Company, 2012b) which was 
approved by the Georgia Public Service Commission. The initiative is divided into two 
programs; a) the distributed generation program and (b) utility-scale Request for Proposal 
program. The distributed generation program gives existing residential and commercial 
Georgia Power customers (i.e. homeowners and solar developers) the option to generate 
electricity and sell it back to the grid through solar power purchase programs. The distributed 
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generation program was further divided into small and medium scale programs which sought 
to generate a total of 45MW per year from 2013 through to 2014 and be in operation between 
2015 and 2016 (Georgia Power Company, 2012a). The specific details of the distributed 
program are set out in (Table 8-1): 
Program Goal (MW) Qualification 
Process 
Project Size Timeline 
Distributed 
Generation 
90 MW – 
45 MW 
per year, 
for 2 Years 
Small Scale 
(11MW) 
Application Residential and 
small 
commercial 
projects, sized 
up to 100kW 
The projects 
begin 
commercial 
operation 
between 2015 
and 2016. 
Medium 
Scale 
(34MW) 
Application System capacity 
100kw and 
1MW. 
Participants 
cannot exceed 
approximately 
20% or 90MW 
of program 
capacity per 
year.  
The projects 
begin 
commercial 
operation 
between 2015 
and 2016. 
Utility Scale  120MW 60MW per 
year for 2 
Years 
Request for 
Proposal 
Projects range 
from 1 MW - 
20MW 
The projects 
begin 
commercial 
operation 
between 2015 
and 2016. 
Table 8-1: Advanced Solar Initiative Breakdown 
Source: Georgia Power, 2012 
 
The Georgia Power request for proposals, began in 2013 and continued through 2014. The RFP 
process, employed an independent evaluator (Accion Group). The chosen projects began 
commercial operations between 2015 and 2016. The reasons why the solar initiative was 
introduced are discussed in the next section. A manager of an Atlanta based, technical, 
research, advocacy institute, explained how the contracts work:  
“Okay. So, a lot of the MWs before 2012, most of the installations we’re talking about were 
on top of homes, before 2012. Most of the capacity; however, were installations that were 
on top of commercial buildings which makes sense. Last year, going from 22MW to 100 
MW, the vast majority of that was solar farms. We’re talking about large scale 30MW, 
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20MW, 2, 3MW farms. That’s where Georgia Power’s voluntary solar initiatives kick in. 
Where they’re voluntary buying these megawatts from solar farms with, you know, 
contractual periods I believe are 20 years.” (7E, Manager technical & research Institute, 
February 24, 2014) 
 
Furthermore, this interviewee also admits that Georgia Power had an existing large scale solar 
(LSS) project but it was developed differently and had different agreements to the new ASI 
program. The ‘LSS’ was based on solar farm installations and made use of power purchase 
agreements whilst the ‘ASI’ program was focused on rooftop and ground-mount residential 
and commercial solar installations: 
“They had what was called the Large-Scale Solar Project which originally was 50MW but 
now we understand that it’s 60MW. Then, you’ve got the Georgia Power Advanced Solar 
Initiative, ASI. ASI is ‘x’ amount, of megawatts broken down over three years. Then there’s 
another breakdown of what’s considered distributed generation. So, it’s 1MW or less, 1MW 
or more, then, there is utility scale. The Large-Scale Solar is a separate programme than 
Georgia Power Advanced Solar Initiative. So, LSS is different than ASI. LSS is essentially all 
solar farms whereas ASI is rooftop solar on homes, rooftop solar, or ground-mount solar 
that is-, let me rephrase that. It’s, rooftop or ground-mount but it’s homes. Then it’s, rooftop 
or ground-mount but it’s commercial. Then it’s utility-scale solar farms.” (7E, Manager 
technical & research Institute, February 24, 2014) 
 
In addition, the large scale solar program was the outcome of a request by the GPSC from an 
administrative session in June 2011, that Georgia Power Company propose options that 
expand large scale solar projects (Georgia Power Company, 2014c). Georgia Power then 
proposed a ‘large scale solar’ plan whose goal was to add 50MW of solar generation capacity. 
Georgia Power would purchase 50MW by signing power purchase agreements with the solar 
project developers (Georgia Power Company, 2014c). In December 2011, Georgia Power 
signed two contracts of 30MW and 19MW of solar energy and in October 2012 Georgia Power 
signed a contract of 1MW (Georgia Power Company, 2014c). The ASI had a different rationale. 
In a formal document, Georgia Power stated: 
“We will continue to build on our record of maintaining one of the nation’s safest, most 
reliable, and innovative electric systems at rates below the national average. To continue 
that tradition Georgia Power is pleased to propose the Georgia Power Advanced Solar 
Initiative (“GPASI”), a solar energy purchase program that will encourage new opportunities 
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for solar development in our state. This program will dramatically spur the growth of solar 
generation in Georgia, and propel us to the forefront of this clean, safe energy technology” 
(Georgia Power Company’s Advanced Solar Initiative, 2012, Docket No. 36325, p.1). 
Nevertheless, solar advocates believe that the creation of the Advanced Solar Initiative (ASI) 
was a response to the growing pressure to facilitate distributed renewable generation. This 
was confirmed by an interviewee, who was an academic consultant for the Atlanta City 
government sustainability plan: 
“So, the official version is different from the real version. In the official version, Georgia 
Power recognised a demand and got together with the Georgia solar energy associations 
and some of the non-profits that lobby on this issue and came forward with this proposal, 
which was accepted by all parties and everyone smiled and had a nice photo op. The 
background was really that the State legislature was pushing forward some fairly new, 
aggressive legislation and it was going, because the last state law that was put in place was 
in 2001; it had some pretty restrictive measures that said that you couldn’t have distributed 
generation in total, so, like all renewables and combined heat and power and just like 
personally owned generators, whatever. They couldn’t exceed 0.2% of summer peak 
demand. So, if you wanted to, summer peak demand is like 16GW in the state and so you 
couldn’t have more than 320MW deployed, which is pretty, pretty restrictive. So, they were 
a couple legislators that were bringing some new language to change those laws that 
Georgia power was opposed to and this was a, and the lobbyists and the non-profits kind of 
got together behind the scenes and accepted this as a temporary deal to go forward that if 
Georgia Power did the 210MW they would stop pushing this bill. So, that was issued and 
that’s what’s called the advanced solar initiative.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, 
October 29, 2013).  
 
The comment suggests that there had been pressure building from a few legislators, non-
profits and representatives for the renewable energy industry and on occasion, a public service 
commissioner. It also shows a shift in the opinions of some state legislators on distributed 
energy, whereby the past severe restrictions on distributed energy were being challenged. The 
outcome was pressure that Georgia Power had to accept some form of energy-carbon 
restructuring. Finally, the comment highlights some of the internal politics involved in 
electricity decision making and energy-carbon restructuring like the negotiations and deals 
that had to be undertaken to get the Advanced Solar Initiative created.  
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Overall, Georgia Power has been extremely resistant and hesitant towards the idea of 
renewable energy, specifically solar and wind, as evidenced by the lack of and non- committal 
renewable plans in the integrated resource plans from 2007 to 2010. The only renewable 
energy Georgia Power had any vague plans for was biomass.  
 
Nevertheless, the section shows past attempts at energy-carbon restructuring by the PSC; 
where moderate forms of restructuring including exploring renewable energy development 
projects have been suggested. Concurrently, there has been pressure on the PSC and state 
legislature from renewable energy businesses to introduce forms of decentralisation and to 
balance multiple interests in electricity generation and supply. 
8.3 CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 2012 
In 2012, before the IRP debate, three corporate and commercial organisations incorporated 
low carbon restructuring into their manufacturing and business process. They included, IKEA, 
Walmart and Coca-Cola. In July 2012, IKEA Atlanta installed a 1.03MW solar generation system 
consisting of 4,326 panels,  and a distribution centre in Savannah Georgia installed a 1.46MW 
system (Cunningham, 2012). The organisation is thinking of expanding its solar projects to 
other parts of Georgia. The move is seen as part of the company’s sustainability commitment 
to become energy and resource independent by 2020, with 16 similar solar projects coming 
online across the United States (IKEA Group, 2012). 
Walmart and Sam’s East (Walmart subsidiary), a commercial retailer, had corporate renewable 
energy targets as part of corporate social responsibility. By 2007 Walmart reported that it was 
involved with 335 renewable energy projects worldwide (Walmart, 2007). Walmart also 
testified in a docket on demand side management that it was scaling up its renewable energy 
electricity purchases and production and energy efficiency: 
“First, Walmart will scale renewable and drive the production or procurement of 7billion 
kWh of renewable energy globally by December 31, 2020 – an increase of over 600% versus 
2010. Second, Walmart will accelerate energy efficiency.  By December 31, 2020, our goal 
is to reduce the kWh/sq. ft. energy intensity required to power our buildings around the 
world by 20% versus 2010.” (Testimony on behalf of Walmart, Docket 36499, 2013, p. 3). 
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A plan which the Georgia commissioners and the utilities were aware of (Solar Energy USA, 
2013b).  
Georgia Power is not the only utility to be made aware of this plan. In North Carolina, the 
investor-owned utility, Duke Energy has been challenged by Walmart’s plan: 
“They’re telling people like Duke Energy, ‘We’re going to put these panels on our roof and 
that’s that.’ I think for a few years ago, Duke Energy was telling big box stores like Walmart, 
‘Well yes you’re going to put panels on your roof but we have to own them.’ ‘Are you out 
of your mind, if we put them on ours they’re mine, you can forget that idea’.” (4Ai, Business 
developer, February 19, 2014). 
 
Finally, the Coca-Cola company installed a 6.5MW combined heat and power plant at one of 
its syrup plants in Georgia (Environmental Protection Agency, 2012a) and has reduced its 
electricity and manufacturing costs. For Coca-Cola, if an investment is good for the 
environment and improves the earnings, then it is undertaken: 
“We are concerned because we know we make an impact and we want to do the right thing. 
In some cases, we look for, as often as we can, we look for where green equals green; where 
improving the impact on the environment also improves our bottom line. So, there is 
business, there is bottom line business, you know triple bottom line kind of stuff reasons 
that we do that for and its risk mitigation, it builds trust in our brand.” (4Aii, Program 
Manager, Coca-Cola, February 27, 2014) 
 
In addition, the strategy by Coca-Cola is to circumvent any utility green power purchases, by 
investing directly in the technology and retiring the full benefits: 
“We don’t buy green power right, any more than is embedded in the grid like if there’s some 
standard green in the grid, then we would be purchasing it automatically but we don’t go 
out there and specifically buy blocks of green power or buy wind power, we don’t but RECS 
at least. We typically don’t, especially North America, we would rather do the project on 
our own facility and retire the benefits. We do get our carbon footprint reduction compared 
to just getting it off the grid and it just so happens that our arrangement saves us money. 
So, we get it both, we get a win-win, that’s what I meant, green equals green.” (4Aii, 
Program Manager, Coca-Cola, February 27, 2014). 
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It is uncertain what the impacts of a growth in these projects which improve these companies’ 
energy efficiency, carbon reduction, and economic competitiveness has on utilities. These 
corporate and commercial interests were not part of the solar IRP debates but these external 
developments may have played in role in the commission’s approval of solar. Nevertheless, the 
comments above suggest that decision makers and the Georgia Power are aware and 
monitoring these recent low carbon developments made by corporate and commercial 
interests.  
8.4 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN EXPANDED SOLAR INITIATIVE 
In January 2010, the Georgia Power Company filed its seventh Integrated Resource Plan as 
required under the Integrated Resource Planning Act (O.C.G.A., 1981). The plan referenced 
pursuing cost-effective renewable energy projects including solar projects and demonstration 
projects undertaken by independent power producers, not exceeding 2.5MW of capacity.  The 
plan did not have any solar or wind projects incorporated into the 2010 Integrated plan. 
Nevertheless, there was a project to convert a unit of one of its coal-fired power plants 
(155MW, Plant Mitchell) to a 96MW biomass plant (Georgia Power Company, 2010). The 
project was suspended because it was dependent on Environmental Protection Agency policy. 
Georgia Power evaluated that it would not be cost effective based on a forthcoming EPA 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards Rule (MATS rule) and changed market conditions like low 
natural gas prices (Georgia Power Company, 2014d). This meant that the project would not be 
cost effective when costs of complying with the regulation, low natural gas prices and other 
capital costs were considered. 
In November 2012, the Georgia Power Company’s eighth Integrated Resource Plans did not 
contain any new solar energy development aside from the 210MW that had been ordered 
under the Advanced Solar Initiative (ASI).  
However, about five organisations filed separate petitions to intervene in the hearings at the 
Commission, immediately the Company filed its plans. The petitioners included Georgia Solar 
Energy Industries Association (GSEIA), Georgia Solar Utilities Inc. (GaSU), Georgia Watch, 
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE) and the Sierra Club. These were filed as separate 
interventions, not filed as coalitions. For example, the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy 
(SACE) filed the petition as, ‘Application of SACE for Leave to Intervene’, whilst a joint petition 
would be presented as, ‘Application of Sierra Club and Coosa River Basin Initiative for Leave to 
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Intervene’. This began an eight-month long process of official testimonies, exhibits and data 
requests and rebuttal testimonies from all organisations that had filed to intervene including 
Georgia Power Company, before the commissioners at the Public Service Commission in 
Atlanta. As part of the process, the PSC staff requested ‘data’ from Georgia Power ("Georgia 
Power Company 2013 IRP Filing," 2013). 
Over the eight months, a total of twenty data requests were made ("Georgia Power Company 
2013 IRP Filing," 2013). Examples of the data requested included information on generation 
and supply performed modelling studies, environmental compliance analyses, operation and 
maintenance expenses for plants/units, load forecasts, fuel forecasts and programs/projects 
("Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP Filing," 2013). Georgia Power presented the first 
testimony in March 2013 and over the following eight months, the intervening organisations 
presented their testimonies and exhibits ("Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP Filing," 2013). 
Georgia Power had no new solar energy planned in its IRP (Georgia Power Company, 2013). In 
testimony a representative confirmed that after the recent ‘ASI’, the company had no new 
plans till to develop new solar energy: 
“With the introduction of the GPASI, the total amount of solar energy under contract by 
Georgia Power is expected to be more than 270 MW by the end of 2014.  In addition to 
procuring cost-effective renewable resources, Georgia Power also supports research and 
demonstration of renewable and emerging technologies. In all of these efforts, the 
Company seeks to responsibly expand the fuel diversity of our supply mix through our 
commitment to renewable generation. Notably, Georgia Power is one of the national 
leaders among utilities operating in states in which there is no mandate for solar 
procurement” (In re: Georgia Power Company’s Application for Approval of Its 2013 
Integrated Resource Plan, 2013, p. 28). 
Consequently, the intervenors, GSEIA, GaSU and SACE, provided testimony at the Public 
Service Commission, each arguing that the IRP was inadequate due to its plans for no new solar 
capacity and that the commission should require Georgia Power to add additional solar energy 
into its IRP ("In Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan," 2013). GaSU 
argued that, Georgia Power’s IRP containing no solar, is due to its inflexible views regarding 
solar energy which do not allow the company to design solar projects to take advantage of the 
positive changes in solar energy, resulting in missed opportunities to reduce rates and hurt the 
ratepayer ("In Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan," 2013): 
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“Second, our state and Georgia Power’s customers are paying a high price for the 
Company’s lack of competence in adapting to solar energy. After so many years of telling 
everyone it’s “too cloudy for solar in Georgia,” Georgia Power has become functionally blind 
to the dramatic economic changes that are transforming the solar industry and energy 
generation forever. Huge price drops have made solar cheaper in many instances than 
Georgia Power’s current resources, but the Company’s inflexible view of the world prevents 
it from building solar into its economic modelling. That blindness has already resulted in 
missed opportunities for Georgia Power to bring downward pressure on rates by investing 
in solar projects that deliver low-cost energy for decades without fuel costs or regulatory 
compliance risks associated with other types of generation” (GaSU Testimony, 2013 In Re: 
IRP 2013, p.4). 
 
Therefore, GaSU requested that the PSC approve 500MW of new solar capacity to be added to 
the IRP, to be developed by GaSU, because an additional 500MW of solar energy would still 
represent less than 1.5% of the company’s total load ("In Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 
Integrated Resource Plan," 2013). SACE argued that Georgia Power lack of commitment to 
renewable energy had not allowed the company to produce an electricity forecast plan which 
lowered costs, lowered risks, increased flexibility, reliability and was cleaner ("In Re: Georgia 
Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan," 2013): 
 
“A stronger commitment to energy efficiency and renewable resources will result in a plan 
that is: Lower cost, resulting in $2.4 billion in potential system savings; lower risk, enhancing 
the use of zero-fuel resources; more flexible, increasing reliance on resources that can be 
developed incrementally and adjusted in response to market conditions and opportunities; 
cleaner, offering a lower-cost path to environmental performance; and more reliable, 
maintaining or extending the existing reserve margin” (Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, 
IRP Testimony, 2013, p. 6). 
SACE emphasized that renewable energy including solar is not considered in GPC’s models, 
therefore solar is not analysed in GPC’s financial models: 
“Solar power costs are rapidly declining, and the Company’s Advanced Solar Initiative is 
evidence that the Company now appreciates the value and potential of this rapidly-
developing technology. Solar energy offers tremendous value to Georgia Power customers. 
At today’s prices, and especially as the Georgia solar installation market matures over the 
next several years, Georgia Power should be able to acquire additional cost-effective solar 
resources for its customers. However, the Company did not analyze solar in its IRP financial 
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models and did not adequately consider solar along with traditional resource options in the 
IRP” (Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, IRP Testimony, 2013, p. 9). 
 
Therefore, SACE recommended that GPC add 2000MW of additional solar energy into its 
portfolio, given current solar energy costs ("In Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated 
Resource Plan," 2013).  
Finally, GSEIA’s testimony focused on the distributed solar generation, arguing that GPC’s plan 
was ‘headed in the wrong direction, because the company delayed the development of 
distributed solar generation ("In Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource 
Plan," 2013) and that valuation techniques for distributed solar generation had improved 
significantly to the degree that electricity decision makers and utilities can make better 
decisions about the value of distributed generation to the utility and rate payers ("In 
Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan," 2013) and distributed solar 
generation also reduced the risks to both the utility and the ratepayer whilst providing 
maximum value to the grid: 
“Distributed solar installation by the Company’s customers and through third party 
contracts substantially reduces costs and risks to the utility and its ratepayers. The customer 
or third party assumes responsibility for financing, maintenance, and insurance 
requirements. With this kind of solar development, the utility obtains energy generation at 
or near the point of consumption, maximizing the value of solar to the system” (Georgia 
Solar Energy Industries Association, IRP Testimony, 2013, p. 23). 
Therefore, GSEIA requested that the Commission, direct GPC to implement distributed solar 
initiatives to its IRP:  
“The market price and experience indicated that the cost of solar in Georgia to the Company 
is already below the value the Company received from solar deployment. Between the 
implementation of the Company’s Advanced Solar Initiative (“ASI”) and the expansion that 
I recommend, the Company can identify and benefit from the true resource potential for 
distributed solar by purchasing electricity from distributed solar resources at a price well 
below its solar value” (Georgia Solar Energy Industries Association, IRP Testimony, 2013, p. 
6). 
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In Georgia Power’s rebuttal, the company repeated its position on renewable energy, which 
was that the company would continue to pursue, develop and acquire, cost-effective 
renewable energy in a ‘responsible manner’ and maintained system reliability ("In Re: Georgia 
Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan," 2013): 
“The Company continues to pursue cost-effective renewable resources in collaboration with 
the Commission and remains open to future opportunities to add more renewable 
resources to the Company’s portfolio, as has been demonstrated by numerous new ground-
breaking programs and acquisitions since the 2010 IRP.  The development of new renewable 
resources must continue to be done in a responsible manner that optimizes the benefits of 
such resources and provides customers with the lowest cost in procuring them. The 
Company’s actions to date have provided for significant increases in the amount of biomass, 
wind and solar resources contracted to serve customers. The Company will continue to look 
for cost effective ways to continue the expansion of renewable resources in Georgia” 
(Rebuttal Testimony in Support of Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource 
Plan, p. 4). 
 
GPC used its recent wind purchase (250MW) from a developer in Oklahoma as an example of 
cost-effective renewable energy ("In Re: Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource 
Plan," 2013). In response to GaSU’s testimony, Georgia Power stressed that GaSU’s main 
motivation is to be granted a monopoly to develop solar in Georgia and avoid competition: 
However, the “plan” put forward by Georgia Solar Utilities (“GaSU”) should be rejected by 
the Commission. GaSU has provided no substantive details or analysis for this Commission 
to evaluate or consider. The only thing that is clear is that GaSU would prefer to bypass the 
competitive bidding process that is a staple of the Company’s procurement practices and 
simply be granted an exclusive right to develop solar but has provided no legal, policy or 
economic justification for such an extraordinary step. In addition, GaSU’s testimony makes 
clear that they do not desire to serve customers and that there is nothing novel regarding 
their ability or approach to solar development that should afford them any special 
consideration by the Commission” (Rebuttal Testimony in Support of Georgia Power 
Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan, p. 4).   
 
In addition, Georgia Power perceived GaSU’s proposals for solar development as unoriginal, 
non-viable and not in the best interests of the ratepayers: 
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“GaSU’s proposal, to the extent it can be deciphered from Mr. Green’s testimony, is neither 
new nor innovative. Mr. Green seems to offer different things at different times. Sometimes 
it seems he is offering Georgia Power ownership of the asset, at other times Georgia Power 
is leasing the asset for nearly its entire life, and at still other times, a PPA for a collection of 
sources which he has aggregated together. None of those financial structures are new or 
innovative in general or in the energy and utility space.  Nor is the idea of financing an asset 
with 100% debt or with public bonds innovative or new in any way” (Rebuttal Testimony in 
Support of Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan, p. 36). 
 
Finally given GaSU’s initial request to enter into contract to develop new solar resources, 
Georgia Power argued that the commission lacked authority to order the company to contract 
with another business entity in any form (Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP Filing, 2012). 
Similar responses were made by Georgia Power regarding the proposals forward by SACE. 
Georgia Power perceived the request for 2000MW of additional solar capacity as unnecessary, 
because the company had no need for the extra capacity and would raise rates:   
“As acknowledged by SACE witness John Wilson, the plan put forward by SACE is not “a plan 
that Georgia Power could begin executing” and was not designed around viable program 
concepts. There is simply no need or justification for the Company to commit to an arbitrary 
amount of additional MW of solar generation at this point in time, particularly because, as 
Mr. Wilson acknowledges, the Company currently has no capacity need and SACE’s 
proposed solar portfolio would put upward pressure on rates through 2023” (Rebuttal 
Testimony in Support of Georgia Power Company’s 2013 Integrated Resource Plan, p. 37). 
According to one interviewee, an academic consultant, some of Georgia Power’s claims of the 
impacts of additional solar into the IRP were repudiated by the commissioners at the end of 
the hearing: 
“Very recently like this past summer, things were coming around again and there had been 
a proposal put forward to do 525 more MW of Solar. That one came from the solar 
advocates and was presented to the commission actually, so this was in the other body and 
Georgia Power was pushing back, their lawyers were pushing back at the commission. And 
so eventually one of the commissioners just stopped and asked a series of questions: "Will 
these increase rates? No!", "Okay, well you'd claimed that would happen before but it’s 
been, the lawyers had to say: "we were wrong before, this will not increase rates" And they 
went down a series of 4 or 5 claims that had been previously pushed by the utility that the 
commissioner just asked them bluntly: "Is this true?", "No". "Okay". Well then the 
commission voted to actually make the 525 come online.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, 
Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013). 
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Another interviewee who was a member and director of a consumer advocacy group in Georgia 
explains in the comment below that the “pressure on rates” argument was important for solar 
development in the state but more so for the competitive bidding process in solar 
development: 
“So there's likely to be another round of hearings we think in the second quarter of the year, 
that would begin to look at what is the true value of solar and you know as they've just 
announced the RFP for the 525, 425 of the utility scale of the 525MW plus the 70MW from 
the ASI from last year they're the RFP and that would help us find out if the cost of solar, 
they've said they can’t, that these solar contracts can’t put upward pressure on rates, so 
they have to be able to demonstrate they have to be able to get bids for solar that are per 
kwh at or below what is currently the cost of kwh for electricity in Georgia. Well, well you 
know, we will, it'll end up showing that it most certainly has, so that would be happening in 
the coming, in the months ahead.” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 
2014) 
In July 2013, the Georgia Public Service Commission voted 3-2 in favour of expanding the 
Advanced Solar Initiative (ASI) to include 525MW of further solar energy development (Georgia 
Public Service Commission, 2013b): 
“So, I think this is a, this is a much friendlier system for everyone involved, we just completed 
this and it was at the end of this process, that commissioner McDonald moved to add 
525MW of solar, it wasn’t in the original proposal, he moved, commissioner Everett 
seconded the motion and I was the third vote and just in a matter of seconds, we changed 
energy policy for the state of Georgia” (Commissioner Echols, Clean Energy Summit, Atlanta, 
October 17, 2013). 
 
However, the expanded initiative was opened to a competitive bidding process rather than 
being allocated directly to Georgia Solar Utilities Inc. This program is felt to be the largest 
voluntary development for solar energy from an investor-owned utility in the U.S. The next two 
sections will describe in detail the groups that campaigned for and against solar energy within 
Georgia, including those that were not involved in the IRP docket. 
 
 
Page 261 of 311 
 
8.5 LOW CARBON ADVOCATES AND SOLAR GENERATION IN GEORGIA 
This section analyses the process of campaigning for solar generation within Georgia prior to 
the end of the field research. The research showed that solar advocates were a loosely grouped 
coalition of interests. However, each organisation filed a separate petition to intervene in the 
energy decision making process, which stipulated that members had to present their own 
interest and could not be adequately represented by other parties in the proceedings. The pro-
solar advocacy interests were a broad grouping of interests. The key members are set out in 
Table 8-2 below. This is not an exhaustive list of participants but these groups were 
continuously referenced in the interviews and gave testimonies at the public service 
commission hearings for the IRP docket ("Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP Filing," 2013).  
As the table suggests, the pro-solar interests were not just individuals but were fronted by 
wider advocacy, consumer and industry groups. These organisations represented numerous 
individuals whose concerns were of different aspects of energy decision making. In addition, 
these organisations collectively represented both clean energy and non-clean energy interests, 
making the overall reach of the low carbon advocates wide and with significant impact. An 
interviewee from a consumer advocacy group confirmed the range and diversity of interests 
in the groups pushing for solar at the hearings: 
“The southern alliance for clean energy and their legal team, the southern environmental 
law centre was also intervening, so were big industry groups, you know manufacturers, 
retailers, the solar power industry there were roughly a dozen different organisations 
intervening.” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 2014).
Page 262 of 311 
 
Summary table of relevant advocacy groups 
Organisation SACE SEIA Georgia Solar Utilities Georgia Watch Sierra Club Atlanta Tea Party Patriots 
Category Clean Energy Non-Profit 
/ Government 
non-profit trade 
association 
Solar developer Consumer advocacy and 
non-profit 
Environmental Advocacy 
and non-profit 
organisation 
Political Organisation and 
grassroots movement. 
About Founded in the 1985 and 
is a non-profit, non-
partisan energy watch 
dog group. 
Established in 1974 as a 
national association 
which represents solar 
companies. 
Founded in 2012 Founded in 2002 as a 
state based organisation 
in Georgia. 
Founded by 182 
members on the 28th of 
May 1892. 
The current tea party was 
formed in 2009 
Role Do not have a direct role 
in energy policy but 
focus on advocating for 
policy change in energy 
and environmental 
legislation across the 
federal, state and local 
governing sphere. Clean 
Energy and 
environmental policy is 
especially lacking in the 
south and the region is a 
major emitter of carbon. 
Georgia chapter of SEIA 
represents between 142 
and 146 solar companies 
Atlanta based solar 
company currently 
trying to become a solar 
alternative to Georgia 
Power. 
Lobbying, Utilities 
Installation, 
Environmental Policy, 
Natural Resource Policy 
Advocates for citizens on 
some of the following 
issues: energy and 
utility, healthcare, fraud, 
etc. In terms of energy 
the organisation also 
develops consumer 
friendly policies, 
educates residents and 
hosting consumer 
workshops. 
Its mission includes 
preserving wild spaces, 
public education about 
natural environments 
and promoting 
environmental friendly 
behaviours. It is the 
largest and most 
influential 
environmental 
organisation in the 
United States and has 
since its inception 
founded many local 
chapters 
They do not have a direct 
role in energy policy 
decision-making because 
they are not part of the 
groups involved in the 
current mode of energy 
provision. 
Importance Their approach to 
pertinent issues through 
the frame of energy 
independence, security 
and job growth, makes a 
stronger position when 
advocating for changing 
policies in the south. 
The association backs 
solar energy at all two 
levels of government 
namely: Federal and 
state. 
Solar Utilities innovative 
business structure 
focuses on both Georgia 
ratepayer interests and 
prevents state-wide 
solar opportunities from 
being extracted and sent 
out of state. 
 It lobbies for more 
environmental friendly 
legislation and it also 
lobbies to protect 
environmental 
legislation already in 
place like the clean air 
act. 
The tea party platform 
focuses on issues around: 
Limited government, 
individual freedom, 
reduced taxes for 
individuals, businesses and 
reduced government 
spending. 
Table 8-2: shows the groups that were listed as relevant to the solar debate 
Source: Georgia Public service commission final order docket.
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a. Advocate Groups and Relationships 
Many of the advocacy groups in the pro-solar group like SACE, SEIA and Sierra club were 
national and regional organisations which had local chapters and brought wider resources such 
as knowledge and, an understanding of solar policies and wider lessons. The Georgia Solar 
Energy Association (GA Solar) and Georgia Solar Energy Industries Association (GSEIA) host 
events in Atlanta including solar summits, conferences, networking meetings and luncheons, 
to discuss relevant policy issues related to solar in Georgia like dockets or legislation to follow 
and how to increase renewable energy generation in Georgia. These are attended by industry 
professionals, lawmakers, activists, etc.  
What united the business-led organisations like SEIA, Georgia Solar utilities, Walmart and the 
other industrial groups were the potential economic and reputational benefits of solar 
investment. Companies responsible for installation (i.e. manufacturers, developers, financers 
and potentially construction firms) had a direct interest in opening-up business around solar 
generation. GA Solar and GSEIA are the trade associations for the growth and expansion of the 
solar market within the United States, and conduct research and gather data to empower local 
governing bodies to develop more solar energy in states like Georgia. These associations focus 
more on the business aspect of growing solar, whilst the focus of the Sierra Club was primarily 
environmental aspect of growing solar. 
 
b. The Atlanta Tea Party Patriots Involvement 
One of the curious aspects of the loose coalition was the combination of organisations which 
might be expected to have different perspectives on the politics of renewable energy. For 
example, Sierra Club environment-led and business-led groups. Moreover, the group had 
strong involvement from Atlanta Tea Party Patriots. The Atlanta Tea Party Patriots were 
different from the other groups in many respects. The Tea Party is a conservative grassroots 
movement and the group operates on a core principle of individual freedom and economic 
freedom and limited government. The party believes in individual freedoms and rights as are 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights (Tea Party Patriots, 2015). It adheres 
strictly to conservative views on limited government, believing that individuals should retain 
the rights and freedom to pursue their dreams to the extent that they don't harm or infringe 
on others rights.  
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The Tea Party promotes individual freedom and limited government on multiple issues 
including healthcare, tax, immigration, federal regulation, etc. (Tea Party Patriots, 2015). The 
Tea Party Patriots is a collection of individual Tea Party Patriot grassroots activist groups, the 
Atlanta Tea Party Patriots, was the group involved in these solar debates. However, there were 
leaders from another Tea Party group, the Georgia Tea Party Inc. who opposed the expanded 
solar initiative (Rehm, 2013c). The spokesperson of the group was the co-founder of the Tea 
Party and the national coordinator of the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots. The national coordinator 
of the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots explained that the interest in energy policy started in 2009 
when the Georgia Public Service Commission granted Georgia Power Company the ability to 
pre-charge consumers for the two new nuclear reactors being built: 
 
“I am actually, my background is, actually I’ve been politically active, I am a conservative, I 
am one of the national founders of the Tea Party movement, I, you know for me, it has 
always been policy over party and I began to, you know, I was very upset at Georgia Power, 
a utility in Georgia, over the fact, that they were pre-billing customers, for a nuclear plant, 
nuclear reactors, that may never be brought online. Yes, and the fact that they have all this 
power and clout and I was investigating them and I realised, okay, solar provides, can 
provide, competition and choice and I began to advocate for solar as a means of free market 
choice, individual freedom and energy freedom. So, I’ve been active, I’m active nationwide 
and I’ve been active ever since.” (15D, Tea Party activist, October 5, 2016) 
 
As shown in the statement above, this policy sparked an interest in the state’s energy policy 
but also in the role of the state’s investor-owned utility (Cottle, 2013; Greentech Media, 2015; 
Kormann, 2015). This interest prompted the Tea Party coordinator to undertake further 
research into energy sources that empowered consumers, resulting in decentralised energy as 
a goal, but more so solar energy and the ability to install solar panels on their roofs become 
attractive. Since the Tea Party is about individual freedoms and limited government 
intervention, distributed solar generation presents the opportunity to be free from the 
monopoly utilities, who might impede the freedoms to choose electricity providers, produce 
or even sell electricity. Since Georgia currently has restrictive laws around individuals and 
businesses buying solar panels and selling solar energy in a manner that resulted in a lack of 
competition for Georgia Power, the Tea Party Patriots involved in the solar energy push, 
perceived Georgia Power as a limiter in consumer energy choice and energy freedom. 
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An alliance in Georgia called the Green Tea Coalition was formed by the Atlanta Tea Party 
Patriots and Sierra Club. The Coalition was officially formed in August 2013 when some 
members of the Georgia chapter of the Sierra Club approached members of the Atlanta Tea 
Party Patriots who were disgruntled with Georgia’s restrictive laws regarding buying, owning 
and operating distributed solar generation (Martin, 2013). The two groups have very little in 
common ideologically, especially with regards to their missions and values (Table 8-2) but in the 
solar energy debate found common ground in their support for solar energy: 
“It’s not a formal coalition, as the name would suggest, it’s we partner on issues as they suit 
our mutual interests.  If it works for both of us, we’ll partner together, but there’s a lot of 
ground that we don’t agree on” (6E 7G, Sierra Club, Georgia Chapter Organiser, February 
26, 2014). 
 
A key part in the lead-up to the Tea Party Patriots involvement with the Sierra Club, was that 
energy became tied up within the wider political ideology of the Tea Party Patriots. A Georgia 
Institute of Technology academic consultant describes this trigger for Tea Party involvement in 
the statement below: 
“Because they had a fairly influential conservative backer who was trying to do a big solar 
installation on a school and was ceased and desist by Georgia Power under their rights, 
under the territorial act and that’s what really got the tea party incensed and then they 
realised they had these natural advocates, these allies over here that have already pushing 
some of this stuff and so they kind of made for interesting bed fellows that they would be 
able to work together on this, on this one thing so that’s what really combined forces there 
between the far right and the environmental left.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, 
October 29, 2013). 
 
The research showed that the Atlanta Tea Party patriots were important to the solar debate in 
many ways, not least because they are important electorally in states like Georgia. The Atlanta 
Tea Party Patriots are an important electoral constituency because they are a conservative 
political group with influence in a state where the majority of the decision-makers are 
conservative from the judicial branch to the legislative branch (Georgia Secretary of State, 
2014): 
“And then finally, let me say, just what’s happened politically within the community that’s 
been a game changer; I don’t know, how you feel about the Tea Party or Debbie Dooley but 
let me tell you, her involvement in the last IRP with solar and this group support of solar, 
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was very important because, we’ve got certain constituency represented here, but when 
you add her constituency to that, you are getting close to a majority and that has really been 
helpful and we’ll see if Debbie and Sierra Club can continue to dance together, if they have 
a lot of things they disagree on, so we’ll see how they do, but this is a really, a pretty amazing 
political dynamic that is happening in our state and I don’t want to underestimate that.” 
(Commissioner Echols, Clean Energy Summit, Atlanta, October 17, 2013). 
 
All five of the Georgia public service commissioners are Republicans with known ties to the Tea 
Party (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2014c). The Atlanta Tea Party Patriot’s commitment 
to individual liberty was expressed as follows by a Public Service Commissioner: 
“I don’t think they are thinking of climate change, I think they are thinking in terms of energy 
independence, the Tea Party is all about Liberty and Independence and freedom from the 
Federal government and Freedom from institutions, so I really think the Tea Party sees Solar 
as a way to be Independent right! that if I want, I can put enough Solar and be completely 
off the grid.” (2Bi, Georgia Public Service Commissioner, October 21, 2013).   
 
The consolidation of these dissimilar groups to advocate for solar, highlight how different 
interests can find gains to be made by low carbon intervention and unite around a common 
goal. The Green Tea coalition is a stand out example of this. The involvement of the Tea Party 
Patriots by the Sierra Club to this solar debate opened a new opportunity politically to advocate 
for low carbon. Since Georgia does not have a strong environmental ethic and is resistant to 
environmental goals (7.2d) the involvement of the Tea Party Patriots allowed for a different 
point of view to be used in the argument for solar, one of individual and economic freedom 
and to be made by a politically important constituency. 
c. Advocates Activities 
This section discusses the activities of the organisations involved in the lobbying for solar 
including what actions they took and events held. Though the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots were 
not listed on the IRP docket, the Atlanta Tea Party coordinator testified as a public witness 
during the hearings at the Public Service Commission ("Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP 
Filing," 2013). A state legislator testified on behalf of his constituents, explaining that since the 
Public Service Commission had approved a specific coal plant for retirement, his county would 
suffer a loss of nearly $15 to 20 million of tax revenue and therefore urged the commission to 
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work with Georgia Power to use that land for solar ("Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP Filing," 
2013).  
Solar town hall meetings were held across Georgia and they ranged in size. In some cases, 
these meetings were attended by most stakeholders including commissioners, politicians, 
representatives of solar manufacturers, solar associations, Sierra Club, Atlanta Tea Party 
Patriots and residents (Solar Energy USA, 2013a). Meetings were held amongst interested 
parties including SACE and the Sierra Club, who often invited the commissioners to these 
events: 
“We have coalition meetings I guess if you will at SACE and Sierra Club, Southeast Climate 
and Energy you know, various groups participate in. These are coalitions of, you know we 
have different, like we are a consumer advocacy organisation, they are an environmental 
organisation but when we have reasons to for example we worked with sierra club to hold 
town meetings about the rate case around the state. The commissioners came to that, 
people came to that so, yeah.” (6E 14A, Director consumer advocacy group, January 9, 
2014) 
 
A pro-solar rally took place on the day of the PSC decision on the addition of solar which 
included Sierra Club, Georgia Solar Utilities, and Atlanta Tea Party Patriots (Southern Clean 
Energy Alliance, 2013). Phone calls to state officials in support of the motion (were made by 
parties with an interest (Tatum, 2013). The Sierra Club and the Public Service Commission also 
hosted town hall meetings attended by residents, a format which presented the opportunity 
for residents to engage with the commissioners on the subject of the IRP (Savannah Morning 
News, 2013). 
“So, we did a lot of work with the commissioners.  We held town hall meetings across the 
state of Georgia, and we invited them to come, and many of the commissioners did attend, 
where we gave citizens, everyday folks in Georgia to tell commissioners what they wanted 
Georgia’s energy future to look like, Georgia Power’s energy future to look like.  Over and 
over again, every single town hall, people said, ‘Georgia Power needs to be adopting solar, 
they need to be adopting energy efficiency, and cheap Mid-West wind in to their energy 
portfolio,’ and the commissioners heard it.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter Organiser, February 
26, 2014) 
 
Finally, in Atlanta, a former director of Georgia Solar Energy Association gave a TedX talk 
advocating for solar in Georgia.  
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The talk covered the potential and barriers to solar in the state of Georgia and steps to remove 
those barriers. One of those steps included calling the Public Service Commissioners or meet 
with them and request solar to be added to the IRP portfolio (Moore, 2013). These meetings 
were influential, media recordings were made of some of these events and it gave residents 
all over the state, who may not otherwise be involved in energy decision making, the chance 
to know and meet their elected commissioners and give their perspectives on energy to the 
Public Service Commissions: 
“So as a result of those town hall meetings, the commission led by Commissioner Bubba 
McDonald, proposed 525 new megawatts of solar, and that was, sort of, on the back of a 
proposal that Georgia Power had made, which was 210MW. So together, they will have 
about 800MW of solar online by 2016.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter Organiser, February 26, 
2014) 
These activities were also influential because there was more exposure from the media, 
newspapers, blogs, ensured by the diversity of the groups advocating. This was important 
because it put a spotlight on this debate for an otherwise routine process. 
 
d. Atlanta City Government and the Solar Debate 
There was also a city dimension to the solar debate. The research showed that many of the 
organisations involved in the solar and nuclear hearings, debates and campaigns, were state-
based and not connected to the city government of Atlanta. There was no evidence that key 
city interests were active in the pro-solar coalition: 
“So, the people that have been pushing the Solar piece live in Atlanta but aren’t connected 
to the city government at all.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013).  
One suggestion for why the city government of Atlanta did not get involved directly in the 
hearings process is that the Office of Sustainability within the city government of Atlanta was 
considering pursuing its own sustainability plan which included the incorporation of renewable 
energy. The Atlanta system had not been made formal, but suggestions were that it may be a 
grid-tied residential scale solar system or a municipal building only service, that was likely to 
involve Georgia Power, due to Georgia Power’s service territory: 
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“We will see what the city government does here shortly because as they, a key component 
of the new sustainability plan will likely include more renewables providing power in Atlanta, 
how they make that happen, that could be in partnership with Georgia Power walking in the 
same direction or could be tooth and nail clawing at each other.” (8Ai, Academic consultant, 
Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013) 
And 
“This residential bulk by program has not started yet. We are still trying to figure it out, but 
it has to be done by the end of the month, so that we can partner up with Georgia Power 
and if we can get Georgia Power on our side and partner up with their Advanced Solar 
initiative program, then we have a little but more oomph to make it happen.” (1C, Manager, 
Office of Sustainability, October 16, 2013).  
The comments above suggest, a jurisdictional issue with created a tension between Atlanta’s 
own plans for renewable energy and its ability to enact these plans under the current system. 
With the plan still in consideration it is unclear how this partnership was going to work, but the 
comments also show, a level of dependency by the City of Atlanta on Georgia Power to give 
this project the backing to come to fruition. Nevertheless, what was clear was that the City of 
Atlanta had its own plans for renewable energy, which may explain its non-involvement in the 
official solar debates. The next section will discuss mobilisation by groups that resisted solar 
throughout from 2011 to early 2014 during the Integrated Resource Planning process. 
 
8.6 OPPOSITION TO SOLAR GENERATION IN GEORGIA 
In Georgia, there is a long history of powerful groups with vested interests in opposing solar 
energy. The opposition group had at its core the extant power generating and distribution 
interests, plus the Chamber of Commerce, the Georgia Chapter of Americans for Prosperity 
and Georgia Tea Party Inc. As will be seen their argument came to rest on issues of cost and 
especially cost to ratepayers. No organisation both on the pro-solar side and the resisting solar 
side wanted a technology that would raise rates. The research showed little opposition to the 
ASI 210MW program from these groups. Instead, the utilities and other supporting 
organisations like the Chamber of Commerce argued and campaigned against not only 
extending utility-scale development for solar but also opening the grid to third party, 
distributed solar generation. This coalition was not anti-solar or anti-renewables per se, but 
were reacting to attempts to extend third party distributed energy to alternative energy 
providers and consumers. 
Page 270 of 311 
 
As stated in section 8.4, Georgia Power made the following arguments; it  would continue to 
carry out demonstration projects, to see how it could cost effectively incorporate solar energy 
into the system without compromising on system reliability and raising costs (Georgia Power 
Company 2013 IRP Filing, 2012); it would continue to seek optimal locations to expand its solar 
projects in order to improve its knowledge about environmental conditions like sunlight, 
temperature and humidity on its solar energy projects thereby gaining valuable knowledge in 
owning and operating solar PV projects (Georgia Power Company 2013 IRP Filing, 2012); and 
since its 2010 Integrated Resource Plan, it has continued to implement diverse and innovative 
new programs which have increased renewable energy capacity. The positions set out in the 
paragraph have been explored above. 
Groups like Chamber of Commerce and the utility companies were not anti-solar; they were 
more pragmatic in their approach. The Georgia Chamber of Commerce was very clear about 
supporting whatever technology would provide, reliable, affordable, supply: 
“Okay, as far as energy policy-, there is no question that it is focused on reliability of supply 
and affordability. Now, so irrespective of where that supply comes from, the chamber’s 
policy is we want to encourage investment by the various generators and transmission 
agencies to ensure that all of Georgia continues to have access to high quality, reliable, 
affordable energy. So, that’s what we have, we’ve been very fortunate to have that for a 
number of years, and we want to continue to have that, being the underlying theme to 
energy.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
 
These opposing organisations sought to make a distinction between solar and other sources of 
energy. The Chamber of Commerce, much like Georgia Power, argued that solar could not be 
compared to other energy sources because of its intermittency and use as peaking power. It 
could not replace baseload sources of energy: 
“But we’re also very concerned that, that becomes a tariff barrier so, you know, we’ve got 
to work through those issues so that you continue to stimulate investment in the new 
technologies, you don’t disadvantage reliability of supply that everybody determines, 
because solar power is, at the moment, a peaking power, it is not a base load power, so 
you’re always going to need a base load supply, and you’ve got to balance that out, you 
know, I’m not an expert on power, I did a visit to the distribution management centre, and 
the one thing I learnt there was for all of these competing supply sources, how they 
balanced the load, so that irrespective of where you are in the state, and what time in the 
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day, you have got the quality of power that you want, and that’s not an easy exercise, I 
mean, I didn’t even realise it was part of an exercise, but it’s an exercise that has to be 
managed.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, October 30, 2013) 
 
a. Activities of Resistant Groups 
In the build-up to the solar expansion (525MW) vote, scheduled for July 11th, 2013 at the Public 
Service Commission, the Georgia chapter of Americans for Prosperity a conservative non-profit 
organization founded in 2004 by David Koch, which advocates for conservative candidates at 
the local, state and federal government and economic freedom based on free markets 
(Americans for Prosperity, 2006), pressured the commissioners against the addition of more 
solar energy by sending  mass emails, holding a rally on the day of the vote and holding a press 
conference at the Public Service Commission (Americans for Prosperity, 2013a). The mass 
email was sent to its 50,000 members of the Georgia chapter. Earlier on July 1, 2013, Americans 
for Prosperity had sent out a mass email to its 50,000-membership base in Georgia, warning 
members that a potential vote for solar energy would change their electricity bills in the state.  
 
The main argument of the Americans for Prosperity email was that this vote would be a solar 
energy mandate in the state of Georgia and the mandate would raise their electricity bills by 
40% based on experience in other states with similar programmes (Americans for Prosperity, 
2013c; Jones, 2013): 
“According to the Institute for Energy Research, utility bills are 40% higher, on average, in 
states with a renewable energy standard than in states without one. It’s a hidden tax 
because it drives up the cost of living for every Georgia family! And states like California 
have reported widespread brownouts and blackouts from an electricity grid that struggles 
to keep up with the new government-imposed solar mandates.” (Americans For Prosperity 
Georgia, Virginia Galloway, July 1, 2013). 
In the same month, Americans for Prosperity of Georgia launched a grassroots initiative titled 
“Keep the lights on in Georgia” urging AFP Georgia activists to oppose the proposed vote by 
the Georgia Public Service Commission on 525MW of solar additions. The initiative comprised 
of internet videos and a website dedicated to sending emails to the GPSC from AFP Georgia 
activists.  
Page 272 of 311 
 
The number of activists emails was recorded at 3,118 (Americans for Prosperity, 2013d). In 
emails and articles some of the more prominent activists from Americans for Prosperity argued 
that Georgia was at the centre of fossil fuel hostility from the Obama administration and 
residents of the state had an opportunity to send a clear message to the Administration by 
urging the GPSC members to vote no on the solar expansion (Americans for Prosperity, 2013b).  
Finally, Americans for Prosperity Georgia activists announced they would hold a press 
conference at the Georgia State Capitol at 11am on the July 11th, 2013, ahead of the vote. The 
press conference was held and featured prominent Americans for Prosperity affiliates 
including some Georgia Tea Party members, the Heartland Institute, the Georgia Tea Party Inc. 
and Partnership for Affordable Clean Energy (Americans for Prosperity, 2013a). The Georgia 
Tea Party Inc., also pressured the PSC against voting for the solar energy (Rehm, 2013b). This 
group also repeated the same argument about electricity bills increasing by 40% from 
mandated solar. 
The result was that the commissioners received hundreds of emails and pushed back on those 
claims by writing editorials, conducting interviews with local newspapers (Galloway, 2013) and 
writing response emails to AFP-GA. Whilst not stating how he would vote, one commissioner 
made the point that the conditions given to vote for any solar bill was that it must not interfere 
with the existing Territorial Act, put upward pressure on rates and create a solar monopoly but 
more importantly the state of Georgia had reached a point where solar energy had become 
competitive (Rehm, 2013a).  
In addition, the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots also pushed back on the claims by writing a letter to 
their members and other Tea Party members, arguing that the information put out by AFP-Ga 
was false, that the information was outdated with solar prices having dropped since (Jones, 
2013): 
“I went to bat for solar, you know in my work nationwide and in the fight in Georgia, I am 
often fighting groups funded by Koch brothers and fossil fuels. So, Americans For Prosperity 
got involved, they put out information that was completely false and you know, completely 
false and I called them out on it. Now I said, ‘look, this is wrong, you’re putting out incorrect, 
false information.’” (15D, Tea Party activist, October 5, 2016). 
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8.7 THE GEORGIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONERS SOLAR VOTE 
This section will focus on three issues in the debate on solar addition. As stated earlier, on July 
11th,2013, the Georgia Public Service Commission voted 3-2 in favour of expanding the 
Advanced Solar Initiative (ASI) to include 525MW of further solar energy development. All five 
commissioners gave various reasons for their votes of approval or disapproval. The three 
approving commissioners’ reasons include, federal regulations, no upward pressure on rates 
and having a reliability electric supply (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2013b). One public 
service commissioner expressed his vote for solar based on probable stringent federal low 
carbon regulations coming through: 
“Adding 525 megawatts of solar to our 20-year energy plan is a hedge against more coal 
regulation and natural gas price volatility. When the President finishes his war on coal, he'll 
come after fracking, and gas prices will surely go up. We have to be ready.” (2Bi, Georgia 
Public Service commissioner, October 21, 2013) 
Another public service commissioner saw approving solar energy as a means to ensure more 
reliable electric service: 
“We are making decisions that affect millions of Georgians, ensuring that we have reliable 
electric service so we do not experience brownouts in extreme weather conditions and 
promoting economic growth and development” (Cmsr. Eaton, July 11, 2013). 
The economic growth perspective showed that solar manufacturers had been successful in 
making the case that, post-recession the state of Georgia had not fully recovered economically 
(Selig Centre for Economic Growth, 2013) and the growth of the solar industry locally would 
bring economic value to the state: 
“So, we found two out of five commissioners that really wanted to hear the story a lot more 
of why renewable energy. One of them was a Tea Party activist and republican who wanted 
to hear about free market enterprise, job growth and economic development.” (4Bii 9B, 
Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, February 20, 2014). 
 
A view that the Georgia Chamber of Commerce partially shared: 
“Yes, it could do, but it’s not a driver of why people are coming to Georgia, you know, there’s 
a whole conflict of reasons, you know, labour laws, access to, you know, Savannah port, 
which is terrific for export, competitive labour market, good transportation, good tax base, 
competitive energy water, so there’s a whole  mix of reasons why businesses are coming to 
Georgia or expanding within Georgia, you know, so yes green economy creates jobs, but 
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does it create more jobs than something else, it just depends on the field you’re in I suppose, 
but having said that, the solar industry has developed quite well here in Georgia, there are 
a number of international solar operations that have established their facilities here, there’s 
an facility producing jet fuel here that’s come all the way from Australia, actually, so, you 
know, there’s certainly green jobs being created here.” (9A, Chamber Energy Consultant, 
October 30, 2013)  
 
Finally, the commissioner who proposed the plan wanted to expand Georgia Power’s solar 
portfolio (Georgia Public Service Commission, 2013b). Conversely, the main opposing 
commissioner wrote a dissent accompanying the final IRP order. The dissent stressed that the 
commissioner was not opposed to solar energy but rather opposed to the solar IRP plan, for 
reasons which were as follows: The ASI was a joint voluntary plan by the PSC and GPC, where 
insufficient capacity was filled by solar but on the other hand, this plan was a ‘force-fed’ 
mandate devised without consideration to GPC’s excess capacity (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 2013a): 
“In contrast, this expansion of solar energy was not planned or proposed by Georgia Power 
Company in these dockets. Rather, it was conceived and advanced without regard to 
Georgia Power being long on power. While the ASI program was voluntarily brought before 
the Commission by Georgia Power, the solar program passed by the Commission in this 
docket results in a force-fed mandate. Though this solar program may not be characterized 
as a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) where the utility chooses the renewable among 
various forms of renewable generation, in my opinion what the Commission has approved 
is worse than an RPS. The Commission’s approved program is mandating a specific 
renewable and by doing so has predetermined the winner -- solar.” (Cmsr. Wise, Final Order 
IRP, 2013, p. 1). 
 
The PSC took the solar vote without a full understanding of the consequences to GPC and its 
ratepayers and GPC did not know the impact of the addition: 
“The vote on this solar program was taken without full knowledge regarding the price of 
solar energy or even the trend, if there is one, of the price. While Georgia Power may already 
have received bids within the ASI program, the Commission does not yet know what those 
bids are, or what impact they will have on the Company’s ratepayers.” (Cmsr. Wise, Final 
Order IRP, 2013, p. 1). 
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Given that, GPC already had excess reserve capacity, so the addition would be forcing GPC to 
purchase unnecessary capacity for an unknown possibly uneconomic price (Georgia Public 
Service Commission, 2013a). Although few amendments have been passed to ensure that the 
addition did not result in upward pressure on rates, the reliance on the ‘levelized cost of 
generation’ as a determination for adding capacity was insufficient: 
“Common sense tells us that when you shut down a cheap natural gas plant so the Company 
can write a check to a solar developer for premium priced power, rates will go up.  Even if 
the bids do come in within or below avoided cost, that should not be the only determining 
factor for whether this is good public policy.  As I tried to articulate at hearing, just because 
wiregrass, biomass and wind may all come under levelized costs, does that mean we should 
add another 500 megawatts of each? At what point, does it move from being a policy 
decision of the Commission to just plain bad policy?” (Cmsr. Wise, Final Order IRP, 2013, p. 
2). 
In a final quote, the dissenting commissioner stated: 
“Smart energy purchases are better left to the experts with the long view in mind, not the 
social engineers. But that is the result of this vote by the Commission, social engineering.  
Rather, the Commission has engaged a Washington-style, feel good energy policy, not based 
on economics or any rational public policy argument.” (Cmsr. Wise, Final Order IRP, 2013, 
p. 2). 
 
The reasons given by the commissioners who voted for the addition of solar highlights why the 
activities undertaken by Georgia’s Americans for Prosperity may not have worked. Essentially, 
the commissioners were positioning Georgia’s energy system in a way that it would gain from 
new growth opportunities or not be damaged by external circumstances such as federal 
regulations. So, whilst the solar order was technically a mandate, there were broader issues to 
consider which affected the utility, rate payers and the state of Georgia. The dissent however, 
highlights some of the possible impacts of investing in solar in an uncertain context, which 
potentially could lock-in the utilities and ratepayers into higher priced solar energy whilst 
installation prices are still reducing, thereby putting upward pressure on rates. The sensitivity 
to upward pressure on rates is especially important for protecting the consumer, but may also 
unnecessarily deter low carbon restructuring.  
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Granted, the commission may not want to increase rates, but the traditional regulated 
structure allows Georgia Power to recover its costs through rates, so that the company is not 
especially damaged by solar development should the costs overrun:  
“I mean this starts to get, I can give you the short version of this. Part of the issue is that 
Georgia Power could build as much Solar as they wanted because they are a state-
sanctioned monopoly, so they get to recover their stuff through rate cases. So, if they 
thought, solar was going to raise their prices by 10% they could raise that 10%, pass it 
through, recover it and be fine. The issue for them is really that they are owned by another 
company, they are owned by Southern company which owns a series of utilities in the south 
and Southern is also headquartered in Atlanta, but southern has got larger national interests 
that are and contracts that are as it’s been told to me anyway, not interested in seeing a 
transition away from fossil fuels and so southern dictates to Georgia Power what Georgia 
Power will be allowed to do in the Georgia Territory so long as it’s still complying with the 
state legal structures which slows down some of the transition itself.” (8Ai, Academic 
consultant, Georgia Tech, October 29, 2013).  
However, ways to balance consumer and company needs may be explored, if Georgia Power’s 
Parent company intends to transition away from fossil fuels, although it seems it may not.  
The solar debates also highlighted how in a short time, the state of Georgia had made 
significant changes to its electricity generation and supply profile, partly because this group of 
elected commissioners had been the most open to clean energy in years given what the 
renewable energy percentage has been in the state prior to this point and partly because these 
commissioners took a long view about Georgia’s electricity generation and supply policies. 
Explained by a solar manufacturer as:   
“Bubba McDonald, said that he wanted to try and get 50MW which back 4 years ago seemed 
astronomical for Georgia said could we challenge Georgia Power and the regulated utilities 
that they control or regulate, could we get them to add 50MW not even one-hundredth, 
you know, one-tenth of a percent of the generation but wouldn’t it be a way to show that 
everybody's thinking toward to future and can we do it without raising rates for the rate 
payer that was the key.” (4Bii 9B, Snr. Director International Sales & Market Development, 
February 20, 2014). 
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8.8 POST 800MW 
Immediately after the solar debates, multiple events occurred which allowed pro-solar and 
anti-solar advocates to continue to debate solar additions, specifically third party distributed 
solar options for consumers. Another solar bill (HB 657) was introduced by a state legislator, 
designed to remove Georgia Power’s monopoly by creating a rural committee solar program, 
where any residential, business and commercial entities could sign up voluntarily (O.C.G.A., 
2014a). The bill was introduced late in the legislative calendar, so was not put to a vote but got 
a hearing in the Georgia House Energy, Utilities and Telecommunications Committee where 
pro-solar advocates from the Sierra Club and a few public service commissioners commended 
the bill (Swartz, 2013b). In addition, when this bill was introduced, Georgia Power opposed the 
bill (Swartz, 2013b) but the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots’ coordinator notes that the EMCs and 
the municipal-owned utilities also opposed this bill, because distributed solar generation was 
a threat to the monopoly utilities in general.  
Since the focus of many pro-solar advocates had been on Georgia Power, as the sole investor-
owned utility, with the largest operating area (Figure 5-4) opposition to solar from publicly 
owned utilities had not been explored. Nevertheless, the Atlanta Tea Party coordinator noted 
that the EMCs were equally resistant to distributed solar generation and given the structure 
for electricity regulation in Georgia, there was little regulatory oversight to provide a check on 
the behaviour of the public utilities: 
“Well, I mean, is more egregious with the EMCs and the Co-ops, because of the fact, I mean, 
they have a board that governs them but it’s a kind of a board system and things like that, 
they are not regulated like Georgia Power is. So, you know, so it is, they can be more 
egregious with their attacks on competition and choice than Georgia Power. Georgia Power 
can’t go out and do a lot, because of the fact that, hey! they know they have the Public 
Service Commission looking over their heads. And so, these, EMCs and Co-ops and municipal 
utilities, they feel more emboldened to attack solar. So, I think, but because of the fact, that 
you have Georgia Power and some of these monopolies are actually bigger by far and have 
a greater service area and attract more people and that’s why a lot of attention is focused 
but I firmly believe that even though a lot of these EMCs are non-profit, I mean, they still, 
they hire employees, they can be paid big salaries, equipment and things like that, so these 
EMCs and Co-ops can be a bigger problem than the regulated investor owned utility” (15D, 
Tea Party activist, October 5, 2016). 
In other words, all the monopolies were against opening-up the grid to alternative providers. 
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Georgia Power initiated a rate case based on recovering some of the cost overruns associated 
with the new nuclear plants (Vogtle 3 and 4). This rate case caused pro-solar groups including 
the Green Tea coalition, GSEIA, Georgia Watch, to continue the push for distributed solar, 
whilst arguing against the nuclear development and rate increase. During the rate case, the 
Green Tea coalition continued to hold rallies for distributed solar and limits on GPCs profits on 
the cost overruns on the nuclear expansion. The Green Tea coalition’s advocacy continued 
despite the unusual ideologies involved, with all groups keeping a bigger perspective:     
“We often find common ground with one another. There are small issues where, based on 
the nature of the missions of our organisations we do diverge a little bit, but the vested 
interest in this state, the utility companies have so much political and capital power that it 
is not in our interests to concentrate on those little things. You know, we have to find where 
we find common ground together and work on those things. (6E 7G, Sierra Club, Georgia 
Chapter Organiser, February 26, 2014). 
 
In addition to the Green Tea coalition, larger loose coalitions of low carbon interests, seem to 
be forming in Georgia:  
“We have a loose-knit coalition of environmental groups, consumer advocates, some of the 
people involved in the Green-Tea Coalition, that have internally committed to getting us to 
20% energy efficiency and renewable energy by 2020.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter 
Organiser, February 26, 2014) 
And unofficial targets for low carbon are being set within these groups: 
“It’s nothing that we’ve ever been public about, but when we sit down together as coalition 
partners and think about what positions are we going to take on this piece of legislation, or 
this proposal by Georgia Power, we make that decision through the framework of, ‘Is it 
going to get us to 20% by 2020?’  So, Georgia Power’s proposed 250-, the thing that we are 
immediately working on, are HB874, this solar legislation and then Georgia Power’s 
proposed wind power purchase agreements.  They’ve proposed 250MW, we think that they 
should do about 1,000MW.” (6E 7G, Sierra Club Chapter Organiser, February 26, 2014) 
With regards to the decision makers, including the utilities, the process of adding 525MW of 
new solar generation to the Integrated Resource Plan, began and GPC starting taking requests 
for proposals by qualifying facilities including Southern Company’s subsidiaries.  
The process was opened to all bidders and the company used an independent monitor 
approved by the commission to manage the process.  
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Some public service commissioners, also left open the possibility for more solar additions at 
the next IRP and in the future: 
“So, we’ve got the solar majority going, you’ve got me on the end there, then Commissioner 
Everett, I won’t mention the next gentleman and then in the foreground there, 
Commissioner McDonald. So, in another three years, we’ll do another IRP and we’ll see what 
happens with solar there. This part is really important, with this 525MW, that we are about 
to contract for, that it be done well. We need quality workmanship, we don’t need stuff in 
the paper about problems and issues, it just needs to be done right. And we are probably 
not going to have enough time to even have problems, it’s in year 20 or year 25 and how 
we see these panels are performing that’s going to be, I think, important but of course 25 
years is a long time from now but we want to do it right.” (Commissioner Echols, Clean 
Energy Summit, Atlanta, October 17, 2013). 
 
Yet another bill was introduced in the Georgia House of Representatives designed to expand 
distributed solar energy (O.C.G.A., 2014b). The HB 874: Solar Power Free-Market Financing and 
Property Rights Act of 2014 seeks to open up the currently restricted access for individual and 
business property owners with regards to buying solar by allowing them to finance or contract 
with solar energy installers. The Georgia House Energy, Utilities & Telecommunications 
committee is made up of 20 elected officials from different districts. The Bill was sponsored by 
six individuals from the Georgia House of representatives. There were five Republicans and 
one Democrat (O.C.G.A., 2014b). It is said to have support from not only the solar industry in 
Georgia i.e. GSEIA but also the real estate community, the Georgia Property Rights Council and 
the Georgia Association of Realtors. The bill was introduced at the end of the field work; it is 
currently in the second reader stage at the time of writing. 
 
Finally, the persistency of the pro-distributed solar groups has shifted the focus of the 
argument in groups opposed to distributed solar, to one of cross-subsidies and the fair value 
of the grid. Georgia Power currently argues that opening the grid to distributed solar 
generators leaves customers who do not install distributed solar subsidising those who do, 
leaving the same total infrastructure costs to be shared by fewer customers.  
This was a concern expressed by the director of energy policy and planning of Georgia Power: 
“Well, I think the balance is ensuring and I mean you’re getting to the cracks of the 
discussions going on right now is not only in Georgia but throughout the country, is that we 
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want to ensure that customers who choose to install to solar, they are paying for the fair 
value of the grid services that they still require. so you know the generation what we call 
spinning reserves is ready to go when the sun doesn’t shine and we have to bring you know 
generation up to respond to the declining solar production to the transmission and 
distribution investments sort of necessarily to ensure you know that you know, that the 
customer can continue to have reliable service if they should something malfunction in their 
solar facility, you know the inverter goes out and now they are totally relying on the 
company’s grid.” (13A, director of resource policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
 
In addition, ensuring an appropriate tariff, for the distributed generation customers that is fair 
to both the utility and ratepayer: 
“So we’ll need to make sure that our experts design to ensure that customers continue to 
pay for the fair value that they get from the grid and at the same time the company needs 
to be, make sure that were paying because many of these customers have the ability to sell 
back to us and so we need you know to ensure our prices, what we willing to pay for their 
solar energy is fair to the customer too. So, I think is all about fairness in terms of the 
customers paying for the fair value of what they get from the grid and from network because 
when they don’t other customers have to step up and pick up that, that responsibility and 
that’s fair to customers who may not want to install solar or other type of distributed 
generation and likewise.” (13A, director of resource policy and planning, April 1, 2014) 
 
This remained the status of the conversation, going forward for distributed generation in 
Georgia. 
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8.9 SUMMARY: THE POLITICS OF THE ‘SOLAR PUSH' 
In Georgia, a loose coalition of interests was able to promote and debate a possible change in 
legislation in relation to the opening up of monopoly state energy systems to third party solar 
generation. The ‘solar push’ was stimulated primarily by solar businesses and then attracted 
other organisations into a loose coalition. The push drew on wider changes underway across 
the U.S. and dissatisfaction with aspects of existing provision and management. In Georgia, the 
noticeable cause was not carbon and climate change: these were rarely mentioned unless 
talking about federal regulations. Instead, arguments were made on different foundations: free 
market competition, individual freedom and property rights with no interest in pursuing 
renewable energy that had the potential to increase costs of energy. 
The pro-solar group included an intriguing range of interests, solar manufacturers, consumer 
advocates, environmentalists and Atlanta Tea Party Patriot members. Faced with this 
challenge, established interests representing existing powerful bodies or those concerned 
about the cost implications of solar, were able to mobilise in their own loose coalition. The 
anti-solar group had an intriguing collection of organisations, including the utilities, the Georgia 
Chamber of Commerce, political groups like Americans for Prosperity, Georgia Tea Party Inc. 
and members of state legislature. The prime argument was about offering ratepayers the 
choice to install distributed solar systems, to be able to sign power purchase agreements with 
alternative energy providers and sell electricity back to the wider grid. Georgia Power sought 
to head off the challenge by introducing its own initiative, the Advanced Solar Initiative, 
designed for Georgia Power to increase its solar capacity by signing power purchase 
agreements with solar energy generators.  
Both sides sought to influence the debate in various ways, including launching significant public 
engagement methods through letters, emails, press conferences and talks. This made some 
difference as the public service commissioners started to actively engage with these groups 
and consider these new arguments. Nevertheless, the real push for distributed solar was 
unsuccessful. Instead, a small accomplishment was made by adding 525MW of solar, bringing 
Georgia’s total solar to 800MW from 22MW. In the end, decision making remained strongly in 
favour of vested interests because decision makers were supporters of the current electricity 
system and utilities, which delivered low costs and were not convinced about the need or the 
value in opening up the system in a way that may compromise the low costs of energy. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this research was to examine the factors which shape decisions about 
electricity generation and supply in the state of Georgia, USA. More specifically, the research 
sought to examine how factors associated with ‘the new energy governance’ were impacting 
on decisions about the future of electricity generation and supply in a context of ongoing 
change and uncertainty in the regulatory, fiscal and political context for management and 
investment. To answer the research questions, this research focused on one state as its case 
study; the state of Georgia in the United States. As chapter 3 demonstrated, the institutional, 
infrastructural and political context for electricity generation and supply varies considerably 
across the USA.  
The state of Georgia can provide general insights into the wider national politics of energy 
governance but also allows for the exploration of the particularly regional and local 
circumstances that shape processes of low-carbon energy restructuring within that broader 
multi-level context. Georgia was selected because it has been under-researched but also 
because it is a context where electricity prices are low and low-carbon would not be expected 
to be a significant drive of change to the dominance of coal-fired power stations.  However 
initial research revealed evidence of pressures on the state electricity provider to reduce its 
dependence on fuel and also pressures to open up the energy system to decentralised energy 
supply. 
This is a contrast to many of the case studies of energy governance and sub-national low-
carbon governance in the USA that have tended to focus on places with proactive low carbon 
policy or more explicit crises in the mode of electricity generation and supply such as California. 
The research provided an opportunity to explore what low carbon energy restructuring might 
mean in a context where political support for low carbon was more equivocal.  
The research employed qualitative research approach, using 25 interviews with key decision 
makers and influential political, business, environmental, consumer groups.  
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9.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION  
First and foremost, the thesis makes a contribution by providing in-depth investigation of a 
context for energy transition/new energy governance that has not previously been researched. 
The issues covered included, the prevailing mode of governing energy generation and supply 
in Georgia, the key groups which were influential in energy decisions, their views, values and 
priorities in energy generation and supply. More issues covered included, the types of lock-ins 
found in Georgia’s energy system and the effects of lock-in on energy decisions. Finally, the 
events and discussions which were occurring at the time concerning decentralisation, nuclear 
energy development and carbon regulations and plans. 
Second, the in-depth research revealed aspects not previously brought out or covered in 
research on energy governance in the United States, notably the impact of the bottom up 
pressure for decentralised supply and, especially, the coalition of different and diverse 
interests that came together around that agenda. The research showed that, bottom up 
pressure to decentralise electricity generation and supply, from a range of interests including, 
citizens, firms, alternative energy providers and other political organisations, was an effective 
way of making changes to energy systems in conservative political settings. 
The decentralization coalition which included, solar manufacturers, consumer advocates, 
environmentalists and Atlanta Tea Party Patriot members, focused on decentralisation, using 
distributed solar generation. It shifted the conversation away from climate change, carbon 
emissions and environmentalism and towards consumer choice, property rights and free 
market competition. 
The involvement of political groups like the Atlanta Tea Party Patriots, strengthened the 
coalition, because they represented an important constituency in conservative politics, which 
could mobilise residents around a cause and provide a counter to other political groups. 
However, the failure of the coalition to change the policy of Georgia Power reflects the 
entrenched power of the energy company and the limited wider pressure from the public, 
municipal authorities or firms for a supportive decentralised system.  In turn that also reflects 
the absence of a sense of crisis in the existing mode of energy generation and the ability of 
Georgia Power to deliver low price electricity without interruption.  
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Other significant contributions from the research included: 
The extent to which decarbonisation is important for energy governance in the US, even in 
contexts where climate policy is weakly supported: the research showed that decarbonisation 
may be important to the extent that there are groups, especially large firms for whom, 
decarbonisation is strategic to long term goals. The research showed that a number of large 
firms including IKEA, Walmart and Coca-Cola, had developed distributed low carbon energy, 
for use in their firms, with the intent of more distributed energy. By 2012, almost 60% of the 
largest companies in the U.S. have set out renewable energy goals (Tawney et al., 2014). These 
are firms with estate that can be used for electricity generation, but also pressure on electricity 
generators for low carbon. 
Importance of understanding the importance of electricity pricing: The research showed that 
understanding electricity prices and how it influences policy are a key part of understanding 
energy investment decisions in the United States. In Georgia, investment decisions are 
designed to keep prices low. Regulators, were very conscious of any investments which would 
risk putting upward pressure on rates, or lock-in high prices. Since, Georgia’s energy system 
was keeping prices low, regulators and legislators, were not inclined to make any changes to 
existing policies on electricity generation and supply. 
In contrast, the state of California, provides an example whereby, high electricity prices and 
cost overruns were crucial to the decision to restructure (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 
2001). The expectation was that competition would give customers choice, prevent utilities 
from making risky investments and deliver cost reductions to consumers. Since California’s 
electricity prices have remained high, decision makers have created policies to encourage and 
support new market entrants to provide alternatives for consumers and competition for the 
utilities. Another outcome of California’s high electricity prices has been that residential solar 
is an attractive option for customers. and this is evident as the state has the largest residential 
solar market in the United States (GTM Research & Solar Energy Industries Association, 2014). 
These elements are absent in Georgia. However, both states show how important electricity 
prices are in influencing policy decisions. 
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The relative absence of an urban dimension to pressures for state-wide energy restructuring: 
there is a growing volume of research on urban energy restructuring which can put cities in 
conflict with prevailing systems of energy generation and distribution (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; 
Hodson & Marvin, 2009, 2010b; While, 2011). This reflects the growing importance for cities 
in controlling the urban energy metabolism as part of carbon policy and to secure energy 
supplies for economic development.  It is argued that there is a new imperative for cities to 
take control of urban energy policy underpinned by a logic of capturing and retaining the 
benefits of investment in decentralised energy generation.  
However, it was noticeable that pressure for energy decentralisation from Georgia’s cities such 
as Atlanta was fairly muted.  
This might be surprising given the economic development context in cities like Atlanta and the 
fact that Georgia's cities operated in a context where there was, lack of control over energy 
production. The city of Atlanta was considering a city renewable energy plan, but lacked 
governing capacities over existing energy infrastructure, which meant that the ability to enact 
these plans, were limited under the current system. In addition, the low costs of electricity, 
provided by the existing energy system meant there was no desire, urgency or political support 
for a distinctive urban energy strategy. 
In Georgia, pressures for low carbon have been rather moderate, compared with some of the 
pressures for low carbon restructuring in other states, for example, the North-east, states.  
In Northeast, pressures to address; lack of capacity from retiring coal and nuclear plants, 
excessive dependence on energy imports especially natural gas, high electricity prices and 
increasing citizen demand for renewable energy, have resulted in intense political pressure to 
undertake low carbon restructuring. Whilst the dominant mode of electricity generation and 
supply, remained during the research period, these pressures for decentralisation, potentially 
represent the start of the emergence of a new context for governing energy.  
The scope and implications of any new business model for electricity generation will likely 
depend upon on the degree to which various challenges to the control of Georgia Power are 
successful, but the search for a new business model in Georgia, will likely first involve, legal, 
regulatory, planning and operational changes which allow incumbent utilities and alternative 
energy providers to share the electricity infrastructure.  
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Nevertheless, for Georgia Power, a new business model might involve charging fees to 
distributed energy customers for the limited use of transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. It may involve Georgia Power, developing and selling distributed generation 
resources to consumers, alongside alternative providers. It may also involve, a reduced rate of 
return, due to competition from distributed energy providers, which has implications for 
investment. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF EVENTS POST RESEARCH  
The research was undertaken at a particular moment of time and could be seen as the opening 
stages of a broader politics of restructuring and transition around energy generation and 
supply. In February of 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency, extended the comment 
period for the proposed standards to limit carbon emissions from new power plants. In June 
2014, the Environmental Protection Agency also announced a proposed plan to limit CO2 
emissions from existing fossil power plants, which is formally known as the Clean Power Plan 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2015b). The proposed plan aims to reduce emissions by 
32% below 2005, by the year 2030 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015b). Each state has 
a calculated target for emissions reductions based on the existing baseline (The state of 
Georgia has between a 46% and 48% emission reduction target by 2030. In response, by the 
end of 2015 twenty-four states including Georgia had filed lawsuits against the EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan (Environmental Protection Agency, 2016).  
In January 2015, a final solar financing bill titled the “Solar Power Free-Market Financing Act” 
was introduced into the Georgia general assembly, by five Republican state legislators and one 
Democrat (O.C.G.A., 2015). The bill passed in May 2015. The law allows solar energy 
procurement agreements (SEPAs), which include solar Power Purchase Agreements, leases and 
other financing mechanisms available, as a means to fund solar energy installation for 
residents, businesses, schools and other institutions (O.C.G.A., 2015). The law does not negate 
the Territorial Act, because it does not permit third party retail sales of electricity with PPAs. 
The law places limits on the size of the installed solar systems. Overall, the law resolves some 
of the issues, regarding property rights and free market financing and it makes Georgia was 
the first state in the Southeast to allow third party financing of solar.  
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The Green Tea Coalition in collaboration with some local groups in Florida, are pushing for 
distributed solar and consumer choice in Florida and new conservative organisations like 
‘Conservatives for Energy Freedom’ have emerged (Dooley & Perfetti, 2015). In June 2015, 
Southern Company, announced that Georgia Power, would start selling rooftop solar systems 
to residential customers in Georgia, beginning in July 2015 (Polson & Chediak, 2015) and also 
announced a deal with Tesla Energy to provide, electric batteries to residents and homes. 
Southern Company also announced its plans to purchase, a natural gas distributor in August 
2015 (Polson, 2015). Finally, in August 2015, as a response to solar advocates, a docket was 
opened by the Public Service Commission to examine the value of renewable and distributed 
energy resources to the grid, in preparation for the 2016 IRP (Georgia Public Service 
Commission, 2015). This means that the low carbon story is still unfolding. 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY GOVERNANCE OUTSIDE OF THE U.S. 
As with any case study the Georgia example reflects a range of factors specific to its regional 
and national context.  For example, the state of Georgia like much of the Southeastern region 
relies on a highly centralized, low cost model of electricity generation and supply, provided by 
powerful investor-owned monopolies with a high dependence on coal. Like much of the region, 
Georgia has little environmental ethic and significant climate change skepticism amongst its 
decision makers. Nevertheless, like states across the country, Georgia is rapidly switching from 
coal to natural gas due to the low cost of natural gas. Finally, Georgia also reflects the national 
context, whereby the 30% renewable energy investment tax credit, has reduced the upfront 
costs of renewable energy, providing opportunities for a decentralization challenge. 
As outlined earlier in the thesis, Georgia might reflect and provide insights into the wider U.S. 
context in a number of ways such as the importance of decarbonisation in the absence of 
climate change policy, pressure for utility-scale development of renewable energy and 
pressure for decentralization from residents, businesses and large firms. However, there is 
wide variation in the context for electricity generation and supply and Georgia might be said 
to contrast with some states in the U.S., like California where pressure for low carbon 
restructuring is significant due to high electricity prices and in the Northeastern states, where 
there is a lack of generation capacity and high electricity prices. Looking beyond the U.S. there 
are potentially parallels as well as differences to be drawn to what is happening in other 
countries, for example Germany and the UK.  
Page 288 of 311 
 
For example, on the surface it might appear that that the context in Georgia is very different 
from Germany or the UK. In Germany and the UK, decision makers and utilities are under 
pressure to decarbonize due to EU and national emission reductions, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy targets. Germany’s Renewables Energy Act and the Federal Energy Concept 
have goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, increase the share of 
renewables to 60% by 2050 and phase out nuclear energy by 2022. The UK’s target is to reduce 
emissions by 80% by 2050. These stringent requirements are in contrast with the United States, 
where the clean power plan has stalled. 
Additionally, Germany and the UK have liberalized energy markets, whereby alternative energy 
providers can enter the market and consumers have retail choice, allowing them to switch 
providers. Therefore, some of the sources of lock-in/lock-out found in Georgia, including the 
legal constraints, regulatory framework and the ownership of transmission and distribution 
infrastructure are not apparent. Finally, Germany and the UK, have stronger attitudes to the 
environment amongst decision makers and residents, therefore some of the cultural resistance 
to environmental causes are not apparent. However, looking beyond issues of climate change 
policy, infrastructure and cultural lock-out, Georgia tells a story that has some connections in 
terms of low carbon restructuring, especially the costs of low carbon restructuring in the 
current centralized model of electricity generation and supply. 
The utilities invest in the lowest cost energy resources, which used to be coal but now is natural 
gas, hence the switching. The upfront costs of renewable energy, whilst continuously reducing 
like those of solar energy are still high and require subsidies. In the same way that nuclear 
energy needs subsidies due to its high capital costs but very low operating costs. For renewable 
energy, despite the 30% ITC, Georgia’s utilities are hesitant to develop utility scale renewable 
energy due to its high costs and effects on rates, preferring instead to buy renewables from 
other generators. Ultimately, the subsidies have been more successful for distributed 
generation companies, reducing the upfront cost of developing solar energy, but still struggling 
to be competitive against Georgia’s low cost of electricity. 
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Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende), also highlights these costs of renewable energy, 
requiring significant subsidies to help meet its greenhouse gas emissions targets and 
renewable energy targets. Whilst these have allowed rapid development of renewable energy, 
residents have experienced increased electricity bills in the form of the renewable energy 
surcharge on their bills. Finally, the UK to meet its targets or rapid renewable energy 
developments, also introduced multiple subsidies to reduce the costs of renewable energy and 
incentivize investment, including the Renewables Obligation and the Feed-in Tariff. However, 
consumers have also experienced increases in their electricity bills as costs are passed through 
to consumers. Across these countries and in Georgia, the upfront costs of incorporating 
renewable energy mean that utilities hesitate to invest in renewable energy without significant 
subsidies. 
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